Suchergebnisse

The regulatory capacity review of the East African Community (EAC) focuses on the capacities of the EAC institutional framework to develop, implement, and sustain the efficient, transparent, and market-based regulatory system that is needed to achieve the economic benefits of the EAC common market. This report argues that the EAC institutions will be successful in implementing the common market only if they safeguard the quality of regulatory practices. This is a highly pragmatic and operational agenda. Quality principles can be applied only if they are defined and institutionalized into the machinery of policy making. The idea is that, just as fiscal management can increase social welfare by better allocating resources, so can regulatory governance.

The aim of this paper is to perform a comparative historical analysis of the development and specific characteristics of taxation in Luxembourg, as developed in a multidimensional context – national (Luxembourg), regional (relations with traditional partners – Belgium and the Netherlands but also Germany and France), European (ECSC, EEC and EU) and international (OECD, GATT/WTO) – in the second half of the 20th century. The two aspects of taxation will be addressed: direct taxation (a prerogative of states) and indirect taxation (subject to international regulation). The time frame stretches from the end of the war (1944) to the Maastricht Treaty (1992).

This article suggests how state enterprises can be incorporated into the theoretical and empirical growth literature. Specifically, it shows that if state enterprises are less efficient than private firms, invest less, employ less skilled labor, and are less eager to adopt new technology, then a large state enterprise sector tends to be associated with slow economic growth, all else remaining the same. The empirical evidence for 1978-92 indicates that, through a mixture of these channels, an increase in the share of state enterprises in employment by one standard deviation could reduce per capita growth by one to two percentage points a year from one country to another.

An attempt to compare Russian Tsar Alexander I was the head of the Grand Duchy of Finland, which the Russian army captured in 1809 as a result of the Russo-Swedish war. The final act of the Congress of Vienna of June 1815 decided to establish the Kingdom of Poland. Beside the title of Grand Duke of Finland tsar, Alexander I was awarded the title of the King of Poland. From that moment on, for over one hundred years, the fate of the Grand Duchy of Finland and the Kingdom of Poland was intertwined during the rule of five Russian tsars.The aim of this paper is to answer the question whether two different ways on the road to independence – romantic Polish way with national uprisings, and pragmatic Finnish, relative loyal to the Russian tsars – had an impact on their policy towards both nations. The Kingdom of Poland and the Duchy of Finland were autonomous, were in a personal union with Russian tsars, had their own constitutions, parliaments, armies, monetary systems and educational structures, and official activities were held in Polish (Polish Kingdom) and Swedish (in the Grand Duchy of Finland). Both countries also had their own universities.The first national uprising in the Kingdom of Poland, which broke out in November 1830, resulted in a wave of repression. The Constitution was replaced by the so-called The Organic Statute, the Sejm (the Parliament) and the independent army were liquidated. The Kingdom was occupied by the mighty Russian army, and in 1833 martial law was introduced. The second national uprising of January 1863 led to another wave of repression and intensive Russification of Polish territories. In 1867, the autonomy of the Kingdom of Poland, its name and budget were abolished. From 1872 the Polish language was only an optional choice. After 1863, the policy of the Russian authorities changed towards the Grand Duchy.A session of the Finnish parliament (Eduskunta) was convened for the first time since 1809, the new parliamentary law allowed the dissemination of the Finnish language. After the deadly assault on Alexander II in 1881, his son Alexander III made attempts to limit also Finland's autonomy. The years 1899–1904 were called the first period of Russification in Finland ("the first period of oppression"). The Manifesto of June 1900 introduced obligatory Russian language in correspondence of officials with Russia. In 1901, the national Finnish army was liquidated. In Russia this was the beginning of the process of the empire's unification into one cultural, political and economic system. After a short thaw as a result of the 1905 revolution in Russia, the Grand Duchy of Finland, the so-called "second period of oppression" and anti-Finnish politics took place. During the great war of 1914–1918, the Grand Duchy was on the side of Russia. The territories of the former Kingdom of Poland were under German rule since 1915. After the outbreak of the revolution in Russia, the Eduskunta (on 6 December 1917) passed a Declaration of Independence. After a short period of regency, on 19 July 1919, the Finns adopted the republican system with a parliamentary form of government.On 11 November 1918 Germany surrendered on the Western Front. On that day, the Regency Council in Warsaw handed over military authority to the Polish Legion commander Józef Piłsudski. Although Poland still had to fight for the final shape of the state, the 11th of November 1918 is considered the first day of recovered Polish independence. ; Car rosyjski Aleksander I był głową Wielkiego Księstwa Finlandii, które rosyjska armia zajęła w 1809 roku w wyniku wojny rosyjsko-szwedzkiej. Ostateczny akt potwierdzający zdobycz uchwalił Kongres Wiedeński w czerwcu 1815 roku, na którym postanowiono także ustanowić Królestwo Polskie. Obok tytułu cara i Wielkiego Księcia Finlandii, Aleksander I otrzymał tytuł króla Polski. Od tego momentu, przez ponad sto lat, losy Wielkiego Księstwa Finlandii i Królestwa Polskiego splotły się pod rządami pięciu kolejnych rosyjskich carów.Celem artykułu jest próba odpowiedzi na pytanie, czy dwa różne sposoby na zdobycie niepodległości – romantyczny sposób polski z powstaniami narodowymi i pragmatyczny fiński, względnie lojalny wobec caratu, miały wpływ na politykę Rosji wobec obu narodów. Królestwo Polskie i Księstwo Finlandii były autonomiczne, miały charakter unii personalnej z carami rosyjskimi, kraje te posiadały własne konstytucje, parlamenty, armie, odrębne systemy monetarne oraz edukacyjne, a życie urzędowe toczyło się w języku polskim (Królestwo Polskie) i szwedzkim (w Wielkim Księstwie Finlandii). Oba kraje miały także własne uniwersytety. Dopiero po pierwszym powstaniu narodowym w Królestwie Polskim, które wybuchło w listopadzie 1830 roku, w wyniku fali represji konstytucja została zastąpiona przez tzw. Statut Organiczny, a Sejm i odrębna armia zlikwidowane. Królestwo było okupowane przez potężną armię rosyjską, a w 1833 roku wprowadzono stan wojenny. Drugie powstanie narodowe ze stycznia 1863 roku doprowadziło do kolejnej fali represji i intensywnej rusyfikacji ziem