This paper studies the role of morality in the decision to repay debts. Using a field experiment with a large Islamic bank in Indonesia, the paper finds that moral appeals strongly increase credit card repayments. In this setting, all of the banks late-paying credit card customers receive a basic reminder to repay their debt one day after they miss the payment due date. In addition, two days before the end of a ten-day grace period, clients in a treatment group also receive a text message that cites an Islamic religious text and states that "non-repayment of debts by someone who is able to repay is an injustice." This message increases the share of customers meeting their minimum payments by nearly 20 percent. By contrast, sending either a simple reminder or an Islamic quote that is unrelated to debt repayment has no effect on the share of customers making the minimum payment. Clients also respond more strongly to this moral appeal than to substantial financial incentives: receiving the religious message increases repayments by more than offering a cash rebate equivalent to 50 percent of the minimum repayment. Finally, the paper finds that removing religious aspects from the quote does not change its effectiveness, suggesting that the moral appeal of the message does not necessarily rely on its religious connotation.
The World Bank supported the community nutrition project (CNP) in the Lao People's Democratic Republic (PDR) from 2009 to 2013, ostensibly to respond to the global food crisis of 2007-08. The evaluation finds an attributable effect on only one of the six formal project indicators: children in intervention areas were more likely to receive full diphtheria, pertussis, and tetanus (DPT) vaccines. This impact evaluation seeks to address whether the CNP can make causal claims to improving indicators related to its six stated project development objective measurements for mothers and children under two years old: antenatal care visits, institutional delivery, well-child checkups, breastfeeding, immunization, and diarrhea oral rehydration solutions. The results of quasi-experimental impact evaluation methods indicate that although general effects for these outcomes are mixed, the project shows improvements for the poorest 40 percent of the population.
The right to access and request information is enshrined in article 19 of the universal declaration of human rights. Access to information (ATI) plays an essential role for promoting accountability and citizens ability to monitor the actions of the government, and it contributes to participatory development. The goal of this report is to provide an overview of the situation of access to information in the Middle East and North Africa (MNA) region, in particular the cases of Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, and Tunisia. This report looks at previous and current efforts for promoting ATI in the region in order to facilitate knowledge exchange among ATI practitioners across those countries and to help them identify areas for collaboration in the region. For each country, this report will first examine the legal and or institutional framework, including a range of factors such as constitutional provisions, restrictive legislation, relevant regional and international conventions, and key administrative bodies. Government initiatives affecting the right of ATI are then considered in detail for each country. This report examines the practice of ATI for each of these four countries, including the use and implementation of ATI legislation or other applicable transparency provisions. Finally, a summary of recent developments of the ATI coalitions and campaigns in these countries is provided.
This paper examines whether labor productivity converged across Peru's regions ("departments") during 2002-12. Given the large differences in labor productivity across the regions of Peru, such convergence has the potential to raise aggregate productivity and incomes, and also reduce regional inequalities. The paper finds that labor productivity in the secondary sector (especially manufacturing) and the mining sector has converged across Peruvian departments. The paper does not find robust evidence for labor productivity convergence in agriculture and services. These patterns are consistent with recent cross-country evidence and with the hypothesis that productivity convergence is more likely in sectors with greater scope for market integration, because of the effects of competition and knowledge flows. The convergence in labor productivity within manufacturing and mining has been sufficient to lead to convergence in aggregate labor productivity across departments. But because services and agriculture continue to employ the majority of workers in Peru, aggregate convergence is slower than that within manufacturing. The paper also finds that poverty rates are not converging across departments. The limited impact of labor productivity convergence on poverty could be tied to the facts that not all sectors are experiencing productivity convergence, poorer people are employed in sectors where convergence has been slower (such as agriculture), and there is very little labor reallocation toward converging sectors (such as manufacturing).
At the request of the government of Kenya and under its guidance, a team of national and international experts conducted an appraisal of different agricultural insurance options for Kenya.This appraisal, as set out in this document and the accompanying technical analysis, lays out the costs and benefits of developing large-scale agricultural insurance that involves both the public and private spheres.The analysis considers potential structures for large-scale agricultural insurance in Kenya, the fiscal cost to the government of Kenya, and the economic benefits for farmers and pastoralists. In order for it to partner with the private sector to prepare and implement a large scale agricultural insurance program, the government should consider taking the following next steps.The government of Kenya may build on there commendations by the Program Steering Committee to take the lead in formulating a national policy on agriculture insurance, in cooperation with county administrations and private insurance companies. The government of Kenya may develop a road map for establishing the institutions required for large-scale agricultural insurance programs, with the goal of covering at least a fifth of Kenya's agricultural producers. As next steps for establishing livestock insurance, the government of Kenya may decide how to integrate the proposed insurance product with other existing protection mechanisms. As next steps for crop insurance, the government of Kenya may seek consultations with agricultural banks and work with private sector insurers to develop a data audit system acceptable to international reinsurers.
Data obtained from ISSR amplification may readily be extracted but only allows us to know, for each gene, if a specific allele is present or not. From this partial information we provide a probabilistic method to reconstruct the pedigree corresponding to some families of diploid cultivars. This method consists in determining for each individual what is the most likely couple of parent pair amongst all older individuals, according to some probability measure. The construction of this measure bears on the fact that the probability to observe the specific alleles in the child, given the status of the parents does not depend on the generation and is the same for each gene. This assumption is then justified from a convergence result of gene frequencies which is proved here. Our reconstruction method is applied to a family of 85 living accessions representing the common broom Cytisus scoparius.
