Suchergebnisse

Since condemnation of operation Vistula by the Senate, we have conducted a "strategic partnership" policy towards Ukraine, expecting at most symbols, not calling for the memory of thousands of victims murdered in Volyn and Cherven Cities. Driven mainly by Russophobia, we supported the Orange Revolution and Euromaidan. On the latter, our politicians didn't hesitate to join banderite shouts in front of portraits of Bandera and Shukhevych. We should not be surprised then that two hours after the address of the President of Poland Bronislaw Komorowski, The Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine adopted without discussion four Acts, which aim were: the recognition of the OUN and the UPA as fi ghters for Samostijna Ukraine, erasing from the collective memory shared 70-year history of the Ukrainian nation and increase of divisions in Ukrainian society. In Poland, the Acts have been passed over by the mass media (except for "Przegląd" and "Nie"). Neither the issue have been raised by the Prime Minister Ewa Kopacz in talks with the chairman of the Verkhovna Rada Volodymyr Groysman, nor by the Interior Minister Grezgorz Schetyna during his parliamentary speech on Polish foreign policy and it is even quite carefully sidestepped in the presidential campaign by all parties. Answering the question posed by "Przegląd" – "How Poland should react to the decisions of the authorities of Ukraine regarding members of the OUN and the UPA?" – advisor to the President of Poland, Professor Tomasz Nałęcz, stated, among others, "Let us remember that Ukraine is our neighbour and friend, therefore we should talk to it. I do not think the best way of conversation with a friend is to send a note of protest". In 2010, we had the courage to raise the question of granting a title of Hero of Ukraine to Bandera and Shukhevych by W. Yushchenko and to persuade the European Parliament to express deep indignation (initiator: Paweł Zalewski from PO) and withdraw this Act. Now, all indications are that we lack this courage. It is very diffi cult to speak now about the future of Ukraine and Polish – Ukrainian relations. There are only very few groups, which speak now about the need to change of our eastern policy. The borderland communities haven't obtained in our country organizations which would have an impact on foreign or even economic policy. It can therefore be assumed that regardless of who wins the presidential and parliamentary elections, Poland will continue to pursue a realistic and pragmatic policy, although resulting from Russophobia of Polish political elites and conducted by them historical policy. Previous actions of the Ukrainian authorities suggest that there may occur a scenario known to us from the period after the Orange Revolution. The current Ukrainian authorities do not seek to unite his people for a common goal, but they increase divisions in society. Ukrainian nation needs an agreement and consensus, not creation of new barriers. Polish experience shows that the actual legal, economic and political transformation needs a national consensus rather than replacing it with settlements with the past and nationalism. It seems that Poland irretrievably lost its positions of expert on East. As correctly pointed out Professor Andrzej Walicki "the prestige of Poland asa supposed export on Russia ceased to exist, because our position in Russian affairs is predictable and does not help to solve real problems". Poland should act in order to end the conflict in Ukraine, at the same time attempting to understand both sides of the conflict. Different economic and geopolitic interests causes that the positions of various countries on the events in Ukraine are and will remain diverse. Louis Stomma wrote that "the sudden and incredible love of Poles for modern Ukraine is a sad love without reciprocity". In the interest of Poland is striving for consensus and sensible mediation rather than setting up as a front-line state. A compromise is always possible, but if interest is not mixed with morals and national resentments. Preventing from compromise would reflect on the fate of the whole region and Ukraine would be harmed the most.

