Suchergebnisse

Dieser Beitrag untersucht das Marktregime des chilenischen Hochschulwesens. Dabei werden drei grundlegenden Dimensionen unterschieden: Marktstruktur, Finanzierung und die sich wandelnden Relation zwischen dem öffentlichen und dem privaten Bereich. Der Beitrag zeigt, wie Marktprozesse das Verhalten von Institutionen bedingen, wie die Politik die Hochschulfinanzierung organisiert und wie beides die Rolle privater und öffentlicher Hochschulen so verändert, dass auf der Grundlage von Marktstrukturen ein hybrides System entsteht. (HoF/Text übernommen)

We investigate how the optimal production tax rate is affected by privatization policies in a mixed oligopoly in which a state‐owned public firm competes against private firms in a free‐entry market. First, we investigate the domestic private firm case. The optimal tax rate is strictly positive except for the full privatization and full nationalization cases, and the relationship between the optimal tax rate and degree of privatization is an inverted U‐shape. Next, we investigate the foreign private firm case and find that the non‐monotonic relationship disappears.

Abstract
What role does sector play in citizens' perceptions of products or services in mixed-market settings where governments compete with for-profit and nonprofit vendors or when governments partner or contract with private-sector providers? Do the public and nonprofit sectors have an advantage over for-profit providers? Using choice-based conjoint analysis with a nationally representative paid consumer panel, we examine the relevance of sector to consumers and compare it other signals of quality; namely, price, third-party certifications, and consumer ratings. Of these, subjects are most sensitive to information from consumer ratings. Regarding sector, we find that subjects generally prefer nonprofit to government providers and government to for-profit providers. Sector is most relevant to consumers in low-information environments when the quality of a product or service is otherwise unclear. We extend theory by proposing four possible mechanisms for the differential value of sector to consumers (process quality, product quality, expertise quality, and moral quality).

The author analyzes the welfare effects of privatization in a mixed duopoly model in which the wage rate for the privatized firm is determined by Nash bargaining beforehand. The evaluations are based on three‐stage privatization frameworks respectively under two regimes: Cournot competition and a public firm acting as a Stackelberg leader. The author finds that the optimal degrees of privatization from the viewpoint of social welfare may be different for various types of competition. The article also shows that even optimal privatization set by a welfare‐maximization government may not guarantee welfare improvement, owing to the interference of wage bargaining. (JEL D60, D78, L32, L33)

Hospitals can be reimbursed for their costs in many ways. Several authors have investigated the effects of these reimbursement rules on physician incentives and, therefore, on the quantity of services provided to patients. A form of (linear) cost‐sharing tends to emerge as the socially efficient reimbursement policy. We present a model of hospital reimbursement, based on Ellis and McGuire (1986). The new feature is that physicians can supply private health care services to a patient, as well as public sector ones; a common institutional arrangement in many health care systems. We investigate the optimal public sector reimbursement rule given that private market incentives must now be taken into account. Public sector cost‐sharing remains socially efficient, but it is generally non‐linear: the precise details depend on whether public and private services are substitutes or complements and on the degree of social efficiency achieved in the private sector. Other reimbursement schemes exhibit optimality properties not present in Ellis and McGuire's work.

Résumé Cet article analyse la réforme des systèmes de protection sociale dans deux pays méditerranéens, prenant comme point de départ le modèle des variétés du capitalisme. Son but est de démontrer l'intérêt d'une méthode intégrant les différentes approches à l'étude de l'État providence. Prenant comme point de départ la capacité limitée des théories existantes pour expliquer la dynamique de réforme des économies de l'Europe du Sud, l'article déploie une analyse sur deux niveaux pour rendre compte de la dynamique et de la direction du changement en Espagne et en Italie. L'intégration des conclusions provenant du modèle des variétés de capitalisme et de la littérature scientifique sur l'évolution de l'État providence nous aident à mieux comprendre les mécanismes du changement dans les économies hybride de l'Europe du sud. À cette fin, nous analysons l'interaction entre régime de production et de protection sociale. Parmi les variables clefs de cette analyse se trouvent : la fragmentation organisationnelle des associations collectives, les types de coalition de réforme, ainsi que les caractéristiques des systèmes politiques.

This paper reviews the reform of social protection systems in two Mediterranean economies in the light of the Varieties of Capitalism theory. Far from providing an exhaustive and detailed explanation of change in all areas of social protection, the paper aims to show the need to integrate insights from different approaches to welfare reform. The starting point is the limited capacity of existing approaches when it comes to explaining reform dynamics in southern European economies. The paper uses a two-level analytical framework in order to understand the dynamics and direction of change in Italy and Spain. The integration of insights from the varieties of capitalism and the politics of welfare reform literature helps to achieve a better understanding of mechanisms underlying change in the Southern European hybrid political economies. The interactions between production regimes and protection systems are analyzed extensively. The organizational fragmentation of collective associations, the type of reform coalitions as well as the characteristics of the political system stand as important variables to explain change in social protection models of these countries. Adapted from the source document.