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During China's high-level 'two sessions' (两会) meetings this year, defence ministry spokesperson Tan Kefei (谭克非) disclosed that ¥1.58 trillion ($338 billion) had been allocated in the 2023 national budget for defence, up 7.2% on the ...

Security cooperation and military aid efforts can fail, but they can also exceed expectations and provide strategic benefits. Ukraine appears to be one such success. For a relatively modest investment between 2014 and 2021, the United States has reaped a substantial gain in terms of Ukraine's military capacity and efficacy.

The conference agreement on the 2024 Military Construction and Veterans Affairs appropriations bill is among the six legislative measures that were signed into law on Saturday. The military construction portion of the bill contains money for forces in the United States and around the world.
The post 2024 Military Construction Appropriations appeared first on American Enterprise Institute - AEI.

After this weekend's horrific Hamas assault on Israel, the ball is now in Jerusalem's court, and the most important question is how the Netanyahu government will respond. Inevitably, that's a complicated issue.
The post Pondering Israel's Military Options appeared first on American Enterprise Institute - AEI.

The ongoing war in Gaza is tragic in terms of human suffering and there is little sign that this conflict will come to an end any time soon. This article asks what lessons can be drawn from recent British military history in defining success or failure.

NATO has taken significant steps to reduce environmental impacts of military activities and has set voluntary emissions reduction targets for its member states. By leveraging its existing standardization processes to encompass a wider range of equipment, supplies, and practices, NATO can solidify its role as the preeminent military leader on climate.

An important AEI report shows that US military primacy, which underwrote American and allied post–World War II security and prosperity, is under serious threat. The report concludes that we are falling behind China in many critical domains of military power.
The post China's March to Military Dominance appeared first on American Enterprise Institute - AEI.

Mark Klamberg (Stockholm University - Faculty of Law) has posted Regulatory Choices at the Advent of Gig Warfare and Killer Robots on SSRN. Here is the abstract: This article describes three ways of regulating military AI. First, existing rules and...

This week we explore the role of military technology in modern warfare.

Yesterday, the New York Times published a guest essay by Craig Singleton, a fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, entitled "China's Military is Going Global." Singleton argues that Beijing is well on its way to building a globe-spanning network of "strategic strong points along China's major trade, energy, and resource routes" that pose a dire military threat to the United States. Allegedly using the structure of the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative of commercial infrastructure projects, Beijing's supposedly new "under the radar" strategy is seen as directly challenging Washington's ability to carry out critical overseas military missions, including the defense of Taiwan.In response to this expanding threat, Singleton calls for Washington to devise a strategy designed to "pre-emptively" neutralize China's moves, including "incentives or punishments" directed at host governments.It is surprising that the New York Times saw fit to publish such an essay, since it is replete with distortions, exaggerations, and speculations. There is no question that China's overseas military-related activities merits close examination, especially when they take place in sensitive areas. But such an examination requires a careful parsing of actual facts, with clear distinctions made between proposed plans, actual undertakings, commercial versus military (and non-military security) purposes, and the likely military benefits for China that might ensue from a particular location or operation. Instead of observing such requirements, Singleton plays fast and loose with the evidence, subtly caveating his statements with weasel words like "might," "may," "could," "suggests," "suspected," etc. Nonetheless, almost every conceivable possible, current, or emerging overseas Chinese commercial, scientific, or security "presence" is labeled as part of a deliberate, coordinated, military-centered strategy to "reshape the global military landscape" in Beijing's favor and hence to threaten the U.S. In reality, China has thus far established only one actual, operating overseas military base, on the horn of Africa, in Djibouti, and is probably establishing a naval facility in Cambodia. But there are real limits to how far China can go in duplicating such places. As Isaac Kardon of the Carnegie Endowment has pointed out, China has no formal military alliances (beyond the dubious case of North Korea) and is unlikely to acquire any in the foreseeable future, a fact that imposes major constraints on its ability to establish serious military bases. Few if any countries wish to commit to housing full-fledged, sizeable military facilities that could project Chinese military power across their region and, in the process, invite an American response. Moreover, many of the actual security-related facilities that Singleton employs as evidence for his argument serve functions other than militarily threatening the United States, such as anti-piracy missions, UN peace-keeping rotations, non-combatant evacuation operations in an emergency, or the protection of nearby investments. And their ability to evolve beyond such functions is likely to remain highly limited. Most recipient states want Chinese commerce and investment above all else. Indeed, many of the supposed new Chinese bases or proto bases identified by Singleton consist primarily of a commercial or civilian scientific presence, some with only a vague potential for military use. A few existing commercial facilities (such as in the UAE) might acquire limited military functions, but in many cases this remains unclear. One can argue that such commercial locations do serve a kind of strategic purpose, but as part of Beijing's efforts to become a major commercial and scientific/technological power, not to directly threaten U.S. global military dominance. In addition, even if a clearer military function were to emerge in many of China's overseas facilities, it is far from clear that it would in most cases provide Beijing with the kind of daunting strategic benefit that Singleton alleges. For example, some analysts of the facility in Cambodia have argued that it will provide few new operational advantages for the PLA. In truth, Singleton's argument is an updated and expanded version of the so-called "string of pearls" idea that appeared many years ago. Originating with an American corporation, the concept sought to link together some of China's overseas activities in Southeast Asia and along the Indian Ocean to the Middle East to form a grand Chinese strategic move to dominate the region militarily and politically. As with the present version, the reality fell far short, usually for similar reasons.Finally, it is troubling that Singleton recommends that Washington should adopt both incentives and coercive means to preemptively neutralize China's allegedly nefarious overseas activities. If applied to most of the existing examples he provides of these activities, such an effort could easily backfire, as target countries interpret Washington's behavior as an attempt to undermine what they regard as legitimate commercial and scientific transactions with China.China's expanding overseas commercial, scientific, and security presence requires close, careful examination, no question. Unfortunately, this essay does not offer such analysis. Indeed, by publishing it, the New York Times has more likely provoked an even greater level of threat inflation than already exists in Washington and elsewhere.

