Suchergebnisse

The Republic of Congo (Congo) boasts numerous assets that can be harnessed to build a strong and robust economy. These assets are oil, ore such as iron and potash, arable lands, and a young population. Congo is the fourth largest oil producer among West and Central African countries, both in total production (260,000 barrels per day) and production per capita terms. In addition, the country is endowed with substantial iron and potash that are yet to be exploited; it has a vast arable lands that could be useful for agricultural development; and the country boasts a young population, which, if well-educated, could be a dynamic labor force helping to spur economic growth.

This edition of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) regional economic update shows that recovery in the region is below historical trends. Its economic prospects depend on global developments and continued strengths in emerging-market demand and oil price trends. Growth in the region is expected to average 4% in 2010, an increase of slightly less than 2 percentage points (pp) over growth in 2009 and weak compared to increases of 5.6pp in advanced economies and 4.5pp in developing nations. Only by 2011 and 2012 is MENA s growth expected to return to the average rates achieved prior to the economic and financial crisis. Recovery has been driven by the global economic rebound and, to varying degrees, by domestic stimulus. Industrial production, which in MENA is dominated by oil, has nearly reached its pre-crisis peak, largely due to the strong recovery in emerging markets, especially Asia. However, the upturn has weakened in recent months because the global slowdown has arrived sooner and is occurring faster than previously anticipated, and there are serious concerns about the sustainability of the global recovery. In response, MENA governments have continued to stimulate their economies in 2010, and even those that did not use any type of fiscal stimulus in 2009 have started implementing fiscal measures in 2010. The economic recovery in MENA has been much less vigorous than the recovery in countries that suffered sharp output contractions. The sustainability of the recovery in Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) economies depends on developments in the rest of the world, and on the extent to which they affect oil markets. The outlook for the global economy and oil markets in the second half of 2010 remains uncertain, and a decline in oil prices cannot be ruled out.

ÖZETSon yıllarda tüm dünyada yoğun biçimde özellikle de gelişmekte olan ülkelerde bankacılık krizleri yaşanmaktadır. Gelişmekte olan ülkelerde finansal liberalizasyon sürecinde denetleme ve düzenleme kurumlarına yeterince önem verilmemesi ve iç ve dış etmenlerden kaynaklanan makroekonomik istikrarsızlıklar bankacılık krizlerinin ana nedenleri olarak gösterilebilir. Faiz oranları ve döviz kurlarındaki dalgalanmalar ve vade uyumsuzlukları finansal ve finansal olmayan kurumlar için piyasa riskinin ve kırılganlığın artmasına neden olmuştur. Bankacılık sektöründe devletin verimsiz bir şekilde bulunması ve kredilerin banka sahipleri ile bağlantılı kişilere verilmesi ve sektörde etkinliğin arttırılmaması sistemik banka krizlerinin artış trendinde önemli etmenlerdir. Diğer yandan muhasebe standartları, yasal düzenlemeler, şeffaflık, risk yönetimi konularındaki eksiklikler bankacılık sektörü gözetim ve denetim otoritelerindeki boşluktan kaynaklanmıştır. Tüm bu bileşenler ülke ve zamana göre farklılık göstermekle birlikte bankacılık sektöründe yaşanan sistemik krizlere neden olan en temel etmenlerdir.Türkiye'de 1980 sonrası yaşanan finansal liberalizasyon 1989 yılında sermaye hareketlerinin de serbestleştirilmesi ile tamamlanmıştır. Bu süreçte finansal piyasaların derinleştirilmesi