Suchergebnisse

This is the third volume dedicated to a World Congress of the IIRA: the one for the Tokyo Congress in 2000 and it is dealing with the European scene. The perspective reflects the fact that Europe has reached a stage where it does no longer make too much sense to analyse national systems in isolation: they have to be put into the European context. The development of structural elements for a European industrial relations pattern has become an even more urgent task in view of the introduction of the European monetary union. Whether and how far collective bargaining can be coordinated throughout Europe or whether the trade unions are already in a stage to be a relevant actor on European level, are burning questions to be asked. The impact of already existing patterns of workers' participation on the spirit of European industrial relations has to be reflected. The still dramatic unemployment situation has led to a joint job creation strategy on EU level whose functioning needs careful analysis. In view of the forthcoming enlargement of the EU it has in addition become of utmost importance to reflect on the question how the industrial relations systems of the newcomers can be integrated in the already existing pattern. These and other aspects of the generation of a European industrial relations machinery are dealt with in this volume.

Ten years ago, the global financial crisis started to unwind in the USA and triggered the greatest recession since World War II. Although the crisis of 2007-08 was caused in the USA, their economy was not hit so hard in the Great Recession of 2009 as in Europe, and in particular in the Euro area. The USA also recovered more rapidly and sustained from the crisis than the Euro area. Additionally, the specific Euro (debt) crisis of 2010 led to a double-dip recession in the Euro area, not joined by the USA. This divergent post-crisis development since then accumulated to a considerable growth gap between the USA and the Euro area. What are the factors behind this different performance? Would a more aggressive fiscal and/or monetary policy in the Euro area have closed the growth gap? As our simulation exercises show: the answer is no. However, the unconventional monetary policy by the ECB since 2014-15 contributed to the most recent recovery in the Euro area. We identify the pivotal reason of Euro areas growth lagging behind the USA in the different experiences in the crises management. The USA has a long-lasting experience in handling financial crises. In historical comparison, the Euro area - the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) of the EU - is still a "teenager". The crises revealed, that the legal basis of the institutional set-up of EMU and hence of the Euro area was not enough crises-proven. Rescue instruments had newly to be implemented. The global financial crisis was the first great shock which was badly absorbed by the still quite heterogeneous Euro countries. The Euro area, shattered by a succession of external (global financial crisis, Great Recession) and internal (Euro crisis) shocks, could therefore not unfold its growth potential in the last decade. If - hypothetically - the Euro area would have profited from the faster-growing production inputs (capital and labour) as in the USA, the growth gap could have been closed.

European Monetary Union (EMU) and its enlargement to prospective members in central and eastern Europe is a politically highly desired process, given that everything works out smoothly. The future eurozone will show a much higher degree of heterogeneity than now. The CEEC are in the process of transition from a planned to a market economy. Despite considerable progress during the past decade, much remains to be done in economic, social, and political terms. However, it is important to note that monetary integration is not a stand alone project, but is preceded by the EU enlargement and its obligation to adopt the acquis communautaire. Both events will be mutually reinforcing: The acquis contains numerous rules and institutions to be followed or created by the prospective members, albeit enforcement will be a problem. The success of the eastward enlargement of the eurozone depends on these institutions and, thus, increases the costs of failure. On the other hand, a successfully introduced euro in the CEEC will facilitate the whole integration process. Accession to the eurozone requires a tremendous structural adjustment in the CEEC. There are the obvious, formal requirements: the acquis, the fulfilment of the convergence criteria of the Maastricht treaty and the enlargement conditions laid down in the treaty of Copenhagen, and finally the renunciation of monetary autonomy. But these lead to more, subtle and deeper changes. Competition pressure will increase while at the same time the scope for public intervention will diminish. After all, this is believed to promote efficiency and prosperity in the CEEC, however, it may also prove to be strain at least for a certain time. Whatever the assessment of the net benefit of the eastward enlargement of the eurozone, there will be losers, in the applicant states as well as in the current members. It will be of utmost importance to realise this, to compensate for the losses or to accept them, anyway, to be aware of the political tension that may arise. .

Although addressing income inequalities is one of the main challenges in the European Union (EU), whether the EU has influenced income distributions, possibly causing a rise in inequalities, is still a heavily underexplored topic. Using the newest methodological developments associated with the counterfactual estimations, I assessed the distributional effects of the 2004 EU enlargement. The results indicate that EU accession cannot be held responsible for any significant changes in income inequalities in the New Member States. That finding is robust to changes in the method of estimation, and it is also supported by dynamic panel data methods.

