Suchergebnisse

The article deals with the fundamentals of Lithuanian foreign policy. It is an attempt to evaluate its understructure, principles, advantages & shortcomings. The article proceeds to exploring a rather strenuous question: are the tensions between Lithuanian & Russia caused solely by the Russian misbehavior as Lithuanian politicians mostly claim or is the Lithuanian foreign policy also to blame. The crucial idea of the "new Lithuanian foreign policy," that of the center or leader of an unnamed & undefined region, presumably of the Eastern Europe or at least a part of it, is put under scrutiny. The author claims that (1) for a small country such a role is utterly unrealistic, (2) attempts to play that role have nothing to do with national interests the foreign policy has serve, (3) playing the chosen role complicates relations both with other EU countries & with Russia. The article ends with the conclusion that the foundation of the Lithuanian foreign policy must be its Western, not Eastern policy. Adapted from the source document.

The article asks the question, how foreign policy is explained by analyzing historical analogies that are voiced by policymakers? It is claimed that conventional approaches are too narrow because of two reasons. The first reason is the way conventional approaches perceive the role of historical analogies. The second reason is the dominance of positivist assumptions about history and language analysis in conventional approaches. This article presents an alternative explanation of how and why policymakers use historical analogies and develops new model for analysis of historical analogies. The model is based on the assumptions of rule-oriented constructivism, speech act theory and dialogical analysis method. Adapted from the source document.

In the article, while analyzing Lithuanian foreign policy, specific attention is paid to the link between the national identity & foreign policy. This link could be the key in analyzing the question, if in truth Lithuanian foreign policy has reached a particular point, which could be named as international isolation or at least a tendency towards it, & if yes, -- then why The article proposes the following answers to these questions -- to abandon the complex of bandwagoning & to acquire more self-reliance as democratic national state. Corrections of domestic politics & democratic legalization of political trends in Lithuania is necessary. Herewith, it is noticed that it would be a big mistake to go to the extremes, eventually even trying to reconsider the feasibility of EU & NATO membership. Euro-Atlantic institutions remain the major guarantee of stability in Europe, including Lithuania. Adapted from the source document.

The concept of deterrence is widely used in social sciences. In general literature this means prevention of someone's actions by threatening to impose sanctions. In the area of strategy, deterrence means preventing states to act in a way that is not acceptable to others. According to deterrence theory, wars or aggressions to be prevented by threatening a potential aggressor with retaliation destructive & credible enough to outweigh any benefit the potential aggressor could expect to gain. The concept of deterrence came to prominence with the appearance of nuclear weapons, precisely because they made it possible for a state under attack to do great harm to the attacker even without really defending itself. This requirement becomes difficult to fulfill when we consider non-nuclear powers. They do not enjoy military capabilities to strike their enemies in retaliation without carrying defense. Nuclear have-not may only threaten her adversaries with a high level of resistance. This articles addresses deterrence strategy of small non-nuclear powers that do not possess retaliatory capabilities but only are capable to threaten their adversaries with a level of destruction higher than the value of objectives sought. The logic of deterrence strategy formulates two main requirements for it to be effective. First is a sufficient capability to carry out the defense actions. The second is ability to impress enemy leaders of their intentions without provoking a preventive or pre-emptive strike out of fear. Effective deterrence strategies of small non-nuclear powers suffer from serious weaknesses that are embedded into the logic of this strategy. First of all, successful deterrence strategy of small non-nuclear powers requires more than ability to impose costs using conventional means. An adversary must be sufficiently convinced that the state will use its defensive capabilities. The greater a state's defensive capability, the less its adversary can hurt it, & the more likely it may use its punitive capabilities on its adversary. Secondly, intelligence communities long have known, policy makers have a way of resisting unwelcome information & advice. Often, national intelligence communities are entirely as culturally blind, not to mention ignorant in other ways, as are their political & military masters. Risk of a mistake when attacking a nonnuclear country is smaller then attacking a nuclear one. When employed by alliances, such as NATO, conventional deterrence also must face a number of additional problems. It requires a large & credible power projection capability because of the simple facts of geography. To operate large expeditionary forces requires an overseas base network & a forcible entry capability. Effective defense demands a large standing force structure, & technological superiority, to assure the success of conventional campaigns. Such complex, capable, & large forces prove to be very costly. Small non-nuclear powers may enhance deterrence using different strategies. Most importantly by making it plain through prior security agreements that aggressors will be severely for punished by the international community, whether or not their invasions are successful. The punishments could be military (including counter-value attacks or asymmetrical threats), political (pariah-state status), & economic (isolation), but they should be certain & tough, even if not perfectly enforced. For example, the European Union may seriously punish aggression from the East using economical measures such as sanctions, boycotts, exclusion from "clubs," etc. Conventional capabilities of small non-nuclear powers is also benefiting from significant improvements in the technology of conventional weapons, notably in accuracy, stealth, intelligence, & information support. Nor does the current theory of conventional deterrence require that conventional weapons be as powerful, destructive, or fearful as nuclear weapons. Growing military strength & asymmetrical capabilities significantly contributes to the psychological credibility of deterrence. Adapted from the source document.