There is more continuity in the history of U.S. military basing policy than is typically assumed.

Thanks, John Kelly! Today, I got into a twitter argument with Dan Gardner, who I respect a lot.  He was making a claim about the next Trump administration being worse than the first one, which is something I readily agree, but asserted that the first batch of appointees restrained Trump.  I scoff at that as I documented here quite often that his first batch included many arsonists and incompetents.  I brought up John Kelly who was a xenophobe in charge of Homeland Security.  Gardner responded that Kelly was highly accomplished when he was appointed.  Which caused the conversation to turn: how was Kelly highly accomplished?Kelly was a retired three star marine general.  And?  To me, that means he had the qualities that the Marines desired.  Because of a number of awful folks getting promoted to the top of various military hierarchies, I can't say that because a dude has a bunch of stars or leafs on their shoulders that they have done great things.  Tommy Franks was great at sucking up and kicking down and got four stars along the way, and then mismanaged Central Command, helping to birth the failures in Iraq and Afghanistan.  I would have swerved off the highway on the way out to California when we passed the Tommy Franks Institute for Leadership if my daughter was not the one behind the wheel.  Yesterday, I gave a talk at the Canadian Club of Kingston, and I ran through some of the senior officers in the CAF who rose despite (or because of) their abuse of power and sexual misconduct.  Art McDonald might have been good at driving a ship, but commanding the CAF?  He showed his incompetence in so many ways but most obviously by sending an email to the entire community of senior officers telling them that he was coming back after being "exonerated," etc.  So, my first point was simply that the promotion processes are far from perfect so accomplishing high rank does not mean as much as one might think.  My second point is that whatever they were good at to get promoted in the military did not mean they had the skills to operate on the civilian side of government.  There is a critical contradiction or irony at play here.  One of the key widely shared characteristics of contemporary military officers in many democracies is that they define themselves as the only professionals in military matters--that they have expertise on the management of violence and such expertise civilians know not (thanks to Sam Huntington).  Indeed, this can lead to contempt for civilians who "interfere" as those who are not "professionals" are amateurs.  The contradiction is that these same military officers, when they retire, often think they can serve in civilian roles without any significant training despite lacking expertise.  These military officers are often far more amateurish in civilian capacities than those civilians working in defence agencies.  Running through the list of senior officers who served under Trump: which ones covered themselves in glory and competence?  Kelly? Mattis? McMaster?  Flynn (the shortest serving National Security Adviser)?  Another contradiction is at work.  Military officers, thanks again to Sam Huntington, think that they are apolitical.  This can mean many things, but militaries are hardly apolitical and working within any large organization requires politics.  But they are trained not to think politically, a paradox of professionalism, despite the fact, you know, war is the continuation of politics by other means. So, dumped into a civilian spot, they need to be sensitive to the politics of their job and of their agency.  Which they are often not.Finally, for cabinet-style governments, where there is some collective decision-making, the decision-makers should not be retired senior officers.  I have written about the mistake of making retired officers SecDef or MinDef.  I am not alone in arguing that retired senior military officers are unfit for being the top civilian in the chain of command as they are not really civilian--they have military mindset and they are embedded in military networks.  What is true for the head of the defense agency (department/ministry/whatever) is somewhat less true but still applicable for other cabinet officials when there is collective decision-making.Some will say: hey, you need military expertise.  The answer to that is that there are plenty of military folks to ask for advice.  Indeed, democracies tend to have specific folks designated as the senior person responsible for providing military advice--the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Chief of the Defence Staff, etc.  Some will say: hey, Ike was a former general, Marshall was a former general, etc.  And the answer is: sure, they were incredibly exceptional people.  Ike, as Supreme Commander of the European theatre had to engage in much politics to manage the competing American generals like Patton, not to mention foreign generals like Montgomery and De Gaulle and civilians like Churchill.  Marshall's experiences managing the US Army during the war gave him a sense of strategy and of politics so that he could be a pretty terrific Secretary of State.  Those individuals did not just earn stars on their shoulders but performed amazingly well in difficult circumstances heavily laden with politics, and they were self-aware as they engaged in politics.  Does that describe Tommy Franks or Wesley Clark or Art McDonald?  Hardly.To be fair, I don't think that all military officers, retired or active, are as flawed as these folks.  I just don't think that military service and promotion to the highest ranks are signals that someone is going to be a great cabinet secretary.  It may be unfair to use the retired/active folks who served under Trump because that was such a shitshow.  But perhaps only a shitshow would focus more on stars on shoulders than real qualifications for the job at hand?  I have the same attitude here as I do towards term limits--I prefer to have experts in important positions, not rookies.  Would you like to be the first patient for a brand new surgeon or dentist or the first client for a brand new lawyer?  Retired military officers would have to learn the job while on the job--and that is not good when the stakes are high.

Some of those who want to appease Beijing assert that China's military superiority would enable it to defeat the US over Taiwan. Like the supposed superior strengths of the Chinese economy, these arguments are based ...

Corruption scandals and high-level rifts could become an existential threat as Kyiv asks for more military aid.

While some Private Military Companies (PMCs) serve authoritarian governments, these actors are not representative of the global industry. PMCs whose structure, leadership, and culture increase accountability can provide benefits to states consistent with international law.