Doing Business in Italy 2013 is a new subnational report of the Doing Business series. It measures business regulations and their enforcement across 4 indicators in 13 Italian cities: Bari (Apulia), Bologna (Emilia-Romagna), Cagliari (Sardinia), Campobasso (Molise), Catanzaro (Calabria), L'Aquila (Abruzzo), Milan (Lombardy), Naples (Campania), Padua (Veneto), Palermo (Sicily), Potenza (Basilicata), Rome (Latium), and Turin (Piedmont) and the indicator trading across borders in 7 ports: Cagliari (Sardinia), Catania (Sicily), Genoa (Liguria), Gioia Tauro (Calabria), Naples (Campania), Taranto (Apulia), Trieste (Friuli-Venezia Giulia). The cities were selected by the Department for Planning and Coordination of Economic Policy (DIPE) of the Presidency of the Council of Ministers of the Italian Republic. The cities can be compared against each other, and with 185 economies worldwide. Doing Business investigates the regulations that enhance business activity and those that constrain it. Regulations affecting 5 stages of the life of a business are measured at the subnational level in Italy: starting a business, dealing with construction permits, registering property, trading across borders and enforcing contracts. These indicators were selected because they cover areas of local jurisdiction or practice. The indicators are used to analyze economic outcomes and identify what reforms have worked, where and why. The data in Doing Business in Italy 2013 are current as of June 1st, 2012.
This report documents the progress of Lithuania in science, technology and innovation (STI) in areas singled out by three major international reports prepared by the Norwegian Research Council (1996), the World Bank (2003) and the CREST-OMC panel (2007). The task was to summarize recommendations of these studies, report on the progress achieved to date and point to priorities for the future. From a low point in the mid-1990s the Lithuanian STI system has gradually strengthened. Funding for R&D has increased and Lithuanian research groups have stepped up their performance in terms of publication output and relevance. It is the opinion of the reviewers that marked progress is evident and visible with respect to the goals of the three reports. This development has indeed been very positive and shows the strong commitment for a continuous improvement of the basic framework conditions for R&D in Lithuania. Nonetheless challenges remain. In order to further the development of STI-policies in Lithuania the report offers new recommendations in four areas: oversight and governance, science base, R&D linkages, and increasing innovative capacity.
In: Library of Selected Cases from the Chinese Court
Chapter 1: Lianqi Development Co., Ltd. v. Shanghai Baoye Group Corp., Ltd., Sakai SIO International(Guangzhou)Co., Ltd. et al. (Appeal against Jurisdictional Objection in Dispute over Infringement of Patent for Invention): The Principle of "Two Conveniences" and the Mechanism of Leapfrog Appeal shall be Fully Considered when Confirming the Jurisdiction of Non-infringement and Infringement of Patent -- Chapter 2: Shanxi Coal International Energy Group Jincheng Co., Ltd. v. China CITIC Bank Co., Ltd. Xi'an Branch, Shaanxi Petroleum & Chemical Corporation Co., Ltd. (Dispute over Contract): In a Confirming Warehouse Transaction Without Real Trade Background, the Real Legal Relationship Among the Buyer, Seller, and the Bank Shall be Found to be the Relationship of Loan and Guaranty Contract -- Chapter 3: Xinjiang Longmei Energy Co. Ltd. v. Zheng X (Dispute over Equity Transfer Contract): Changed Circumstances Shall not Be Claimed to Rescind the Contract Concluded When a Party Clearly Knowing the Risk -- Chapter 4: Ping An Bank Co., Ltd. Beijing Branch, and Beijing Gold Exchange Co., Ltd. et al v. Hainan Jinfenghuang Hotspring Resort Co., Ltd., Beijing Xinyupeng Mechanical & Electrical Engineering Co., Ltd. et al (Dispute over Loan Contract): The Effect of Issuing a Blank Guaranty Contract Stamped with the Official Seal, and the Issue That a Guaranty Provider May Be Exempted Within the Scope of the Pledge Waived by Its Pledgee -- Chapter 5: China Nonferrous Metal Industry's Construction Co., Ltd. v. Hengfeng Bank Co., Ltd. Ningbo Branch and defendants in the first instance, Ningbo Zhong Ren Hong Electronics Co., Ltd. and Ningbo Gang Di Trade Co., Ltd. et al. (Disputes over the Issuing of Letter of Credit and the Right of Recourse) : Instruments Debtors Shall not Protest Against the Pledgee on the Ground of Protesting Against the Pledgor -- Chapter 6: Xinjiang Hua Cheng An Ju Real Estate Development Co., Ltd. v. China Railway Construction Bridge Engineering Bureau Group Co., Ltd. (Dispute over Contract for the Undertaking of Construction Projects): on Application of Good Faith Principle in Finding the Validity of Contract -- Chapter 7: LC Securities Co., Ltd. and Eastern Gold Jade Co., Ltd. v. Yunnan Xinglong Industry Co., Ltd. and Zhao X et al. (Dispute over a Suretyship Contract): The Scope of Security Liability Assumed by the Security Provider Shall be Limited to the Scope of the Principal Obligation -- Chapter 8: Bank of DaLian Co., Ltd. v. Dalian Branch of China Railway Modern Logistics Technology Co., Ltd. and Jinzhou Zuoyuan Sugar Foods Co., Ltd. et al. (Dispute over a Loan Contract): Pledge in Movable Property May not be Created by Possession Reformulation -- Chapter 9: Sichuan Zhongding Construction Engineering Co., Ltd. v. Zhu X and Natural Resources Bureau of Wulan County (Dispute over Contract for the Undertaking of Construction Projects): In a De Facto Juristic Relation, the Actual Builder May Claim Project Payments Directly with the Party Offering the Contract -- Chapter 10: Fujian Tinghu Real Estate Group Co., Ltd. v. Natural Resources Bureau of Xianyou County (Dispute over a Contract for Transfer of State-owned Construction Land Use Right): In Case of Breach of Contract due to Objective Reasons, the Liquidated Damages Clause Shall be Applied Primarily to Cover the Loss -- Chapter 11: Wang X V. Bazhou Sairui Machinery & Equipment Installation Co., Cao X(A) (Dispute over Change of Registration): The Claim of the Resigned Legal Representative for the Registration of the Change of the Legal Representative of Company Shall, Absent Other Remedies, Be Accepted