hedefine ulaşılsa da, seksenli yılların ilk yarısında yakalanan ekonomik istikrar doksanlı yıllarla birlikte kendini ekonomik dalgalanmalara bırakmıştır. Yüksek kamu açıkları iç borçlanma ile finanse edilmiş, devletin borçlanma gereği özel sektör yatırımlarını dışlamıştır. Bankacılık sektöründe finansal aracılık faaliyetlerinin payı düşmüş, kamu borcunun finansmanı ve arbitraj gelirleri sektörün en önemli gelir kaynakları haline gelmiştir. Makroekonomik istikrarsızlığa son vermek amacıyla IMF ile 2000 yılı başında döviz kuru çıpasına dayalı bir istikrar programı anlaşması imzalanmıştır. Ne var ki programın maliye ve para politikası hedefleri tutturulsa da enflasyon beklentilerinin inatçılığı istenen ölçüde kırılamamıştır. Döviz kurunun olağanüstü değerlenmesi ve büyüme sürecine giren ekonomide ithalat harcamalarının artması, cari dengenin beklenenin iki katı (GSMH'nın%5'i) açık vermesine neden olmuştur. İç politikadaki belirsizlikler ve dış ekonomik dalgalanmalar programa olan güvenin azalmasına neden olmuş ve ard arda yaşanan iki kriz sonrası kur çıpası hedefi terk edilip döviz kuru serbest dalgalanmaya bırakılmıştır.İstikrar programının uygulanma sürecinde, zaten zayıf olan bankacılık sistemi programın yapısı gereği piyasa risklerine çok daha açık hale gelmiş ve kırılgan bir hal almıştır. Kriz döneminde faiz oranlarının inanılmaz seviyelere ulaşması, döviz kurunun ise aşırı değer kaybetmesi birçok bankanın sermaye yapısını olumsuz yönde etkilemiştir. Kamu bankalarının büyük montanlı "görev zararlarını" çok kısa vadeli kaynaklarla fonlaması piyasada baskı yaratmıştır. Ekonomideki yavaşlama reel sektör bilançolarının da bozulmasına neden olmuş finansal sektörde geri dönmeyen kredilerin oranı giderek artmıştır. Bütün bu problemlerin çözümü için 2001 yılı ortasında Bankacılık Sektörü Yeniden Yapılandırma Programı yürürlüğe konmuştur. Kamu bankalarının yeniden yapılandırılması ile işe başlanmış, kısa vadeli borçlanma ihtiyacını ortadan kaldıracak önlemler alınmış, eriyen sermaye yapısı onarılmıştır. Tahsili gecikmiş alacakları toplam kredilerinin 'ine ulaşan kamu bankalarına aktarılan kaynağın 2001 GSMH'na oranı .8'i bulmuştur. Kriz sonrası zor duruma düşen ve bankacılık sektöründe toplam paya sahip olan pek çok özel bankaya Tasarruf Mevduatı Sigorta Fonu (TMSF) tarafından el konulmuştur. Bu bankaların rehabilitasyon ve satışı için kamu kaynaklarından 2001 yılı GSMH'nın .9'u kadar kaynak ayrılmıştır. Bunlara ilaveten krizden olumsuz etkilenen diğer özel bankalar için sermayelerinin güçlendirilmesi ve tahsili gecikmiş alacaklarının çözümü için girişimlerde bulunulmuştur. Ayrıca etkin çalışan, global rekabete açık ve daha güçlü bir bankacılık sektörüne sahip olabilmek için düzenleme ve denetleme yapısının güçlendirilmesi çalışmalarına hız verilmiştir. Şimdiye kadar kayda değer bir ilerleme kaydedilmiş olsa da, yeniden yapılandırma programının başarısı, istikrarlı bir ekonomik ve politik düzenle doğrudan ilişkilidir. Uzun dönemdeki hedef büyüme sürecini yeniden yakalayıp ve o çizgide devam edip olası Avrupa Birliği üyeliğine zemin hazırlamaktır.SUMMARY (Banking Crises and Turkish Banking Sector Restructuring Program)In recent years there have been an increasing trend in banking crises in both developing and developed countries. Attaching inadequate importance to the regulatory and supervisory institutions during the financial liberalization process and macroeconomic instability due to domestic and foreign disturbances are the main determinants of banking crises in the developing countries. Volatility in interest and foreign exchange rates and maturity mismatches increased market risk and vulnerability of both financial and nonfinancial institutions. Inefficient occurrence of government in the banking sector, increase in connected lending and no