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It is common knowledge that Martin Heidegger's attempts at engaging non-Western philosophy are very much a construct of his own making. This article in no way seeks to disagree with those observations, but argues two things: first, that Heidegger's "dialogue" with his two main other sources of inspiration, the ancient Greek thinkers and the German poets, is not different in kind or in principle from his engagement with East Asia. One can of course quite easily argue that Heidegger's main interest was the ancient Greek thinkers, and then the poets, and only lastly Asia. But this hierarchy in preference does not make Heidegger's approach different in kind or in principle. Second, I argue that there is an important place in comparative philosophy for the type of thinking displayed by Heidegger in this kind of Auseinandersetzung (confrontation) with—and "appropriation" of—Asian (or Greek, or Poetic) thought.

The theory of being helps us understand the condition of planning in an evanescent, shape-shifting world and how to be a strategic planner in such a world. Martin Heidegger's investigation of being reveals important and sometimes disconcerting insights into humans and the worlds they inhabit and generate. In this article, we use Heidegger's framework of thought to reveal what being means for planners and planning. In our investigation, we focus on one theme that seems fundamental to the practice of planning, the transformative impulse, and we reflect on how Heidegger's thought provides insights into that element. We show how Heidegger, the philosopher of the everyday, overturned the Cartesian dualistic ontology of subject–object, replacing it with the holistic being-in-the-world. We explore how this holistic ontology helps reinterpret transformative practice. We argue that effective transformation of society involves a transformation of being.

The article analyzes Martin Heidegger's idea of creating a special phenomenol­ogy of religion at an early stage of his work, which was obviously inspired by the fashion for the study of religion, which was also caused by R. Otto's The Holy. It is proved that some of the philosophical ideas of early M. Heideg­ger, especially in his The Phenomenology of Religious Life, are in tune with Otto's thought and are close to the phenomenological tradition of religious stud­ies. But late M. Heidegger departs from these ideas, using the category of Holy as applied to the study of artistic and poetic creativity. Further, the article ana­lyzes the existential of horror, which plays a significant role in the second stage of M. Heidegger's work, which is also in many ways similar to the description of the characteristics of numinous feeling by R. Otto. The article separately ana­lyzes the specifics of the two concepts Angst and Furcht, for this purpose paral­lels are drawn with the works of S. Kierkegaard, S. Freud, G. van der Leeuw. It is suggested that the proximity of R. Otto's and M. Heidegger's approaches to this issue is more due to the cultural context than to direct influence, and it does not provide sufficient ground for a serious convergence of the phenomenology of religion and the ideas of M. Heidegger's philosophy of the period of Being and Time. Although this does not deny the fact that some phenomenologists later turned to the philosophy of M. Heidegger, seeing it as a support for the construc­tion of their theories.