by the Court -- Chapter 12: Peng X V. Chengdu Rural Commercial Bank Co., Ltd. Cuqiao Subbranch, Chen X, et al. (Dispute over Suretyship agreement): Impact on the Liability of Other Guarantors Involved of Creditor's Waiver in Mixed Security of Security in Rem as Provided by Debtor -- Chapter 13: Hubei YAS Commercial Chain Co., Ltd. V. Danyang Yongsheng Motor Transport Co., Ltd. (Dispute over Tort Liability): Criteria for the Determination of Erroneous Application for Property Preservation -- Chapter 14: Jiang X, Chen X, el al. V. Lin X, Weng X(A)., et al. (Dispute over Objection to the Enforcement of Judgment): Determination on the Time When the Seizure Ruling and the Notice of Assistance in Execution Take Effect -- Chapter 15: Huang X V. Xiamen Shuangrun Investment Management Co., Fenghe (China) Co. (the third party in the first instance), Hui'an County Rural Credit Cooperative (Dispute over the Objection by an Outsider to the Enforcement): The Requirements for the Valid Objection to the Execution by the Transferee of Equity -- Chapter 16: Guilin Zhangtai Industry Group Co., Ltd., Guangxi Lichengdong Investment Co., Ltd. et al (Enforcement Reconsideration of Dispute over Recovery of Financial Distressed Debt): Identification of Interest in Cases of Enforcement against Dispute over Recovery of Financial Distressed Debt -- Chapter 17: Zhou X v. Xiamen Baixiang Shouli E-Business Co., Ltd. (Dispute over Online Shopping Contract): Determination of the Basis for the Adjustment of Agreed Punitive Liquidated Damages. - Chapter 18: Yunnan Copper Co., Ltd. v. Kunming Wanbao Jiyuan Biotechnology Co., Ltd., Yunnan Zhongheng Innovation Investment Co., Ltd. etc (Dispute over Sale Contract): Identification of the Nature and Validity of Closed-loop Sale Contracts -- Chapter 19: Zhongkong Guorong New Energy Development Co., Ltd. v. Fuzhou Dade Industry Co., Ltd. (Dispute over Sale Contract): Determination and Application of Deposit-related Penalty Rules for Partial Performance of Contracts -- Chapter 20: Zhongrong Hengsheng Wood Industry Co., Ltd.(Beijing)v. Crosplus (Shanghai) Co., Ltd. and Nanjing Mengyang Furniture Sales Center (Dispute over Copyright Infringement): Elements for Copyright Protection of Works of Applied Art -- Chapter 21: JDB (China) Co., Ltd. v. Guangzhou Wanglaoji Health Industry Co., Ltd. (Dispute over False Advertising): Identification of False Advertising -- Chapter 22: Shandong Bittel Intelligent Technology Co., Ltd (Bittel) v. Jiangsu Zhongxun Digital Electronics Co., Ltd. (Dispute over Tortious Liability for Damages Arising from Malicious Prosecution in Intellectual Property Litigation): Standard for Assessing the Subjective Fault in Disputes over Damages Arising from Malicious Prosecution in Intellectual Property Litigation -- Chapter 23: Lacoste Company Limited v. Cartelo Pty Ltd. and Trademark Review and Adjudication Board of State Administration for Industry and Commerce of the People's Republic of China (Administrative Dispute over Trademark Disputes): Impact of Offshore Co-existence Agreements on Determining the Trademark Similarity -- Chapter 24: Xiamen Meetyou Co., Ltd. v. Beijing Kangzhilesi Network Technology Co., Ltd. and China National Intellectual Property Administration (Administrative Dispute over Request for Declaration of Trademark Invalidity): Whether the Trademark at Issue is the Sign "Not to be Used as Trademark" Falls within the Jurisdiction of People's Court to Review the Administrative Act or Conduct in Affirming and Authorizing the Trademark -- Chapter 25: Xiao X v. Seno LED Co., Ltd. (Dispute over Infringement of Patent for Invention): The Role of Interpretations of the Recorded Technical Effect upon the Patent Claims and Impact on the Principle of Equivalence -- Chapter 26: Medacor (Tianjin) Technology Co., Ltd. v. Sunshine (Tianjin) Group Co., Ltd., and Defendants in the First Instance, Wang A, Zhang A, et al. (Dispute over Infringement of Trade Secrets): How to Determine whether the Customer List Constitutes the Trade Secrets -- Chapter 27: Ningbo Beworth Textile Machinery Co., Ltd. v. Ningbo Cixing Company Limited (Dispute over License Contract for Technological Secrets): Handling of Cases involved both Criminal and Civil Proceedings related to Trade Secrets -- Chapter 28: VMI Holland B.V. and Cooper (Kunshan) Tire Co., Ltd. v. Safe-run Co., Ltd. (Dispute over Confirmation of Patent Non-infringement): Prerequisites for Confirming Patent Non-infringement -- Chapter 29: Alfa Laval Corporate A B v. China National Intellectual Property Administration and SWEP International A B (the Third Party in the First Instance) (Administrative Dispute over Invalid Patent for Invention): Determination of Modification of Patent Claims beyond Scope in Invalidity Declaration Proceedings -- Chapter 30: Shimano v. Sensah Smart Sports Equipment Co., Ltd. (Dispute over Infringement of Patent for Invention): Determination of Protection Scope of Functional Features -- Chapter 31: Shenzhen Jiedian Technology Co., Ltd. v. Shenzhen Laidian Technology Co., Ltd. and Anker Innovations Technology Co., Ltd. (Dispute over Infringement of Patent for Utility Models): Classification and Identification Standards of Technical Features in Patent Claims -- Chapter 32: Wartsila Finland Oy and Spliethoff's Bevrachtingskantoor B.V. v. Rongcheng Xixiakou Shipbuilding Co., Ltd. and Yingqin Engine (Shanghai) Co., Ltd. (Tort dispute over the sale and purchase of marine equipment): Mere interest in the performance of a contract does not in principle fall within the scope of application of the law of tort liability -- Chapter 33: Shanghai Salvage Company under the Ministry of Transport v. Provence Shipowner 2008-1 Ltd, CMA CGM SA, et. al (Dispute over salvage at sea and ship pollution damage liabilities): How to distinguish the costs of preventive measures and the costs of salvage measures, determine the subject avoiding liability in ship collision and oil spill pollution incidents, and identify restricted and unrestricted maritime compensation claims -- Chapter 34: Bank of China Limited, Henan Branch v. UBAF (Hong Kong) Ltd. (Dispute over independent guarantee): How to determine independent guarantee fraud by a prima facie complying demand due to abuse of claim for payment -- Chapter 35: Evergreen Marine (Singapore) Pte. Ltd. v. .