correction policies for the inefficiencies in the sector are important factors contributing to the increasing trend of the systemic banking crises. Deficiencies in accounting and disclosure standards, legal arrangements and risk management arise from the absence of sound regulatory and supervisory framework in these countries. Even if it can change from country to country and from time to time all the above stated distortions are the main determinants of banking crises.Financial liberalization process in Turkey after 1980 has been completed by the liberalization of capital account in 1989. During this process even if the target of financial deepening is attained, the economic stability that is reached in 1980s has to be abandoned with the economic instability years of the 1990s. High borrowing requirement of government has been financed through domestic borrowing and the private sector investments are crowded out. Share of financial intermediation declined and financing government debt and arbitrage gains became the main sources of income for the banking sector. In the beginning of 2000, Turkey signed a stabilisation program with IMF, which was based upon an exchange rate anchor. Main target of the program was to attain macroeconomic stability. Even if the fiscal and monetary targets of the program have been achieved, inflation expectations could not be reduced. Extraordinary valuation of the foreign exchange rate and economic growth induced increase in import expenses resulted twice of the targeted current account deficit reaching 5%of GNP. Uncertainties in domestic politics and instability in foreign economic environment caused a decline in confidence to the program. After the Nov.2000 and Feb.2001 crises the program became unsustainable; the government has to abandon the peg and to float the currency.During implementation process of the stabilisation policy, due to the structure of the program already weak banking sector became more open to market risks and more fragile. Increase in interest rates to incredible levels and excessive valuation of exchange rate influenced negatively the capital structure of banks. State banks created pressure on the markets through their large amount of financing requirements for "Duty losses". The crises led to a serious contraction in the economy, which exerted an adverse impact on the asset quality of the banking sector and increased the nonperforming credits. In consequence, the government adopted in mid-2001 "Banking Sector Restructuring Program" in order to eliminate these problems. The program started with the restructuring of state banks, measures are taken to limit the short-term exposure and support is given to dissolved capital. While the state banks' 45% of the total loans were nonperforming, total cost of the financial restructuring was 15.8% of 2001 GNP. On the other hand those banks which became insolvent after the crises and taken over by Saving Deposit Insurance Fund totalled 14% of banking sector assets. For the rehabilitation and sale of these banks a resource of 11.9% of 2001 GNP is allocated from public funds. In addition, for other banks that have been affected adversely by the crises, steps have been taken to strengthen capital base and to solve the problem of nonperforming assets. Achieving an efficiently working, globally competitive and sound Turkish Banking sector, strengthening the regulatory and supervisory framework is important. Up to now even if a significant progress has been taken in the implementation of the program, the successful completion of the program depends on the political and economic stability. For the longer term, the challenge is to recapture growth momentum and translate it into sustained economic convergence, as a basis for prospective entry into the European Union.