La "crisis" actual, que no son sólo es la crisis de una fase del ciclo económico, o una crisis financiera o ambiental, una crisis que no sólo se identifica con la fase terminal del régimen capitalista de producción, es la crisis de una civilización. Una crisis que implica la crisis de la era moderna y de su paradigma; la crisis de un modelo de organización del conocimiento; la crisis del modo industrial de producción; la crisis de las modalidades de gobierno, el alejamiento de las posturas positivistas, la crisis de las verdades y de los valores absolutos, de las teorías abstractamente valida y de la puridad del derecho, entre otras.Crisis, un concepto que no sólo trae consigo aspectos negativos sino también aspectos positivos, pues una crisis siempre genera dos posibles caminos, aquel que conduce a la muerte, y aquel que guía hacia una nueva forma de vivir y pensar el mundo. Hoy se han abierto dos caminos frente a la crisis, el primero conduce a la conservación del ecosistema y consecuentemente de la especie humana, mientras el segundo lleva ineludiblemente al suicidio colectivo; el primer camino es el único que permite sobrevivir y es el que se ha llamado Buen vivir.[1]Una nueva alternativa que ha surgido en los países andinos, y particularmente en Ecuador y Bolivia, una alternativa que devuelve la esperanza a la pacha mama y sus hijos, entre ellos los seres humanos, una alternativa que permite la liberación y la descolonización, una alternativa a la lógica capitalista que únicamente ha generado brechas sociales y económicas entre los iguales.Giraldo busca explicar cómo las utopías contemporáneas quieren hacer un frente distinto a la proyección occidental moderna camino a la muerte, y ver en el buen vivir un ejemplo de ese frente. El buen vivir es un proyecto político latinoamericano, es la alternativa a la modernidad capitalista, es un concepto tomado de la cultura aymara y quechua, caracterizado por ser un arte que permite vivir en equilibrio y armonía con lo existente, pues no se puede vivir bien si los demás viven mal; es decir, el buen vivir es algo que no se reduce a las ejecuciones de proyectos gubernamentales, creación de ministerios especializados o articulado constitucional, es un proceso que implica luchas sociales y un cambio de paradigma.[2]La especie humana se acostumbró a no pensar por sí misma, sino en función de la cultura y estructura lingüística a la que pertenece; aceptar que el pensamiento no es un fenómeno individual ayuda a comprender la heterogeneidad de arquetipos ideológicos empleados para que las personas reproduzcan un determinado status quo, pero también sirve para observar el camino de toda cultura que no quiera cimentarse en los mismos postulados de la cultura que quiere superarse.[3]Culturas rebeldes para seguir manteniendo un pensamiento generalizado surgen en Latinoamérica, culturas que empiezan a abrir puertas del camino hacia el buen vivir. Culturas que buscan alejarse de los postulados capitalistas generando una nueva forma de convivencia humana en la diversidad y en armonía con la naturaleza. Culturas que buscan alejarse de la noción vulgar del tiempo, denominada así por Heidegger, basada en el olvido del pasado y un pensamiento dirigido a adquirir las expectativas implantadas por la sociedad como metas a alcanzar[4]. Culturas que quieren apartarse de vivir un presente en olvido del pasado y con visión permanente a un futuro común, un futuro de dualidades en que sólo existe lo bueno y lo malo. Culturas que buscan construir un futuro anclado en el pasado entrelazando las tres dimensiones de la temporalidad, esto es, el haber sido, el ser, y el advenir[5]. Y el camino para llegar a ello toma el nombre de buen vivir.Es legitimo pensar entonces que el buen vivir no es únicamente un estampado en papel, por lo contrario es un paradigma de profundas transformaciones, es la alternativa al encierro occidental, es un significado abigarrado de vivencias desde la diversidad y la igualdad, es nuestra esperanza.[1] Omar Felipe Giraldo, Utopías en la era de la supervivencia una interpretación del Buen vivir, (México D.F.: Editorial Itaca, 2014), 15.[2] Ibíd. 16, 17.[3] Ibíd. 23.[4] Martin Heidegger, el concepto de tiempo (Tratado de 1924). Barcelona: Herder, 2008.[5] Omar Felipe Giraldo, Utopías en la era de la supervivencia una interpretación del Buen vivir. 24, 25.

Die Philosophie der Architektur kennt, so der Verfasser, verschiedene Teilbereiche, da auch Gebäude vielschichtig in unser Leben eingewoben sind. Man könnte von einer philosophischen Anthropologie der Architektur sprechen, wenn es um das ihr zugrundeliegende (oder durch sie beförderte) Menschenbild geht. Oder von der Ästhetik der Architektur: Sie fragt beispielsweise nach den Vorstellungen von Schönheit oder den Gründen für aufrechte, "stehende" oder "liegende" Fenster. Man sollte ferner die Metaphysik erwähnen: Es ist eine umfassende Aufgabe der Philosophie (bzw. Metaphysik) der Architektur, Aussagen über letzte Dinge, die das Bauwerk macht, zu verdeutlichen. Die Philosophie der Architektur stellt auch sozialphilosophische Fragen: Welche gesellschaftlichen Bedingungen erklären Bauweisen oder spiegeln sich in ihnen? Die Gestaltung der Küche zeigt etwa die soziale Struktur. Es gehört zur Philosophie, nicht nur eine analytische, sondern stets auch eine kritische bzw. bewertende Seite zu haben. Sie kann fragen, ob wir das, was wir vorfinden oder was geplant ist, auch gutheißen - und entsprechend, wie wir bauen sollten. Dieses bewertende Herangehen findet sich in allen genannten Bereichen. In der Ästhetik können Maßstäbe bewertet werden, ebenso in der Anthropologie. Die Philosophie der Architektur steckt noch in ihren Kinderschuhen. Und doch lohnt die Aufgabe, Architektur philosophisch weiter zu denken. Es ist an der Zeit, denkend tiefer in diesen wichtigen Bereich menschlicher Kultur vorzudringen, damit wir die Architektur unserer Gesellschaft besser verstehen und so vielleicht in Zukunft auch besser bauen. (ICF2)