This article examines the provisions of the Law of the Republic of Lithuania on Compensation of Damage Resulting from the USSR Occupation (hereinafter -- the Law), which was adopted on 13 June 2000, in the light of customary rules of international law on state responsibility, as codified in the 2001 the UN International Law Commission's Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (hereinafter -- the ILC Draft Articles). The main aim of the article is to deal with the international legal grounds of the responsibility of the Russian Federation for the Soviet occupation of the Republic of Lithuania and, against this background, to identify the role of the Law. The ground of Russia's responsibility is an internationally wrongful act committed as the aggression against the Republic of Lithuania, which was started by the 15 June 1940 incursion by the Soviet armed forces & subsequently continued in the form of the illegal occupation of Lithuania until the restoration of Lithuania's independence on 11 March 1990, however, the illegal presence of the foreign forces on Lithuania's soil ended only in 1993. The fact of the 1940 Soviet aggression & illegal occupation of the Baltic States has been widely recognized by the international community, it was even acknowledged by the USSR & Russia in 1989-1991. Therefore there is no doubt that under international law from 1940-1990 the Republic of Lithuania had been an occupied State. That is why the illegal occupation with its consequences, as the breach of an international obligation not to resort to aggression having a continuing character, constitutes an objective element of an internationally wrongful act being the ground for Russia's responsibility. That also explains why the title of the Law refers to the occupation. Meanwhile the specific feature of subjective element is addressed in the preamble of the Law. That is the continuity of the Russian State & the corresponding identity of its international legal personality with the Soviet Union, which was claimed by Russia & generally recognized by the international community. Therefore under international law the Russian Federation is the State continuing the rights & obligations of the former USSR (ie., it is the same international legal person). Consequently, internationally wrongful acts of the latter, including the Soviet occupation of Lithuania & the other two Baltic States, should be attributable to the Russian Federation. Apart from the ground for Russia's responsibility, the issue of reparation is addressed in the article. In accordance with international law (the ILC Draft Article), the principle of full reparation should be applied to realize responsibility for an internationally wrongful act. The full reparation for the injury can be provided in the form of restitution, compensation & satisfaction, while any financially assessable damage should be covered by compensation when restitution is not practically possible. Responsibility for the Soviet occupation is the latter case. Therefore in this sense the Law concretizes the claim of Lithuania as it lays down the obligations of the Government of Lithuania to calculate the damage & seek its compensation from Russia. In conformity with the principle of full reparation, the provisions of the Law require to calculate the damage for all period of the Soviet occupation as well as to cover all types of financially assessable damage. The third main issue addressed in this article is admissibility of a claim for reparation, ie., the procedural requirements to be observed by the injured State invoking an international responsibility of other State. The main requirement, as follows from Art. 43 of the ILC Draft Articles, is that the injured State should give a timely & proper notice of its claim to the State responsible for an internationally wrongful act; the claim is admissible when it is waived by the injured State or it can be inadmissible when it is not maintained. However, a mere lapse of time without a claim is being resolved, including delay in its prosecution due to refusal of the respondent State, cannot result in loss of the right of the injured State to invoke responsibility. In this regard the Law is a unilateral act of the State of Lithuania which formulates & concretizes the claim for Russia's responsibility. The form of this act was determined by Lithuanian national rather than international law as the former requires that any compulsory rules or instructions for the Government can be laid down by the Seimas (the Parliament) only in the form of (statutory) law. As it is clear from the preamble of the Law, in continuing & consolidating the previous Lithuanian acts invoking Russia's responsibility the Law demonstrates that the claim for responsibility has been raised without any unreasonable delay a long time ago (the first time Lithuania declared about its claim for reparation in 1991) & Russia is aware of that claim from the very beginning. In such a manner the Law also proves a consistent & unchanging position of Lithuania with regard to Russia's responsibility. Therefore, the Law evidences that the claim of Lithuania remains admissible although still being unresolved & notwithstanding that Russia is rejecting it. Under international law the injured State has the right to waive its claim for responsibility of another State. National law may, however, restrict that right in setting up appropriate duties for the authorities of the injured State. In this regard it follows from the preamble of the Law that under Lithuanian constitutional law no State organ or official can declare a waiver of the claim for Russia's responsibility because the Law is based on & aims at implementation of the corresponding decision by the 14 June 1992 national referendum that demanded to seek reparation for the Soviet occupation. Therefore, the waiver can be declared only by other referendum as well as without a referendum the Seimas cannot abolish the provisions of the Law requiring to seek a compensation (such kind of action could amount to the waiver in the sense of Art. 45(a) of the ILC Draft Articles). To keep the claim for responsibility of another State admissible & valid, when it is being unresolved a long time, the injured State should do everything it can reasonably do to maintain the claim. Otherwise it can be questioned, whether the right to invoke responsibility is lost due to conduct of the injured State in the sense of Art. 45(b) of the ILC Draft Articles. Therefore, to avoid similar doubts the Law obliged the Government to seek constantly the compensation for the damage caused by the Soviet occupation. Since Russia used to reject Lithuania's initiatives to conduct negotiations on the matter & any other way of settlement is not available without Russia's consent, it can be stated that as yet, in particular due to the Law, the conduct of Lithuania has not raised any serious doubts with regard to validity of its claim for compensation. Obviously such doubts would be serious if any kind of moratorium on the claim had been announced. To sum it up, it can be concluded that the Law is based on & is consistent with the rules of international law. It also implements the international legal requirements for the proper declaration & maintenance of the claim for reparation. Therefore both under international law & under Lithuanian constitutional law the Law has been necessary to consolidate & consistently maintain the claim to Russia for the compensation of the damages caused by the Soviet occupation. Lastly, it should be noted that a proper settlement of the problem of Russia's responsibility for the Soviet occupation of Lithuania is not a question of self-interest for Lithuania & it should pursue the claim for compensation not only due to the decision by the 14 June 1992 referendum. Not accidentally Art. 1 of the ILC Draft Articles refers that "every internationally wrongful act of a State entails the international responsibility of that State." It is also not accidentally that the preamble of the 1991 Treaty between Lithuania & Russia states that mutual confidence between the people of both Parties is hard to achieve without elimination of the consequences of the Soviet annexation of Lithuania. Like for national law, rule of law & justice cannot be established without realization & inevitability of responsibility for grave breaches of international law. Therefore the realization of responsibility for the 1940 aggression against the Baltic States & its consequences would undoubtedly contribute to general prevention of such grave breaches as well as would assure that similar tragic events never happen again in the history of Lithuania. Such kind of prevention should be at the focus of attention of the whole international community rather than only Lithuania & the other two Baltic States, since a prohibition of aggression is a long-standing rule of jus cogens character & obligation erga omnes towards international community. Adapted from the source document.