This paper studies the pass-through of exchange rate changes into the prices of imports that originated inside the euro area made by some New Member States (NMSs) of the European Union and one candidate country (Turkey). I use data on import unit values for nine different product categories and bilateral imports from the euro area for each country and I estimate industry-specific rates of pass-through across and within countries using two different methodological approaches. The first one is based on Campa and González-Mínguez (2006) which estimates the short- and long-run pass through elasticities, where long-run elasticities are defined as the sum of the pass-through coefficients for the contemporaneous exchange rate and its first four lags. The second one is employed by de Bandt, Banerjee and Kozluk (2007) which suggests a long-run Engle and Granger (1987) cointegrating relationship and the possibility of structural breaks to restore the long-run in the estimation. I did not find evidence either in favour of the hypothesis of Local Currency Pricing (zero pass-through) or the hypothesis of Producer Currency Pricing (complete pass-through) for all the countries except Slovenia and Cyprus in the latter. The exchange rate pass-through ranged from 0.090 to 2.916 in the short-run and from 0.102 to 2.242 in the long-run. With reference to the results by industry the lowest values for exchange rate pass-through are in Manufacturing sectors. However, I did observe a exchange rate pass-through decline through the pricing chain and a large dependence of their economies on imported inputs

With the abolition of exchange rates the role of wage formation in the European Monetary Union changes fundamentally and national economic policy in particular fiscal policy faces new restrictions. These are analysed in the first two chapters. A major impact is expected for wage formation. To achieve a convergence of economic developments wage finding has to follow in all EMU member countries basically the same rules. An empirical investigation using econometric methods show that this is presently not yet the case. In particular in the southern European countries wage finding is different from that in the rest of the EMU. Frequently the introduction of Euro is perceived as a signal to lower wages all over Europe to overcome the dismal employment situation. The book addresses the question whether such a race for lower wages is appropriate in terms of employment creation. Theoretical considerations as well as simulations on an econometric multi country model lead to the conclusion that to enhance growth and employment a productivity oriented wage strategy is advisable, a strategy already followed in particular in Austria, the Netherlands and Germany. In this case distorting changes of competitiveness not based on innovative successes are avoided and at the same time domestic European demand is stabilised

This book has two aims. The first is to investigate the causes of the bad performance of many exchange rate models. It is concluded that probably the models' bad performance is due to the use of semi-reduced form relations in almost all studies on exchange rate determination and to an inappropriate approximation of expectations. Three criteria for approximating expectations are introduced. It is concluded that the rolling regressions technique and multi-state Kalman filters are correct procedures for approximating expectations formation. A structural model of exchange rate determination is developed in which exchange rate expectations are approximated by rolling regressions. It is shown how demand functions determine the explanatory power of the exchange rate or interest rate derived by means of this method. It appears that the derived exchange rate tracks its historical values very well. The second aim of the book is to determine a small industrial country's optimal exchange rate regime. This is related to the recent proposals for a European Monetary Union. Optimal control experiments are used to determine the optimal wag to peg a small European country's currency to the Deutsche Mark

This paper explores the nonlinear relationship between workers' remittances and real effective exchange rates for West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) member countries using the panel smooth transition regression (PSTR). The PSTR was estimated with one transition function and one location parameter as dictated by the diagnostic tests. The diagnostic tests reveal that the relationship between workers' remittances and real effective rates is nonlinear. The estimated threshold value is 3.07%. The results reveal that increases in workers' remittances have a depreciating effect on real effective exchange rates in regime one, associated with threshold value of less than 3.07%. However, in the second regime when the threshold value is greater than or equal to 3.07%, increases in workers remittances have an appreciating impact on real effective exchange rates. These results substantiate that the relationship between workers' remittances and real effective exchange rates is asymmetric and as such should be modeled accordingly. Above all, the results confirm the presence of Dutch disease effect in the second regime where the estimated coefficient on workers' remittances is negative and statistically significant. However, there is no evidence of Dutch disease effect in the first regime where the regression coefficient on workers remittances is positive and also statistically significant. Policy implications are discussed.

