Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community
In: Politologija, Heft 3, S. 140-147
ISSN: 1392-1681
14 Ergebnisse
Sortierung:
In: Politologija, Heft 3, S. 140-147
ISSN: 1392-1681
In: Politologija, Heft 3, S. 103-115
ISSN: 1392-1681
In: Politologija, Heft 3, S. 3-34
ISSN: 1392-1681
The concept of deterrence is widely used in social sciences. In general literature this means prevention of someone's actions by threatening to impose sanctions. In the area of strategy, deterrence means preventing states to act in a way that is not acceptable to others. According to deterrence theory, wars or aggressions to be prevented by threatening a potential aggressor with retaliation destructive & credible enough to outweigh any benefit the potential aggressor could expect to gain. The concept of deterrence came to prominence with the appearance of nuclear weapons, precisely because they made it possible for a state under attack to do great harm to the attacker even without really defending itself. This requirement becomes difficult to fulfill when we consider non-nuclear powers. They do not enjoy military capabilities to strike their enemies in retaliation without carrying defense. Nuclear have-not may only threaten her adversaries with a high level of resistance. This articles addresses deterrence strategy of small non-nuclear powers that do not possess retaliatory capabilities but only are capable to threaten their adversaries with a level of destruction higher than the value of objectives sought. The logic of deterrence strategy formulates two main requirements for it to be effective. First is a sufficient capability to carry out the defense actions. The second is ability to impress enemy leaders of their intentions without provoking a preventive or pre-emptive strike out of fear. Effective deterrence strategies of small non-nuclear powers suffer from serious weaknesses that are embedded into the logic of this strategy. First of all, successful deterrence strategy of small non-nuclear powers requires more than ability to impose costs using conventional means. An adversary must be sufficiently convinced that the state will use its defensive capabilities. The greater a state's defensive capability, the less its adversary can hurt it, & the more likely it may use its punitive capabilities on its adversary. Secondly, intelligence communities long have known, policy makers have a way of resisting unwelcome information & advice. Often, national intelligence communities are entirely as culturally blind, not to mention ignorant in other ways, as are their political & military masters. Risk of a mistake when attacking a nonnuclear country is smaller then attacking a nuclear one. When employed by alliances, such as NATO, conventional deterrence also must face a number of additional problems. It requires a large & credible power projection capability because of the simple facts of geography. To operate large expeditionary forces requires an overseas base network & a forcible entry capability. Effective defense demands a large standing force structure, & technological superiority, to assure the success of conventional campaigns. Such complex, capable, & large forces prove to be very costly. Small non-nuclear powers may enhance deterrence using different strategies. Most importantly by making it plain through prior security agreements that aggressors will be severely for punished by the international community, whether or not their invasions are successful. The punishments could be military (including counter-value attacks or asymmetrical threats), political (pariah-state status), & economic (isolation), but they should be certain & tough, even if not perfectly enforced. For example, the European Union may seriously punish aggression from the East using economical measures such as sanctions, boycotts, exclusion from "clubs," etc. Conventional capabilities of small non-nuclear powers is also benefiting from significant improvements in the technology of conventional weapons, notably in accuracy, stealth, intelligence, & information support. Nor does the current theory of conventional deterrence require that conventional weapons be as powerful, destructive, or fearful as nuclear weapons. Growing military strength & asymmetrical capabilities significantly contributes to the psychological credibility of deterrence. Adapted from the source document.
