Suchergebnisse

La 4e de couv. indique : "European Merger Control provides a wide-ranging comparative review of the applicable European rules: scope of control, exercise of control, control procedure. Extensively referencing case law and legislative and regulatory sources, European Merger Control interprets the various complex rules and illustrates how they may interact and develop."

We set up a sequential merger game to study a firm's incentives to pass up on an opportunity to merge with another firm. We find that such incentives may exist when there are efficiency gains from a merger, firms are of different sizes, there is an antitrust authority present to approve mergers, and there is a sufficient alignment of interests between the antitrust authority and the firms. We point out three distinct motives for not merging: the external-effect motive, the bargaining-power motive, and the pill-sweetening motive.

An extensive body of literature has investigated financial and strategic variables as predictors of mergers and acquisitions (M&A) performance without finding clear relationships. The literature does not investigate remedies for conflicts in M&A. This paper aims to develop a knowledge-based theory of M&A integration, drawing upon research on HR practices in M&A, the resource-based view of the firm, and international management. The study also explores the critical differences between acquirers from various countries in the way in which human resources are managed during cross-cultural conflict situations, and tests the relationships between HR practices and post-merger performance in multiple countries. The findings show that there is no clear best practice to address the conflict situation and enhance M&A performance.

Antitrust merger policy suffers from a disconnect between its articulated concerns and the methodologies it employs. The Supreme Court has largely abandoned the field of horizontal merger analysis, leaving us with ancient decisions that have never been overruled but whose fundamental approach has been ignored or discredited. Only within the last generation has econometrics developed useful techniques for estimating the price impact of specific mergers in differentiated markets. Although the Supreme Court's Brown Shoe decision required a market definition, the Court was not thinking of a relevant market as a grouping of sales capable of being monopolized or cartelized. The perceived injury in Brown Shoe was not collusion, but rather that the postmerger firm would acquire a competitive advantage over its competitors. Indeed, Brown Shoe was a "unilateral effects" case in the sense that its concern was with the likelihood that the postmerger firm would be able to undersell other firms within the same market.

Economists have had success in describing a coherent—if not always accurate—framework for analyzing antitrust issues using price theory. This framework borrows heavily from neoclassical assumptions. Post—Chicago school analysis just expands conduct based on price theory to include some predatory conduct. Now it is time to look at nonprice considerations. The 2006 Merger Commentary explored this subject in some detail. The 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines went further—but not far enough in the author's estimation. They do not incorporate the learning associated with behavioral economics, for example. The FTC is the ideal institution for exploring this subject since it has both a Consumer Protection Bureau and a Competition Bureau.

"Die Autoren analysieren den Public Merger als Integrationsinstrument. In den kommenden (und zunehmenden) Fusionsprozessen werden organisatorische Änderungen bewegt, die durch die aktuellen Verwaltungsreformen, die eher nur die vorhandenen Organisationen reorganisieren, weit hinter sich lassen." (Verlagsangabe)

AbstractMerger control impacts the type of merger projects that are submitted, as well as the information provided by the merging parties upon assessment. In this paper, we consider the outcomes in terms of selection of merger types and evidence provision of alternative timings for merger review, pre‐ or postconsummation of the merger. We show that the selection effect induced by the ex post merger review is welfare‐improving due to the deterrence of the most anticompetitive merger projects. In contrast, the welfare impact of evidence provision under ex post assessment is ambiguous. Balancing these two effects makes possible the welfare comparison between the ex ante and the ex post merger policy enforcement.

Merger control in Indonesia is based on the Indonesia Anti-Monopoly Law No.5/1999 and it is specifically set forth in Government Regulation 57/2010 providing for mandatory notification to the competition authority under the threat of fines for late reporting. It is rather unique compared to merger regulations in general which tend to focus on pre-merger notification. Companies meeting certain thresholds based on assets or sales value are required to conduct notification. The process of merger review has to go through the formal (procedural) and substantive stages. The formal/procedural stage is concerned with the fulfillment of certain qualifications such as meeting the criteria as an effective merger acquisition, affiliations, and exceeding the thresholds. The substantive stage involves the assessment of entry barriers, potential anti-competition conduct, inefficiencies and the prevention of bankruptcy. The Commission's opinion issued in the final stage of assessment can be in the form of no objection, objection, or conditional no objection. Any violations of Law No.5/1999 found by the Commission are processed further through the case examination process, in compliance with the prevailing rules. GR 54/2010 also provides for voluntary pre merger notification. The incentive is that once the Commission's no objection letter is obtained, there is no need to go through examination in the mandatory post merger notification process. However, the Commission's opinion is non-binding. Therefore, business actors still prefer to conduct post merger notification despite the potential exposure to relatively high fines. Limited availability of data and a lack of awareness among business actors are some of the main challenges in the implementation of GR 54/2010. Cooperation and policy harmonization with relevant agencies such the Ministry of Law and Human Rights, the Capital Markets Supervisory Agency and Bank Indonesia need to be explored in the future.