From the end of the Cold war there is no shortage of academic analyses & political considerations on the possible directions of foreign & security policy of Ukraine. The researches usually stress the strategic location of the country. It is asserted that its foreign & security policy is conditioned not only by domestic (political, socio-economical) factors, but also by the position of the country between "overlapping integrational spaces." Ukraine is influenced by Western "neighborhood" which has extended to the Central Eastern Europe & is manifesting itself through the Eastern policies of the EU & NATO. From the other side, Ukraine is influenced by Russia & structures backed by Russia (Commonwealth of Independent States -- CIS, Common Economical Space -- CES). Thus, Ukraine becomes the special object of contest between East & West. Sometimes this contest creates the stability & cooperation, sometimes -- the conflict. Ukraine tries to use these situations to strengthen its state identity & crystallize the geopolitical functions. Using these insights the article analyses what & how the complex of domestic & external factors influenced the foreign & security policy of Ukraine during the transformation of political regime in 2004-2005 & after the "Orange revolution." It is asserted that Ukraine met the 2004 Presidential elections in very difficult situation: the efforts of the external actors to influence the geopolitical self-determination of the country intensified its domestic problems (fragmentation of the society & the state, crisis of the oligarchic political system etc). During this pressure the strategy of Yushchenko & Timoshenko alliance that relied on the fight with the corrupt political economical system & stressed the orientation to the West was more effective. Although the victory of the alliance created the premises of the pro-Western policy, the integration of Ukraine with the West is still very murky. This integration can create the conflicts with Moscow. Whereas the West is politically not prepared to propose the quicker integration plan. Hence a lot will depend on the capabilities of Kiev to sustain the consolidated Yushchenko-Timoshenko alliance, which won the presidential elections & declared the Western orientation, & to win the parliamentary elections in spring of 2006. The victory would be signal that Ukraine is prepared to continue the liberal reforms & pro-Western foreign policy. The article also proposes the guidelines for Lithuanian foreign policy towards the Ukraine. Adapted from the source document.