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Today, Afghanistan is a nightmarish place for many Afghans, marked by a lack of rights and opportunities. It's crucial to recognize this reality. However, it's also important to acknowledge that numerous predictions from Washington did not materialize as expected. For all the admonishments of the Biden administration, Afghanistan has not become a gift for China or Russia, or a hotbed of transnational terrorism.President Biden faced relentless criticism for the withdrawal, decried as squandering "20 years of blood and sacrifice" by Republican Senator Jim Risch and branded "fatally flawed" by Democratic Senator Bob Menendez. Former Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta, who oversaw the end of the U.S. surge in Afghanistan during President Obama's tenure, likened the evacuation to the infamous Bay of Pigs fiasco, even before the tragic loss of 13 U.S. service members and at least 170 Afghans in an ISIS attack. Meanwhile, former Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, who less than one year earlier had proudly stood for a photo op with the Taliban's chief negotiator, after agreeing to withdraw U.S. troops, told Fox News that the "Biden administration has just failed in its execution of its own plan." In April, the Wall Street Journal's Editorial Board partly attributed Russia's invasion of Ukraine to "U.S. surrender in Afghanistan" and during a Congressional hearing in July, Congressman Michael McCaul labeled the withdrawal "a mistake of epic proportions." Failure is, indeed, an orphan.One of the most frequently cited reasons for why the U.S. military had to remain in Afghanistan was rooted in counterterrorism efforts. Indeed, fighting terrorism was the reason for the authorization for the use of military force that allowed U.S. troops to be deployed to Afghanistan in the first place. President Biden drew criticism from certain pundits when he asserted on August 16, 2021, that "Our only vital national interest in Afghanistan remains today what it has always been: preventing a terrorist attack on [sic] American homeland." He emphasized that the original mission was, in fact, a response to a terrorist attack and had a primary focus on counterterrorism. Some pundits might find this fact inconvenient, especially those who have come to believe that our presence in Afghanistan was primarily about nation-building, rather than acknowledging that nation-building itself was an ill-conceived strategy within the context of the War on Terror. In the lead-up to the withdrawal, the notion of over-the-horizon counterterrorism capabilities was often ridiculed as ineffective. During the fall of 2021, the Pentagon assessed that the Islamic State-Khorasan Province (ISKP), an ISIS offshoot in Afghanistan, could potentially launch an attack on the U.S. within as little as 6 months. Yet, nearly two years later, no ISKP attack originating from Afghanistan has targeted U.S. soil. Furthermore, senior analysts at the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) recently evaluated that the group relies on "inexperienced operatives in Europe" to carry out attacks abroad. In other words, the next generation of 9/11 hijackers is not being trained in Afghanistan. The Biden administration showcased its ability to secure significant over-the-horizon victories against terrorists, such as when a U.S. drone killed al-Qaeda chief Ayman al-Zawahiri in a Kabul apartment on July 31, 2022. As of last March, Nicholas Rasmussen, the Department of Homeland Security's counterterrorism coordinator, viewed the likelihood of a 9/11-style attack as "almost inconceivable." The world of today is different than on the morning of September 11, 2001. Back then, Afghans had extremely limited communication with the outside world. In contrast, today, over 60 percent of adults own a cell phone, with more than 80 percent having access to one. This trend holds true for other once-isolated parts of the world as well. This connectivity will pose challenges to the Taliban's ability to enforce their draconian restrictions over the long-run. It has also changed the way terrorists operate. In the realm of terrorism, the world is indeed flat. Extremist ideologies can be disseminated, and terrorists can recruit overseas operatives to inflict harm. But this may not be such a big win for terrorist groups like ISKP. While their capacity for recruitment is more substantial than in the past, their ability to train and direct quality recruits without interference is actually diminished. Meanwhile, the capacity of potential target nations to intercept such plots is stronger than ever before. Instead of participating in a global campaign of terrorist whack-a-mole, it is our domestic defenses that are best positioned to protect the homeland. This isn't meant to downplay the potential of ungoverned spaces to serve as breeding grounds for adept and motivated terrorists. However, concerning the case of Afghanistan, NCTC analysts concluded that the Taliban's activities have "prevented the branch [ISKP] from seizing territory that it could use to draw in and train foreign recruits for more sophisticated attacks."While it's true that terrorism can be managed and nation-building wasn't the purpose of going to war, it was still shocking for many Americans to witness the swift collapse of a government that so many U.S. lives, tax dollars, and lives of our Afghan partners had contributed to building. One reason for the astonishment shared by lawmakers, media, and the American public over the evacuation debacle, the vanishing of Afghan security forces, and the hasty departure of the Ghani administration, stems from a steady flow of falsehoods regarding the war. Rather than a deliberate effort of intentional deceit, it was more of a collective exercise in self-deception, omission, and hopeful exaggeration. As the U.S. war in Afghanistan trudged onward, a carefully curated liturgy of talking points was repeated in Washington. Our leaders were well aware that Afghanistan was an archipelago of cut-off cities and forward operating bases, while the Taliban dominated the countryside, roads, and the night. It was no secret that Ashraf Ghani was surrounded by a circle of sycophantic advisors. The economy was sustained by a continuous flow of aid and war-related industries. Yet, speaking candidly about this was rare until after the Afghan government collapsed.A cognitive dissonance made it acceptable for U.S. lawmakers, foreign elites, military-aged men who had fled their conflict-ridden countries, and even human rights