polskich. W 1867 roku Autonomia Królestwa Polskiego, jego nazwa i budżet zostały zniesione. Od 1872 roku język polski był tylko wyborem opcjonalnym.Po 1863 roku zmieniła się także polityka władz rosyjskich w stosunku do Wielkiego Księstwa Fińskiego. Posiedzenie fińskiego parlamentu (Eduskunta) zostało zwołane po raz pierwszy w 1809 roku, nowa ustawa parlamentarna umożliwiła rozpowszechnianie języka fińskiego. Po śmiertelnym ataku na Aleksandra II w 1881 roku, jego syn Aleksander III również próbował ograniczyć autonomię Finlandii. Lata 1899–1904 nazwano pierwszym okresem rusyfikacji Finlandii ("pierwszy okres ucisku"). Manifestem z czerwca 1900 r. język rosyjski został wprowadzony obowiązkowo w korespondencji urzędników z Rosją. W 1901 roku została zlikwidowana narodowa fińska armia. W Rosji był to początek procesu unifikacji imperium w jeden system kulturowy, polityczny i gospodarczy. Po krótkiej odwilży, w wyniku rewolucji w Rosji w 1905 r., w Wielkim Księstwie Fińskim nastąpił tzw. "drugi okres ucisku" i pogłębiła się polityka antyfińska. Podczas wielkiej wojny 1914–1918 Wielkie Księstwo stanęło po stronie Rosji.Natomiast tereny byłego Królestwa Polskiego znalazły się od 1915 roku pod panowaniem niemieckim. Po wybuchu rewolucji w Rosji, fińska Eduskunta uchwaliła 6 grudnia 1917 roku deklarację niepodległości. Po krótkim okresie regencji, 19 lipca 1919 roku, Finlandia przyjęła system republikański z parlamentarną formą rządu. 11 listopada 1918 roku Niemcy poddały się na froncie zachodnim. Tego dnia Rada Regencyjna w Warszawie przekazała władzę wojskową dowódcy Legionów Polskich – Józefowi Piłsudskiemu. Chociaż Polska wciąż musiała walczyć o ostateczny kształt państwa, dzień 11 listopada 1918 roku jest uważany za pierwszy dzień odzyskania polskiej niepodległości.

An attempt to compare Russian Tsar Alexander I was the head of the Grand Duchy of Finland, which the Russian army captured in 1809 as a result of the Russo-Swedish war. The final act of the Congress of Vienna of June 1815 decided to establish the Kingdom of Poland. Beside the title of Grand Duke of Finland tsar, Alexander I was awarded the title of the King of Poland. From that moment on, for over one hundred years, the fate of the Grand Duchy of Finland and the Kingdom of Poland was intertwined during the rule of five Russian tsars. The aim of this paper is to answer the question whether two different ways on the road to independence – romantic Polish way with national uprisings, and pragmatic Finnish, relative loyal to the Russian tsars – had an impact on their policy towards both nations. The Kingdom of Poland and the Duchy of Finland were autonomous, were in a personal union with Russian tsars, had their own constitutions, parliaments, armies, monetary systems and educational structures, and official activities were held in Polish (Polish Kingdom) and Swedish (in the Grand Duchy of Finland). Both countries also had their own universities. The first national uprising in the Kingdom of Poland, which broke out in November 1830, resulted in a wave of repression. The Constitution was replaced by the so-called The Organic Statute, the Sejm (the Parliament) and the independent army were liquidated. The Kingdom was occupied by the mighty Russian army, and in 1833 martial law was introduced. The second national uprising of January 1863 led to another wave of repression and intensive Russification of Polish territories. In 1867, the autonomy of the Kingdom of Poland, its name and budget were abolished. From 1872 the Polish language was only an optional choice. After 1863, the policy of the Russian authorities changed towards the Grand Duchy. A session of the Finnish parliament (Eduskunta) was convened for the first time since 1809, the new parliamentary law allowed the dissemination of the Finnish language. After the deadly assault on Alexander II in 1881, his son Alexander III made attempts to limit also Finland's autonomy. The years 1899–1904 were called the first period of Russification in Finland ("the first period of oppression"). The Manifesto of June 1900 introduced obligatory Russian language in correspondence of officials with Russia. In 1901, the national Finnish army was liquidated. In Russia this was the beginning of the process of the empire's unification into one cultural, political and economic system. After a short thaw as a result of the 1905 revolution in Russia, the Grand Duchy of Finland, the so-called "second period of oppression" and anti-Finnish politics took place. During the great war of 1914–1918, the Grand Duchy was on the side of Russia. The territories of the former Kingdom of Poland were under German rule since 1915. After the outbreak of the revolution in Russia, the Eduskunta (on 6 December 1917) passed a Declaration of Independence. After a short period of regency, on 19 July 1919, the Finns adopted the republican system with a parliamentary form of government. On 11 November 1918 Germany surrendered on the Western Front. On that day, the Regency Council in Warsaw handed over military authority to the Polish Legion commander Józef Piłsudski. Although Poland still had to fight for the final shape of the state, the 11th of November 1918 is considered the first day of recovered Polish independence. ; Car rosyjski Aleksander I był głową Wielkiego Księstwa Finlandii, które rosyjska armia zajęła w 1809 roku w wyniku wojny rosyjsko-szwedzkiej. Ostateczny akt potwierdzający zdobycz uchwalił Kongres Wiedeński w czerwcu 1815 roku, na którym postanowiono także ustanowić Królestwo Polskie. Obok tytułu cara i Wielkiego Księcia Finlandii, Aleksander I otrzymał tytuł króla Polski. Od tego momentu, przez ponad sto lat, losy Wielkiego Księstwa Finlandii i Królestwa Polskiego splotły się pod rządami pięciu kolejnych rosyjskich carów. Celem artykułu jest próba odpowiedzi na pytanie, czy dwa różne sposoby na zdobycie niepodległości – romantyczny sposób polski z powstaniami narodowymi i pragmatyczny fiński, względnie lojalny wobec caratu, miały wpływ na politykę Rosji wobec obu narodów. Królestwo Polskie i Księstwo Finlandii były autonomiczne, miały charakter unii personalnej z carami rosyjskimi, kraje te posiadały własne konstytucje, parlamenty, armie, odrębne systemy monetarne oraz edukacyjne, a życie urzędowe toczyło się w języku polskim (Królestwo Polskie) i szwedzkim (w Wielkim Księstwie Finlandii). Oba kraje miały także własne uniwersytety. Dopiero po pierwszym powstaniu narodowym w Królestwie Polskim, które wybuchło w listopadzie 1830 roku, w wyniku fali represji konstytucja została zastąpiona przez tzw. Statut Organiczny, a Sejm i odrębna armia zlikwidowane. Królestwo było okupowane przez potężną armię rosyjską, a w 1833 roku wprowadzono stan wojenny. Drugie powstanie narodowe ze stycznia 1863 roku doprowadziło do kolejnej fali represji i intensywnej rusyfikacji ziem polskich. W 1867 roku Autonomia Królestwa Polskiego, jego nazwa i budżet zostały zniesione. Od 1872 roku język polski był tylko wyborem opcjonalnym. Po 1863 roku zmieniła się także polityka władz rosyjskich w stosunku do Wielkiego Księstwa Fińskiego. Posiedzenie fińskiego parlamentu (Eduskunta) zostało zwołane po raz pierwszy