In: Politologija, Heft 4, S. 3-53
ISSN: 1392-1681
This article examines the provisions of the Law of the Republic of Lithuania on Compensation of Damage Resulting from the USSR Occupation (hereinafter -- the Law), which was adopted on 13 June 2000, in the light of customary rules of international law on state responsibility, as codified in the 2001 the UN International Law Commission's Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (hereinafter -- the ILC Draft Articles). The main aim of the article is to deal with the international legal grounds of the responsibility of the Russian Federation for the Soviet occupation of the Republic of Lithuania and, against this background, to identify the role of the Law. The ground of Russia's responsibility is an internationally wrongful act committed as the aggression against the Republic of Lithuania, which was started by the 15 June 1940 incursion by the Soviet armed forces & subsequently continued in the form of the illegal occupation of Lithuania until the restoration of Lithuania's independence on 11 March 1990, however, the illegal presence of the foreign forces on Lithuania's soil ended only in 1993. The fact of the 1940 Soviet aggression & illegal occupation of the Baltic States has been widely recognized by the international community, it was even acknowledged by the USSR & Russia in 1989-1991. Therefore there is no doubt that under international law from 1940-1990 the Republic of Lithuania had been an occupied State. That is why the illegal occupation with its consequences, as the breach of an international obligation not to resort to aggression having a continuing character, constitutes an objective element of an internationally wrongful act being the ground for Russia's responsibility. That also explains why the title of the Law refers to the occupation. Meanwhile the specific feature of subjective element is addressed in the preamble of the Law. That is the continuity of the Russian State & the corresponding identity of its international legal personality with the Soviet Union, which was claimed by Russia & generally recognized by the international community. Therefore under international law the Russian Federation is the State continuing the rights & obligations of the former USSR (ie., it is the same international legal person). Consequently, internationally wrongful acts of the latter, including the Soviet occupation of Lithuania & the other two Baltic States, should be attributable to the Russian Federation. Apart from the ground for Russia's responsibility, the issue of reparation is addressed in the article. In accordance with international law (the ILC Draft Article), the principle of full reparation should be applied to realize responsibility for an internationally wrongful act. The full reparation for the injury can be provided in the form of restitution, compensation & satisfaction, while any financially assessable damage should be covered by compensation when restitution is not practically possible. Responsibility for the Soviet occupation is the latter case. Therefore in this sense the Law concretizes the claim of Lithuania as it lays down the obligations of the Government of Lithuania to calculate the damage & seek its compensation from Russia. In conformity with the principle of full reparation, the provisions of the Law require to calculate the damage for all period of the Soviet occupation as well as to cover all types of financially assessable damage. The third main issue addressed in this article is admissibility of a claim for reparation, ie., the procedural requirements to be observed by the injured State invoking an international responsibility of other State. The main requirement, as follows from Art. 43 of the ILC Draft Articles, is that the injured State should give a timely & proper notice of its claim to the State responsible for an internationally wrongful act; the claim is admissible when it is waived by the injured State or it can be inadmissible when it is not maintained. However, a mere lapse of time without a claim is being resolved, including delay in its prosecution due to refusal of the respondent State, cannot result in loss of the right of the injured State to invoke responsibility. In this regard the Law is a unilateral act of the State of Lithuania which formulates & concretizes the claim for Russia's responsibility. The form of this act was determined by Lithuanian national rather than international law as the former requires that any compulsory rules or instructions for the Government can be laid down by the Seimas (the Parliament) only in the form of (statutory) law. As it is clear from the preamble of the Law, in continuing & consolidating the previous Lithuanian acts invoking Russia's responsibility the Law demonstrates that the claim for responsibility has been raised without any unreasonable delay a long time ago (the first time Lithuania declared about its claim for reparation in 1991) & Russia is aware of that claim from the very beginning. In such a manner the Law also proves a consistent & unchanging position of Lithuania with regard to Russia's responsibility. Therefore, the Law evidences that the claim of Lithuania remains admissible although still being unresolved & notwithstanding that Russia is rejecting it. Under international law the injured State has the right to waive its claim for responsibility of another State. National law may, however, restrict that right in setting up appropriate duties for the authorities of the injured State. In this regard it follows from the preamble of the Law that under Lithuanian constitutional law no State organ or official can declare a waiver of the claim for Russia's responsibility because the Law is based on & aims at implementation of the corresponding decision by the 14 June 1992 national referendum that demanded to seek reparation for the Soviet occupation. Therefore, the