organizations to not only call for the perpetual deployment of American soldiers but to claim we owed such a commitment. Of course, the U.S. military was more than enthusiastic to oblige. And for soldiers, there is an unrelenting desire and pressure to deploy. I too volunteered to deploy. However, the enthusiasm of young warfighters shouldn't grant a blank check for putting them in harm's way.Since the U.S. withdrawal, unsettling truths emerged. Although tens of thousands of Afghan soldiers made the ultimate sacrifice, when push came to shove — even before the Americans' departure — Afghan forces fell to the Taliban. Their supplies ran out and corrupt leaders in Kabul left them to die or surrender. The strongman warlords, elevated by Washington and summoned by Ashraf Ghani to save the republic, fled to neighboring countries. Over the years, the Taliban were dismissed as a proxy of Pakistan, disconnected from Afghan society, yet, it was the Afghan government, created through an international conference in Bonn, Germany, and supported with billions of U.S. aid, that failed to inspire Afghans to fight for its survival at a crucial moment. Many observers, myself included, were confident that Afghans would fiercely resist the Taliban and the country would rapidly descend into civil war. The country has instead fallen into a haunting silence.One prediction that has come true is the dire situation for women under the Taliban's rule that can only be described as gender apartheid. They have progressively restricted girls'and women's right to education, closed gathering places and livelihoods like beauty parlors, and even banned women from a national park. Their actions seem more driven by an obsession with control of every aspect of women's lives than religious doctrine. Additionally, the Taliban have stifled dissent and used torture against rivals. We must confront these harsh realities and take meaningful actions, but we must also avoid making promises we cannot fulfill, both for the sake of Afghans and our own credibility.Today, Afghanistan is not at war for the first time in twenty years, with violent deaths decreasing from well over 20,000 per year in the years leading up to the U.S. withdrawal to under 2,000 last year. The country hasn't turned into a narco-state. The Taliban also haven't abandoned their extremist beliefs, disavowed al-Qaeda, or restrained the Pakistani Taliban. However, their current focus seems to be inward on Afghanistan. The Afghan economy is struggling, partly due to Taliban mismanagement, though it doesn't appear to be much worse than the previous government at management, and their corruption seems to be less. Their cruelty, however, seems unfailing.It's worth reflecting on why so many of our predictions were inaccurate. The U.S. facilitated Afghanistan's development, but it also prolonged the war. Now, Taliban rule and the isolation it creates has plunged Afghans into deeper poverty and created a nightmare for women, a bargain from hell, created by Washington and its partners in Kabul, but that ultimately can only be resolved by Afghans themselves.
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Last Wednesday, July 12, an updated version of the Lummis‐Gillibrand Responsible Financial Innovation Act (RFIA) became public. The updated RFIA, like its predecessor, looks to tackle crypto regulation comprehensively, covering in its 274 pages major topics including market structure, crypto exchanges, stablecoins, illicit finance, and taxation. The proposal confronts the reality of longstanding legal uncertainty for American crypto market participants. Last week's highly anticipated order in the case of Securities and Exchange Commission v. Ripple Labs, Inc., along with both the RFIA in the Senate and ongoing efforts in the House, all demonstrate that there's still significant work to be done before the United States can credibly claim regulatory clarity for crypto. The RFIA takes important steps toward providing more legal certainty to U.S. market participants, but on some of crypto policy's most nettlesome questions there remains room for improvement. We offer our initial thoughts on the RFIA's market structure, crypto exchange, and stablecoin components below. (Our colleague Nicholas Anthony will cover the illicit finance and taxation portions in additional posts.) Market Structure One of the most hotly contested issues in crypto policy is the seemingly endless debate over whether and when a crypto token is properly considered to be a security or a commodity under U.S. law. The RFIA takes a swing at this issue by seeking to establish the concept of a crypto token as an "ancillary asset." The idea is that while a crypto token may be sold pursuant to a type of securities transaction known as an investment contract, the token itself need not be considered a security. Under the RFIA, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) would have exclusive jurisdiction over a crypto token that qualifies as an ancillary asset but not the "security that constitutes an investment contract." To qualify as an ancillary asset, the token must not offer the holder any financial rights in a business, such as to debt or equity, liquidation, or interest or dividend payments. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), however, would have a role to play: where the average daily aggregate value of transactions in the ancillary asset exceeds a certain threshold and where the issuer engaged in "entrepreneurial or managerial efforts that primarily determined the value of the ancillary asset," the issuer would be required to file detailed disclosures with the SEC. (Where the issuer certifies—and the SEC does not reject—that those efforts have ceased, disclosures are no longer required.) When the issuer complies with the disclosure requirement, ancillary assets owned by the issuer or affiliates will be "presumed" to be commodities and not securities. This presumption could be overturned by a court finding that an ancillary asset does confer a financial right. Required disclosures to the SEC hinge on whether the issuer is engaged in relevant entrepreneurial or managerial efforts. This "efforts" language is familiar; the third prong of the Howey test for investment contracts asks whether the purchaser "is led to expect profits solely from the efforts of the promoter or a third party." This element is frequently key to thinking about whether a crypto token should be treated as a security. One reason is that crypto technology allows token projects to develop such that the issuer's efforts are no longer