Ovaj rad ispituje odnos između građanskih prosvjeda i društvenih medija iz perspektive istraživačkog programa kolektivnog djelovanja. Dok literatura ukazuje na snažne empirijske dokaze o pozitivnom odnosu između upotrebe društvenih medija i pojave građanskih prosvjeda, teorijsko je podupiranje ovog odnosa osporavano i često neodređeno. Nastojeći pružiti snažniju teorijsku osnovu za taj odnos, ovaj rad istražuje teorije kolektivnog djelovanja fokusirajući se na društvene medije i njihovu ulogu u rješavanju problema kolektivnog djelovanja onih koji se suprotstavljaju službenoj politici. Rad promišlja kako upotreba teorije kolektivnog djelovanja za razumijevanje društvenih medija i prosvjeda može poslužiti boljem razumijevanju pozitivnog odnosa između društvenih medija i pojave građanskih prosvjeda. ; This article examines the relationship between social protest and social media from the theoretical perspective of the Collective Action Research Program. While the literature shows strong empirical evidence for a positive relationship between social media use and incidents of social protest, the theoretical underpinnings of this relationship remain contested and often unspecified. In order to provide a stronger theoretical basis for this relationship this paper explores theories of collective action, focusing on how social media can assist in solving the dissident collective action problem. It argues that using collective action theory to understand social media and protest can better inform our understanding of how and why social media shares a positive relationship with incidents of social protest.
The paper analyzes and discusses two sets of issues: (1) differences between the avant-garde and the neo-avant-garde, and (2) different avant-garde and neo-avant-garde approaches to materialism in a philosophical, political, and aesthetic sense. The avant-garde and the neo-avant-garde were seldom doctrinaire, but one can nevertheless speak about the circularity of beliefs and attitudes, the mobility of theoretical and practical platforms from self-destructiveness to artistic and media nomadism, in the manner of rhizomatic manifolds. Certainly, there are common obsessions with the unity of art and life, or the fundamental turn of art into life, which are expressed by the macro-utopian projections of the new society (industrial society, communist society) forwarded by avant-garde artists, or by the concretizations of micro-utopias (communes, alternative production and exhibition institutions) by neo-avant-garde artists. Examples of primary materialism, aleatory materialism, historical materialism, and basic materialism are given in order to point out the unstable relations between the medium (material) and the media (technique, technology) of communication, but also non-communication. ; U radu se analiziraju i raspravljaju dvije tematizacije: (1) razlike avangarde i neoavangarde i (2) različiti avangardistički i neoavangardistički pristupi materijalizmu u filozofskom, političkom i estetičkom smislu. Avangarde i neoavangarde su rijetko kada bile doktrinarne, prije se može govoriti o cirkularnosti uvjerenja i stavova, mobilnosti teorijskih i praktičnih platformi od autodestruktivnosti do umjetničkog i medijskog nomadizma te o antagonizmima istovremenog suočavanja s dijalektičkim napetostima i obratima, strukturnom proizvodnjom razlika i beskrajnim usložnjavanjima mogućnosti na način rizomatičnih mnogostrukosti. Svakako, postoje i zajedničke opsesije jedinstvom umjetnosti i života ili fundamentalnim obratom umjetnosti u život, koje se iskazuju makroutopijskim projekcijama novog društva (industrijskog društva, komunističkog društva) kod avangardista ili konkretizacijama mikroutopija (komune, alternativne produkcijske i izlagačke institucije) kod neoavangardista. Izvedeni su primjeri primarnog materijalizma, aleatornog materijalizma, historijskog materijalizma te baznog materijalizma da bi se upozorilo na relativne odnose medija (materijala) i medija (tehnike, tehnologije) komunikacije, ali i nekomunikacije.
Ovaj članak nastoji prikazati na istraživanju utemeljeno razumijevanje uloge medija u tranzicijskim zemljama. Naše se istraživanje fokusira na procese političke socijalizacije, na političko ponašanje i vjerodostojnost te daje primjere iz triju regija: središnje i istočne Europe, Latinske Amerike te Bliskog istoka i sjeverne Afrike. Pozornost smo skrenuli na neke od glavnih radova relevantnih za studije masovnih medija u tranzicijskom kontekstu s ciljem uvida u važne teorije dostupne u studijama o medijima i demokratizaciji. Svjesni ograničenja koja postavlja priroda i opseg uzorka pregledanih studija, identificirali smo i raspravili neke od potencijalnih ključnih prepreka razvoju teorije o političkoj socijalizaciji, političkom ponašanju i vjerodostojnosti u navedenim područjima te predložili alternativne pristupe u istraživanju. ; This article seeks to compile an empirically-based understanding of the role of media in countries in transition. The study focuses on the processes of political socialization, behaviour and accountability, and gives examples from three regions: Central and Eastern Europe, Latin America, and the Middle East/North Africa region. We draw on some of the major works relevant to the study of mass media in these transitional contexts with the aim of discerning emergent theories available to the study of media and democratisation. While aware of the limitations posed by the nature and scope of the sample of the studies reviewed, we do identify and discuss some of the potentially key obstacles to theory-building and propose some alternative paths of enquiry.
Postalo je gotovo uobičajeno sugerirati kako nove tehnologije, nove politike i nove ekonomije donose mnoge izazove koji ugrožavaju opstojnost koncepta javne radio-televizije (engl. public service broadcasting) i institucija javnih radio-televizija. Iz tih izazova, u duhu plemenitog optimizma, proizišla je ideja kako javne radio-televizije mogu biti redefinirane u javne medijske servise i kako njihova vrijednost može biti mjerljiva pa samim time i "vjerodostojna". Ovaj pak članak sugerira ne samo da je to vjerojatno pogrešno nego i da je ono što je zapravo na stvari povijesno određena borba oko vrijednosti koje će modernitet prihvatiti. ; It has become common place to suggest that the concept and institutions of public service broadcasting (PSB) are being fundamentally challenged by new technologies, new politics and new economics. Out of these challenges, in a kind of noble optimism, has emerged the idea that PSB can be reimagined as public service media, the worth of which can be made measurable and therefore 'accountable.' This article suggests that not only is this likely misplaced, it also masks the fact that what is actually in play is a historically defined struggle over the values that will constitute modernity.