waiver can be declared only by other referendum as well as without a referendum the Seimas cannot abolish the provisions of the Law requiring to seek a compensation (such kind of action could amount to the waiver in the sense of Art. 45(a) of the ILC Draft Articles). To keep the claim for responsibility of another State admissible & valid, when it is being unresolved a long time, the injured State should do everything it can reasonably do to maintain the claim. Otherwise it can be questioned, whether the right to invoke responsibility is lost due to conduct of the injured State in the sense of Art. 45(b) of the ILC Draft Articles. Therefore, to avoid similar doubts the Law obliged the Government to seek constantly the compensation for the damage caused by the Soviet occupation. Since Russia used to reject Lithuania's initiatives to conduct negotiations on the matter & any other way of settlement is not available without Russia's consent, it can be stated that as yet, in particular due to the Law, the conduct of Lithuania has not raised any serious doubts with regard to validity of its claim for compensation. Obviously such doubts would be serious if any kind of moratorium on the claim had been announced. To sum it up, it can be concluded that the Law is based on & is consistent with the rules of international law. It also implements the international legal requirements for the proper declaration & maintenance of the claim for reparation. Therefore both under international law & under Lithuanian constitutional law the Law has been necessary to consolidate & consistently maintain the claim to Russia for the compensation of the damages caused by the Soviet occupation. Lastly, it should be noted that a proper settlement of the problem of Russia's responsibility for the Soviet occupation of Lithuania is not a question of self-interest for Lithuania & it should pursue the claim for compensation not only due to the decision by the 14 June 1992 referendum. Not accidentally Art. 1 of the ILC Draft Articles refers that "every internationally wrongful act of a State entails the international responsibility of that State." It is also not accidentally that the preamble of the 1991 Treaty between Lithuania & Russia states that mutual confidence between the people of both Parties is hard to achieve without elimination of the consequences of the Soviet annexation of Lithuania. Like for national law, rule of law & justice cannot be established without realization & inevitability of responsibility for grave breaches of international law. Therefore the realization of responsibility for the 1940 aggression against the Baltic States & its consequences would undoubtedly contribute to general prevention of such grave breaches as well as would assure that similar tragic events never happen again in the history of Lithuania. Such kind of prevention should be at the focus of attention of the whole international community rather than only Lithuania & the other two Baltic States, since a prohibition of aggression is a long-standing rule of jus cogens character & obligation erga omnes towards international community. Adapted from the source document.
In: Politologija, Heft 2, S. 59-89
ISSN: 1392-1681
Theoretical concepts of "structure" & "structural intersection" are analyzed in this article. The use of these concepts in political science & their critical interpretation is presented by analyzing positivist, ideational & post-modernist approaches. Sociological understanding of structure, which encompasses both material & ideational elements is created. Under the suggested definition, structure is seen as comprised of identity, institutions & material base. The interaction of these structural elements forms scientifically useful concept, which can be applied in the analysis of the socio-political processes in post-soviet transformations. Opportunities & limitations of "structural intersection" analysis, which include both international relations & internal policy perspectives are also presented. Adapted from the source document.
In: Politologija, Band 4(60, S. 142-172
ISSN: 1392-1681
The article belongs to the scope of pension reforms, however does not analyse different reform models but goes into the base of necessity to reform. The major attention is given to explore different and contradicting interests of pension system's participants. The article claims that to reform pension system means to change the interests of its participants from antagonistic -- which are in PAYG schemes -- to cooperational. The latter can develop among individuals, business and communities only in more free, more flexible and less politically influenced social security system. The conclusion is made that in other case no economic and political means can resolve the inner tension of the pension systems and to achieve its long term viability as well as social value. Adapted from the source document.
In: Politologija, Band 1, Heft 77, S. 101-151
ISSN: 1392-1681
The article deals with contemporary executive's rewards system in the Lithuanian public sector and its changes over time. This analysis includes high officials in civil service as well as heads of public service's providers and managers of state-owned enterprises. The analysis bases on the reward dimension of the Public Service Bargains (PSBs) model which reflects different approaches to tangible and intangible reward elements. This theoretical approach is used to test the hypotheses that there is a clear public sector bargain on the executive's rewards system, and this bargain was shaped by pre-planned reforms in the public sector. This article concludes that the Lithuanian public sector executive reward system can be regarded as egalitarian and was largely shaped by incremental policy decisions, changes in economic conditions, and court decisions but not by pre-planned reforms. Adapted from the source document.