I offer a hermeneutical/deconstructive interpretation of a specific drawing by Leonardo da Vinci and a thought-experiment suggested by that drawing. My reason for turning to this drawing is that it graphically illustrates an ambiguity in Martin Heidegger's notion of the hermeneutical circle. I take this ambiguity to be illustrative of an interpretive problem of crucial importance to mainstream interpretations of Heidegger as well as to the hermeneutical and deconstructive traditions. I explicate this problem through an interpretation of relevant passages in Being and Time and argue 1) that there are two different, irreducible understandings of futurity in Heidegger's thought, and 2) that Heidegger's understanding of the present helps to mediate these different meanings of futurity. The thought experiment with which the article begins raises questions about the role of the imagination in understanding the temporal structure of intentionality. By calling attention to the mediating role that the present plays in Heidegger's understanding of temporality in Part II of Being and Time, I argue for an interpretation of the hermeneutics of understanding that better answers the questions posed by this thought experiment.

Abstract: Visual representations of the whole earth permeate modern cultures, shaping how societies imagine globalization and planetary ecological derangement. To explore the complex ways in which these images configure human attitudes toward environments, this essay attends to a series of hegemonic representations of the earth from diverse situations and stages of modernity in conjunction with ideas drawn from Martin Heidegger's ontological philosophy. I proceed from the insight that for Heidegger modernity is not a singular condition, but entails two contrary determinations of being: "machination," in which detached subjects reshape an objectified world, and "enordering," in which fungible and flexible resources circulate endlessly around a closed global space. Taking up these divergent concepts, my argument accentuates basic differences in how the earth has been disclosed in representation over the course of modern history. Through close analyses of world maps from the early modern Netherlands; chalkboard globes from nineteenth-century schoolrooms; and the contemporary geospatial application Google Earth, I show how global visions both articulate and complicate Heidegger's thinking of machination and enordering. Far from being the culmination of a singular modernity, images of the earth reveal and reinforce a discordant global condition, riven by clashing, equally total disclosures of the world.

This essay argues that comparative and transcultural philosophy are interdependent, and so opting for only one of the two is an impossibility. The comparative approach persists as long as we distinguish identities and make differences. As long as people do not speak only one language, the need to move between different languages and to translate, and thus the need to relate and compare different possibilities of philosophical articulation, will remain. Any attempt to free oneself from the problem of cultural identity is doomed to failure, as it leads to further entrapment in the very same problem. Comparative philosophy works with more or less fixed identities, transcultural philosophy transforms them and thereby creates new identities. Those two approaches combined constitute what I call intercultural philosophy.
In this essay I try to explain the relation between comparative and transcultural philosophy by connecting François Jullien's "comparative" and Martin Heidegger's "transcultural" understanding of "Being" (Sein) and "Between" (Zwischen). In part 1 I argue that by turning Between and Being into opposing paradigms of Chinese and Greek thinking, respectively, Jullien causes both to become more or less fixed representatives of different cultural identities within a comparative framework: Greek thinking ossifies into traditional metaphysics, and Chinese thinking ossifies into the non-metaphysical thinking of immanence. Part 2 argues that Heidegger takes a decisively different direction. He explores the Between in Being, and even makes an attempt to think of Being as Between. Heidegger's invocation of "Greekdom" is undoubtedly Eurocentric. But, ironically, Heidegger's "Greek thinking" is less Eurocentric than Jullien's "Chinese thinking", because he discovers the "Chinese" Between in the midst of "Greek" Being. Part 3 touches upon the task of speaking about European philosophy in Chinese terms. While modern Chinese philosophers frequently speak about Chinese philosophy in European terms, Heidegger's work points to the possibility of speaking about European philosophy in Chinese terms. Because Jullien and Heidegger both connect Greek and Chinese thought, it seems to me that the discussion of their different approaches is helpful in clarifying perspectives for intercultural philosophy between China and Europe.