Rad kritički evaluira postoji li (ne)podudaranje između teorije javnog medijskog servisa i njegove politike i strateških dokumenata kada je riječ o idejama uključivanja medijskih publika u javni medijski servis. Najprije se teorijski nastoji uokviriti ova rasprava, tako da se razmatra pet zadaća uključivanja medijskih publika u javni medijski servis. Potom se istražuje kako BBC (Ujedinjeno Kraljevstvo), France Télévisions (Francuska), VRT (Flandrija, Belgija) i NPO (Nizozemska) trebaju (politika) i namjeravaju (strategija) uključiti svoje medijske publike. Odabrani slučajevi daju uvid u bolje financirane (BBC, FTV) i manje javne medijske servise (VRT, NPO), kao i u različite medijske sustave. Upotrijebljena je metoda goal-means tree analiza, tip kvalitativne analize dokumenata kojoj je svrha otkrivanje odnosa između cilja i sredstava u politici i strateškim tekstovima. Glavni je argument da je ovdje prije riječ o nekim upitnim, normativnim pretpostavkama iz teorije o javnom medijskom servisu i uključenosti publike, koje su prenesene i u tekstove o politici i strategiji javnog medijskog servisa, a ne o nepodudaranju između teorije, politike i strategije javnog medijskog servisa. ; The article critically evaluates whether there is a (mis)match between ideas on audience involvement in public service media (PSM) theory and the translation thereof in public broadcasters' policy and strategy documents. The literature section theoretically frames this discussion, first, discussing five objectives of PSM and audience involvement. Subsequently, it studies how the BBC (UK), France Télévisions (France), VRT (Flanders), and NPO (the Netherlands) have to (policy) and intend to (strategy) involve their audiences. These cases have been selected with an eye on including both better-funded (BBC, FTV) and smaller public broadcasters (VRT, NPO), as well as different media systems. For the analysis, the method of goal-means tree analysis is adopted, a type of qualitative document analysis that can be deployed to uncover goal-means relationships in policy and strategy texts. The main argument is that, rather than a mismatch, some of the questionable, normative assumptions made in theories concerning audience involvement and PSM are also present in the PSM policy and strategy texts.
Prednosti komunikacije te lakšu dostupnost ciljnih javnost preko društvenih mreža prepoznale su i političke elite te su, osim tradicionalnih oblika komunikacije, političku komunikaciju obogatile društvenim medijima. Dominantna društvena mreža u Hrvatskoj je Facebook, iako nemali broj osoba iz javnoga života koristi i Twitter kao sredstvo komunikacije. Premda se raspravlja jesu li društveni mediji unaprijedili demokraciju ili je ugrozili, činjenica je da je ta platforma omogućila transparentniju i dostupniju komunikaciju koja zasigurno utječe na izgradnju imidža pojedinaca i institucija iz političke arene, kojima je takav oblik komunikacije omogućio i izgradnju vlastite virtualne zajednice. Struktura rada sastoji se od nekoliko većih cjelina i pripadajućih podcjelina. Razlike koje su uočene istraživanjem upućuju na to da su institucije, dakle ministarstva, u Sloveniji u daleko većoj mjeri prisutna u viralnome prostoru nego li je to slučaj u Hrvatskoj. Gledaju li se sami nositelji javne vlasti, ministri, oni su u Hrvatskoj, za razliku od Slovenije, prisutniji sa svojim službenim Facebook stranicama. Takvi rezultati, iako znakoviti, ne upućuju na to da se u Hrvatskoj i Sloveniji komunikacija na digitalnim platformama koristi u svrhu političkoga diskursa ili u cilju informiranja ključnih aktera te posljedično kreiranja javnoga mišljenja o nekome političkom pitanju ; With the development of the Internet, as the fastest growing media, social networks have evolved, as well as everyday communication on these platforms. Benefits communication and easier access to the target public and has been recognized by the political elites and are, in addition to traditional forms of communication, political communication enriched communication on social media. The dominant social network in Croatia is Facebook, although not a small number of public life uses Twitter as a means of communication. Despite the numerous controversy over whether or not the social media have upgraded or threatened democracy, the fact is that this platform has enabled a more transparent and accessible communication that certainly has an impact on building the image of individuals and institutions from the political arena, which has made this form of communication possible to build a virtual community . The structure of the work consists of several larger entities and corresponding subdivisions. The first part of the work is based on theoretical insights. Minorizing the transition theory and democratization of post-communist societies, the theoretical part of the work also deals with civic participation and culture. All these transversal processes for three decades have also influenced the modification of communication, from top to bottom, therefore, towards citizens, from citizens to the public authorities. Therefore, political communication on social networks as well as social networks as a tool for creating a positive image in public relations will be treated theoretically. The second part of the deconstruction process is the presence of Croatian and Slovenian ministries, as a public authority institution and ministers on Facebook's social network. Compilation and descriptor methods, theoretical perspectives are dissected using relevant sources, while in the second part, the descriptive statistics method deconstructs the results obtained by research. Using the illustrations and the comparison method, the results are compared. At the end of the paper, the conclusion is based on theoretical strengths and results obtained.
Istraživanje je poduzeto radi svrhe prikazivanja odnosa moći između različitih aktera koji su sudjelovali u formulaciji dopunskog osiguranja. Cilj je utvrditi tko su bili najutjecajniji/najmoćniji akteri u tom procesu kako bi se unaprijedilo znanje o akterima hrvatske zdravstvene politike i pokazalo tko su jedni od najvažnijih aktera u toj hrvatskoj politici. U radu autor se vodio pretpostavkom pluralizma kako je moć široko distribuirana među različitim akterima te da im se na temelju toga omogućava sudjelovanje, zastupanje interesa i utjecaj na spomenuti proces. U skladu s time autor je razvio mrežu interakcije između aktera, a moć se mjerila pomoću 4 indikatora: javne ovlasti, uloga u procesu, medijska zastupljenost te percepcija aktera o distribuciji moći. Svi indikatori upućuju na to da su najutjecajniji akteri bili formalni, odnosno državni te da moć nije bila široko distribuirana. Nadalje, iako su akteri razvili svojevrsnu mrežu odnosa, ona se ne može u potpunosti objasniti pristupom mreža javnih politika jer je kao prvo, postojao jedan centar moći oko kojeg se strukturirala interakcija i kao drugo, civilno društvo je bilo nedovoljno zastupljeno. ; Research was conducted for purposes of explaining the relations of power between various actors which have participated in the formulation of supplementary health insurance. The goal was to determine who were the most inflental/powerful actors in that process in order to advance knowledge about Croatian health policy actors and to show which actors are the most relevant in that policy. In this paper the author took the assumption of pluralism as a theory which holds that power is widely distributed among different actors and thus enables them to take part in the policy process, representing their interests and influencing policy. Accordingly, the author developed a network of interaction between actors, and power was measured by four indicators: public authority, role in the policy process, media representation, and actors perception of power distribution. All ...