In: Politologija, Heft 2, S. 72-102
ISSN: 1392-1681
The aim of the article was to explore the Agreement on the Adaptation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe 1999 (hereinafter referred to as an A-CFE) & its positive/negative implications for the NATO-Russian relations. The A-CFE, considered to be a cornerstone of the European security paving the way to a greater conventional stability on the continent, has not entered into force for political & geo-strategic reasons. Moreover, A-CFE aims at establishing a stable & balanced overall level of conventional armed forces between NATO & Russia in Europe, thus solving NATO enlargement & security dilemmas, the bone of contention between NATO & Russia. The main question the article dealt with was whether the A-CFE could stabilize NATO-Russian relations in the anarchical international system facing the dynamics of balance of power. The article focused on analyzing conventional arms control influence on NATO-Russian interaction; a heavy emphasis was placed on A-CFE functionality to solve security dilemma problems in light of NATO enlargement, hypothetical NATO-Russian conflict, & NATO-Russian level of conventional armed forces in Europe. What's more, a concrete case -- the Baltic States possible membership in A-CFE & its influence on NATO-Russian relations has been analyzed in the context of military power disparities & geo-strategic position of the Eastern Baltic sub-region. Having analyzed it accordingly, the following conclusion has been made: A-CFE Treaty of actual text would not properly stabilize NATO-Russian relations due to the reaction of national units to the on-going redistribution of military power & the dynamic of military balance. If not revised, A-CFE will amount to a "sunset Treaty" while remaining an instrument of political process. This assumption emerges from the following factors: 1. A-CFE has asymmetrically imposed the ceilings of conventional arms in favor of Russia, reducing U.S. Army quota in Europe & setting strict limits on keeping foreign military forces on a permanent basis; new NATO members are obliged not to increase the ceilings whereas Russia's limits rise to the Flanks. 2. Asymmetrical distribution of power imposed by A-CFE has decreased NATO operational capabilities to respond to Russian offensive/defensive attacks. NATO forces have been reduced in NATO-Russian border sub-regions, which might become a conflict zone. 3. The first wave of NATO enlargement was set in a frame of arms control thus solving the security dilemma of Russia, whereas the second wave diverted the distribution of power & required a new response from arms control. With the second wave including the Baltic States, NATO has significantly improved its geo-strategic positions as a result of the possibility of establishing an offensive front against Russia from the Baltic States in which conventional arms control does not apply. 4. The Baltic States' membership in the A-CFE has had implications for its own national security could be evaluated from perspectives of defensive & offensive realism. In the world of the offensive realism, the Baltic States should avoid entering the A-CFE with low ceilings, as Russia proposed, which would diminish Baltic States' national security. On the other hand, the Baltic States are supposed to evaluate a negative effect of the security dilemma, according to defensive realists. Large & flexible ceilings the Baltics may negatively affect Russian security & it could start increasing the weapons. The Baltic States would lose the arms race with Russia due to the lack of economic recourses. 5. The research suggests two ways to revise the A-CFE to solve the security dilemma of both Russia & the Baltic States: (1) to set ceilings for the whole Eastern Baltic sub-region (at the present time, Russia's commitments in Kaliningrad & Pskov are the political ones); (2) to add the whole Eastern Baltic sub-region to Central European stability zone using the formula national ceilings = territorial ceiling. 5 Lenteles. Adapted from the source document.
In: Politologija, Heft 3, S. 112-134
ISSN: 1392-1681
Emigration is considered to be the most important non-military threat to Lithuania. Available statistical data indicates that approx. 10% of Lithuania's residents have emigrated over past 16 years. According to the Eurostat data, Lithuania also had the highest rate of emigration in the EU in 2005. Most of the research done in this field explains high rates of emigration as a result of relatively low wage levels. However, this paper seeks to develop an alternative explanation, which focuses on the structural imbalances in the labor market. The imbalances have resulted from rapid increase in the supply of qualified university graduates & very slow development of Lithuania's knowledge intensive sectors, which could offer high quality workplaces. This argument is supported by empirical evidence. Adapted from the source document.
In: Politologija, Band 2(62, S. 94-123
ISSN: 1392-1681
Although since 1994 much attention has been paid to the Zapatista movement on both English and Spanish publications, its actual development revealed that in most cases the prognoses of the analysts were unduly optimistic. Despite their initial popularity and innovation, an evident decrease in activity and popularity, together with the ability to implement real change, could be perceived after 2006. This article is aimed at ascertaining long-term challenges for movements that seek radical political change by non-military means through the analysis of the Zapatistas' decrement. Most attention is paid to the lack of structure in their worldviews, the inability to create a 'success story' in their own communities promptly enough, and problems of virtual communication and mobilization. Due to the fact that in Lithuania there is very little written on the Zapatista movement, essential information about their activities and context is also provided. Adapted from the source document.