Artykuł jest próbą pokazania ewolucji i stanu społeczeństwa obywatelskiego w Polsce w ćwierć wieku po transformacji ustrojowej na podstawie najważniejszych badań zastanych oraz badań i obserwacji własnych. Nawiązuje też do obecnej w polskim dyskursie od połowy XIX w. do dziś tezy o trudnościach w budowie polskiego społeczeństwa obywatelskiego. Z przeprowadzonej analizy wynika, że Polacy rzeczywiście rzadziej stowarzyszają się nie tylko w porównaniu z obywatelami Europy Zachodniej, ale nawet w porównaniu z obywatelami innych krajów postkomunistycznych. Polską specyfiką jest wreszcie z jednej strony wielość rozmaitych stowarzyszeń, w tym także reprezentujących tzw. nowe ruchy społeczne, z drugiej zaś – ich kadrowy charakter. Przynależność do stowarzyszeń nie jest w Polsce masowa, nie jest elementem kultury politycznej społeczeństwa, lecz ma charakter elitarny. Media społecznościowe mogą ułatwić komunikowanie się i współdziałanie w sprawach publicznych, ale na razie rolę tę pełnią w niewielkim stopniu. ; This paper is an attempt to present the evolution and the condition of the civil society in Poland 25 years after the transformation of the political regime. The analysis is based on the existing results of earlier research and on the author's own studies and observations. It also refers to the discourse that has been going on in Poland since the middle of the nineteenth century on the difficulties in building a Polish civil society. As the analysis shows, Poles do indeed, affiliate much less frequently than citizens in West European states, or, even in comparison with citizens of other post-communist states. Another Polish specificity is that although there is a variety of organisations and associations, also representing followers of new social movements, most of them are elite in character. Membership in organisations does not have a mass character in Poland, nor is an element of political culture. Social networks may, eventually, facilitate communication and collaboration in social matters. Their role today, however, is negligible.

The main determinant of the development of the contemporary political communication constitutes the attempt to impart a rational dimension to the actions of communication in compliance with Weber's understanding of the term. M. Weber claimed that rationism is a direct reflection of (a) the ability to determine such aims which are optimal and adequate to one's own resources within a given situational context, as well as the possibility to calculate the consequences of the actions undertaken (rational actions on account of the aim) and/or (b) orientation of actions around a given value system (rational actions on account of the values). In this view, a direction of the development of the contemporary conception of political communication reflects the evolutionary transformation of the relations between an axiological and instrumental-functional approach to the process of creating, planning, and executing communication strategies. Four stages in the development of the conception of communicative actions strategically ordered can be distinguished: — stage I: domination of communicative actions oriented around the political system of values preferable by the sender of the information (the stage of a traditional political propaganda; the chief aim of communicative influences — social integration/persuasion), — stage II: a relative balance of actions oriented around preferable political values and pragmatic aims (the stage of institutionalised political propaganda; the chief aim of communicative influences — persuasion/integration/political activation), — stage III: domination of pragmatic aims parallel with political values preferable by the sender of the information (the stage of early communication campaigns market-oriented; the chief aim of communicative influences — persuasion/political activation), — stage IV: correlation of pragmatic aims and instrumental values (the stage of a developed political marketing communication; the chief aim of communicative influences — political motivation, with the main emphasis on the election activation). An increasing popularity of the marketing methods of organization and conducting political campaigns should be treated as a subsequent stage of the search for the efficient formula of political communication, the stage whose main determinants are the following: — organizational transformation of traditional political subjects (political parties, electional organizations of candidates), — gradual professionalization of politics, in two perspectives: professionalization of political parties evident in the increase of the role of professional politics in making important organizational decisions, as well as the appearance of new actors on the political stage, political consultants, taking over the position of a central decisive centre in political organizations, with responsibility for preparation and implementation of the political communication strategy, — mediatisation of political communication — means of mass communication have become the main transmission channel of political information on the one hand, and, on the other hand, a kind of creator of the political reality, shaping the image of the political market, particular political subjects, or the course of political rivalry by active selection and exposure of given information according to the commercial and/or political interests of the media transmitters, — change of the system of factors determining political behaviours (electional behaviours in particular) of citizens — what becomes especially important in this context is a progressing decrease of the level of political identification leading to the increase of the number of citizens slightly engaged in the political enterprise, possessing relatively low competences of receiving and understanding transmitted political information, as well as basic problems with taking a given political decision. The complexity of the market conditions makes the subjects of political rivalry choose and develop communication marketing strategies. Such a way of organizing and realising political communicative campaigns — in accordance with the four basic criteria: efficiency, predictability, calculationism, and the use of advanced technology — may be treated as an optimal variant of a strategic adjustment of the contemporary organizations to diversified requirements of the political environment.