w 1809 roku, nowa ustawa parlamentarna umożliwiła rozpowszechnianie języka fińskiego. Po śmiertelnym ataku na Aleksandra II w 1881 roku, jego syn Aleksander III również próbował ograniczyć autonomię Finlandii. Lata 1899–1904 nazwano pierwszym okresem rusyfikacji Finlandii ("pierwszy okres ucisku"). Manifestem z czerwca 1900 r. język rosyjski został wprowadzony obowiązkowo w korespondencji urzędników z Rosją. W 1901 roku została zlikwidowana narodowa fińska armia. W Rosji był to początek procesu unifikacji imperium w jeden system kulturowy, polityczny i gospodarczy. Po krótkiej odwilży, w wyniku rewolucji w Rosji w 1905 r., w Wielkim Księstwie Fińskim nastąpił tzw. "drugi okres ucisku" i pogłębiła się polityka antyfińska. Podczas wielkiej wojny 1914–1918 Wielkie Księstwo stanęło po stronie Rosji. Natomiast tereny byłego Królestwa Polskiego znalazły się od 1915 roku pod panowaniem niemieckim. Po wybuchu rewolucji w Rosji, fińska Eduskunta uchwaliła 6 grudnia 1917 roku deklarację niepodległości. Po krótkim okresie regencji, 19 lipca 1919 roku, Finlandia przyjęła system republikański z parlamentarną formą rządu. 11 listopada 1918 roku Niemcy poddały się na froncie zachodnim. Tego dnia Rada Regencyjna w Warszawie przekazała władzę wojskową dowódcy Legionów Polskich – Józefowi Piłsudskiemu. Chociaż Polska wciąż musiała walczyć o ostateczny kształt państwa, dzień 11 listopada 1918 roku jest uważany za pierwszy dzień odzyskania polskiej niepodległości.

Until the last major recession, there was an approach in macroeconomics that income distribution was not significant for macroeconomic processes. However, the recent major recession has prompted policymakers and economists to take into account the phenomenon of income inequality, its economic and social causes and consequences related to poverty, social inclusion, social trust, support of democratic institutions, economic growth, financial and other issues. In recent years, income inequality has been rising in many countries, and the International Monetary Fund, the OECD and other organizations underline the importance of addressing this problem. It is important to choose the right measures to make the right decisions in order to address the issues of growing income inequality. Their choice is influenced by the identification of factors influencing the change of income inequality and the impact assessment. The scale and change of income inequality can be influenced by the factors related to the market economy (globalization, technological progress) and the institutional factors (setting the rules of the game on the market, creating a certain environment). According to the factors analysed in the research, three groups of authors can be distinguished. Some authors (Asteriou, Dimelis, Moudatsou, 2014, Cabral, García-Díaz, Mollick, 2016, Lim, McNelis, 2016, Sheng, 2015, Haan, Sturm, 2017, Wade, 2004, Alvarez, 2015, Elmawazini, Sharif, Manga, Drucker, 2013, Jaumotte, Lall, Papageorgiou, 2013, Çelik, Basdas, 2010, Hermes, 2014, Richmond, Triplett, 2017, Franco, Gerussi, 2013, Stockhammer, Guschanski, Köhler, 2016, Soons, 2016, Jaumotte, Lall, Papageorgiou, 2008) investigate and assess the impact of market factors (globalization, financialization, technological progress) on income inequality, while other authors or the group of authors (IMF, 2014, Arestis, Gonzalez-Martinez, 2016, Checchi, Josifidis, Supic, Beker Pucar, 2017, Feld, Schnellenbach, 2014, Obadić, Šimurina, Sonora, 2014, Calderón, Chong, 2009, Checchi, García-Peñalosa, 2008, Saez, 2017, Jaumotte, Buitron, 2015, Bastagli, Coady, Gupta, 2012, Kenworthy, Pontusson, 2005) distinguish the impact of institutional factors (labour market institutions, welfare state) on income inequality. According to J. E. Stiglitz (2016), the market does not operate in a vacuum – it operates within an institutional setting. Therefore, the third group of authors can be identified that assess the impact of both market and institutional factors on inequality (Stiglitz, 2016, Atkinson, 2003, Josifidis, Supic, 2017, Josifidis, Mitrović, Supić, Glavaški, 2016, Huber, Stephens, 2014, Darcillon, 2015, Lin, Fu, 2016, Ghossoub, Reed, 2017, Kristal, Cohen, 2017, Alderson, Nielsen, 2002, Kus, 2012, Tridico, 2015, Dabla-Norris, Kochhar, Ricka, Suphaphiphat, Tsounta, 2015, Jain-Chandra, Kinda, Kochhar, Piao, Schauer, 2016). The results of empirical studies assessing the impact of different factors on income inequality are contradictory. There is a disagreement on the distinction between different factors influencing the change of inequality as well as the direction and strength of their impact. Therefore, it is relevant to determine what factors determine income inequality and what is their impact on income inequality. The aim of the research is on the basis of empirical research to analyse the impact of factors influencing the change of income inequality, to identify which factors have the greatest impact. Research methods are as follows: analysis, grouping and generalization of scientific articles. On the basis of the analysis of the studies, which evaluated the factors determining income inequality, five groups of factors determining income inequality have been identified: 1) globalization; 2) technological progress; 3) financialization; 4) labour market institutions; 5) welfare state. It is possible to state that some studies assess the impact of only one set of factors on the change of income inequality: globalization, financialization, labour market institutions or technological progress, while other studies assess more than two groups of factors. This reflects the authors' differing views on the factors and how they influence the change of income inequality. On the basis of the empirical results analysed in this research, it can be concluded that globalization tends to increase income inequality. However, the results of some studies show that globalization increases income inequality in both developed and developing countries, while the results of other studies show that globalization reduces income inequality in developing countries. The research assessing the impact of factors determining income inequality in EU countries (Asteriou, Dimelis, Moudatsou, 2014) found that in some countries (Austria, Belgium, Germany, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Greece, Italy, Ireland, Portugal, Spain) the globalization led to the decrease in income inequality and in other countries (Finland, Sweden, Denmark and the new EU countries) it led to the increase. It has been found that: 1) the impact of trade globalization on changes of income inequality is ambiguous: in some studies it reduces income inequality, in others it increases income inequality or the impact is insignificant; 2) the impact of financial globalization on changes of income inequality is usually positive. Summarizing the impact of technological progress on income inequality, it has been found that technological progress increases income inequality, but the use of information and communication technologies (Internet and mobile communication) reduces income inequality. The impact of the group of financialization factors