Suchergebnisse

The collapse of the bipolar system of international relations at the end of the twentieth century led to global changes in these relations, the main one being that local conflicts have replaced large-scale wars. Soft power is increasingly moving in to replace hard power; international and nongovernmental organizations, transnational companies, and even terrorist groups are taking the place of individual countries on the international arena. Nevertheless, when it comes to state security, certain mechanisms that used to be part of the bipolar system continue to function. I am referring to military bases abroad, which, in the context of globalization, continue to play just as significant role in international relations as they did during the Cold War. This article takes a look at how important it is to have these facilities in the territory of foreign states, as well as the advantages they offer the countries where they are located, using Central Asia (CA) as an example.

The category of the sphere of influence can explain some contemporary international processes. To define that category, however, much stress is laid on great powers' exclusivity within their spheres of influence. The author takes into consideration the thesis of the aforementioned exclusivity's erosion. Because foreign military bases are essential instruments of spheres of influence due to their strong impact on security policy, it is worth investigating their presence in this context. Specifically, the author carries out an in-depth study of military bases of more than one major power in one host country. Further, the article discusses the extent to which the gradual erosion of exclusivity undermines the significance of spheres of influence as such. In conclusion, the author states that the case of Djibouti undermines the idea of great power exclusivity. Yet, other cases do not provide sufficient evidence on such deep transformation because of either limited periods of bases' existence or great power cooperative attitudes.

International audience ; The purpose of this paper is to assess the projection of the US military establishment on French sports culture during the Cold War, when American soldiers were stationed in army bases across the country. After World War I, the War Department agreed to assist private organizations in setting up sporting events – especially basketball games and tournaments – to keep up army morale. But after World War II, from the onset of the Cold War until the 1960s, times were harder for the GIs in France: in rural areas, where US military bases were located, their presence was often contested and led to important disputes over issues of culture, sovereignty and national defence. As a consequence, France became the setting of drastically changing US military diplomacy in Europe, orchestrated by the Department of Defense, in cooperation with the United States Information Services (USIS), a network established by the State Department in the postwar years.As we intend to demonstrate, the entire US cultural diplomacy network revolved around the needs of the military stationed in France. Sport, and especially basketball, was pivotal in the political promotion of American culture to the French. In 1954, the failure of the European Defense Community led to a change in public diplomacy objectives: the fear of European dislocation was partly countered by better planning of sporting events organized both on and outside the bases. This paper is set at the crossroads of political and cultural history, will introduce original USIS, NATO and French archives as well as some oral history interviews. It analyses two promotional events – the Armed Forces Day and the GI Basketball All-Star Game, which took place on Chambley Air Base in the mid-1950s – and attempts at showing how specific cultural reflexes were eventually passed on to the French.

Shipping list no.: 88-504-P. ; Caption title. ; Mode of access: Internet.

There are areas of the former military base contaminated waste war. The U.S. position is moderate in these areas clean, and no intrusion into areas of possible decontamination. For Panama, this is not enough, and demands to continue the cleanup Americans. There is a consensus in Panama to claim this cleanup. ; Existen zonas de las antiguas bases militares contaminadas de residuos bélicos. La posición de EEUU es la limpieza moderada de esas zonas, y la no intrusión en las zonas de imposible descontaminación. Para Panamá esto no es suficiente, y exige que prosigan las actividades de limpieza estadounidenses. Existe un consenso en Panamá para reclamar esta limpieza.

