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Recent work on the relationship of economics to economic institutions has argued that economics is constitutive of economic institutions, and of markets in particular. In opposition to economic sociology, which has treated economics as a competing disciplinary frame or an ideology, the 'performativity' literature takes economics seriously as a set of market-building practices. This article demonstrates the compatibility of these perspectives by analyzing the role of economics in the politics of market formation. It presents a case study of the formation of a new institution: capacity markets connected to wholesale electricity markets in the United States. The case demonstrates how economic framing shapes the politics of markets by imposing a specific set of terms for the legitimate conduct of the struggle over market rules.

AbstractThis paper considers a mixed duopoly two‐sided market of platforms in which a private firm competes with a public firm in a linear city model with fixed demand of full coverage. We examine whether prices of platforms are lower in the mixed duopoly market than in the standard pure duopoly market in which two private firms compete. We show that introducing a public competitor may or may not induce lower prices of the private platform than introducing a private firm, depending on the quality of the public platform service. In particular, if the quality of the public platform is superior, the prices of the platforms are lower than when it competes with the private rival, whereas they are higher if the quality is lower. We also show that the private firm invests more than the public firm. This has the policy implication that maintaining lower platform prices by introducing a competing public platform will not be sustainable in the long run.

We present a simple Bertrand competition model with a Hotelling (Economic Journal, Vol. 39 (1929), pp. 41–57) type spatial competition by incorporating the framework of partial privatization developed by Bös (Privatization: A Theoretical Treatment, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1991). We investigate simultaneous price choice and sequential price choice with respect to fixed locations of firms and show how the degree of privatization of a public firm influences social welfare in a mixed duopoly market. We also analyse sequential price competition with respect to the location choice of firms.

Principal market players in microeconomy, mezzoeconomyand macroeconomy and their behavior analysis -- Overview of economic behavior of regional governments -- Resource generation and categorization of three types of resources -- Dual attributes of government -- Regional government competition -- Competitive economic growth -- Government foresighted leading (GFL) -- New engines of economic development -- On the dual-entity of market competition (DEMC) -- "Double strong forms" theory in a mature market economy -- Several consensuses on governmental economic behavior.

Book reviewed in this article:Amy Chua. 2003. Worldon Fire: How Exporting Free Market Democracy Breeds Ethnic Hatred and Global Instability.Thomas L. Friedman. 2002. Longitudes and Attitudes: Exploring the World After September 11.Samuel P. Huntington. 1996. The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order.

We investigate how the optimal production tax rate is affected by privatization policies in a mixed oligopoly in which a state‐owned public firm competes against private firms in a free‐entry market. First, we investigate the domestic private firm case. The optimal tax rate is strictly positive except for the full privatization and full nationalization cases, and the relationship between the optimal tax rate and degree of privatization is an inverted U‐shape. Next, we investigate the foreign private firm case and find that the non‐monotonic relationship disappears.