essential to the functioning or benefits of the project—in other words, projects can become decentralized. The RFIA does not explicitly invoke decentralization when it comes to classifying crypto tokens as securities or commodities, but it implicitly grapples with the concept to some extent by incorporating the third prong of Howey. Perhaps for that reason, the RFIA's co‐author Senator Kirsten Gillibrand (D‑NY) told Yahoo! Finance that, at least in general, decentralization is relevant in determining a token's legal character: "If it meets the Howey test, then it's a digital security. If it does not, and it is fully decentralized and has the hallmarks of a commodity, then it's a digital commodity." One benefit of the "ancillary asset" approach is that it potentially streamlines the token classification process. Nonetheless, as the RFIA's effort to implement the approach demonstrates, it remains difficult in practice to avoid the "efforts of others" concept given the realities of existing (and convoluted) capital markets regulation and the characteristics of crypto. And in incorporating the idea of entrepreneurial or managerial efforts without further defining it—such as by more explicit reference to and definition of a decentralized token network—the current version of the RFIA leaves important questions unanswered. Fortunately, one place to turn for such a definition—in addition to other proposals—would be the RFIA itself, which defines a decentralized crypto asset exchange (DEX). The RFIA largely defines DEXs as software where no person, or group of people agreeing to act together, can unilaterally control that protocol, including by altering transactions or functions. That's a sound place to begin defining a decentralized token network as well. In addition, distinguishing the token from the investment contract "arrangement or scheme" through which the token is offered or sold can leave questions about the investment contract itself. As noted above, under the RFIA, the SEC would retain jurisdiction over the investment contract. Yet the bounds of that jurisdiction are not clearly circumscribed. For example, would SEC jurisdiction over the investment contract be strictly limited to primary market token sales between the issuer and the counterparty, or could the SEC also extend its investment contract jurisdiction to secondary market token sales on theories related to the overall arrangement or scheme? Nothing about the SEC's recent crypto enforcement activity suggests anything other than a willingness to aggressively assert, or expand, its jurisdiction. And the recent Ripple opinion, while containing important implications for secondary markets in crypto assets, expressly left open the question of whether secondary market token sales constituted offers and sales of investment contracts. If the RFIA envisions SEC crypto jurisdiction as covering only primary—not secondary—market token sales, it should say so unequivocally. Exchanges The RFIA contains provisions addressing both centralized and decentralized crypto asset exchanges. The bill requires any trading facility offering a market in crypto assets or stablecoins to register with the CFTC as a crypto asset exchange. Registered exchanges must both confirm that ancillary assets meet applicable disclosure requirements before they're listed, as well as comply with core exchange principles, including safeguarding systems and customer assets, monitoring trading to provide an efficient market and prevent manipulation, and providing price and trade volume information. While making important strides to define decentralized exchanges, as described above, the RFIA leaves somewhat uncertain their ultimate regulatory obligations. On the one hand, some sections regulate DEXs only indirectly by imposing risk management requirements on the centralized institutions that interact with DEXs, not the DEXs themselves. That registered crypto asset exchanges are subject to specific requirements regarding their interactions with decentralized crypto asset exchanges also suggests that the former (registered exchanges) does not necessarily include the latter (DEXs). Similarly, the RFIA defines a crypto asset exchange to expressly include a "centralized or decentralized platform" only for purposes of a tax provision, implying that the term crypto asset exchange is not generally meant to cover both centralized and decentralized platforms when used elsewhere in the bill. On the other hand, by amending the Commodity Exchange Act's definition of "trading facility," which excludes systems that allow for bilateral transactions, to clarify that decentralized crypto asset exchanges that allow for multiple bids and offers to interact are distinguishable from such excluded systems, the RFIA suggests that at least some DEXs could be considered trading facilities subject to crypto asset exchange registration requirements. How exactly a DEX that enables trading pairs of crypto assets would mesh with this provision is perhaps open to interpretation. Given these questions, the RFIA should make more explicit that disintermediated crypto exchange protocols are not subject to inapt requirements designed for centralized intermediaries. Stablecoins The RFIA would only permit "depository institutions," such as banks, credit unions, and savings associations, to issue payment stablecoins (tokens redeemable on a 1‑to‑1 basis with instruments denominated in U.S. dollars). Notably, the RFIA would amend the definition of depository institution under the Federal Reserve Act to incorporate a category of "covered depository institutions" that includes non‐banks exclusively engaged in issuing payment stablecoins and approved to operate by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) or a similar state authority. Under the RFIA, such OCC‐authorized payment stablecoins would not be required to maintain federal deposit insurance. It's welcome when a bill allows for the operation of stablecoin issuers beyond federally insured depository institutions. Nonetheless, in giving federal banking regulators discretion to reject applications of prospective stablecoin issuers on the basis of subjective and open‐ended criteria beyond basic reserve and disclosure requirements, the RFIA risks further constraining future payment services competition. Concluding Thoughts Providing clarity to crypto entrepreneurs, developers, and users in the United States remains a work in progress. Even with important case law evolving in the courts, Congress ultimately must provide a stable and practical framework for U.S. crypto policy.