on income inequality is also ambiguous: 1) financial deepening increases income inequality by investigating the impact in many countries of the world, but it decreases it in developed countries; 2) if the impact of some financial development indicators on inequality is insignificant, then the impact of ratio between bank credits and GDP increases income inequality; 3) financial liberalization increases income inequality; 4) banking crises increase income inequality; 5) the intensity of microfinance reduces income inequality. One of the indicators of labour market institutions (trade union membership) is mentioned in the studies as both reducing and increasing (through channels of wage differences and unemployment rate) income inequality. The results of empirical research show that income inequality is reduced by labour protection laws, bargaining power in wage setting, and it is increased by labour market flexibility, capital per worker (through part of work and unemployment channels) and the ratio of minimum and average wage (through the gap of pay and unemployment rate channels). The factors of welfare state have a positive impact and reduce income inequality. The results of the research do not provide an unambiguous answer, but most evidence shows that labour market institutions and welfare state factors reduce income inequality, while factors of technological progress and financialization increase income inequality. In summary, technological advances, labour market institutions and globalization have the greatest impact on changes of income inequality.

Until the last major recession, there was an approach in macroeconomics that income distribution was not significant for macroeconomic processes. However, the recent major recession has prompted policymakers and economists to take into account the phenomenon of income inequality, its economic and social causes and consequences related to poverty, social inclusion, social trust, support of democratic institutions, economic growth, financial and other issues. In recent years, income inequality has been rising in many countries, and the International Monetary Fund, the OECD and other organizations underline the importance of addressing this problem. It is important to choose the right measures to make the right decisions in order to address the issues of growing income inequality. Their choice is influenced by the identification of factors influencing the change of income inequality and the impact assessment. The scale and change of income inequality can be influenced by the factors related to the market economy (globalization, technological progress) and the institutional factors (setting the rules of the game on the market, creating a certain environment). According to the factors analysed in the research, three groups of authors can be distinguished. Some authors (Asteriou, Dimelis, Moudatsou, 2014, Cabral, García-Díaz, Mollick, 2016, Lim, McNelis, 2016, Sheng, 2015, Haan, Sturm, 2017, Wade, 2004, Alvarez, 2015, Elmawazini, Sharif, Manga, Drucker, 2013, Jaumotte, Lall, Papageorgiou, 2013, Çelik, Basdas, 2010, Hermes, 2014, Richmond, Triplett, 2017, Franco, Gerussi, 2013, Stockhammer, Guschanski, Köhler, 2016, Soons, 2016, Jaumotte, Lall, Papageorgiou, 2008) investigate and assess the impact of market factors (globalization, financialization, technological progress) on income inequality, while other authors or the group of authors (IMF, 2014, Arestis, Gonzalez-Martinez, 2016, Checchi, Josifidis, Supic, Beker Pucar, 2017, Feld, Schnellenbach, 2014, Obadić, Šimurina, Sonora, 2014, Calderón, Chong, 2009, Checchi, García-Peñalosa, 2008, Saez, 2017, Jaumotte, Buitron, 2015, Bastagli, Coady, Gupta, 2012, Kenworthy, Pontusson, 2005) distinguish the impact of institutional factors (labour market institutions, welfare state) on income inequality. According to J. E. Stiglitz (2016), the market does not operate in a vacuum – it operates within an institutional setting. Therefore, the third group of authors can be identified that assess the impact of both market and institutional factors on inequality (Stiglitz, 2016, Atkinson, 2003, Josifidis, Supic, 2017, Josifidis, Mitrović, Supić, Glavaški, 2016, Huber, Stephens, 2014, Darcillon, 2015, Lin, Fu, 2016, Ghossoub, Reed, 2017, Kristal, Cohen, 2017, Alderson, Nielsen, 2002, Kus, 2012, Tridico, 2015, Dabla-Norris, Kochhar, Ricka, Suphaphiphat, Tsounta, 2015, Jain-Chandra, Kinda, Kochhar, Piao, Schauer, 2016). The results of empirical studies assessing the impact of different factors on income inequality are contradictory. There is a disagreement on the distinction between different factors influencing the change of inequality as well as the direction and strength of their impact. Therefore, it is relevant to determine what factors determine income inequality and what is their impact on income inequality. The aim of the research is on the basis of empirical research to analyse the impact of factors influencing the change of income inequality, to identify which factors have the greatest impact. Research methods are as follows: analysis, grouping and generalization of scientific articles. On the basis of the analysis of the studies, which evaluated the factors determining income inequality, five groups of factors determining income inequality have been identified: 1) globalization; 2) technological progress; 3) financialization; 4) labour market institutions; 5) welfare state. It is possible to state that some studies assess the impact of only one set of factors on the change of income inequality: globalization, financialization, labour market institutions or technological progress, while other studies assess more than two groups of factors. This reflects the authors' differing views on the factors and how they influence the change of income inequality. On the basis of the empirical results analysed in this research, it can be concluded that globalization tends to increase income inequality. However, the results of some studies show that globalization increases income inequality in both developed and developing countries, while the results of other studies show that globalization reduces income inequality in developing countries. The research assessing the impact of factors determining income inequality in EU countries (Asteriou, Dimelis, Moudatsou, 2014) found that in some countries (Austria, Belgium, Germany, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Greece, Italy, Ireland, Portugal, Spain) the globalization led to the decrease in income inequality and in other countries (Finland, Sweden, Denmark and the new EU countries) it led to the increase. It has been found that: 1) the impact of trade globalization on changes of income inequality is ambiguous: in some studies it reduces income inequality, in others it increases income inequality or the impact is insignificant; 2) the impact of financial globalization on changes of income inequality is usually positive. Summarizing the impact of technological progress on income inequality, it has been found that technological progress increases income inequality, but the use of information and communication technologies (Internet and mobile communication) reduces income inequality. The impact of the group of financialization factors on income inequality is also ambiguous: 1) financial deepening increases income inequality by investigating the impact in many countries of the world, but it decreases it in developed countries; 2) if the impact of some financial development indicators on inequality is insignificant, then the impact of ratio between bank credits and GDP increases income inequality; 3) financial liberalization increases income inequality; 4) banking crises increase income inequality; 5) the intensity of microfinance reduces income inequality. One of the indicators of labour market institutions (trade union membership) is mentioned in the studies as both reducing and increasing (through channels of wage differences and unemployment rate) income inequality. The results of empirical research show that income inequality is reduced by labour protection laws, bargaining power in wage setting, and it is increased by labour market flexibility, capital per worker (through part of work and unemployment channels) and the ratio of minimum and average wage (through the gap of pay and unemployment rate channels). The factors of welfare state have a positive impact and reduce income inequality. The results of the research do not provide an unambiguous answer, but most evidence shows that labour market institutions and welfare state factors reduce income inequality, while factors of technological progress and financialization increase income inequality. In summary, technological advances, labour market institutions and globalization have the greatest impact on changes of income inequality.

Research problem It has been four decades since conclusion of the Vienna Convention on the law of treaties. The Convention included a provision that a treaty shall be inter-preted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose. The customary status of this rule has been accepted by the International Court of Justice. Disregarding that, some question whether the rules, as opposed to principles, of interpretation are possible (i.e. would that not be better not to reduce them to writing). The International Law Commission itself has com-mented on this. On the other hand, the differences concerning interpretation of treaties were apparent already at the time the treaty was drafted. When the Convention was finally adopted, a few scholars representing the so-called New Haven approach opined that they expected the Convention to fail due to its "insistent emphasis upon an impossible, comformity-imposing textuality". In their view, conclusion of an international agreement was a continuous process of cooperation and collaboration of the parties, which required a much more detailed focus on the intentions of the parties than the Vienna Convention rule of interpretation envisaged. They called for interpretation which would search for genuine shared expectations, together with the complementary appeals for 'supplementing' and 'policing' communications in accordance with overriding community goals. Disregarding these hallmarks, they accepted that the text should remain an important index of party expectations, which they identify as one of the goals of interpretation. In their view, attention to the carefully worked out arrangements of the parties encourages the clarity of expectation, especially when sources of equal credibility give contradictory results concern-ing their expectations. Although the New Haven approach to interpretation of treaties was not included in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, a form of their reflection could be identified in national law, especially that of continental legal systems. It is agreed that the major difference between common law and conti-nental practice lies in the rules of interpretation: common law is based on a presumption of law, into which statutes are interwoven, hence the practice of drafting statutes in the fullest detail, and the broad assumptions that a statute deals only with those cases which fall within its actual wording. Continental theory, on the other hand, treats statutes as a basis of the law, but these tend to be drafted in a very general and abstract way, leaving it up to the courts to fill in the details by reference to a presumed legislative intention. However, this key difference seems to dissipate, as the common law tends to move away from the purely literal towards the purposive construction of statutory provi-sions, i.e. a new, 'revamped' version of literal rule has developed, which required the general context and purpose to be taken into consideration before any decision is reached concerning the ordinary meaning of statutory words. The continental practice remains consistent on its emphasis on the legislative intention. In the law of contracts this rule turns into a global one: both Lando and UNIDROIT principles of international commercial contracts include a rule of interpretation requiring to determine the common intentions of the parties. This approach finds reflection also in the Civil Code of the Republic of Lithuania, which was drafted on the basis of the UNIDROIT Principles. The International Law Commission returned to the topic of interpreta-tion of treaties thirty years later, in 2000, when it decided to consider the issue of fragmentation of international law and the potential problems it might give rise to. With this purpose in mind in its report on the topic of 2006 the study group has identified four general principles of interpretation of international rules: first, international law should be considered as a legal system, not as a random collection of international rules; second, in applying international law, it is necessary to determine the precise relationship between two or more rules and principles that are both valid and applicable in respect of the whole situa-tion (i.e. to identify whether their relationship is a one of interpretation or con-flict); thirdly, the norms should be interpreted in accordance with the Vienna Convention on the law of treaties, and fourthly, when several norms bear on a single issue, they should be interpreted so as to give rise to a set of compatible obligations. Explaining the latter principle, the Commission, similarly to the New Haven group approach, emphasized the need to take into consideration the community values, i.e. ius cogens and erga omnes, even though continues to recommend to follow the Vienna Convention approach on the ordinary meaning of the terms. Forty years later, it is already possible to consider, whether the New Haven group was correct criticising the Vienna Convention rule of interpreta-tion for its excessive emphasis on text, and how significant is the practical difference between the rule requiring to determine the common intentions of the parties as opposed to the rule, which requires to interpret a treaty in accor-dance with the ordinary meaning of its terms. Also, what is the practical im-pact of these differences on protection of the rights of persons. In order to answer this research question, the focus of the dissertation is on the