Southern Comfort in the Middle East
Blog: Carnegie Middle East Center - Diwan
Emerging countries in the "global South" are resisting Western narratives on the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, which isn't such a bad thing.
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Blog: Carnegie Middle East Center - Diwan
Emerging countries in the "global South" are resisting Western narratives on the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, which isn't such a bad thing.
Blog: Carnegie Middle East Center - Diwan
None of the major actors in the Middle East wants to see the conflict spread, but are locked into positions that lead in the contrary direction.
Blog: The Strategist
May was a busy month for diplomats in the Middle East. Twelve years after the Arab League suspended Syria's membership, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad was officially welcomed back into the fold. As the protracted war ...
Blog: Features – FiveThirtyEight
Welcome to The Riddler. Every week, I offer up problems related to the things we hold dear around here: math, logic and probability. Two puzzles are presented each week: the Riddler Express for those of you who want something bite-size and the Riddler Classic for those of you in the slow-puzzle movement. Submit a correct […]
Blog: The RAND Blog
The Middle Corridor's journey toward becoming a viable alternative to existing trade routes will be met with tough challenges. But with renewed international investment and cooperation, it could emerge as a cornerstone of 21st-century trade connectivity.
Blog: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace - Carnegie Publications
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia actively borrowed Western-primarily European-legal and bureaucratic practices. Now that the European path appears to be closed off entirely, the Middle East is fast emerging as an alternative route.
Blog: The Strategist
The political and strategic profile of the Middle East is changing as China asserts itself as a major challenger to US unipolar domination and regional states, especially Saudia Arabia, seek more independence in shaping their ...
Blog: Responsible Statecraft
The Biden administration is currently considering going where no other president has gone before: offering a formal security guarantee to Saudi Arabia and helping the kingdom develop a civilian nuclear program in return for Riyadh normalizing relations with Israel. President Biden and his team argue that the United States has a national security interest in brokering such a deal, even if that means massive and unprecedented concessions to Riyadh. Biden and his team are wrong. Entering into a mutual security agreement with Saudi Arabia would represent a catastrophic miscalculation. A security guarantee for Saudi Arabia would entrap Washington as Riyadh's protector despite a fundamental disconnect between the interests and values of the United States and the kingdom.Saudi Arabia seeks increased security commitments in return for formally normalizing relations with Israel, a country with which it is already strategically aligned. This is part of a deliberate strategy by Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MbS) to exploit growing fears in Washington that the United States is losing influence in the Middle East relative to other actors such as Russia or China. As the Wall Street Journal reported, "in private, Saudi officials said, the crown prince has said he expects that by playing major powers against each other, Saudi Arabia can eventually pressure Washington to concede to its demands for better access to U.S. weapons and nuclear technology."And yet, though Russia and China have expanded their respective footprints in the Middle East, neither Moscow nor Beijing can fill an American void in the Middle East, nor do they desire to. States within the region are aware of the limitations facing Russia and China. Saudi Arabia and other U.S. regional partners have cultivated Washington's anxiety about losing its position relative to Russia or China and are pressing for major policy concessions, resulting in a type of "reverse leverage." The pinnacle of this reverse leverage strategy is the peekaboo game MbS is playing with the United States over whether Saudi Arabia will join the so-called Abraham Accords. Since the introduction of the Accords in 2020 by President Donald Trump – which witnessed Israel formally normalize relations with Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), later expanded to also include Sudan and Morocco – U.S. and Israeli officials have been determined to add Saudi Arabia to the mix.The Abraham Accords have become the new "lodestar" of U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East. Through these series of normalization deals, the United States hopes to create a more formal coalition through which it believes it can best advance its interests, namely by maintaining its regional influence amid Russian and Chinese "encroachment" while also allocating more attention to other global theaters such as Eastern Europe and the Pacific.However, regional actors are increasingly using the Accords as a mechanism to keep the United States entangled in the region as the continued guarantor of their security. The Arab states that joined the Abraham Accords were granted considerable policy concessions for doing so without any serious debate as to whether such tradeoffs served the interests of the United States. They interpret the Accords as a mechanism for maintaining the regional status quo – with more concrete and integrated U.S. security guarantees undergirding it. This is precisely the lens through which Riyadh views its possible entry into the Abraham Accords: as a way to pressure the United States into granting the kingdom sweeping concessions and guaranteeing Washington remains its ultimate protector over the long term. Washington's ongoing support for actors like Saudi Arabia has resulted in a vicious cycle: by committing itself to propping up the underlying sources of regional instability, the United States repeatedly finds itself having to confront challenges that are largely the product of its own presence, policies, and partners in the Middle East. Making things even more obscene, Washington may be deepening its commitment to these illiberal states at a time when it has become clear that the region hardly matters to U.S. national security. The United States must decide whether it will continue underwriting actors such as Saudi Arabia and the artificial status quo in the Middle East, or whether it will recognize the failures of its own policies and limit its involvement to a level commensurate with U.S. interests.