Seit einem Vierteljahrhundert ist die Management Revue Plattform für Forschungsergebnisse der Verwaltungswissenschaft und Management Studies. Die Zeitschrift richtet sich in erster Linie an Autoren, die institutionelle Besonderheiten von Managementinfrastrukturen und Organisationen im europäischen Kontext untersuchen. Die Beiträge dieses Sonderband beschäftigen sich u.a. mit Personalführung, Arbeitsgeber-/Arbeitnehmerbeziehungen sowie Theoriebildung.Mit Beiträgen vonWolfgang Mayrhofer und Chris Brewster; Paul Boselie; Erik Poutsma, Paul E.M. Ligthart und Roel Schouteten; Ingo Singe und Richard Croucher; Walther Müller-Jentsch; Stefan Kirchner; Dudo von Eckardstein und Stefan Konlechner; Wenzel Matiaske; Jörg Freiling; Werner Nienhüser; Kirsten Foss und Nicolai J. Foss

Botswana represents one of the few development success stories in Sub-Saharan Africa. Real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth averaged almost 9 percent between 1960 and 2005, far above the Sub-Saharan Africa average. Real GDP per capita grew even faster, averaging more than 10 percent a year -- the most rapid economic growth of any country in the world. The crucial question is: Why has Botswana grown the way it has done, and what lessons does it offer? This evidence-based story is an account of policy and institutional dynamics of sustained growth and development in Botswana -- illuminating the role of leadership. It shows how a secure political elite has pursued growth-promoting policies and developed, modified, and maintained viable inherited traditional and modern institutions of political, economic, and legal restraint. These institutions have remained robust in the face of initial large aid inflows and spectacular mineral rents, producing a growth pattern that has been both rapid and cautious. The nature of the Botswana developmental state is illustrated by the way in which the state mobilized development resources-especially savings, investment, and human resources, widely known as the primary drivers of economic growth, and prudently managed the economy without becoming excessively involved in the nuts. It demonstrates that through intentional policy choices and countercyclical instruments, countries can shift from aid-dependent to trade-led natural resource development (though probably with narrow-based growth), to a broader development strategy as long as the state is capable and operates within effective institutional design. Botswana's story is sterling example of how the critical issue in development is not so much access to resources but how resources are managed.

In its report to the September 22, 2008 meeting of the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee (AHLC), the World Bank noted that the Palestinian Authority (PA), Israel, and the international donor community made some progress on the three parallel conditions for Palestinian economic revival, albeit to different degrees. The report notes the dramatic impact of Israel s recent three-week offensive in Gaza and analyzes the variety of recovery and reconstruction schemes being explored by the donor community. We find that these have not yet led to any significant impact on the ground due to the continued closure imposed on Gaza. The devastation in Gaza, coupled with a fluid political environment in both the PA and Israel, has made it necessary for this report to revisit the fundamentals of donor support to the PA in view of the long-term goal of establishing an economically viable Palestinian state independent of external aid. Examination through this lens reveals a fundamentally flawed picture.

This report begins by documenting the Palestinian Authority's (PA's) ongoing fiscal crisis that threatens its ability to provide basic services to the population. In 2011, the PA required about US$1.5 billion dollars in budget support, of which US$200 million to cover development expenses not funded directly by donors. However, it only received about US$814 million in budget support and US$169 million in development financing, for a total of US$983 million. Ultimately, the PA can only hope to achieve fiscal sustainability through a combination of sustained private sector growth and continued internal reforms. Robust private sector growth is necessary for the PA to generate the revenues needed to sustain service delivery. Yet the private sector remains stifled as a result of Israeli restrictions on access to natural resources and markets. The West Bank has experienced a slowdown in economic growth in 2011, combined with double-digit growth in Gaza. The recovery in Gaza can be attributed to a combination of aid inflows and easing of restrictions on entry of goods from Israel-though it is important to keep in mind that the average Gaza today is worse off than s/he was back in the late nineties. The recent growth in Gaza is also driven largely by a boom in the construction sector, and Gaza infrastructure exhibits such gaps and disrepair that major investments are necessary and would generate important employment as well as future growth. The slowdown in growth in the West Bank, on the other hand, is the result of falling donor support, uncertainty caused by the PA's fiscal crisis, and lack of significant new easing of restrictions by the Government of Israel (GoI).

Carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions are a global concern; impacts on the climate do not depend on where the CO2 is emitted. To meet this concern, a worldwide program for cutting greenhouse gases was formed in Kyoto, Japan in December 1997. The Kyoto protocol formulates the general principles for a worldwide treaty on cutting greenhouse emissions and specifies reductions for the industrialised world. The European Union has introduced an EU wide emission trading system (EUETS) that became operational in 2005 as an instrument for EU member states to meet their Kyoto obligations. Transports are not included, but may become a part of the EU-ETS in future revisions. Instead emissions from transports are regulated by other means, including fuel taxes. To further reduce CO2 emissions from passenger cars and to improve fuel efficiency, the European Community has adopted a separate strategy. An important element of this strategy are the Commitments of the European, Japanese and Korean Automobile Manufacturers Associations to achieve total new passenger car fleet average CO2 emissions of 140 g CO2/km by 2008/2009. In this paper we assess the option of introducing an EU wide certificate/emission permit trading system for new passenger cars as an alternative to the commitments made by the European Automobile Manufacturers Associations. An overview of alternative trading systems is presented, possible objectives and evaluation criteria are discussed, arguments for introducing separate systems for new passenger cars are discussed, the potential for emission reduction through technological advances and changed consumer behaviour is analysed and a possible design of a system of tradable permits for new passenger cars is presented. CAP-AND TRADE OR BASELINE-CREDIT? In a cap-and-trade system a total limit (a cap) on emissions is defined. Emission permits that sum up to the limit or cap are then allocated among the agents generating the emissions. Having allocated the permits, trade is introduced. If certain conditions are achieved, trade will continue to the point where marginal abatement costs are the same across sectors and nations. Cost-effectiveness is then achieved. The EU-ETS is an example of a cap-and-trade system. A baseline-credit system is an alternative. In such a system certificates or credits are based on the achievement of improvements in relation to a baseline. Agents with emissions lower than the predefined baseline receive credits and those exceeding the baseline will have to buy credits. The baseline is typically defined in relation to a rate-based value such as CO2-emissions per kilometre or emissions per unit of output. A relative baseline system of this kind is thereby designed to control average emissions, e.g. per car and kilometre, rather than total emissions. The cap-and-trade system has the advantage by allowing a larger variety of choices for adjusting emissions. Taking road transports as an example, total emissions can be reduced not only by reducing average emissions per car and kilometre but also by reducing total car fleet mileage e.g. by giving incentives to travellers to drive less, drive shorter distances or shifting to alternative modes of transport. If the overall objective is to reduce emissions in a cost-effective manner across sectors and nations, including the transport sector in current EU-ETS would be an option to consider. The advantage of such a system is that it has the potential of providing incentives to agents to act in a way that will equalise marginal abatement costs across sectors (assuming also that current CO2-based fuel taxes/other taxes linked to CO2 emissions are adjusted accordingly), thus leading to cost-effective abatement. The baseline-credit system, on the other hand, would concentrate on reducing average emissions and consequently target the behavioural changes necessary to reduce average emissions. If, for example, the objective is to increase energy efficiency through technological improvements, a baseline-credit system may therefore be the optimal choice. Moreover, myopic behaviour in the market for new passenger cars may lead to a situation where consumers' preferences and willingness to pay for CO2-reducing technology is insufficient to cover the costs of developing the technology and put it to the market even if car manufacturers were to trade in EU-ETS and thereby receive monetary gains by developing technology that reduces fuel consumption and CO2 emissions. A system such as the baselinecredit system may therefore be necessary in order to provide sufficient incentives to manufacturers to work towards increased energy efficiency in new cars through technological improvements. The average CO2 emissions from new cars sold in the market can be reduced in two ways; either by increasing the energy efficiency in each type of car put to the market (i.e. improved technology) or by providing incentives to consumers to choose the most energy-efficient cars already in the market. Achieving objectives such as 120 g CO2/km for new car fleet most likely requires both of these. Also, in order to influence consumer behaviour it is important to make technology available to consumers at low cost. Consumers choose to pay for new technology only if the benefits of improved gas-mileage exceed the costs of higher car prices. TECHNOLOGICAL IMPROVEMENT OR CHANGED CONSUMER BEHAVIOUR? Considering technological improvements there are two ways in which to reduce specific CO2 emissions: By reducing fuel consumption in vehicles with conventional combustion engines (petrol and diesel), or by using renewable, low-CO2fuels (partly) in conjunction with new engine technologies. Fuel consumption in vehicles with conventional combustion engines can in turn be reduced in a number of ways. Technological measures can be roughly divided into four categories: Improved engine technology, downsizing and enhanced transmission technology, energy management and hybridisation, and vehicle design. The literature shows that conventional combustion engines have considerable potential for fuel-saving. In the case of petrol engines, it is thought that measures involving the drive train in a middle-size