Rad istražuje značenje teorije vrijednosnog uokvirivanja u političkoj komunikaciji, odnosno ispituje utjecaj vrijednosnih okvira na formiranje političkih stavova u javnosti. Učinak vrijednosnog uokvirivanja izveden je iz kontekstualne vrijednosti informacije (pozitivno, negativno) i vrijedi ako stavovi ljudi prema određenoj temi odgovaraju kontekstualnoj vrijednosti primljene informacije. Ovaj rad kao studiju slučaja predstavlja izvještavanje za vrijeme krize vlade Mireka Topoláneka u Češkoj Republici 2009. Rad ispituje u kojoj je mjeri kontekst izjava na češkim vijestima o dvjema parlamentarnim strankama – Građanskoj demokratskoj stranci (Občanská demokratická strana, ODS, predsjednik Mirek Topolánek) i Češkoj socijaldemokratskoj stranci (Česká strana sociálně demokratická, ČSSD, predsjednik Jiří Paroubek) – povezan s postojećim političkim stavovima njihove potencijalne publike. U radu se tvrdi kako je učinak vrijednosnog uokvirivanja bio vidljiviji u programu javne televizije Události ČT nego u komercijalnom programu Televizní noviny, što predstavlja paradoks koji se može objasniti jedinstvenom poveznicom između karakteristika češkog medijskog okruženja i političkih stavova televizijskih gledatelja. ; This article explores the meaning of valence-framing theory in political communication. It examines the influence of valence frames on the formation of political attitudes among the public. The valence-framing effect is derived from the information context value (positive, negative) and applies if people's attitudes towards a certain subject match the context value of the information received. The article presents a case study of reports during the crisis of Mirek Topolánek's government in the Czech Republic in 2009. It examines to what extent the context of the statements on the Czech news concerning the parliamentary parties Civic Democratic Party (ODS, leader Mirek Topolánek) and the Czech Social Democratic Party (ČSSD, leader Jiří Paroubek) related to the existing political attitudes of their prospective audiences. The article argues that the valence-framing effect was more evident in the public broadcasting programme Události ČT than the commercial programme Televizní noviny, a paradox which can be explained by the unique link between the attributes of the Czech media environment and the political opinions of their viewers.
Pri analizi dvaju suprotstavljenih narativa povezanih s temom uspostave vojske Europske unije (EU) u europskom medijskom i političkom prostoru u ovome radu upotrebljava se teorija sekrutizacije te se temeljem analize diskursa i javnog mnijenja dokazuje da suprotstavljeni narativi ispunjavaju uvjete da ih prema definiciji Kopenhagenske škole svedemo pod pojam sekuritizacije. Prema autorima Kopenhagenske škole, sekuritizacija je govorni čin kojim provoditelj sekuritizacije do tada nepolitizirani odnosno politizirani predmet debate prikazuje kao egzistencijalnu prijetnju prema referentnom objektu koja zahtijeva hitne mjere. Prvi narativ koji rad analizira je neizvjesna sigurnosna situacija u Europi i oko nje koja bi mogla prerasti u egzistencijalnu prijetnju društvu Europske unije i europskom identitetu zbog nepostojanja vojske Unije. Drugi, tome oprečni narativ pak interpretira uspostavu vojske Europske unije kao egzistencijalnu prijetnju NATO savezu i suverenitetu država članica Unije. Rad postavlja pitanje je li sekuritizacija upotrebljiva poluga u nastojanju provođenja odnosno blokiranja čvršće intergracije EU na području obrane. Analizom diskursa glavnih aktera, provoditelja sekuritizacije i sigurnosnih strategija EU, Velike Britanije i Sjedinjenih Američkih Država te analizom prihvaćanja narativa od strane publike, rad zaključuje da su ti oba narativa činovi sekuritizacije. Prvi narativ, sekuritiziran od strane europskih federalista na čelu s predsjednikom Europske komisije Jean-Claudeom Junckerom, kao referentne objekte koji se pod hitno moraju zaštiti postavlja društvo EU i europski identitet. Egzistencijalna prijetnja referentnim objektima dolazi od ruske politike, ali i neizvjesne sigurnosne situacije u neposrednom susjedstvu EU-a. Ovaj narativ kao rješenje nameće uspostavu vojske EU-a. Drugi narativ, sekuritiziran od strane euroskeptika, NATO saveza te političkih elita Velike Britanije, SAD-a i Rusije, kao referentne objekte koji se pod hitno moraju zaštititi postavlja suverenitet država članica EU i opstanak NATO saveza koji se nalaze u egzistencijalnoj prijetnji od strane uspostave vojske Europske unije, čija bi uspostava oduzela nacionalne vojske tj. suverenitet država članica u području obrane, a postojanje NATO saveza učinilo izlišnim ; The thesis proves that around the establishment of the European Union army, we can infer two opposing narratives in European Union's media and political space and that both meet the conditions to be called a securitization. The first narrative (positive securitization) that the thesis analyses argues that the precarious the security situation in and around Europe could become an existential threat to the society of European Union (EU) and European identity because of the paucity of the EU army. The second narrative (negative securitization) that the thesis analyses interprets the establishment of the EU army as an existential threat to the North Atlantic Alliance (NATO) and the sovereignty of EU member states. Securitization is defined through the Theory of Securitisation by the scientists belonging to Copenhagen School (Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver and Jaap de Wilde) as a speech act by which an actor (securitizing actor) presents a specific issue, until then only politicised in the political or public space, as an existential threat to the referent object that requires extraordinary measures. For a speech act to be an act of securitization and not just an attempt of securitisation, public (or a target group) needs to accept the speech as such. Thus, the Theory of Securitization affirms that the chosen narratives are acts of securitizations through discourse analysis and public opinion analysis. Elements of securitization are before mentioned securitization actor, referent object and public, as well as functional actors, which indirectly affect security decisions by lobbing or directing the securitization actors, and context, as a speech act cannot be an independent factor in the securitization process but is dependent on historical, political, societal, economic, geographic, and other variables. The principal difference between Theory of Securitisation and the mainstream security theories: Traditional Security Studies (TSS) and Critical Security Studies (CSS), is that Theory of Securitization is not concerned if the issue that a speech act wants to present as a security issue, really is a security issue, but how a speech act presents the issue as a security issue. Unlike the Theory of Securitisation, TSS is a realistic security theory that examines is the issue a real security threat while CSS is a constructive security theory that examines the reality of security threat. Both, TSS and CSS, analyze already present security threat, while Theory of Securitisation analyses the creation of the security threat. Positive securitisation, the precarious security situation in and around Europe that could become an existential threat to the society of the EU because of the paucity of the EU army, is