Blog: Australian Institute of International Affairs
Australia has a long relationship with the Middle East and strong trusting partnerships. With energy and economic transformation on the agenda for the region, Australia stands to gain considerably with more investment, and with a nimble diplomatic approach.
Blog: Responsible Statecraft
Despite the White House parsing whether the U.S. is in a "war" or not, the Pentagon is mulling whether to extend the deployment of an existing Amphibious Ready Group now stationed in the Middle East, according to reports, as attacks by the Houthis and subsequent retaliations increase.According to Military.com, the group includes the USS Bataan, USS Carter Hall, and USS Mesa Verde and has been "operating in the Middle East and the Mediterranean since the summer." ARG also includes aircraft and about 2,000 Marines as part of the 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit, according to the online magazine. As Naval warships with anti-missile batteries have been engaging directly with Houthis in the Red Sea, the USS Bataan has been "trawling the waters of the Red Sea, Strait of Hormuz and Mediterranean as a warning to disruptive actors in the area while being ready to help in an emergency."The ARG was supposed to be replaced by the Boxer ARG, but reports indicate that the amphibious group is not "ready" (this has been fueled by speculation since the summer that the lead ship, the USS Boxer, was experiencing mechanical problems and had been docked for the last year).An extended tour would mean the Marines on the USS Bataan would be in the region for upwards of a year before going home.All told, the U.S military has about 30,000 service members currently deployed in the Middle East, which includes its permanent bases in Kuwait, Qatar, and Bahrain. The USS Ford carrier group returned to the U.S. this month on regular rotation, leaving the USS Eisenhower carrier strike group in the Red Sea with about 7,500 personnel. The White House, despite nearly a dozen retaliatory attacks against the Houthis by the U.S. military over the last week, does not want to characterize the situation as "war," which has some in the press corps "perplexed," according to Miltiary.com. "We don't seek war," said White House spokesperson Sabrina Singh last Thursday. "We are not at war with the Houthis." "I don't know that there's any purpose served by being too cute about the way you talk about it," former Navy captain and RAND researcher Brad Martin told Military.com. "It's definitely combat, and it is definitely something that could become a much larger combat. ... Whether or not it is at the level that we would call a war is sort of an academic distinction."The magazine noted that the Navy has awarded medals including a rare Combat Action Ribbon to sailors on the USS Carney, which was involved in shooting down Houthi strikes in October. At the time, it was reported that the Houthis were not attacking U.S. ships directly. From reporter Konstantin Toropin: Navy officials have, so far, been unwilling to provide the citation behind the Combat Action Ribbon to Military.com, and they have yet to offer an explanation for why it cannot be made public.When (Pentagon spokesman Maj. Gen. Pat Ryder) was asked whether the award signified that Navy ships are considered in combat while conducting seemingly defensive operations in the Red Sea, he replied that "the admiral's actions speak for themselves in terms of recognizing the crew ... so let's leave it at that."
Blog: Responsible Statecraft
With no ceasefire in the war between Israel and Hamas in sight and Houthi forces in Yemen still firing missiles and drones at commercial shipping in the Red Sea, the EU's efforts at addressing conflict in Gaza and its broader regional ramifications keep flailing.After weeks of discussions, the EU officially launched its naval operation in the Red Sea on February 19 to protect international commercial shipping from Houthi attacks. The Houthis claim they wantto force a ceasefire in Gaza. Yet, while the ceasefire remains elusive, the attacks impose real costs on EU members: the EU commissioner for economy Paolo Gentiloni recently estimated that the rerouting of shipping from the Red Sea has increased delivery times for shipments between Asia and the EU by 10 to 15 days and the consequent costs by around 400%. Around 40% of the EU's total trade with the Middle East and Asia passes through the Red Sea.Protecting that shipping route thus is an important collective economic and security interest for the EU. Yet only four countries — France, Germany, Italy and Belgium — out of the 27 member states have agreed to provide warships for the new operation. Spain, which refrained from using its veto power to block the initiative, nonetheless declined to participate, having expressed concerns from the outset that any armed operation would reduce pressure on Israel to agree to a ceasefire in Gaza. A bigger question is how effective this new EU operation will be in countering the Houthi threat given its purely defensive mandate to provide "situational awareness, accompany vessels and protect them against possible attacks at sea." Accordingly, the participating EU warships will be authorized to fire on Houthi targets only if they themselves or commercial vessels they are to protect are attacked. That rules out pre-emptive action against Houthi missile batteries or related targets.The defensive