In: Politologija, Heft 2, S. 82-96
ISSN: 1392-1681
After liberation Lithuanian society & Lithuanian nation expected to build nation state & to consolidate & recreate national identity at the same time denouncing the Soviet legacy, however European integrational processes promoted the political & cultural attitude to create new European civil identity. The author of this article examines the deconstructional impact on the debates about the Idea of Europe & the efforts to deconstruct all types of identities, including national identity, & national essentialism. Some features of new European identity are highlighted by critical analysis of the meditations of J. Derrida on today's Europe, his & J. Habermas' joint efforts to ground the necessity of European Constitution & base new European identity on constitutional patriotism, solidarity, unconditional openness to the Other & the feeling of common destiny. The article examines the radical criticism of the Idea of Europe & Europeanness provided by G. Agamben & A. Amin. The author of this article comes to conclusion that the efforts to create & embed European civil identity disconnected from national identity features & feelings & national state power disavow the possibility of promoting a manifest European identity politics & disclaim the idea of Europeanness, because of the idea of multi-ethnicity on which these efforts are based. Adapted from the source document.
In: Politologija, Heft 70, S. 124-168
ISSN: 1392-1681
In: Politologija, Heft 2, S. 46-68
ISSN: 1392-1681
Although the correlation of welfare & democracy is not direct, it is possible to sustain that the problems related with democracy satisfaction could be solved by public policy measures. Lithuanian's who reflect themselves as the losers of the transition reforms are unsatisfied with their socio-economic status & their anticipation of the prompt life improvement is rather high. If such tendencies start to dominate in the society of Lithuania, the question of political stability arises. Therefore social security, welfare network & infrastructure development as well as the increase of the redistribution amounts look like inevitable reforms in nowadays Lithuania. All appropriate compensatory measures could be related to the development of the welfare state in Lithuania. The liberal model of the welfare state should be the most suitable option for Lithuania at first sight. The Lisbon Strategy is implicitly based on this kind of welfare state model. Lithuania was trying to apply active labor market policy nevertheless the efforts were restrained by the small resources. The structural policy of the EU, mainly the measures financed by the European Social Fund, should increase the amount of funds allocated to the active labor market policy. Considering public policy in Lithuania an exclusive attention should be paid to the reduction of regional inequalities, establishment of the workplaces & social security infrastructure. Due to the Lithuanian budget restrictions it's necessary to develop a tax base & to improve tax administration. The second important component is partial decentralization of programming & implementation of the EU funds by means of the EU Cohesion policy reform. The third component is the implementation of horizontal regional policy in Lithuania. Legal & organizational premises for the aforementioned steps are already established. Adapted from the source document.
In: Politologija, Heft 1, S. 79-94
ISSN: 1392-1681
In the sphere of construing regional identity, political science can accomplish less than philosophy. Common regional identity can never be derived from scientific cultural studies conducted in certain countries. A new cultural & philosophical meaning can never be devised on the basis of political science. It can only be the end result of philosophical imagination. Scientists can present facts which bear proof of merely cultural & political affinity. However, so far they have failed to propose any more significant concepts or images for the future of Central Europe. Mere knowledge of empirical facts cannot be treated as a philosophical discovery. Both politicians & scientists can be aware of & handle an abundance of facts, & yet a philosophical idea is needed to bind all these facts into one coherent whole. In construing the identity of Central Europe, there is no need whatever to get involved in discussions about certain given objective facts, similar to objects studied by natural sciences. There are no natural characteristics, which could predetermine the perception of regional identity, irrespective of a moral awareness of its citizens. Morality is an independent motive of human conduct, which can exert influence on the perception of regional identity. Nevertheless, today it is one of the most unpopular subjects of geopolitical discussions. Geopoliticians claim that cultural & political identity of a region must be objectively predetermined, be it by geography, economy or military power. Political philosophers seem to be the only ones who can take a stand against such a naturalist perception of regional identity. Adapted from the source document.