Suchergebnisse

The stated objectives for countries in providing foreign aid have been strategic, economic and humanitarian. The end of the Cold War and the recent disintegration of territorial states has increased the prominence of the humanitarian objective. Therefore, the paper concentrates on the transfer of resources from wealthier and politically stable countries to poorer and politically unstable ones. The amount of foreign aid provided by governments and international relief agencies is determined by the altruistic desires of individuals. Within a median voter framework, it is found that foreign aid is increasing in the degree of altruism of the median voter, their income, the similarity the median voter has with the ethnicity or religion of the recipient group, and the number of civilian casualties resulting from armed conflicts in the recipient nation. Foreign aid is inversely related to the size of the recipient country and the extent that international relief is being pilfered. This latter result explains "foreign aid fatigue." An implication of this analysis is that donor nations may have an incentive to intervene militarily in civil conflicts which reduce the welfare of their altruistic citizens in order to establish order in the relief effort or to stabilize or establish a government capable of controlling the domestic unrest. This option will be chosen if the welfare of the median voter is greater under military intervention than under the status quo of continuing to send only aid. Intervention will occur, the more effective the military option is in reducing the unrest, the greater the degree of altruism of the median voter, the larger the size of the donor country, the lower the cost of intervention, the larger the extent and size of the group being victimized, the lower the relative valuation placed on alternative domestic uses of foreign aid, and the greater the size of the transfer being provided.

This article argues that military intervention by traditional members of the OECD's Development Assistance Committee (DAC) has a significant impact on the development aid given to target states. This seemingly innocuous thesis contributes to two literatures. First is the literature on foreign aid, which examines a long list of donor and recipient state variables to explain assistance patterns. It has yet to analyze the signal that DAC military intervention sends about the importance of specific recipient states, however. Second is the literature on foreign policy substitutability, which maintains that increasing the resources allotted to one change-inducing foreign policy tool often reduces the resources available for other tools. Using interrupted time-series panel-corrected standard error estimates of 120 recipient countries from 1960 to 2004, we find that aid flows from traditional DAC donors rise significantly when one or more of their members dispatch soldiers in support of a target government, but gradually recede after troops depart. The opposite pattern holds for interventions that oppose the target government. These outcomes suggest that studies of foreign aid should consider donor state military actions as an additional explanatory variable, and that policymakers may at times view foreign aid and military intervention as complementary rather than competing foreign policy tools.

This article presents a theoretical framework and some empirical results showing that the level of foreign aid received reduces the supply of terrorist attacks from recipient countries, while U.S. military interventions are liable to increase this supply. Due account is taken of endogeneity problems in producing these results. They suggest that Western democracies, which are the main targets of terrorist attacks, should invest more funds in foreign aid, with a special emphasis on supporting education, and use military interventions more sparingly.

Research shows that foreign aid promotes economic development in democracies but not in autocracies. Although explanations for this phenomenon vary, a common theme is that autocracies are more likely to misuse aid. We provide evidence of such misuse, showing that autocracies are more likely than democracies to divert development aid to the military. Theoretically, we build on "selectorate" models in which autocrats respond to aid by contracting civil liberties. Because this strategy requires military capacity, autocracies but not democracies should spend aid on the military. We support this hypothesis empirically, providing further evidence that autocracies misuse foreign aid. Adapted from the source document.

Research shows that foreign aid promotes economic development in democracies but not in autocracies. Although explanations for this phenomenon vary, a common theme is that autocracies are more likely to misuse aid. We provide evidence of such misuse, showing that autocracies are more likely than democracies to divert development aid to the military. Theoretically, we build on "selectorate" models in which autocrats respond to aid by contracting civil liberties. Because this strategy requires military capacity, autocracies but not democracies should spend aid on the military. We support this hypothesis empirically, providing further evidence that autocracies misuse foreign aid.

Assesses whether US foreign economic aid is treated as a fungible item by recipient countries seeking to bolster their military establishments. Also seeks a better theoretical understanding of the influences that foreign aid has on the recipient state and the determinants of national military allocations. (PAS)

Highlights Convention Issue - 'Mansfield Wants Cutback in Foreign Military Aid'