Suchergebnisse

Examines the 1992-1996 siege of Sarajevo to explore how experiences of war influence perceptions about war. A model of "civilian," "soldier," & "deserter" modes of perceiving war is introduced as the basis for social interaction. Each mode is discussed in relation to four domains of social life considered important in war: the character of time; perceptions of social order; legitimation of choices; & group identities. Data were drawn from 1 year of fieldwork during the war, as well as from books & documents written by Sarajevans, foreign diplomats, & journalists. The material is presented in the form of a key narrator who exemplifies how the three modes of perception merge to deal with war experiences. It is noted that the civilian mode of thinking characterizes war as the opposite of peace & the normal way of life, while the soldier mode sees war as an acceptable phenomenon controlled by people, & the deserter mode views violence as part of a life in which lines between war & peace are blurred. Ways in which the modes affect social actions are discussed. 41 References. J. Lindroth

Examines the 1992-1996 siege of Sarajevo to explore how experiences of war influence perceptions about war. A model of "civilian," "soldier," & "deserter" modes of perceiving war is introduced as the basis for social interaction. Each mode is discussed in relation to four domains of social life considered important in war: the character of time; perceptions of social order; legitimation of choices; & group identities. Data were drawn from 1 year of fieldwork during the war, as well as from books & documents written by Sarajevans, foreign diplomats, & journalists. The material is presented in the form of a key narrator who exemplifies how the three modes of perception merge to deal with war experiences. It is noted that the civilian mode of thinking characterizes war as the opposite of peace & the normal way of life, while the soldier mode sees war as an acceptable phenomenon controlled by people, & the deserter mode views violence as part of a life in which lines between war & peace are blurred. Ways in which the modes affect social actions are discussed. 41 References. J. Lindroth

Germany's future contribution to European and allied security depends on the Bundeswehr's ability to harness emerging and disruptive technologies (EDTs) such as artificial intelligence, 5G/6G cellular network technology, Low Earth Orbit (LEO) satellite connectivity, and quantum communications and computation. Even amidst Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine, Germany continues to be mired in siloed conceptual, institutional, and ethical thinking that results in disconnections between the military and the technology sector, and even between ­Germany and its allies. The Zeitenwende should catalyze not only a defense budgetary increase but a reconciliation between ethics and military requirements regarding EDTs if Germany is to look beyond immediate needs and ensure the Bundeswehr's future ­operational readiness.