securitised by European federalists headed by European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker and HR/VP Federica Mogherini. Referent objects that are in urgent need of protection are the EU society and the European identity (values and principles) that are in the existential threat of Russia and uncertain security situation in the immediate neighbourhood of the EU. As a solution for the existential threat, securitising actors impose the establishment of the EU army. Functional actors of positive securitisation are stakeholders in the European defence industry who have a purely economic reason for the backing of positive securitisation, and European elite which advocates the federalisation of the European Union. The prime public, core target group, for the positive securitisation should be the Heads of 28 EU member states who make decisions concerning Common Security Defence Policy (CSDP). As the decisions concerning CSDP must be unanimous, and some member states, mostly United Kingdom (UK), steadily use the instrument of veto to block further development of the CSDP, the thesis assumes that the securitising actors of positive securitisation decided to expand the target group for their securitisation onto European Union society as a whole. Reasons behind the expansion of the target public, which thus makes the whole society of the European Union a the public is a pressure onto the Heads of EU member states since the citizens of the EU have a very favourable opinion about the further development of the CSDP and mostly positive opinion regarding the establishment of the EU army. Negative securitisation, which interprets the establishment of the EU army as an existential a threat to the NATO and the sovereignty of EU member states, is a complex form of securitisation. Instead of one securitising actor or one group of securitising actors with the same motive (European federalist with Juncker as champion in positive securitisation), negative securitisation is securitised by several securitising actors without the leading champion with sometimes the same and sometimes different motives: Eurosceptics, NATO, decision-makers in the United Kingdom, the United States (US) and Russia. Furthermore, negative securitisation accumulates the referent objects that are in urgent need of protection: the sovereignty of the EU member states and the survival of the NATO alliance. The only element of the negative securitisation that is unambiguous is the existential threat from the establishment of the EU army whose establishment would take away the national armies, i.e. the sovereignty of the EU member states and made the NATO alliance vulnerable. Hence, for the sake of simplicity of understanding the elements of negative securitisation and their synergy, the thesis uses the Classical Security Complex Theory (CSCT) for the proper consideration of the patterns of the security connections. Using discourse analysis of the speech acts and official documents the thesis shows how the decision-makers in the US (regardless of their political affiliation) securitise the establishment of the EU army as an existential threat to NATO and future of Atlantic security cooperation. Same is evident with the NATO as a securitising actor. The decision-makers in the UK (mostly conservatives) securitise the establishment of the EU army and further development of CSDP as an existential threat to the national sovereignty of EU member states. Russia too securitises the establishment of the EU army as an existential threat to the national sovereignty of EU member states but does the deed backstage financially supporting nationalist and Eurosceptic EU parties and via cyber-attacks and disinformation campaign. Functional actors of negative securitisation are stakeholders in the non-EU defence industry and other industries which prosper due to unstable global security situation, private military organisations, non-independent think thanks, etc. The public for the negative securitisation is the Eurosceptic part of the EU society, but the core target group are the citizens of the UK. Securitising actors of the negative securitisation narrowed the public of their securitisation for the same reason why the securitising actors of the positive securitisation broaden theirs – decisions concerning CSDP must be unanimous. Consequently, the securitising actors of the negative securitisation to be successful in their securitisation need to persuade only citizens of the UK that their narrative is correct. As already mentioned, the Theory of Securitisation analyses the creation of the security threat, so very important for the understanding of the results of discourse analysis is the context behind the construction of the securitisation. In the case of the securitisations analysed in the thesis, the contexts of both narratives have foundations in the conflict between neorealist and neoliberal doctrines in foreign politics, different security strategies of the countries, and change in a global security system, as well as historical, political, societal, economic, geographic and other variables. No EU member state can be a superpower on its own in today's world. This notion and aim to hinder the possibility of another armed conflict in Europe prompted the creation of the Union. After more than 60 years of enlargement and integration, the EU is an economic superpower. Nevertheless, to protect its economic superiority as well as to impose its doctrine in foreign politics and expand its multilateral security strategy, the EU needs to be and defence union. This idea is not a new one but exists and was attempted to be implemented from the beginning of the EU existence. The securitising actors of the positive securitisation believe that with the establishment of the EU army, the EU can keep the US hegemony in the global security system and the Russian renewal of bloc-system aspirations under control. Some securitising actors of the positive securitisation also believe that the further integration of the EU is necessary to prevent the disintegration. Above all, is the strong desire of the EU elite for the federation of the EU. Expectedly, not least because of the postulate of the security dilemma, the US and Russia are afraid of the military-strong EU which could change the current global security system, while the UK believes that with the strengthening of the EU its military and political strength will wane or disappear. As the UK is the EU member state and its citizens are the most Eurosceptic the public in the EU, both and the US and Russia focused most of their securitisation's efforts toward the UK's citizens. The US also uses the UK as a tool of disruption in the EU – it's right to veto decisions about the further development of CSDP, integration of the EU in the defence field and the establishment of the EU army. The thesis hypothesises that the two opposed narratives that the thesis considers to be securitisations have generated the status quo in the development of CSDP. Through the discourse analysis of speech acts and the official documents of securitising actors of both narratives as well as analysis of the acceptance of narratives by the audience (public opinion analysis), the thesis positively answers the research question: Is the securitisation theory usable the instrument in the effort to implement/block more effective EU integration?