• Opsomming: Tans is Fort England in Grahamstad 'n sielsieke-inrigting. Dit het oorspronklik bekend gestaan as die East Barracks en was die brandpunt van die vroegste nedersetting op die Kaapse Oosgrens. Fort England was trouens die bakermat en vesting van die militêre eenheid wat later die Cape Mounted Rifles geword het. Ofskoon dit in werklikheid sIegs as barakke gedien het, is die naam Fort England in 1832 aan hierdie kompleks gegee. Die 'fort' was vir 'n halfeeu die militêre hoofkwartier op die Oosgrens, behalwe vir 'n kort rukkie toe die hoofkwartier na King William's Town verskuif is. Fort England het tot 1870 – toe die Imperiale troepe onttrek is – 'n belangrike bydrae gelewer ten opsigte van die militêre verdediging en die mediese, maatskaplike en burgerlike ontwikkeling van Grahamstad. ; • Summary: Fort England, today a mental institution in Grahamstown, was originally known as the East Barracks. It was a focal point of the infant settlement of the unit which evolved into the Cape Mounted Rifles. Though it never became more than a barracks in effect, its name was changed to Fort England in 1832. For fifty years the 'fort' served as the military headquarters of the Eastern Frontier (except for a brief spell when the headquarters was at King William's Town). It was closely integrated not only with military defence, but with the medical, social, and civic development of Grahamstown, until the Imperial troops withdrew in 1870.

This research deals with an energy efficient network for military mobile base station placement. The proposed method is based on minimizing the energy loss of military communication networks where the base station is moving along a preset path and the users are constantly moving in an independent speed and direction. It takes into account the free space loss and the knife edge effect for the energy loss to establish a path weight for the shortest path model. Then, it evaluates the neighboring points to the base station for the energy loss of the network in order to find the position at which the minimum energy loss occurs. The results show a clear energy saving advantage when compared to Lloyd-Max's method

This article analyzes the nature of the conflict generated in South America by the adoption of the new military agreement between the U.S. and Colombia. The article will evaluate the political and the geostrategic implications of this agreement, especially its repercussions for the regional integration process of South America. It will also analyze the stances of the local actors in order to consider prospective scenarios, and will assess the U.S. approach to South American integration under the Obama administration.

This paper explores the phenomenon of US quasi-bases in Latin America, which are semi-formal agreements that grant the US military tacit access to local military bases without a formal lease. While the importance of formal US bases in the region has dramatically decreased, a network of quasi-bases provides critical support for US antidrug operations from Central to South America. The paper builds on Alexander Cooley's theory of base politics (2008) to explain why formal bases are more difficult to open and maintain as democracy expands in the region, and categorizes previously unstudied quasi-base arrangements. Democratic expansion affects foreign military bases in three ways. Formal base negotiations are likely to succeed if the benefits of hosting foreign bases are not only perceived by the local government but also by the opposition. Conversely, when the benefits are concentrated in the government and its clients, excluded political groups are likely to oppose the base

The United States is involved in a substantial reconfiguration of its overseas military bases that requires negotiating new base agreements with prospective host nations and amending old agreements with others. U.S. officials must grapple with the effects of anti-base social movements during this process. However, if history is any indication, these officials are unlikely to succeed fully. Both the United States's historical approach and much of the relevant scholarship on military bases underemphasize an important issue in the negotiation of base agreements: the domestic political contexts of host nations. Borrowing from social movements theory, this Article argues that the United States needs to take into account the structural determinants of successful anti-base mobilization in order to understand fully its bargaining position and to produce effective base agreements. The Article uses comparative case studies on anti-base movements in Okinawa and the Philippines to explain that the concept of "political opportunity structure" can be used to achieve these ends.

