Suchergebnisse

A study of productive tensions / by Stuart Elden -- Prolegomena. notice to readers -- The superseding of philosophy -- Philosophy in crisis -- Opening of the testament. inventory of the legacy -- The search for heirs -- Mimesis and praxis -- Philosophy as message -- Metamorphosis of philosophy: poiesis and metaphilosophy -- Marxism and poetry / by Georges Labica

Intro -- Contents -- PREFACE -- Chapter 1HOLISTIC EXPLANATION AND THEIDEA OF A GRAND UNIFIED THEORY -- Chapter 2ON FIRST PRINCIPLESAND THEIR LEGITIMATION -- Chapter 3ON PHILOSOPHICALSYSTEMATIZATION(APORETIC METHOD AND THEHEGELIAN VISION) -- Chapter 4THE PRICE OF AN ULTIMATE THEORY -- Chapter 5PHILOSOPHICAL METHODOLOGY -- Chapter 6THE FALLACY OF RESPECT NEGLECT -- Chapter 7PHILOSOPHICAL DISAGREEMENT:AN ESSAY TOWARDSORIENTATIONAL PLURALISMIN METAPHILOSOPHY -- Chapter 8IS PHILOSOPHY A GUIDE TO LIFE?(On the Problematic Nature of"Applied Philosophy") -- Chapter 9PHILOSOPHICAL PRINCIPLES -- Chapter 10THE INTERPRETATION OFPHILOSOPHICAL TEXTS -- Chapter 11REFERENTIAL ANALYSIS INPHILOSOPHY -- Name Index.

Abstract
This article argues that a pragmatist ambition to transcendence undergirds Richard Rorty's metaphilosophy. That transcendence might play a positive role in Rorty's work might seem implausible given his well-known rejection of the idea that human practices are accountable to some external, Archimedean standpoint, and his endorsement of the historicist view that standards of rationality are products of time and chance. It is true that Rorty's contributions to epistemology, philosophy of mind and metaphysics have this anti-transcendentalist character. But in his metaphilosophy, Rorty shows great respect for pre-philosophical impulses aimed at transcendence of some kind, in particular the romantic (and indeed religious) experience of awe at something greater than oneself, and the utopian striving for a radically better world. These impulses do not disappear in Rorty's metaphilosophy but are reshaped in a pragmatist iteration of transcendence which, we argue, can be characterised as horizontal (rather than vertical) and weak (rather strong). We use this characterization to distinguish Rorty's metaphilosophy from other accounts that share a postmetaphysical ambition to transcendence.

This volume presents a selection of the philosophical essays which Richard Rorty wrote during the first decade of his career, and complements four previous volumes of his papers published by Cambridge University Press. In this long neglected body of work, which many leading philosophers still consider to be his best, Rorty develops his views on the nature and scope of philosophy in a manner which supplements and elucidates his definitive statement on these matters in Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature. He also develops his groundbreaking version of eliminative materialism, a label first coined to describe his position, and sets out original views on various central topics in the philosophy of language, concerning private language, indeterminacy, and verificationalism. A substantial introduction examines Rorty's philosophical development from 1961 to 1972. The volume completes our understanding of Rorty's intellectual trajectory and offers lucid statements of positions which retain their relevance to current debates

"Recent Anglophone scholarship has successfully shown that Nietzsche's thought makes important contributions to a wide range of contemporary philosophical debates. In so doing, however, this work has lost sight of another important feature of Nietzsche's project, namely his desire to challenge the very conception of philosophy that has been used to assess his merits as a philosopher. In other words, contemporary scholarship has overlooked Nietzsche's contributions to metaphilosophy, i.e. debates around the nature, methods, and aims of philosophy. This important new collection of essays brings together an international group of distinguished scholars to explore and discuss these contributions and debates. It will appeal to anyone interested in metaphilosophy, Nietzsche studies, German studies, or intellectual history"--

Recent Anglophone scholarship has successfully shown that Nietzsche's thought makes important contributions to a wide range of contemporary philosophical debates. In so doing, however, scholarship has lost sight of another important feature of Nietzsche's project, namely his desire to challenge the very conception of philosophy that has been used to assess his merits as a philosopher. In other words, contemporary scholarship has overlooked Nietzsche's contributions to metaphilosophy, i.e. debates around the nature, methods, and aims of philosophy. This important new collection of essays brings together an international group of distinguished scholars to explore and discuss these contributions and debates. It will appeal to anyone interested in metaphilosophy, Nietzsche studies, German studies, or intellectual history.

AbstractIn this paper I defend the claim that Paul Feyerabend held a robust metaphilosophical position for most of his philosophical career. This position I call Decision-Based Epistemology and reconstruct it in terms of three key components: (1) a form of epistemic voluntarism concerning the justification of philosophical positions and (2) a behaviorist account of philosophical beliefs, which allows him (3) to cast normative arguments concerning philosophical beliefs in scientific methodology, such as realism, in terms of means-ends relations. I then introduce non-naturalist and naturalist variants of his conception of normativity, which I trace back to his mentors Viktor Kraft and Karl Popper, respectively. This distinction, introduced on the metaphilosophical level, can can be put to use to explain key changes in Feyerabend's philosophical proposals, such as the viability of his methodological argument for realism. I conclude that this Decision-Based Epistemology should be further explored by historically embedding Feyerabend's metaphilosophy in a voluntarist tradition of scientific philosophy.