Prvi svjetski rat bio je (ne)očekivana situacija zastrašujućeg intenziteta koja je uvelike izmijenila dotadašnje pojmove i rasprave o ograničenosti ratnih djelovanja. Bio je pomalo »očaravajući« za tehnologe, uzbudljiv za političare i šokantan za intelektualce. Međunarodni odnosi (preko Lige naroda i Ujedinjenih naroda) nakon Drugog svjetskog rata više nikad nisu bili isti, uz tihe ratove koje su vodili idealisti i realisti teorija politike i međunarodnih odnosa. Kenneth Waltz, kao neorealist, usmjerava raspravu o smislu rata manje na pitanje ljudske prirode, a više prema pitanjima država, međunarodnih sustava te prema globalnoj strukturi koje stvara potrebu za ratovanjem ili za uspostavljanjem mira. Uviđa da suvremene metode (filozofije) politike i političke znanosti valja i dalje prožimati s klasičnim pristupima i kriterijima filozofske i političke misli. U raspravi o naravi ratovanja ili nužnosti mira valja razotkrivati koncepte sile i državne dominacije – koja se provodi u kulturnoj, tehnološkoj pa i masmedijskoj sferi – i kritičkim pristupom Noama Chomskog. Potrebno je i (re)afirmirati stav javnosti, reakcije intelektualaca i ozračje što ga je izazvao Prvi svjetski rat da bismo se – i kroz eseje Hermanna Hessea – bolje suočili s današnjom postmodernističkom dehumanizacijom i beznađem aktualnih koncepcija i perspektiva ratovanja. ; World War I was the (un)expected situation of frightening intensity that has greatly changed the prior concepts and discussions about the limitations of war operations. It was somewhat "enchanting" for technologists, exciting for the politicians, and shocking for the intellectuals. International relations (through the League of Nations and United Nations) after World War II changed, with silent wars being led by idealists and realists of the theory of politics and international relations. As a neorealist, Kenneth Waltz directs discussion about the meaning of war less towards the matter of human nature, and more towards the questions regarding countries, international systems, and global structure that create the need for a war or the need for establishing peace. He recognizes that modern methods of (philosophy of) politics and political science should still be pervaded with classical approaches, and criteria of philosophical and political thought. In the debate about the nature of war or about the necessity of peace, the concepts of force and the state domination should be exposed. They are carried out in the cultural, technological, and even in the mass media sphere, and here Noam Chomsky's critical approach is needed. Attitude of the public, the reaction of intellectuals, and the atmosphere which was caused by the First World War has to be (re)affirmed in order to – and through the essays by Hermann Hesse – better face with today's postmodern dehumanization, and the pointlessness of current concepts and perspectives of War
Baski, manjinski narod sa svojim zasebnim jezikom i kulturom, stoljećima je podijeljen između Španjolske i Francuske. U Francuskoj Baski nemaju status manjine ni institucionalnu autonomiju. U Španjolskoj, međutim, nakon teškog razdoblja Francove diktature i preustrojstva Španjolske 1978. na kvazifederalnom načelu, španjolski Baski dobivaju priznanje nacionalne posebnosti te znatnu institucionalnu autonomiju kroz tzv. Autonomnu zajednicu (AZ) Baskiju. Unatoč zadovoljavanju većine aspiracija Baska u Španjolskoj, u španjolskoj Baskiji i dalje je prisutan secesionizam, dok taj fenomen u francuskom dijelu Baskije gotovo da i ne postoji. Cilj disertacije bio je, binarnom studijom i dizajnom najsličnijih slučajeva, koristeći se kvalitativno-kvantitativnom metodom, istražiti je li autonomija, umjesto zadovoljavanja španjolskih Baska statusom u okviru Španjolske, pridonijela jačanju njihova nacionalizma i secesionizma. Ovi fenomeni obrađeni su kroz tri prizme: izgradnju subdržavnih institucija, izgradnju subdržavnih identiteta i izgradnju lokalnih elita. Uočeno je da je autonomija u španjolskoj Baskiji pridonijela izgradnji protodržave, od demokratski izabranog Parlamenta, preko izvršne vlasti, do djelomično izgrađenog sigurnosnog aparata. Iako usporen rascjepima u baskijskom društvu uslijed demografske heterogenosti, na djelu je proces izgradnje subdržavne baskijske nacije. Autonomija je omogućila i izgradnju lokalnih elita, dolazak baskijskih nacionalista na vlast, kao i stranačko nadmetanje u baskijskom nacionalizmu. Sve to omogućilo je i da AZ Baskija krene izrazito "baskijskim" smjerom. Ona je potencijalno samo korak do pune neovisnosti, kojoj nedostaje još "prozor mogućnosti", koji se dogodio npr. raspadom bivših komunističkih federacija. U francuskoj Baskiji ne postoji teritorijalna, odnosno institucionalna autonomija. Ne dajući im "prozor mogućnosti" za razvoj i jačanje, građanska i unitarna država u Francuskoj odigrale su značajnu ulogu u ublažavanju baskijskog nacionalizma i secesionizma. Slučajevi španjolske i francuske Baskije pokazali su kako (ne)postojanje autonomije znatno utječe na periferni nacionalizam i secesionizam, kao i na potencijal za secesiju. ; In the last couple of years, the rise of secessionism in several democratic, Western European countries - from the United Kingdom (Scotland) and Belgium (Flanders) to Spain (Catalonia and the Basque Country) has been noted. All of them have something in common. In addition to having a heterogeneous ethnic structure, that is, the existence of distinct historical ethnic communities, all of these states have also, in the last couple of decades, gone through dramatic administrative and structural changes. From unitary states they had once been, they have transformed in a way which resulted in the introduction of either a certain degree of devolution or even in federalization. Consequently, historical ethnic communities have achieved a certain degree of autonomy, ranging from a partial and asymmetric decentralization ("devolution") as in the case of Scotland, to an extensive autonomy of the so-called autonomous communities of Spain. The intention of the central state and the legislator has been, inter alia, to safeguard the state unity and strengthen the state by accommodating the grievances of ethnic communities and their elites. The final outcome, however, has often been adverse to initial intentions. In the newly formed administrative units, "proto-states" of the ethnic minorities, there has been a rise in nationalism and secessionism. The purpose of this dissertation is to tackle this phenomenon and explore the causal relationship of autonomy and nationalism/secessionism. That is, the idea whether the autonomy itself strengthened nationalism and secessionism in the autonomous territories, thus acting as "subversive institutions" towards the central State, has been examined. In order to test the hypothesis and the arguments of the theory of subversive institutions, a dual comparison of two cases, Spanish and French Basque Country, and the most similar systems design have been used. The most similar systems design holds that the two cases share many common features and differ in only one. For instance, French and Spanish Basque Country are situated in the same region, share common language and ethnic origins; they are both parts of wider nation-states, face situation of diglossia etc. A differing