vehicle could achieve fuel savings of around 38 per cent. Further measures such as weight reduction, reduced rolling and air resistance, and promotion of fuel-efficient driving habits can result in 40 per cent or greater decrease in overall consumption. Diesel engines have lower savings potential than petrol engines because diesel engines are less wasteful than petrol engines when run at partial throttle, and significant increases in diesel motor efficiency have already been achieved. Nevertheless, hybridisation and improved transmission could result in savings of around 32 per cent. Additional savings could also be achieved with a reduction in vehicle weight, reduced rolling and air resistance, and by promoting fuel-efficient driving habits. Turning then to consumer behaviour, it is important to recognise that consumers consider a large variety of characteristics before finally choosing the car that best fits their needs and their personal preferences. From a CO2 point of view consumers should ideally be concerned about fuel efficiency more than any other characteristics. This, however, is not the case. Studies have shown that factors such as safety, prestige and powerful engines influence consumer behaviour more than does fuel efficiency, especially in times when disposable incomes increase. However, in spite of recent trends there seems to be a potential to provide incentives to consumers to shift to low-emitting cars without any large sacrifices being involved. Consider, for instance, Volvo V70, which was the most popular new car model in Sweden in 2005. The emissions from the different petrol versions range between 214 and 266 g CO2/km, whereas diesels are available with emissions ranging from 171 to 223 g CO2/km. A movement form the highest CO2/km per kilometre value to the lowest would thus imply savings of 95 grams per kilometre. To achieve these savings a consumer who currently prefers the highest emitting car has to change fuel, automatic transmission and engine power. However, brand, model or car size would not need to change. For most consumers the "adjustment cost" would thus be relatively low. The above is an extreme case scenario involving only one car model. Considering instead the whole fleet of new passenger cars, our calculations show that there is a general potential to reduce CO2 emissions from new cars by 13-30 g CO2/km within the same car model (or approximately 8-15 per cent). THE COST OF INCREASED ENERGY EFFICIENCY The main purpose of a baseline-credit system for new passenger cars would be to provide incentives for car manufacturers to develop and introduce the technology in new cars required to reach the specified CO2-objectives. However, this also means that consumers must find it worthwhile to buy a low-emitting car, i.e. the benefits of the improved technology, not the least in terms of increased gas mileage, must exceed the increase in sales price. The technological potential is large, but the benefits for consumers could be questioned since car buyers apparently do not judge energy efficiency as an important characteristic. Assuming unchanged market shares for petrol and diesel cars as well as small, medium and large sized cars, our calculations show that a reduction of the average emissions to 120 g CO2per car and kilometre in the EU would imply an increase in retail prices by 2 000 euro. There is technological potential to further reduce emissions to an average of 100 g CO2 per kilometre. However, the cost increase for this additional reduction is about 6 000 euro. THE DESIGN OF A SYSTEM FOR NEW PASSENGER CARS It is our conclusion that an emission trading system for new cars should be separated from the EU-ETS and designed as a baseline and credit system, based on emission intensity. Setting up a separate emission trading system for new cars as a baseline and credit system involves defining a baseline. It is natural to tie the baseline to the goals that are under discussion in the European Union i.e. 140 and 120 g CO2/km. Different time frames have been discussed. One possibility is to reach 140 CO2/km by 2008/2009 and 120 g CO2/km by 2012. Earlier discussions about technological development show that this time frame is feasible. Before trade can take place, demand and supply of credits need to be created. In a cap-and-trade system initial allocation of permits is a very important issue. In the baseline and credit system the allocation of credits is automatic: cars below baseline receive credits and cars above baseline need to purchase credits. In principle, this implies that no cost is imposed on the baseline car. High-emitting cars will become more expensive and low-emitting cars less expensive. The credits will work in a way similar to a system of subsidies for cars emitting below the baseline and taxes for those above. Trade with credits need to perform in a way that supports attainment of the baseline. A possible solution is that credits are traded in a market that is similar to a stock exchange. The offers of sellers and the bids of buyers will meet in a market that ideally clears each trading day. As long as markets clear, there is attainment of the baseline. To overcome imbalances, an accommodating system that handles short time excess credits or shortages will need to be worked out. There is also a need for an enforcement and compliance mechanism. Another issue to deal with is that there may be different incentives for buyers and sellers. Buyers will generally be obliged to buy credits. Sellers, on the other hand, may want to capitalise their credits later, or to bank them for coming periods. The differences in incentives can lead to shortages and an upward pressure on prices and fluctuating prices. The issue whether trade of credits should take place downstream or upstream includes several options in the production-consumption chain. The recommendation is that the retailers should be the trading entity. We also suggest gradual reductions in baseline. However, the details of a system of baseline and credits will need further analysis. Important issues in a future analysis will be designing mechanisms for compliance, monitoring and penalising. Incentive problems need also to be dealt with.