This paper sets out to de-mystify the effects of the Barnett Formula – the mechanism which has delivered the bulk of the funding for Scottish domestic services over the past forty years. There has always been considerable ambiguity about the effects of the formula: with some holding that it is a mechanism which would eventually deliver converging levels of per capita spending in the different countries of the UK: while others held that it protected expenditure differentials. The paper explains why, partly because of the effects of relative population change, both views were correct at different times in the period up to 2015. In particular, at times of austerity, the formula operated to protect relative per capita spending levels in Scotland. Largely by accident, the Barnett Formula delivered some of the features expected in a properly functioning monetary union. After 2015, however, with the introduction of the post referendum fiscal settlement, the position is quite different. While Barnett still plays a part, the overall effect of the new funding system is to place Scotland in a vulnerable position, where it is at much greater risk of falling into a cycle of economic decline relative to the rest of the UK.

AbstractUsing panel data from 1990 to 2016, this paper examines the Granger causality and long-run relationship between foreign direct investment, and trade (imports, exports, and trade openness) in the West African economic and monetary union (WAEMU). This study will determine the link between international trade and foreign direct investment to the policymakers. The study follows the short-run causality, cointegration, and long-run approach. The Granger causality tests that there is causality between trade and FDI. The analysis uses Kao and Pedroni method which reveal the existence of cointegration between trade and FDI. The long-run effect tests suggested that foreign direct investment has a positive long-run effect increasing export WAEMU. The tests also indicate that foreign direct investment has a positive long-run effect spurring import and leads to more trade openness in WAEMU. Additionally, the long run estimation indicates that FDI induces to more trade openness in WAEMU. Moreover, the analysis indicates also that export and import have a positive and significant long-run effect on foreign direct investment. Furthermore, the estimation indicates that trade openness has a positive and significant impact on attracting more foreign investment in WAEMU. We explored the economic and policy implications of our analyses in the conclusions.

This paper argues that the process of deriving legitimacy criteria for political institutions ought to be sensitive to features of the political context in which that process is to occur. The paper builds on Allen Buchanan's 'Metacoordination View' of legitimacy, which we explicate in the first section. While sympathetic to Buchanan's practical approach, we believe the idea of a metacoordination process to be underspecified across two dimensions, which we explain in the second section: (i) constituency and (ii) normativity. Both dimensions admit of differing specifications. In the third section, we suggest that how best to fill in these dimensions in any one instance depends upon the political context in which the metacoordination process is to occur. We highlight three relevant elements of a political decision context – criticality, institutional time point, and motivational landscape – and illustrate their significance by way of reference, respectively, to the World Health Organization, the European Economic and Monetary Union, and the Bank of International Settlements. The 'context-dependence' of the metacoordination process, and therefore of legitimacy, entails the possibility that institutions that are similar, even identical, in terms of their nature and function may nevertheless be held to differing legitimacy criteria in differing political contexts.

The Eurozone crisis constitutes a grave challenge to European integration. This article presents an overview of the causes of the crisis and analyzes why it has been so difficult to resolve. We focus on how responses to the crisis were shaped by distributive conflicts both among and within countries. On the international level, debtor and creditor countries have fought over the distribution of responsibility for the accumulated debt; countries with current account surpluses and deficits have fought over who should implement the policies necessary to reduce the current account imbalances. Within countries, interest groups have fought to shift the costs of crisis resolution away from themselves. The article emphasizes that the Eurozone crisis shares many features of previous debt and balance-of-payments crises. However, the Eurozone's predicament is unique because it is set within a monetary union that strongly constrains the policy options available to policy makers and vastly increases the interdependence of the euro crisis countries. The outcome of the crisis has also been highly unusual because the costs of crisis resolution have been borne almost exclusively by the debtor countries and taxpayers in the Eurozone.

Abstract:This essay analyses the consequences of contested multilateralism (CM) for the level of constitutionalisation of specific multilateral institutions. We argue that CM has implications for institutions' constitutional quality in particular if it is polity-driven and not (merely) policy-driven, that is, when actors' employment of alternative institutions stems from their dissatisfaction with the political order of an institution rather than individual policies. Given the co-existence of constitutionalised and non-constitutionalised multilateral institutions in today's international order, state and non-state actors can use alternative institutions to contest the constraining or discretionary character of an institution's polity. We hold that CM is likely to have negative consequences for the constitutionalisation of multilateral institutions if it is employed 'top-down' by states to enhance their freedom to wield discretionary authority, but that it is likely to have positive consequence if it is employed 'bottom-up' by society actors to constrain the exercise of discretionary authority through multilateral institutions. We illustrate the empirical plausibility of our claims in two cases involving top-down contestation of the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) and bottom-up contestation of the World Health Organization (WHO).