feature, in this case, autonomy in the Spanish Basque Country – Autonomous Community of the Basque Country –Euskadi, is held responsible for the different outcome (stronger peripheral nationalism and secessionism). The choice of these two cases has been prompted by the fact that they may be considered the most similar cases in extremis, given that it is the same people on the two sides of the state border.The Basques, minority group with their own language and culture, for centuries have been divided among Spain and France. In France of today the Basques enjoy neither status of a national minority nor an institutional autonomy. In Spain, however, after a difficult period of Franco's dictatorship and the country's restructuring in 1978 on a quasi-federal principle, the Spanish Basques got acknowledgement of their national uniqueness (through a status of a nationality), and the Basque Country gained a significant institutional autonomy through so-called Autonomous Community of the Basque Country. In spite of the accommodation of most of the Spanish Basques' grievances, both on a tangible level (economic, political and cultural) and on a symbolic level (national and state symbols), the Spanish Basque Country still faces secessionism, while that phenomenon is hardly visible in its French counterpart. The dissertation explores whether the autonomy, instead of accommodating the Spanish Basques in the framework of the Spanish State, has contributed to the growth of their nationalism and secessionism. Conversely, the dissertation explores also whether the French civic state has contributed to attenuation of the peripheral, in this case, Basque nationalism. In France there are no "autonomic" institutions, but as a result of political and societal changes in France and external pressure from the South, i.e. from the Spanish Basque Country (spill over effect or Galton's problem), a "new governance" with specially designed institutions has been developed to partially accommodate the Basque grievances. Deprived of any substantial competences, executive or financial, they are a pale shadow of their Spanish counterparts. However, precisely for that, they serve as a good example to make comparative research in order to show the immense difference the autonomy per se can make. The research relies on the Valerie Bunce' s theory of "subversive institutions", which she tested on the cases of the former communist federations Soviet Union (USSR), Czechoslovakia (CSFR) and Yugoslavia (SFRY). Valerie Bunce (1999), explaining the collapse of former communist federations USSR, CSFR and SFRY, put forward a thesis that their design created preconditions for creating states within state. Consequently, the structure itself brought about the collapse of the communist bloc, and within it, of the federations USSR, CSFR and SFRY. Therefore, Bunce holds that the federalism created nations at the republican level or, if they had already been "defined", the federalism strengthened them. In other words, federal structure where the autonomous/federal units enjoyed relatively wide autonomy, in the long term acted centrifugally and finally led to the collapse of states (federations). With the advent of Gorbatchev and perestroika, consequent abandoning of the Brezhnev doctrine, and array of events that brought upon the collapse of communism and of federations, federal units – new "nations-in-the-making", took advantage of the situation ("window of opportunity") and proclaimed their independence.Bunce's theory and arguments have been applied on the situation in Spain. In the second case of the French Basque Country, and especially in the following comparative analysis, the situation in Spain can be/ is compared with the situation in France. It is thus possible to test the hypothesis on subversive institutions and to note the differences produced by the existence of autonomy in Spain. Bunce's theory has been tested on Spain (Spanish Basque Country) particularly for its quasi-federal structure of so-called autonomous communities (comunidades autónomas), or in Spanish jargon, Autonomías. Spanish autonomías provide a certain framework of a proto-state, nation-state, "state-in-waiting", and strengthen the centrifugal forces and local nationalism in a way, maybe to a lesser extent, but similarly as former republics of the ex-socialist federations. There comes the idea to test the theory of subversive institutions on Spain, i.e. Spanish Basque Country. In the introductory chapters of the dissertation, the phenomena of identity and nationalism have been tackled, followed by the theory of subversive institutions, as well as other supportive theories of the official nationalism (Anderson, 1990), path dependency (Krasner, 1984) and logic of appropriateness (March and Olsen, 2009). Finally, the three main arguments of the theory of subversive institutions have been elaborated, as well as the fourth, "counter argument". The two case studies follow, of the Spanish and the French Basque Country, structured in the same or very similar way. Firstly, the phenomenon of the Basque identity, its formation and its specifics for each of the two cases, has been elaborated. Secondly, the relation of the State towards the Basques and their identity has been examined in more depth. Within that framework, process of state building and other "counter-subversive action" of the state, with the aim of diminishing the peripheral nationalism and secessionism, has been tackled. Separate chapters have been dedicated to the transition to autonomy in the Spanish Basque Country (and to the Spanish Estado de las Autonomías /State of Autonomies) Bunce's theory and arguments have been applied on the situation in Spain. In the second case of the French Basque Country, and especially in the following comparative analysis, the situation in Spain can be/ is compared with the situation in France. It is thus possible to test the hypothesis on subversive institutions and to note the differences produced by the existence of autonomy in Spain. Bunce's theory has been tested on Spain (Spanish Basque Country) particularly for its quasi-federal structure of so-called autonomous communities (comunidades autónomas), or in Spanish jargon, Autonomías. Spanish autonomías provide a certain framework of a proto-state, nation-state, "state-in-waiting", and strengthen the centrifugal forces and local nationalism in a way, maybe to a lesser extent, but similarly as former republics of the ex-socialist federations. There comes the idea to test the theory of subversive institutions on Spain, i.e. Spanish Basque Country. In the introductory chapters of the dissertation, the phenomena of identity and nationalism have been tackled, followed by the theory of subversive institutions, as well as other supportive theories of the official nationalism (Anderson, 1990), path dependency (Krasner, 1984) and logic of appropriateness (March and Olsen, 2009). Finally, the three main arguments of the theory of subversive institutions have been elaborated, as well as the fourth, "counter argument". The two case studies follow, of the Spanish and the French Basque Country, structured in the same or very similar way. Firstly, the phenomenon of the Basque identity, its formation and its specifics for each of the two cases, has been