Public interest litigation is a mechanism of intervention in a matter that concerns the public. It could be about human rights, government policy, or some other issue that could present a challenge to public life. Public interest litigation is important because it presents hope to the powerless and offers justice where there might not previously have been the opportunity. The aim of public interest litigation is to recognise injustice and give a voice to the concerns of members of society who might not have the means to articulate them. In Nigeria there is a high tendency for people of low socioeconomic status to experience police brutality, or even become victims of extra-judicial killing. In this article, it was argued that although public interest litigation is a good strategy to engage the injustice of extra-judicial killings, the recurrence shows that the solution lies more in addressing a systemic problem. ; Dorcas A. 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The Global Alliance for Genomics and Health (GA4GH) aims to accelerate biomedical advances by enabling the responsible sharing of clinical and genomic data through both harmonized data aggregation and federated approaches. The decreasing cost of genomic sequencing (along with other genome-wide molecular assays) and increasing evidence of its clinical utility will soon drive the generation of sequence data from tens of millions of humans, with increasing levels of diversity. In this perspective, we present the GA4GH strategies for addressing the major challenges of this data revolution. We describe the GA4GH organization, which is fueled by the development efforts of eight Work Streams and informed by the needs of 24 Driver Projects and other key stakeholders. We present the GA4GH suite of secure, interoperable technical standards and policy frameworks and review the current status of standards, their relevance to key domains of research and clinical care, and future plans of GA4GH. Broad international participation in building, adopting, and deploying GA4GH standards and frameworks will catalyze an unprecedented effort in data sharing that will be critical to advancing genomic medicine and ensuring that all populations can access its benefits. ; B.P.C. acknowledges funding from Abigail Wexner Research Institute at Nationwide Children's Hospital; T.H. Nyrönen acknowledges funding from Academy of Finland grant #31996; A.M.-J., K.N., T.F.B., O.M.H., and Z.S. acknowledge funding from Australian Medical Research Future Fund; M.S. acknowledges funding from Biobank Japan; D. Bujold and S.J.M.J. acknowledge funding from Canada Foundation for Innovation; L.J.D. acknowledges funding from Canada Foundation for Innovation Cyber Infrastructure grant #34860; D. Bujold and G.B. acknowledge funding from CANARIE; L.J.D. acknowledges funding from CANARIE Research Data Management contract #RDM-090 (CHORD) and #RDM2-053 (ClinDIG); K.K.-L. acknowledges funding from CanSHARE; T.L.T. acknowledges funding from Chan Zuckerberg Initiative; T. Burdett acknowledges funding from Chan Zuckerberg Initiative grant #2017-171671; D. Bujold, G.B., and L.D.S. acknowledge funding from CIHR; L.J.D. acknowledges funding from CIHR grant #404896; M.J.S.B. acknowledges funding from CIHR grant #SBD-163124; M. Courtot and M. Linden acknowledge funding from CINECA project EU Horizon 2020 grant #825775; D. Bujold and G.B. acknowledge funding from Compute Canada; F.M.-G. acknowledges funding from the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG, German Research Foundation) – NFDI 1/1 "GHGA – German Human Genome-Phenome Archive; R.M.H.-S. acknowledges funding from Duke-Margolis Center for Health Policy; S.B. and A.J.B. acknowledge funding from EJP-RD EU Horizon 2020 grant #825575; A. Niewielska, A.K., D.S., G.I.S., J.A.T., J.R., M.A.K., M. Baudis, M. Linden, S.B., S.S., T.H. Nyrönen, and T.M.K. acknowledge funding from ELIXIR; A. Niewielska acknowledges funding from EOSC-Life EU Horizon 2020 grant #824087; J.-P.H. acknowledges funding from ETH Domain Strategic Focal Area "Personalized Health and Related Technologies (PHRT)" grant #2017-201; F.M.-G. acknowledges funding from EUCANCan EU Horizon 2020 grant #825835; B.M.K., D. Bujold, G.B., L.D.S., M.J.S.B., N.S., S.E.W., and Y.J. acknowledge funding from Genome Canada; B.M.K., M.J.S.B., S.E.W., and Y.J. acknowledge funding from Genome Quebec; F.M.-G. acknowledges funding from German Human Genome-Phenome Archive; C. Voisin acknowledges funding from Google; A.J.B. acknowledges funding from Health Data Research UK Substantive Site Award; D.H. acknowledges funding from Howard Hughes Medical Institute; S.B. acknowledges funding from Instituto de Salud Carlos III; S.-S.K. and K.T. acknowledge funding from Japan Agency for Medical Research and Development (AMED); S. Ogishima acknowledges funding from Japan Agency for Medical Research and Development (AMED) grant #20kk0205014h0005; C.Y. and K. Kosaki acknowledge funding from Japan Agency for Medical Research and Development (AMED) grant #JP18kk0205012; GEM Japan acknowledges funding from Japan Agency for Medical Research and Development (AMED) grants #19kk0205014h0004, #20kk0205014h0005, #20kk0205013h0005, #20kk0205012h0005, #20km0405401h0003, and #19km0405001h0104; J.R. acknowledges funding from La Caixa Foundation under project #LCF/PR/GN13/50260009; R.R.F. acknowledges funding from Mayo Clinic Center for Individualized Medicine; Y.J. and S.E.W. acknowledge funding from Ministère de l'Économie et de l'Innovation du Québec for the Can-SHARE Connect Project; S.E.W. and S.O.M.D. acknowledge funding from Ministère de l'Économie et de l'Innovation du Québec for the Can-SHARE grant #141210; M.A.H., M.C.M.