Bulgarian Interpretations of Ancient and Medieval Philosophy
In: Studies in East European thought, Band 53, Heft 1-2, S. 75-109
ISSN: 1573-0948
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In: Studies in East European thought, Band 53, Heft 1-2, S. 75-109
ISSN: 1573-0948
In: Medieval Feminist Newsletter, Band 14, S. 1-12
ISSN: 2154-4042
In: Socium i vlast, Band 3, S. 86-94
In: The Maghreb Review, Band 44, Heft 4, S. 563-566
ISSN: 2754-6772
In: Chinese Semiotic Studies, Band 12, Heft 3, S. 455-464
ISSN: 2198-9613
Abstract
With Medieval Philosophy Redefined as the Latin Age, John Deely has written a truly revolutionary book. Both medieval historians and semioticians alike will gain a new perspective on their subject matter upon reading Medieval Philosophy Redefined. In it, Deely traces the history of the sign by going to its roots in the writings of Augustine, and following it through to the time of John Poinsot. John Poinsot, a previously marginalized philosopher from the late medieval period, factors greatly in Deely's book. Poinsot makes it possible to get through the "thicket" of nominalism and see beyond Renaissance Humanism. Perhaps even more remarkable is the fact that, by using the sign as the point of departure, Deely has found a constant thread that runs through the Medieval Ages, making it, the sign, a key to understanding medieval philosophy from its start to its finish.
In: The philosophy of humor yearbook, Band 4, Heft 1, S. 307-307
ISSN: 2698-718X
In: Idei i idealy: naučnyj žurnal = Ideas & ideals : a journal of the humanities and economics, Band 13, Heft 3-1, S. 35-47
ISSN: 2658-350X
This paper is devoted to the analysis and to the comparison of concepts on theodicy and on the nature of evil that was developed by two medieval Jewish philosophers. They are Levi ben Gershom (Gersonides or Ralbag, 1288-1344) and Hasdai Crescas (1340-1410/12). The sources of the analysis are the third chapter of the fourth book of the "Wars of the Lord" (1329) by Gersonides and the second chapter of the second book of the "Light of the Lord" (1410) by Crescas. Both philosophers assert that evil essentially cannot come from God. The causes of evil are the sinfulness of human beings, or the celestial bodies, or the breaking of the connection between human and God. The problem of evil and injustice in this world are closely related for Gersonides and Crescas to other problems, such as divine knowledge of future events, free will, reasons for reward and punishment. Gersonides and Crescas differ considerably on these issues. Gersonides demonstrates that God is not an essential source of evil. He proceeded to build on this statement with the fallacy of the opinion that divine providence extends to individuals. After all, said Gersonides, retribution would make God a source of evil. And in this case, righteous men would always be rewarded, and sinners would always be punished for their sins. But obviously this is not the case. Crescas, in contrast to Gersonides, claims that God knows individuals. This does not prevent him from agreeing with Ralbagh that God is not the source of evil. According to Crescas, any punishment or suffering (even for the righteous) always leads to good. It is obvious therefore that Crescas adheres to a more traditional position, trying, inter alia, to bring his thoughts as close as possible to the ideas expressed in the Torah. Gersonides adheres to a position close to the ideas of Maimonides. Gersonides, in the author's opinion, created a philosophical concept that is more consistent in comparison with Crescas' conception, however more distant from the Jewish teaching.
In: Primeiros escritos: boletim de pesquisa na graduação em filosofia, Heft 8, S. 8
ISSN: 2594-5920
O presente artigo tem por objetivo expor possíveis abordagens da história da filosofia medieval a partir do debate entre Alain de Libera e Claude Panaccio. Embora a discussão seja em específico sobre a historiografia da filosofia medieval, o plano de fundo é uma discussão a respeito de como lidar com a história da filosofia em geral ou, em última instância, como ler um texto filosófico
In: Political studies review, Band 11, Heft 2, S. 239
ISSN: 1478-9299
In: The Western political quarterly, Band 17, Heft 1, S. 148
ISSN: 1938-274X
In: Perspectives on political science, Band 28, Heft 4, S. 189
ISSN: 1045-7097
In: Perspectives on political science, Band 28, Heft 4, S. 189-193
ISSN: 1930-5478
In: Political theory: an international journal of political philosophy, Band 38, Heft 3, S. 340-366
ISSN: 1552-7476
According to both contemporary intuitions and scholarly opinion, autonomy is something specifically modern. It is certainly taken to be incompatible with religions like Islam and Judaism, if these are invested with political power. Both religions are seen as centered on a divine Law ( sharî 'a, viz., torah) which prescribes what we may and may not do, promising reward for obedience and threatening punishment for disobedience. Not we, but God makes the rules. This picture is in important ways misleading. There is, I argue, a substantive intellectual tradition, going back to Plato's Laws, which takes the purpose of a theocracy—a community governed by God through the intermediary of a divine Law—to be promoting rational autonomy, conceived as (1) the ability to rationally determine what is in one's best interest and (2) having the motivation to live accordingly. Among the most important representatives of this intellectual tradition are medieval Muslim and Jewish philosophers.
In: Political theory: an international journal of political philosophy, Band 38, Heft 3, S. 340-367
ISSN: 0090-5917
In: Shofar: a quarterly interdisciplinary journal of Jewish studies ; official journal of the Midwest and Western Jewish Studies Associations, Band 25, Heft 1, S. 201-204
ISSN: 1534-5165