foreign investment law in the energy sector. The topic is suitable and convenient to consider the impact of the rules of interpretation and the problems posed by fragmentation of international law. Its sources include in-ternational, national, and for the EU countries also EU law, even though the nature of the relationship between EU law and international investment law remains a disputable issue. The energy sector has been chosen in order to evaluate more precisely the impact of the rules of interpretation and fragmenta-tion of international law on the content of the rights of persons and their appli-cation. Research sources The Dissertation analyzes multilateral and bilateral investment trea-ties which are significant for the the protection of investment in the energy sector and the decisions of international investment arbitral tribunals. The ma-jor sources of international investment law are international treaties. The most significant documents for the energy sector currently are the Energy Charter treaty, the ICSID Convention, and the bilateral investment treaties, although national law remains also important for enforcement of arbitral awards and interpretation of state contracts. State contracts also remain significant, be-cause as a rule they include arbitration clauses and stabilization clauses. The latter are particularly common in the energy sector due to its specificity – on the one hand, energy is a heavily politicized sector due to its significance for the development of the economy of a state and both its economic and political stability. Therefore it has a status of a strategic sector, even an issue of national security. This could be observed ever since the beginning of the twentieth century. On the other hand, energy is an infrastructure sector, which requires high investments for development. Not all states are capable to develop this sector by their own financial means, and choose to attract foreign investment. As a result, investment contracts (state contracts) are concluded; they have a status of international commercial contracts, and their parties are free to choose both the applicable law and the means of dispute settlement. The en-ergy contracts as a rule include stabilization clauses, which seek to maintain stable business legal and financial environment for the duration of the contract. Finally, European Union law may also be accepted as a source for in-vestment protection, despite its generalized purposes, which are to achieve the strengthening and convergence of their economies and to establish a monetary and economic union, to implement a common foreign and security policy, including the progressive framing of the common defence policy, and to estab-lish the area of freedom, security and justice. EU law and foreign investment law are still largely conceived as independent and hardly interlinked. However, as integration between the EU member states becomes closer, EU legislation makes an increasing impact also on the specific sectors of the economy, in-cluding the energy sector. Research object The research object of this dissertation are the problems of interpreta-tion and application of law which arise in the resolution of disputes concerning protection of investments in the energy sector between the host states and for-eign investors. They may be grouped into three groups on the basis of the ap-plicable law: 1. The problems of interpretation of international agreements. Both BITs and MITs apply only with respect to investment. ICSID arbitral tribunals can hear only disputes arising directly out of an investment. Disregarding the key role the notion has on the exercise of rights, its meaning remains unclear. The most recent arbitral practice is completely inconsistent on this issue. No less problems are posed by the umbrella clauses, which are included in a large number of BITs and the Energy Charter Treaty, and which requires states to observe obligations they have entered into with an investor. These provisions have been included even in the BITs of 1970s, but in practice they have emerged only recently. The arbitral tribunals differ on whether this provision should be read literaly, or whether its meaning should be restricted. 2. The problems of interpretation of arbitration clauses and invest-ment contracts. This group includes the problems concerning arbitrab

Research problem It has been four decades since conclusion of the Vienna Convention on the law of treaties. The Convention included a provision that a treaty shall be inter-preted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose. The customary status of this rule has been accepted by the International Court of Justice. Disregarding that, some question whether the rules, as opposed to principles, of interpretation are possible (i.e. would that not be better not to reduce them to writing). The International Law Commission itself has com-mented on this. On the other hand, the differences concerning interpretation of treaties were apparent already at the time the treaty was drafted. When the Convention was finally adopted, a few scholars representing the so-called New Haven approach opined that they expected the Convention to fail due to its "insistent emphasis upon an impossible, comformity-imposing textuality". In their view, conclusion of an international agreement was a continuous process of cooperation and collaboration of the parties, which required a much more detailed focus on the intentions of the parties than the Vienna Convention rule of interpretation envisaged. They called for interpretation which would search for genuine shared expectations, together with the complementary appeals for 'supplementing' and 'policing' communications in accordance with overriding community goals. Disregarding these hallmarks, they accepted that the text should remain an important index of party expectations, which they identify as one of the goals of interpretation. In their view, attention to the carefully worked out arrangements of the parties encourages the clarity of expectation, especially when sources of equal credibility give contradictory results concern-ing their expectations. Although the New Haven approach to interpretation of treaties was not included in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, a form of their reflection could be identified in national law, especially that of continental legal systems. It is agreed that the major difference between common law and conti-nental practice lies in the rules of interpretation: common law is based on a presumption of law, into which statutes are interwoven, hence the practice of drafting statutes in the fullest detail, and the broad assumptions that a statute deals only with those cases which fall within its actual wording. Continental theory, on the other hand, treats statutes as a basis of the law, but these tend to be drafted in a very general and abstract way, leaving it up to the courts to fill in the details by reference to a presumed legislative intention. However, this key difference seems to dissipate, as the common law tends to move away from the purely literal towards the purposive construction