elaborated. Secondly, the relation of the State towards the Basques and their identity has been examined in more depth. Within that framework, process of state building and other "counter-subversive action" of the state, with the aim of diminishing the peripheral nationalism and secessionism, has been tackled. Separate chapters have been dedicated to the transition to autonomy in the Spanish Basque Country (and to the Spanish Estado de las Autonomías /State of Autonomies) after the 1978 Constitution, possess almost the entire state administration. One of the 17 autonomous communities, Autonomous Community of the Basque Country - Euskadi has a clearly defined territory, a democratically elected Parliament (officially called the Basque Parliament), a Government, officially called the Basque Government, ministries (called departamentos, departments, headed by consejeros, counselors), a Prime Minister, Lehendakari, with some prerogatives of a President, including state honours and palace. His office includes a mini Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Acción Exterior – External Action), with its delegations abroad. Thus, the Basque Government can project its image abroad. The autonomous administration has some 60 000 employees, to which one has to add the 30 000 employees of the provincial and communal administration, and disposes of a 10.6 billion € budget. At the same time, the central state administration in the Basque Country counts only 15 000 employees. Euskadi disposes of its own police forces Ertzaintza. As mentioned before, several authors argue that with such a developed administrative apparatus, a "segment-state", in our case the Spanish Autonomous Community of the Basque Country- Euskadi, has been in power for most of the post-1978 Constitution period. Its institutions are consequently able to act as centrifugal ("subversive") institutions, transmitting nationalist messages through media, education system, and regional institutions. But their nationalist message is not of Spanish, but of peripheral, in this case, Basque nationalism. Given the specific, unfavourable linguistic situation of diglossia, and the importance of language for national (and Basque) identity, the Basque Governments took it as a mission to restore to the Basque language a status of a full-fledged official and education language, in a sense of Gellner's "language of high culture" (1998). (Re)Introducing the Basque language, not only in schools and universities, but literary everywhere, rebasquisating Euskadi, a Basque identity has been (re)enforced. Nowadays almost all institutions under the competence of local, autonomous institutions in the Spanish Basque Country are obliged to adopt Action plans or Five-year plans on the language normalization, that is, reinforced use of the Basque language. The Basque Government, in that way projects certain ideology and builds up and strengthens the Basque national identity. A new, Basque nation is being built.The statistics speak for themselves. Before the autonomy, that is, before 1978/1980, education language was 100% Spanish. Nowadays, only a tiny 0.5% of students study exclusively in Spanish (so called Model X), and 15.3% in Model A, with education in Spanish, and Basque language as one of the subjects. 18.9% study in bilingual schools (Model B) and the high 65.3% study in Basque schools (Model D), with Spanish language as one of the subjects. The presence of the Basque language is enforced in other areas as well. For instance, in public administration the targeted percentage of Basque speakers should be 48.46% and it should increase with the rise of knowledge of the Basque language in general population. Moreover, the presence of the Basque language is checked regularly in yearly evaluation reports. In the Parliament, in 2005-2009 legislature, 56% of deputies spoke Basque, while in 2013 the percentage rose to 68,5%. At the University of the Basque Country, in Academic year 1995/1996, 27.2% of the students studied in Basque, while in 2013/2014 the percentage rose to 64.3%. The number of bilingual professors (Basque and Spanish) rose from 35.1% in 2006 to 47.8% in 2013. Similar processes can be followed everywhere.As far as identity is concerned, the 35% of the interviewees in the opinion polls conducted by the University of the Basque Country declare themselves as "only Basques", 21% as "more Basque than Spanish", 35% "equally Basque and Spanish", 3% "more Spanish" and 3% "only Spanish". As it can be noted, Basque identity prevails, with a significant percentage of dual identity. Spanish identity (more or exclusively Spanish) is quite low. Opinion polls also testify of the presence of a strong local (Basque) patriotism, and at the same time, mistrust in Spanish State institutions. For example, 62% of the interviewees show trust in the Basque Government, 61% in the Basque Parliament and Basque police Ertzaintza, while only 39% in the King, 15% in the Spanish Cortes and 11% in the Spanish Government. Trust in the Basque Prime Minister is 56%, while in the Spanish Prime Minister it is only 7%. Regarding the attitude towards secessionism, 35% of interviewees support the present autonomous status, 29% favour federation (which understands a more autonomy), 7% favour more centralization and 25% favour secession. Although the latter percentage alone seems low as to provide proof of secessionism in stricto senso, the sum of the all percentages, except for 7% for centralization, should be taken into consideration if secessionism were to be regarded in a wider sense (as peripheral nationalism; autonomism and secessionism; Horowitz, 1985). From the data above, the conclusion can be drawn that the process of Basque nation-building maybe has not finished yet, but is well under way and that there is a "Basque direction" of the Euskadi. As for the Basque language in the French Basque Country, though it is increasingly present in its schools, public institutions and society, it still does not enjoy an official status. The improvement of linguistic situation is only partially due to the incitement on the part of the authorities. There is an immense difference from Spain. The French state after 1980-s allowed more freedom and space for "regional languages" to be taught, but did not impose it, force it by "dictate", as has been in the case of Euskadi. The main credit for the improvement of status of the Basque language is due to the efforts of the civil society, associations and citizens themselves. The results, comparing the Spanish and the French Basque Country, vary accordingly. Only 36,6% of school children attend some Basque language classes, while in Spanish Basque Country it is 99,5%. There is the Public Office of the Basque Language (OPLB), that helps and promotes teaching Basque language in the French Basque Country, but it has no authority to impose the Basque language in education as the Viceconsejería de Política Lingüística of the Gobierno Vasco and the Gobierno Vasco in the Spanish Basque Country. Only 11% of the interviewees feel "only Basques", 5% "more Basques", 24% "equally Basques and French", 16% "more French and 36% "only French". In the French Basque Country, the French identity and the French language in both education and society prevail. There is no "Basque direction" or