-T., J.O.J., H.E.P., and P.N.R. acknowledge funding from Monarch Initiative grant #R24OD011883 and Phenomics First NHGRI grant #1RM1HG010860; A.L.M. and E.B. acknowledge funding from MRC grant #MC_PC_19024; P.T. acknowledges funding from National University of Singapore and Agency for Science, Technology and Research; J.M.C. acknowledges funding from NHGRI; A.H.W. acknowledges funding from NHGRI awards K99HG010157, R00HG010157, and R35HG011949; A.M.-J., K.N., D.P.H., O.M.H., T.F.B., and Z.S. acknowledge funding from NHMRC grants #GNT1113531 and #GNT2000001; D.L.C. acknowledges funding from NHMRC Ideas grant #1188098; A.B.S. acknowledges funding from NHMRC Investigator Fellowship grant #APP177524; J.M.C. and L.D.S. acknowledge funding from NIH; A.A.P. acknowledges funding from NIH Anvil; A.V.S. acknowledges funding from NIH contract #HHSN268201800002I (TOPMed Informatics Research Center); S.U. acknowledges funding from NIH ENCODE grant #UM1HG009443; M.C.M.-T. and M.A.H. acknowledge funding from NIH grant #1U13CA221044; R.J.C. acknowledges funding from NIH grants #1U24HG010262 and #1U2COD023196; M.G. acknowledges funding from NIH grant #R00HG007940; J.B.A., S.L., P.G., E.B., H.L.R., and L.S. acknowledge funding from NIH grant #U24HG011025; K.P.E. acknowledges funding from NIH grant #U2C-RM-160010; J.A.E. acknowledges funding from NIH NCATS grant #U24TR002306; M.M. acknowledges funding from NIH NCI contract #HHSN261201400008c and ID/IQ Agreement #17X146 under contract #HHSN2612015000031 and #75N91019D00024; R.M.C.-D. acknowledges funding from NIH NCI grant #R01CA237118; M. Cline acknowledges funding from NIH NCI grant #U01CA242954; K.P.E. acknowledges funding from NIH NCI ITCR grant #1U24CA231877-01; O.L.G. acknowledges funding from NIH NCI ITCR grant #U24CA237719; R.L.G. acknowledges funding from NIH NCI task order #17X147F10 under contract #HHSN261200800001E; A.F.R. acknowledges funding from NIH NHGRI grant #RM1HG010461; N.M. and L.J.Z. acknowledge funding from NIH NHGRI grant #U24HG006941; R.R.F., T.H. Nelson, L.J.B., and H.L.R. acknowledge funding from NIH NHGRI grant #U41HG006834; B.J.W. acknowledges funding from NIH NHGRI grant #UM1HG009443A; M. Cline acknowledges funding from NIH NHLBI BioData Catalyst Fellowship grant #5118777; M.M. acknowledges funding from NIH NHLBI BioData Catalyst Program grant #1OT3HL142478-01; N.C.S. acknowledges funding from NIH NIGMS grant #R35-GM128636; M.C.M.-T., M.A.H., P.N.R., and R.R.F. acknowledge funding from NIH NLM contract #75N97019P00280; E.B. and A.L.M. acknowledge funding from NIHR; R.G. acknowledges funding from Project Ris3CAT VEIS; S.B. acknowledges funding from RD-Connect, Seventh Framework Program grant #305444; J.K. acknowledges funding from Robertson Foundation; S.B. and A.J.B. acknowledge funding from Solve-RD, EU Horizon 2020 grant #779257; T.S. and S. Oesterle acknowledge funding from Swiss Institute of Bioinformatics (SIB) and Swiss Personalized Health Network (SPHN), supported by the Swiss State Secretariat for Education, Research and Innovation SERI; S.J.M.J. acknowledges funding from Terry Fox Research Institute; A.E.H., M.P.B., M. Cupak, M.F., and J.F. acknowledge funding from the Digital Technology Supercluster; D.F.V. acknowledges funding from the Australian Medical Research Future Fund, as part of the Genomics Health Futures Mission grant #76749; M. Baudis acknowledges funding from the BioMedIT Network project of Swiss Institute of Bioinformatics (SIB) and Swiss Personalized Health Network (SPHN); B.M.K. acknowledges funding from the Canada Research Chair in Law and Medicine and CIHR grant #SBD-163124; D.S., G.I.S., M.A.K., S.B., S.S., and T.H. Nyrönen acknowledge funding from the EU Horizon 2020 Beyond 1 Million Genomes (B1MG) Project grant #951724; P.F., A.D.Y., F.C., H.S., I.U.L., D. Gupta, M. Courtot, S.E.H., T. Burdett, T.M.K., and S.F. acknowledge funding from the European Molecular Biology Laboratory; Y.J. and S.E.W. acknowledge funding from the Government of Canada; P.G. acknowledges funding from the Government of Canada through Genome Canada and the Ontario Genomics Institute (OGI-206); J.Z. acknowledges funding from the Government of Ontario; C.K.Y. acknowledges funding from the Government of Ontario, Canada Foundation for Innovation; C. Viner and M.M.H. acknowledge funding from the Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada (grant #RGPIN-2015-03948 to M.M.H. and Alexander Graham Bell Canada Graduate Scholarship to C.V.); K.K.-L. acknowledges funding from the Program for Integrated Database of Clinical and Genomic Information; J.K. acknowledges funding from the Robertson Foundation; D.F.V. acknowledges funding from the Victorian State Government through the Operational Infrastructure Support (OIS) Program; A.M.L., R.N., and H.V.F. acknowledge funding from Wellcome (collaborative award); F.C., H.S., P.F., and S.E.H. acknowledge funding from Wellcome Trust grant #108749/Z/15/Z; A.D.Y., H.S., I.U.L., M. Courtot, H.E.P., P.F., and T.M.K. acknowledge funding from Wellcome Trust grant #201535/Z/16/Z; A.M., J.K.B., R.J.M., R.M.D., and T.M.K. acknowledge funding from Wellcome Trust grant #206194; E.B., P.F., P.G., and S.F. acknowledge funding from Wellcome Trust grant #220544/Z/20/Z; A. Hamosh acknowledges funding from NIH NHGRI grant U41HG006627 and U54HG006542; J.S.H. acknowledges funding from National Taiwan University #91F701-45C and #109T098-02; the work of K.W.R. was supported by the Intramural Research Program of the National Library of Medicine, NIH. For the purpose of open access, the author has applied a CC BY public copyright license to any Author Accepted Manuscript version arising from this submission. H.V.F. acknowledges funding from Wellcome Grant 200990/A/16/Z 'Designing, developing and delivering integrated foundations for genomic medicine'. ; Peer reviewed