Straipsnyje siekiama isanalizuoti Lenkijos parlamentiniu politiniu partiju programas, kuriose isskiriamas uzsienio politikos vektorius regioninio bendradarbiavimo kontekste. Pagrindinis demesys analizeje skiriamas politinems partijoms ir jas vienijanciai ideologijai analizuoti, apibreziant siu subjektu vaidmeni bendrame Lenkijos uzsienio politikos formavimo procese. Tekste pateikiamos prioritetines uzsienio politikos sritys, kurias isskiria parlamentines Lenkijos partijos. Analize atliekama nagrinejant 2011 metais suformuluotas parlamentiniu politiniu partiju - Pilieciu platformos, Teises ir teisingumo, Demokratines kaires aljanso, Lenkijos valstieciu sajungos - programas. Straipsnyje nera analizuojamas Palikotos judejimo (lenk. Ruch Palikota, RP) atvejis, nes sios partijos programoje nera isskiriamas uzsienio politikos vektorius. Tekste siekiama isanalizuoti pagrindinius Lenkijos uzsienio politikos prioritetus, ju vieta formuojant ir vykdant politika, ir daugiausia demesio skiriama siu prioritetu apraiskoms parlamentiniu politiniu partiju programose. Analizuojant Lenkijos regioninio ir strateginio bendradarbiavimo sritis, pateikiamas partiju programose isskiriamas bendradarbiavimas Europos Sajungos regione, transatlantiniai rysiai su JAV ir NATO bei santykiai su gretimomis valstybemis. Straipsnyje siekiama ivertinti, ar politiniu partiju programose iskelti uzsienio politikos vektoriai atspindi oficialia valstybes uzsienio politikos koncepcija This article analyses programs of Poland Parliamentary political parties, which exclude vectors of foreign politics in the context of regional collaboration. The most important concept in this article is the analysis of political parties and their ideologies which show their importance in forming foreign politics in Poland. Priority areas of foreign politics in Poland are presented in the text. Analysis was conducted using analysing programs (2011) of Parliamentary parties such as Civic Platform, Law and Justice, Democratic Left Alliance and Polish People Party. The case of Palikot's movement is absent in the article due to the fact that the vector of foreign politics is not excluded in its program. The main priorities of Poland's foreign politics, its position in forming and performing the politics are analysed in the text. The focus of it is on how these priorities are presented in the programs of Parliamentary parties. Adapted from the source document.