AbstractTaking as a starting point the challenge of containing the spread of epidemics, this article provides an oblique critique of the connections between biopolitics and contact tracing. Aligning the question of biopolitical strategies with epidemiology, the article follows the lines of continuity between containment strategies, contact-tracing technology, and circulations and networks. The uptake of mobile application surveillance by government entities to trace the spread of SARS-CoV-2 has seamlessly supplemented containment measures. Singapore's deployment of TraceTogether, an application developed by the Ministry of Health and Government Technology Agency, circumvents the use of geolocation tracking: formulating a network of infected bodies using proximity data, the population undergoes a topological change. Drawing on a tradition that acknowledges the transformative quality of technology and its implications on information societies, the article frames the enquiry within the parameters of Martin Heidegger's and Gilles Deleuze's deliberations on the ways in which technology is brought to bear on the biopolitical imaginary of a population. The technological rationality that, according to Heidegger, has gripped the entire horizon of thought is opened up for interruption wherever technology fails. In these slippages emerge spaces in which a critique of society's faults may be advanced. This article proposes a critical reading of application surveillance with a view to the biopolitical and philosophical implications of overdetermined network structures against the backdrop of contagion-related phenomena.

Krzysztof Uniłowski zmarł na początku grudnia. Przez ostatnie dwadzieścia lat był wśrod kluczowych figur polskiego literaturoznawstwa. Pisząc na bardzo zróżnicowane tematy - od recenzji współczesnych polskich powieści po eseje o ideach nowoczesności, od klasowo podbudowanych analiz fantastyki i seriali telewizyjnych po komentarze dotyczące polityczności i etosu krytyki literackiej - Uniłowski rozwinął imponującą i wyjątkową krytyczną perspektywę, a wręcz szczególny język krytyki, który zainspirował - i bez wątpienia nadal będzie inspirować - krytyków wszystkich pokoleń. W swojej pracy Uniłowski czerpał chętnie z materializmu historycznego, stale balansując swoje intuicyjne skupienie na tym, co polityczne (w szczególności na kategorii klasy) z równie intuicyjnym przekonaniem co do niezastępowalności formy literackiej. Chociaż nie zawsze się z nim zgadzaliśmy - co jest na lewicy normą, jeśli nie tradycją - to jako redaktorzy i redaktorki "Praktyki Teoretycznej" cieszymy się, mogąc nazwać go nietylko punktem odniesienia, ale towarzyszem. Uniłowski zmarł w trakcie końcowych prac nad esejem, który prezentujemy poniżej. Niestety, nie zdążył przesłać nam gotowego abstraktu/streszczenia, musimy więc sami podjąć próbę podsumowania jego głównych punktów. Kwestie podniesione w tym erudycyjnym i formalnie złożonym artykule dotyczą spraw zasadniczych: w jakim sensie fikcyjne światy przypominają świat niefikcyjny, i w jaki sposób owe światy zamieszkujemy? Jak wygląda relacja między imersją i interpretacją? Jakie figury mogą pomóc nam w wyobrażeniu sobie - zwizualizowaniu - naszej intymnej, lecz przecież nieuchronnie społecznej relacji z tym, co fikcyjne (czy jesteśmy gośćmi, mieszkańcami, przechodniami...)? Uniłowski szuka odpowiedzi we współczesnej krytyce marksistowskiej (Eagleton, Jameson, Berardi), w pisarstwie sci-fi i fantasy (Lem, Sapkowski, Martin), a także w nowoczesnej filozofii kontynentalnej (Gadamer, Heidegger) oraz - w ostatniej części eseju - we współczesnych badaniach gier. Cieszymy się, mogąc przedstawić artykuł Uniłowskiego w dwóch wersjach - w polskim oryginale oraz w angielskim tłumaczeniu (autorstwa Jakoba Zigurasa). Po to, by zachować trudny do pomylenia flow myśli Uniłowskiego w języku angielskim, do tekstu wprowadzono na etapie tłumaczenia - przy pełnej współpracy autora - drobne zmiany. Mamy nadzieję, że dla naszych polskojęzycznych czytelniczek i czytelników porównanie obu wersji okaże się ciekawe i pożyteczne - wydaje sie bowiem oferować szczególny wgląd w warsztat pisarski Uniłowskiego.