 Yesterday, I participated at a roundtable consultation with the Social Sciences Research Review Board* [SSRRB], which is DND/CAF's equivalent of a research ethics board.  The meeting was partly to brief us (some profs researching the military, some research ethics board folks) and partly to get our feedback on how things are going and about potential reforms.*  The SSRB process is essentially run out of the Director General Military Personnel Research and Analysis.  And that was cool to learn since DGMPRA is a partner of the CDSN, with one of its staff, Irina Goldenberg, serving as one of our Co-Directors.  I would say that this institution, like research ethics boards, are necessary evils for researchers, but they are not evil.  They can be inconvenient, but as one REB participant said, they create necessary friction.  Social science has a history of doing harm to its research subjects--with the most infamous ones being the Milgram experiments and the Stanford Prison experiments.  What is it about psychologists that cause them to be the exemplars for this stuff?  I don't know, but I do know that Carleton has separate REBs for psych versus other social sciences since the former needs more vigilance than the latter.Part of the challenge of REBs and especially SSRRB is that we hear the horror stories, but do not have a good sense of how much they slow researchers down, how much of that is due to the researchers and how much of that is due to the review process.  I can give you one example that is most trivial that slowed my latest one down: the Carleton REB required me to change my various documents (the consent form I give to my research subjects, for example) to update the new Carleton logo.  Which is, to be clear, utter bullshit since an old logo or a new one has no implications for whether I would be creating risk for the research subjects if they consented to be a research subject (to agree to be interviewed).  But the change did not take me long.  Anyhow, SSRRB does not have a website!  So, their ability to convey info is not great, so we can borrow from a organization (and CDSN partner) that interacts with SSRRB quite often: CIMVHR! CIMVHR is the Canadian Institute for Military and Veteran Health Research, and while much of their work is on health stuff, which goes to a different board, their members do a lot of social science stuff (more on that below).  So, the CIMVHR website provides much more help for SSRRB than, well, SSRRB does right now:We encourage all applicants to review the Social Science Research Review Board (SSRRB) requirements before applying; For SSRRB inquiries contact: ssrrb-cerss@forces.gc.caSo, our first recommendation was for them to get a website!Anyhow, they explained the process, and it was most relevant as I just had a student face serious challenges.  To get SSRRB approval, one needs an internal sponsor within the CAF or DND.  What is most confusing about this is that it needs to be an L1 organization--which means the Army or the Navy or the Air Force or a command like CANSOF or CJOC.  Does that mean that it needs to be approved by THE L1?  The commander of the Navy, the chief of the army and so forth?  Um, depends on what you are asking?  If you are asking to survey a specific unit, one can perhaps work with someone at the LCol level rather than having the big boss sign off.  The SSRRB folks said that they could help folks find a sponsor, which my student didn't experience.Why a sponsor and then why are other approvals needed?  The SSRRB folks said this was mostly to prevent survey fatigue and researchers getting in the way of operations, etc.  I did ask about whether this could serve as a veto in the research process since there is language in the documents (from Treasury Board) about the research being in the interests of the organization.  The SSRRB folks insisted this didn't happen, but it is hard to tell if that is the case.  The big thing in play is that the Arbour Report had a recommendation (#46) specifically focused on this stuff.  Specifically, why should academics have to go through their university REBs and then do it again with SSRB?  They are working on three three options:Allow for concurrent review with academics so that folks don't have to wait and if they get feedback from one system, they can then revise what is in the other.Have SSRRB accept or waive the ethics stuff in their process if a researcher can provide them with a REB certificate from their home institution, and just work on the stuff that is DND/CAF-centric--security/operational issues, whether the research has already been done (lots of internal research that we don't have easy access to), or whether it gets in the way of operations.Collaborative agreements whereby a university's REB and SSRRB agree perhaps to SSRRB essentially be one-stop shopping--that if one gets SSRRB approval, then the home university accepts that as a legit REB approval.  The idea here for any reform is to make it easier/simpler/quicker for academics.  Grad students and junior faculty do not have a lot of time to go through multiple processes.  So, this is a work in progress, but it does look like things will get easier although perhaps not easy.  Getting a sponsor is not so easy and getting commanders to approve of research in their area of responsibility is tricky as well.  But eliminating duplicative REB processes would be a big improvement.I mentioned social science above--one of the things that drives me crazy works in a positive way here: a narrow definition of what counts as social science.  In the minds of the SSRRB folks, as far as I can tell, there is a tendency to consider surveys as social science and may be focus group stuff, but not other stuff, which means that other stuff (which really is social science) does not fall into their domain.  So, one can do elite interviews (the stuff I do) since they are "consultations".  One can also do program eval, which don't count as research if worded correctly.  So, either one's REB or SSRRB can help frame a project so that going through SSRRB's approval process is not necessary.  On the other hand, having that stamp of approval is handy for getting commanders to allow pesky academics to have access to subordinates.So, the big punchlines are: SSRRB may not be as much a gate keeper as folks think, and if they are gate keepers, they are willing to change due to the Arbour report to make things better.  Oh, and there are ways to dodge them.  I still worry about the parts of their procedures that give senior folks in the CAF the ability to veto research, but the practical reality is that one can't do a variety of research projects on the military if  the commander is hostile, whether or not there is a procedure that gives them a veto.One last thing: DGMPRA have done a lot of studies on personnel issues, so if one is working on that, it is best to approach them and see if a related project may have produced data--they are willing to share data.  Tis what the collaborative agreements are for.   

The issue of whether war crimes should be considered as a moral, legal, or political category is addressed. It is initially contended that only "crimes against peace" should be considered war crimes since other traditional categories of war crimes (eg, violations of human rights) remain criminal in nature outside the context of war. Moreover, it is claimed that crimes against peace possess specific moral & legal difficulties since defeated parties are generally labeled war criminals. The tendency to equate military success in war with absolution from blame is subsequently questioned on moral & legal grounds; specifically, it is argued that prosecuting those who achieve military victory may infringe on a state's universal right to self-defense. Moreover, the capacity to bring charges of war crimes against parties regardless of the outcome of war is deemed problematic since such reasoning suggests that certain entities have a right to victory during war. Consequently, it is maintained that only aggressor states that are defeated during war can legitimately be prosecuted. It is concluded that prosecutions of parties accused of committing war crimes ultimately constitutes a political act. J. W. Parker

Examines the argument that major interstate war is in decline as a policy option & interrogates the notion of a post-World War II "discontinuity." Kant's purported pacifism & cosmopolitanism are problematized, as is modern political & military scholarship contending that major-power war is becoming obsolescent. The technological deterrent is also examined, as are the rise of the international system, global economic & political development, & multilateral norms, laws, & ethics. The decline of major war depends on some basic social & global transformations; this thesis therefore contradicts the notion that major-power war can vanish in the absence of significant alterations in root human & social conditions. K. Coddon

The issue of whether morally unjustifiable means (ie, war crimes) can be used by state military forces to accomplish morally justifiable ends in times of war is contemplated. It is contended that human rights impose certain constraints on the means & ends of wartime behavior. Consequently, crimes that violate human rights committed against aggressor forces are deemed morally permissible since the perpetrators were attempting to violate the human rights of the defenders. However, two categories of war crimes that essentially violate human rights are identified: actions in which (1) aggressor states attempt to dominate other groups for purposes of self-aggrandizement regardless of such groups' human rights & (2) military forces inflict unnecessary injury (eg, rape & torture) on subjugated groups. It is claimed that justifiable ends realized through the use of unjustifiable means cannot be morally legitimized. It is concluded that international law has a moral responsibility to establish guidelines for preventing & punishing violations of human rights during times of war. J. W. Parker