Suchergebnisse

THIS SECTION ENUMERATES THE AFRICAN GOVERNMENTS WHO ARE CURRENTLY LED BY SOME FORM OF MILITARY REGIME. MOST HAVE HAD THEIR GOVERNMENTS OVERTURNED, OR THREATENED TO BE OVERTURNED, BY MILITARY COUPS. THE DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN MILITARY AND CIVILIAN GOVERNMENTS IN AFRICA ALSO SEEMS INCREASINGLY SUPERFICIAL. IN THIS INAUSPICIOUS POLITICAL CONTEXT, THERE ARE FEW CLEAR-CUT RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN ARMY RULE, MILITARY SPENDING, AND DEVELOPMENT.

A notable imbalance exists in the literature on the rôle of soldiers in politics – far less attention is given to their rule than to their intervention. This is particularly true for the African continent, where scant effort has been made to relate patterns of military rule to patterns of demilitarisation. The policy objectives of officers are often dealt with as two opposing ideal types: broadly ideological, leaning towards 'anticommunism', 'modernisation', or 'Arab socialism'; or fundamentally apolitical and unable to formulate reasonable policy objectives because of their narrow corporate perspectives. The logic of these two ideal positions leads to the alleged dichotomy that juntas with broad political ambitions will tend to stay in power indefinitely, while those with limited corporate interests will find it easy to turn power over to civilians who will 'grant autonomy to the armed forces'.1

THE CASE OF MALI CONTRADICTS THE NOTION THAT JUNTAS WITH BROAD POLITICAL AMBITIONS WILL TEND TO STAY IN POWER INDEFINATELY, WHILE THOSE WITH LIMITED CORPORATE INTERESTS WILL FIND IT EASY TO TURN POWER OVER TO CIVILIANS WHO WILL GRANT AUTONOMY TO THE ARMED FORCES. IT SEEMS UNLIKELY THAT THE JUNTA WILL SHOW A DRAMATIC DEPARTURE FROM ITS PAST RECORD DURING THE REMAINDER OF THE 1970S.

1. The Coup. 1975. 9 S. Vol.22 No.1.; 2. The new regime. 1975. 12 S. Vol.22 No.2