Krzysztof Uniłowski passed away earlier this December. For the last twenty years, he has been crucial to Polish literary studies. Writing on a broad range of topics – from reviews of contemporary Polish novels to essays on the idea of modernity, from class-oriented analyses of sci-fi books and TV shows to comments on the politics and ethics of literary criticism – he developed an impressive and highly unique critical perspective, or indeed: a unique language of criticism, one that has managed and will undoubtedly still manage to inspire countless critics of all generations. Throughout his work, Uniłowski drew heavily on historical materialism, constantly balancing his instinctive focus on the political – and, specifically, on class – with his equally instinctive conviction as to the irreplaceability of literary form. While we might not have agreed on every single issue – as is always the case on the Left – we in "Praktyka Teoretyczna" are proud to have called him not just an inspiration, but a comrade. Uniłowski passed away while putting finishing touches to the essay we're presenting below. Unfortunately, he never managed to send us the finished abstract/summary for this article, so it falls to us to try and summarise its main theses. Krzysztof Uniłowski passed away earlier this December. For the last twenty years, he has been crucial to Polish literary studies. Writing on a broad range of topics – from reviews of contemporary Polish novels to essays on the idea of modernity, from class-oriented analyses of sci-fi books and TV shows to comments on the politics and ethics of literary criticism – he developed an impressive and highly unique critical perspective, or indeed: a unique language of criticism, one that has managed and will undoubtedly still manage to inspire countless critics of all generations. Throughout his work, Uniłowski drew heavily on historical materialism, constantly balancing his instinctive focus on the political – and, specifically, on class – with his equally instinctive conviction as to the irreplaceability of literary form. While we might not have agreed on every single issue – as is always the case on the Left – we in "Praktyka Teoretyczna" are proud to have called him not just an inspiration, but a comrade. Uniłowski passed away while putting finishing touches to the essay we're presenting below. Unfortunately, he never managed to send us the finished abstract/summary for this article, so it falls to us to try and summarise its main theses.Krzysztof Uniłowski passed away earlier this December. For the last twenty years, he has been crucial to Polish literary studies. Writing on a broad range of topics – from reviews of contemporary Polish novels to essays on the idea of modernity, from class-oriented analyses of sci-fi books and TV shows to comments on the politics and ethics of literary criticism – he developed an impressive and highly unique critical perspective, or indeed: a unique language of criticism, one that has managed and will undoubtedly still manage to inspire countless critics of all generations. Throughout his work, Uniłowski drew heavily on historical materialism, constantly balancing his instinctive focus on the political – and, specifically, on class – with his equally instinctive conviction as to the irreplaceability of literary form. While we might not have agreed on every single issue – as is always the case on the Left– we in "Praktyka Teoretyczna" are proud to have called him not just an inspiration, but a comrade. Uniłowski passed away while putting finishing touches to the essay we're presenting below. Unfortunately, he never managed to send us the finished abstract/summary for this article, so it falls to us to try and summarise its main theses. The issues raised in this erudite and formally complex piece include such fundamental questions as: in what sense do the fictional worlds resemble the non-fictional one, and how do we inhabit them? What's the relationship between immersion and interpretation? What real-life figures can help us imagine or visualise our intimate yet inherently social relationship with the fictional (are we guests, dwellers, passersby...)? Uniłowski looks for answers in contemporary Marxist criticism (Eagleton, Jameson, Berardi), sci-fi and fantasy writing (Lem, Sapkowski, Martin), as well as modern continental philoso phy (Gadamer, Heidegger) and – in the last part of the essay – contemporary game studies. We're happy to be able to present Uniłowski's piece in two versions, the original Polish as well as its English translation (by Jakob Ziguras). In order to preserve the unmistakable flow of Uniłowski's thought in English, small changes were introduced – with the author's full approval – in the English version. We trust that our Polish-speaking readers will fin the comparison of the two versions interesting and instruc tive, as they seem to give a unique insight into Uniłowski's writing process.