Basque nation-building process. The third argument of the theory of subversive institutions is about elites' building. In Euskadi, there is the local (Basque) Parliament, where the Basque nationalists have dominated since the first elections after the establishment of autonomy (1980), with an average of 60% of votes/seats, except for the period 2009-2012 (due to a ban of the Basque radicals before the elections). In the current legislature, 2012-2016, the nationalists (moderate PNV-EAJ and radical EH Bildu) have 48 out of 75 seats. That means that they have been able to impose a "Basque direction", e.g. policies of rebasquization (termed language normalization), or vote the Ibarretxe Plan. There are also numerous examples of party competition in nationalism and local patriotism, e.g. the issue of Basque language use, flag, coat of arms or anthem. In the French Basque Country, due to non-existence of a local Parliament or self-rule, there are no such phenomena. There have been since decades Basque nationalist parties, and they score up to 10% of the votes. Nowadays, there is also a Basque nationalist party, AB (Abertzaleen Batasuna), which is relatively successful at the lower, communal level, having around 100 councillors. However, the non-existence of a Basque administrative unit,département, and centralist French electoral and administrative system, result in a situation where only two Basque nationalist councillors managed to enter the General Council of the Département Pyrénées-Atlantiques, of which French Basque Country is a part. And there they are only two of the 54 councillors. Therefore, even if at the lower, communal level, Basques nationalists can enter the local communes and be part of ruling coalitions, or form associations of local councillors and mayors, they cannot impose a more "Basque direction" of the whole French Basque Country, like their Spanish Basque counterparts. The autonomy, embodied in the Euskadi's Basque parliament, enabled Basque nationalists in the Spanish Basque Country (Autonomous Community of the Basque Country – Euskadi) to come to power at the local level and to direct the (Spanish) Basque Country towards a "Basque direction". In addition, it helped also to build up their own elites – party elites and leaders, Government and Parliament dignitaries, above all the Prime Minister- Lehendakari, local public company managers, University, Academy, institutes' directors etc. If a potential future new country needs the infrastructure (i.e. state administration, the framework), it also needs identity/ideology and leaders (the contents and experts). And here they are! Not only are they in place, but they are in power! Finally, having their own Basque University will help to reproduce new Basque elites. In contrast, the French Basque Country does not possess almost any of the above. Indeed, the difference produced by autonomy is immense. A special attention has been given to the Ibarretxe Plan which represents at the same time a peak of the autonomy, but also shows its limits. Juan Jose Ibarretxe, Euskadi's Prime Minister (Lehendakari) from 1999 to 2009, put forward in 2003 his Proposal for Reform of the Political Statute of Community of Euskadi, popularly known as Ibarretxe Plan. It was actually a proposal for a confederation between the Basque Country and Spain. The relations between them would be based on a "free association"(Art.1). Without going into details of the Proposal, suffice it to say that, had it been enacted, even without a completely independent Basque Country, it would mean the end of Spain as we know it today. The Plan was approved by the Basque Government in 2003, and a year later, by the Basque Parliament, although with a narrow majority of 39 out of 75 votes. However, in order to be enacted, the Proposal should have passed in the Spanish Parliament. It was not surprising that the Spanish Parliament had rejected any discussion about it. Today a Spanish "carte blanche" for an independent Basque Country seems completely unimaginable. Nevertheless, remembering the "velvet divorce" of Czech and Slovak Republics and bearing in mind as well the development of situation in Catalonia, one cannot exclude, under different circumstances and leadership in Madrid and Euskadi, a possibility of a "new Ibarretxe Plan" leading to a "velvet divorce" and eventually to an independent Basque Country. To conclude, the autonomy enabled institutions (Parliament/Argument 1), nurtured Basque identity (Argument 2), enabled Basque nationalists to come to power, created a space for Basque elites and leaders and created space or even incentives for party competition in Basque nationalism (Argument 3). The thing the autonomy has not produced, and that lacks for secessionists, is a "window of opportunity" (Bunce, 1999). But if the "window" opens, as in the case of e.g. Czechoslovak "velvet divorce", an opportunity for a potential sovereign Basque state could be created. The comparative analysis has showed more sharply the differences between the two cases resulting from the existence of the autonomy in the Spanish Basque Country (Autonomous Community of the Basque Country- Euskadi) and its absence in the French Basque Country. While in Euskadi the nationalists have since 1980 scored around 60% of the votes in the Basque Parliament and dominated local politics for most of the time, in the French Pays Basque they never score more than 10% and have always been quite irrelevant at the regional local level (except for the lower local level of municipalities). The Basque identity prevailed in Euskadi and French in the Pays Basque. The Basque nationalists have been able to impose a "Basque direction" and an intensive "basquization" within the language normalization policy in Euskadi, which has not been the case in Pays Basque. Finally, a serious sovereignist/secessionist attemps – Ibarretxe Plan occurred, materialized, and was voted in the Basque Parliament of Euskadi, while in the Pays Basque anything of a kind is beyond imagination. There is no French Basque Government to conceive such a plan, no French Basque Parliament as a forum where such a Plan could be voted and no prevalence of Basque nationalists to vote such a plan…All of these phenomena are direct or indirect results of the autonomy or were allowed and fostered by the autonomic institutions in the Spanish Basque Country. Conversely, they are missing in the French Basque Country due to lack of autonomy. The two cases confirmed the hypothesis that the autonomy in ethno-federal arrangements fosters peripheral nationalism and secessionism and a potential for secession, while civic State attenuates them. Interestingly enough, even the consultative institutions of the French "new governance", initially quite powerless, managed to acquire some of the features of the "subversive institutions". They have become increasingly "Basque" and have taken a "Basque direction". However, the civic, centralised and unitary State prevented these institutions stripped of a real power from taking a lead in the Basque nationalism, to gain any significant power, or to direct the French Basque Country in any "Basque direction". The civic State in France indeed acted in attenuating peripheral, Basque nationalism by not providing it a "window of opportunity" to grow.