nature of the operation, however, may not be enough to convince the Houthis to refrain from attacking the European ships. In fact, Houthi leaders warned Italy, one of the new operation's chief promoters, that it will become "a target if it participates in attacks on the Houthis." If this threat comes to fruition, will the EU authorize offensive action against the Houthis, potentially drawing itself into a wider conflict? Will it rely on U.S. hard power for protection given that Washington is already engaged against the Houthis through "Operation Prosperity Guardian," in which a few EU nations – Denmark, Netherlands and Greece, as well as non-EU NATO members Britain and Norway -- are also participating? Would such developments not lead to a de facto merging of the U.S. and EU-led operations under Washington's lead — an outcome Europeans sought to avoid and which is the very reason why they launched their own mission in the first place? That these are not abstract questions is underscored by the failure, so far, of scores of U.S.- and UK-led strikes to degrade the Houthis' capabilities to the point where they would no longer pose a significant threat. Indeed, just as the EU announced its mission, the Houthis hit a British cargo ship which was at risk of sinking in the Gulf of Aden in what the Yemeni rebels claimed was their biggest attack yet. The United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations confirmed the incident, though it did not name the ship.Ironically, the safest way for the EU to avoid a direct military engagement with the Houthis, apart from testing their vow to stop attacking shipping if Israel ends its Gaza offensive, would be to reduce the number of targets in the Red Sea by encouraging ships to reroute. But such an outcome would, of course, vindicate the Houthi strategy to impose costs on the Western powers for the failure to stop the war in Gaza.And that brings us back to the mother of all conflicts in the Middle East: the continuing war in Gaza. The EU's approach so far has been to delink Gaza from the crisis in the Red Sea and the broader escalation in the region, including clashes between Israel and Lebanon's Hezbollah. Yet mounting tensions on that front show that its approach is not working. Some actors in the EU understand the urgent need for a ceasefire in Gaza as a necessary condition for regional de-escalation. The EU high representative on foreign policy Josep Borrell has been particularly vocal in his criticism of Israel. He suggested limiting arms sales to Tel Aviv on the grounds that such transfers violate EU guidelines that ban sales to countries accused of violations of the international humanitarian law. A Dutch appeals court recently ordered a halt to exports of F-35 jet parts to Israel on the same grounds. However, it is highly unlikely that the EU as a whole would adopt such a position, given that a number of countries – especially Germany, Austria, Czech Republic, Hungary – strongly support Israel.A stronger point of leverage could be to suspend fully or partially the association agreement between the EU and Israel. The EU is Israel's largest trading partner. In 2023, that agreement enabled 46.8 billion euros worth of bilateral trade. The prime ministers of Spain and Ireland, Pedro Sanchez and Leo Varadkar, respectively, asked the president of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, to "urgently review" whether Israel is violating the human rights clauses included in that agreement. On February 19, the Spanish foreign minister, Jose Manuel Albares, insisted that the review should be completed in time for the next EU foreign ministers meeting on March 18.A full suspension of the agreement seems very unlikely even if the Commission finds Israel to have violated its human rights obligations because that would call for a unanimous decision by all member states. A partial suspension would require a qualified majority: 55% of member states (or 15 out of 27) representing 65% of the EU's total population. Notably, the only precedent for taking such an action came in 2011 when the EU suspended an association agreement with Syria in response to mass violations of human rights by the Bashar al-Assad regime. Meanwhile, the EU proved unable last week to issue even an official appeal to Israel not to follow through with its plans to carry out a ground invasion of Rafah, the southernmost city in Gaza, which has become the last refuge of nearly a million refugees from elsewhere in the enclave. In the face of a veto threat by Hungary, the other 26 member states instead issued a joint statement warning of the catastrophic humanitarian consequences should Israel move ahead with such an invasion. Notably, however, Hungary was isolated in its opposition to the appeal as Germany and other member states that have traditionally been reluctant to criticize Israel's conduct of war were on board. That is a step forward, but it's too little and it comes too late. As long as the EU keeps avoiding imposing real consequences on Israel for its conduct, it will keep losing influence in the Middle East.
Blog: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace - Judy Dempsey's Strategic Europe
Sidelined in the region, Europe is unlikely to have its voice heard amid the ongoing Israel-Hamas confrontation. Yet the EU's economic leverage could prove useful in getting Israel and a new Palestinian leadership to negotiate in the longer term.