of statutory provi-sions, i.e. a new, 'revamped' version of literal rule has developed, which required the general context and purpose to be taken into consideration before any decision is reached concerning the ordinary meaning of statutory words. The continental practice remains consistent on its emphasis on the legislative intention. In the law of contracts this rule turns into a global one: both Lando and UNIDROIT principles of international commercial contracts include a rule of interpretation requiring to determine the common intentions of the parties. This approach finds reflection also in the Civil Code of the Republic of Lithuania, which was drafted on the basis of the UNIDROIT Principles. The International Law Commission returned to the topic of interpreta-tion of treaties thirty years later, in 2000, when it decided to consider the issue of fragmentation of international law and the potential problems it might give rise to. With this purpose in mind in its report on the topic of 2006 the study group has identified four general principles of interpretation of international rules: first, international law should be considered as a legal system, not as a random collection of international rules; second, in applying international law, it is necessary to determine the precise relationship between two or more rules and principles that are both valid and applicable in respect of the whole situa-tion (i.e. to identify whether their relationship is a one of interpretation or con-flict); thirdly, the norms should be interpreted in accordance with the Vienna Convention on the law of treaties, and fourthly, when several norms bear on a single issue, they should be interpreted so as to give rise to a set of compatible obligations. Explaining the latter principle, the Commission, similarly to the New Haven group approach, emphasized the need to take into consideration the community values, i.e. ius cogens and erga omnes, even though continues to recommend to follow the Vienna Convention approach on the ordinary meaning of the terms. Forty years later, it is already possible to consider, whether the New Haven group was correct criticising the Vienna Convention rule of interpreta-tion for its excessive emphasis on text, and how significant is the practical difference between the rule requiring to determine the common intentions of the parties as opposed to the rule, which requires to interpret a treaty in accor-dance with the ordinary meaning of its terms. Also, what is the practical im-pact of these differences on protection of the rights of persons. In order to answer this research question, the focus of the dissertation is on the foreign investment law in the energy sector. The topic is suitable and convenient to consider the impact of the rules of interpretation and the problems posed by fragmentation of international law. Its sources include in-ternational, national, and for the EU countries also EU law, even though the nature of the relationship between EU law and international investment law remains a disputable issue. The energy sector has been chosen in order to evaluate more precisely the impact of the rules of interpretation and fragmenta-tion of international law on the content of the rights of persons and their appli-cation. Research sources The Dissertation analyzes multilateral and bilateral investment trea-ties which are significant for the the protection of investment in the energy sector and the decisions of international investment arbitral tribunals. The ma-jor sources of international investment law are international treaties. The most significant documents for the energy sector currently are the Energy Charter treaty, the ICSID Convention, and the bilateral investment treaties, although national law remains also important for enforcement of arbitral awards and interpretation of state contracts. State contracts also remain significant, be-cause as a rule they include arbitration clauses and stabilization clauses. The latter are particularly common in the energy sector due to its specificity – on the one hand, energy is a heavily politicized sector due to its significance for the development of the economy of a state and both its economic and political stability. Therefore it has a status of a strategic sector, even an issue of national security. This could be observed ever since the beginning of the twentieth century. On the other hand, energy is an infrastructure sector, which requires high investments for development. Not all states are capable to develop this sector by their own financial means, and choose to attract foreign investment. As a result, investment contracts (state contracts) are concluded; they have a status of international commercial contracts, and their parties are free to choose both the applicable law and the means of dispute settlement. The en-ergy contracts as a rule include stabilization clauses, which seek to maintain stable business legal and financial environment for the duration of the contract. Finally, European Union law may also be accepted as a source for in-vestment protection, despite its generalized purposes, which are to achieve the strengthening and convergence of their economies and to establish a monetary and economic union, to implement a common foreign and security policy, including the progressive framing of the common defence policy, and to estab-lish the area of freedom, security and justice. EU law and foreign investment law are still largely conceived as independent and hardly interlinked. However, as integration between the EU member states becomes closer, EU legislation makes an increasing impact also on the specific sectors of the economy, in-cluding the energy sector. Research object The research object of this dissertation are the problems of interpreta-tion and application of law which arise in the resolution of disputes concerning protection of investments in the energy sector between the host states and for-eign investors. They may be grouped into three groups on the basis of the ap-plicable law: 1. The problems of interpretation of international agreements. Both BITs and MITs apply only with respect to investment. ICSID arbitral tribunals can hear only disputes arising directly out of an investment. Disregarding the key role the notion has on the exercise of rights, its meaning remains unclear. The most recent arbitral practice is completely inconsistent on this issue. No less problems are posed by the umbrella clauses, which are included in a large number of BITs and the Energy Charter Treaty, and which requires states to observe obligations they have entered into with an investor. These provisions have been included even in the BITs of 1970s, but in practice they have emerged only recently. The arbitral tribunals differ on whether this provision should be read literaly, or whether its meaning should be restricted. 2. The problems of interpretation of arbitration clauses and invest-ment contracts. This group includes the problems concerning arbitrab