Conceptual Framework: The study of trainee engagement, albeit a recent concept, has been getting a special attention due to de assumption that the promotion of engagement in training can shape the effects of organizational resources over performance, well-being and quality of life in general, thus benefitting not only the individuals, but organizations as well. Objectives: The present study aims to analyze the differences in engagement regarding self-concept and context factors of trainees attending the Training Courses for Petty Officers 1st Class (CFS). Methodology: The methodology made use of the Utrecht Work Engagement Scale (Schaufeli, Salanova, González-Romá & Bakker, 2002), the Assessment Scale for Trainee Engagement in the Portuguese Navy (Frade & Veiga, 2014), as well as the Assessment Scale for Trainee Self-concept in the Portuguese Navy (Frade & Veiga, in press; Frade, 2015). The sample was comprised of 149 trainees from the CFS of the Portuguese Navy. The data collected were analyzed using SPSS software. Results: Trainees living offbase and with more self-concept have reached higher levels of engagement than those presenting low self-concept. In cases of low self-concept, trainees living onbase reached higher levels of engagement when compared to those living off-base.Conclusion: The result analysis allowed the finding of relationships between trainee engagement, self-concept and on-base living. There was an intention of getting directions to support the action of the Portuguese Navy with the engagement of its human resources in learning situations and work realization. ; info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion

Testimony issued by the General Accounting Office with an abstract that begins "The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002 authorized an additional Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) round in 2005. The legislation requires the Department of Defense (DOD) to provide Congress in early 2004 with a report that addresses excess infrastructure and certifies that an additional BRAC round is needed and that annual net savings will be realized by each military department not later than fiscal year 2011. GAO is required to assess this information as well as the selection criteria for the 2005 round and report to Congress within 60 days of DOD's submission. The legislation also retains the requirement for GAO to assess the BRAC 2005 decisionmaking process and resulting recommendations. This testimony addresses (1) the BRAC process from a historical perspective, (2) GAO's role in the process, and (3) GAO's initial observations on key issues DOD is required to address in preparation for the 2005 round. Because DOD had not submitted its required 2004 report at the time we completed this statement, this testimony relies on our prior work that addressed issues associated with excess capacity and BRAC savings."

At all times, armed forces have dominated and still dominate the development of statehood: they protect the fundamental interests of states-sovereignty and territorial integrity-and their capabilities are widely used as an effective instrument for implementing foreign policy, determining, along with the economy and ideology, a state's impact on world politics. Armed forces have retained their adequacy amid the current globalization trends when traditional (military) threats are retreating, states' security interests are growing increasingly interdependent, and the principle of their indivisibility is being widely recognized, while the world has acquired alternative forces and means to ensure security, etc. Today, however, military spending is constantly climbing, while the "responsibility zone"/"geography of functioning" of armed forces outside their state borders is widening. The national interests of the sovereign entities of world politics suggested by the very nature of international relations and security threats presuppose a wider network of military bases overseas. The foreign military presence is directly connected with events and processes that reverberate across the world and which, at different periods in human history, have been the driving force behind progress. In the past, in the 17th-20th centuries, military bases in foreign countries were set up by colonial powers or by the great powers locked in the ideologically driven Cold War. 1 Early in the 21st century, this trend survived because of transnational threats (mainly from international terrorism and the proliferation of WMD), as well as due to the struggle for strategic resources. Here I will analyze the foreign military bases that appeared in Central Asia along with the "global war against terrorism" and the prospects for new military facilities in conjunction with the interests of the Central Asian states.

Testimony issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "On May 13, 2005, the Department of Defense (DOD) submitted 222 base realignment and closure (BRAC) recommendations, involving an unprecedented 837 BRAC actions, to the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission for its review. DOD expects the proposals, if approved, would generate net annual recurring savings of about $5.5 billion beginning in fiscal year 2012 and net savings of nearly $50 billion over a 20-year period, despite an expected cost of over $24 billion to implement the recommendations. The Commission is charged with reviewing these proposals and submitting its own list to the President by September 8, 2005. The Commission requested GAO to provide testimony before the Commission summarizing the results of its report, issued on July 1, 2005, on the 2005 BRAC process. This statement presents GAO views on (1)whether DOD's selection process in developing BRAC actions was logical and reasoned, (2) selected issues regarding the recommendations, and (3) certain challenges associated with implementing the BRAC recommendations, if approved."

"HUD-1581-CPD"--P. [4] of cover. ; "March 1996." ; Shipping list no. 96-0197-P. ; Cover title. ; Mode of access: Internet.