Blog: Australian Institute of International Affairs
Back in September 2023, the United Nations hosted leaders and diplomats from around the world for the 78th session of the UN General Assembly. The highlight of the event—the General Debate—brought together over 190 state representatives to address the theme "Rebuilding trust and reigniting global solidarity: Accelerating action on the 2030 Agenda and its Sustainable Development Goals towards peace, prosperity, […]
Blog: Australian Institute of International Affairs
On Tuesday 27 February, the AIIA welcomed the Hon. Bob Carr to speak about past, current and future challenges of the ongoing Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The Hon. Bob Carr is a former NSW premier (1995-2005) and Australian Foreign Minister (2012-2013). Carr began by considering the paramount importance of human life amongst conflict, highlighting the need for […]
Blog: Responsible Statecraft
The United States is barreling toward another war in the Middle East. The conflict between Israel and Hamas is rapidly escalating across the region and risks dragging the United States directly into the fray. The recent barrage of ballistic missiles and drones launched by Yemen's Houthi movement at Israel — coupled with a statement by the group that such attacks will continue — and the continued attacks on U.S. positions in the region show this conflict is expanding fast. The United States now finds itself on a new war footing with Iran and its regional partners, whom many in Congress have cast as part of a new "Axis of Evil" that includes Russia and China.The Biden administration is preparing for such a scenario, yet adequate measures are not being taken by Washington to prevent such a disaster from transpiring. Fear among the American public that the United States will be dragged into another Middle East war is rising fast: according to a recent Quinnipiac poll, 84% of respondents were either "very" or "somewhat" concerned that the U.S. could be drawn into the conflict. President Biden and his team have repeatedly warned Israel against making the same "mistakes" the United States made following September 11, 2001, but it would appear Washington has yet to learn from our own errors of the past two decades. If the administration does not want to enter another war in the Middle East, it needs to prevent the conflict from pulling in additional actors from across the region. The way the war is being fought at present seems to make that outcome more likely, not less.Following Hamas's terror attack on Israel on October 7, the United States significantly increased its military presence in the Middle East in hopes of deterring a broader regional conflict. The United States deployed two aircraft carrier strike groups, with roughly 7,500 personnel on each, two guided-missile destroyers, and nine air squadrons to the Eastern Mediterranean and Red Sea region. Washington also deployed an additional 4,000 troops to the region, with another 2,000 on standby, adding to the roughly 30,000 troops already in the region.This buildup comes as the conflict is escalating considerably. Over 1,500 Israelis and more than 9,770 Palestinians have died as a result of the war. The situation inside Gaza is dire, with over one million displaced and thousands in desperate need of humanitarian assistance. In the West Bank, violence has also been escalating, with an estimated 152 Palestinians killed by Israeli settlers and soldiers since the war began, resulting in the United States calling on Israel to "protect Palestinians from Israeli extremist settler violence."Outside of the war itself, violence is increasing throughout the region. U.S. forces in the Middle East have already been targeted at least 23 times in Iraq and Syria by groups connected to Iran. In response, U.S. forces conducted airstrikes on two facilities linked to the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) in Syria, while vowing to retaliate further if the targeting of U.S. personnel continues. Israel and Hezbollah continue to engage in clashes, with almost 50 Hezbollah fighters killed since October 7. Hezbollah's leader, Hassan Nasrallah, delivered his first public address since the start of the war on Friday Nov. 3, where he stressed the independent decision-making of Hamas in launching its attack on Israel while also pressing for an end to the conflict, but maintained that a region-wide war remains possible. Nasrallah also praised Yemen's Houthis for getting involved. Following the latest barrage of ballistic missiles and drones, the Houthis have now targeted Israel three times since the war began. Israel has also continued to strike Iran-backed militias in Syria following the outbreak of war in Gaza.The Biden administration needs to square up to the fact that a broader war in the Middle East would be ruinous for the United States and the region.Given the relative military weakness of America's regional partners — with the exception of Israel, who would nonetheless be overextended in such a scenario — the United States would have to do the lion's share of the fighting and would bear the majority of its costs. Such a war would result in dramatic new levels of U.S. commitments and entanglements in the region at a time when the Middle East no longer represents a core theater of U.S. interests.The risk of a major war in the Middle East comes as the United States is already deeply engaged in assisting Ukraine against Russia's invasion and trying to deter China in the Indo-Pacific, while carrying a national debt north of $33 trillion and running $1 trillion-plus budget deficits each year in peacetime. Opening a new front in the Middle East while trying to pursue Washington's stated interests in Europe and the Indo-Pacific risks plunging America toward an economic crisis.It goes without saying that for the Middle East itself, such a war would be catastrophic, destabilizing the region politically, economically, and militarily. The war would threaten to empower illiberal actors across the region at the expense of genuine stability. The profound human and material costs would plague the Middle East for generations to come.It should be clear from the past several decades that throwing money, weapons and military assets at the region often has profound negative consequences. In this case, Washington is risking further escalation and even direct U.S. involvement in a region-wide war. Biden needs to make clear that the central U.S. interest is to stay out of the revolving door of Middle East conflicts and avoid being dragged into a ruinous military campaign across the region.