The shock election of a self-proclaimed "libertarian liberal," the chainsaw-wielding eccentric Javier Milei as Argentina's president has attracted a flurry of attention globally. Most of it was focused on the radicalism of Milei's economic proposals to cure Argentina's chronic ills — chief among them an annual inflation at the rate of 143% and the poverty that has engulfed over 40% of Argentines, and all that with an outstanding debt of $43 billion owed to the International Monetary Fund. Milei's remedies include liquidating Argentina's central bank, dropping the national currency — the peso — in favor of the U.S. dollar, privatizing state assets and slashing public expenditures, including subsidies for the most vulnerable individuals and communities. The chainsaw that he adopted as his icon during the election campaign symbolized his intention to demolish the state, which, according to Milei, is at the root of Argentina's relative decline in the 20th and 21st centuries.While some libertarians, notably in the U.S., welcomed his election as the latest and best chance to advance their long-cherished beliefs and a future inspiration for the U.S., their enthusiasm may be misplaced. Milei's main focus may be on the economy, but, as president, he'll also have to steer Argentina's foreign policy. This is not an area in which he has displayed much interest or knowledge to date, but someone like Sen. Rand Paul (R-Ky.), a standard bearer of libertarianism in the U.S., would hardly recognize himself in the positions embraced by Milei. In fact, Milei's foreign policy views, to the extent they exist, are far closer to neoconservative than libertarian. His views would easily find home in hawkish Washington D.C. think tanks and parts of the mainstream of both the Republican and Democratic parties. This is not to be underestimated, as Argentina is a member of the G-20, the third largest economy in Latin America, and has recently been invited to join BRICS, a grouping that comprises China, Russia, India, Brazil and South Africa.Milei's foreign policy views, as expressed repeatedly during the election campaign, are starkly Manichean — they divide the world into democracies and "communist autocracies." Counter-intuitively for a self-proclaimed champion of free trade, he promised to sever ties with two of Argentina's main trade partners — China and Brazil (combined, both account for around 25% of the total of Argentinian exports) — on the grounds that both are ruled by "communists." China was an object of particular scorn, with Milei dubbing the country at one point "an assassin."Milei is a staunch supporter of Ukraine, in contrast to a more moderate position espoused by the outgoing center-left Peronist administration which, while condemning Russia's aggression of Ukraine, was also reluctant to sever ties with Moscow, which grew closer during the pandemic when Argentina acquired Russian vaccines, with results generally deemed acceptable.Perhaps on no issue Milei's neoconservative credentials are more on display than in his fervid embrace of Israel. While Argentina, under different governments, has generally enjoyed good relations with Israel, those were traditionally balanced by Buenos Aires' engagement with Arab countries and, at times, even Iran. That balancing act did not prevent Argentina from declaring Hezbollah a terrorist organization for its alleged role in the notorious 1994 bombing of a Jewish community center in Buenos Aires. Milei's defeated opponent, Sergio Massa, promised to similarly add Palestinian Hamas to Argentina's terrorist list if he had been elected. Milei, however, wants to go much further. He declared that his first international trips as president-elect will be to Israel and the U.S. He also promised to move Argentina's embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. Such a one-sided reorientation would represent a major break in Argentina's traditional foreign policy consensus.Milei is also opposed, on ideological grounds, to Argentina joining the BRICS, despite the invitation issued by the existing members, reportedly the result of heavy lobbying by Brazil on Buenos Aires' behalf. While the prospect of joining the group that represents more than 40% of the world's population and 31% of global GDP (and also a destiny of some 30% of total Argentine exports) is seen as an opportunity by many Argentine businesspeople and politicians, for Milei BRICS represents little more than a dictators' club.The president-elect is also remarkably skeptical about Mercosur, a South American trade bloc which includes, besides Argentina, also Brazil, Uruguay and Paraguay. Milei dismissed it as merely a "low-quality customs union that distorts commerce." Such a position raises fresh questions about the prospects for a long-delayed trade deal between Mercosur and the European Union.There is always a chance that the realities of governing (among them, the fact that his party holds relatively few seats in the National Congress) would temper some of the most radical ideas Milei spouted during an election campaign. After all, the former president of Brazil, Jair Bolsonaro, with whom Milei professes a mutual admiration also started as a fierce critic of China, only to significantly soften his position while in office. But during the presidential debate, Milei displayed a worrying ignorance of how international relations work. While no longer calling for a complete severance of ties with China and Brazil, he insisted that any such interaction should be left entirely to the private sector, apparently oblivious to the fact that it is governments that negotiate international trade frameworks and agreements, including tariffs, phyto-sanitary rules, and other measures.That is especially true in the case of China, where the weight of the public sector in the country's external economic activity is preponderant. Currently, alongside many smaller projects, China is involved in building two hydroelectric dams in Argentina which, when completed, would cover the daily electricity consumption of 1.5 million Argentine households, cut oil and gas import expenses, and even allow to export electricity to the neighboring countries. Milei's simplistic vision of economic relations as mere exchanges between private actors sows doubts about the future of these projects. Worse, their cancellation would risk seriously undermining Argentina's credibility with international partners, even from ideologically more "compatible" countries.The likely appointment of Diana Mondino, an economist, as the future minister of foreign affairs, has so far failed to assuage concerns about Milei's policies. As evidenced in a pre-election debate organized by the Argentine Council on Foreign Relations, Mondino, who has spent her entire professional life in private sector, seems to share her future boss' ideological view of international relations, as well as a penchant for hyperbole. A few days before the elections, she likened Milei's possible victory to the fall of the Berlin Wall 34 years ago, as if the modern-day Argentina were in any way comparable to Soviet-backed communist dictatorships.It is obviously too early to tell how the Milei presidency will unfold, but based on his rhetoric it may be a bumpy road ahead for foreign policy in Argentina.