The images of flattened buildings and tent cities that dominated the news following the Haitian earthquake of January 12, 2010 triggered an emergency response from the global aid and development community. Foreign governments, multilateral organizations including the World Bank, and NGOs dramatically increased the flow of funding to the devastated country. The money helped pay for emergency relief but also for higher public investment spending that sought to repair damage and press ahead with development projects that had begun before the disaster. Six years later, the flow of aid is declining, and Haiti faces pivotal challenges: how to adapt to the reductions, raise more resources internally, spend more efficiently, and safeguard the fragile social gains it has achieved in a time of extreme hardship. The infrastructure Haiti has acquired in the recent surge of investment is something like a newly built house that lacks furniture and running water, it may look good from the outside but does little for its occupants. For the present, life remains a struggle for most of the country's 10.4 million people. Thus in addition to growth, the country needs policies that will foster inclusiveness. Analysis and past experience suggest that two factors are key: human capital and political stability. To achieve this goal, Haiti will require a new outlook favoring fair, efficient government and social inclusiveness.

Over the past decade, donors of foreign aid quadrupled their annual contributions to trust funds at the World Bank. This earmarking of contributions to donors' preferred recipient countries and issues has raised concerns about the alignment of trust funds with the performance-based allocations of aid by the International Development Association, the World Bank's concessional lending arm, and raises the question of the role of this new "multi-bi" aid channel. This study finds that the cross-country allocations of aggregate trust fund aid are poverty- and policy-selective. In this respect, they are much more similar to allocations from the International Development Association than from bilateral donors. The allocations of trust fund types that are more closely controlled by donor countries—recipient-executed and single-donor trust funds—are more strongly related to the strategic interests of donor countries than trust fund aid in general. Trust funds for health and education aid are poverty selective and positively correlated with the World Bank's assessment of the quality of countries' sector policies, while environmental trust funds are neither poverty selective nor correlated with the assessed quality of countries' environmental policies. Overall, the evidence indicates that multi-bi funds administered by the World Bank do not undermine the International Development Association's allocation criteria.

This Report on Observance and Codes-Accounting and Auditing (ROSC-A&A) assesses the corporate sector accounting, financial reporting, and auditing practices in Jamaica. It builds on its predecessor, a 2003 ROSC-A&A, and its aims to assist the Government of Jamaica's efforts to strengthen accounting and auditing practices and to enhance financial transparency in the corporate sector, so as to support the Government's economic reform program and provide greater confidence to current and potential investors with respect to the financial reporting environment. Jamaica has embarked on an economic reform program whose main objectives are to contain the country's growing economic and external vulnerabilities and address economic imbalances, while putting the country on a path to sustainable growth. Important reforms include: (a) strengthening public finances, including through comprehensive tax reform, expenditure rationalization, and improved public debt management and public financial management; (b) enhancing the resilience of the financial sector through strengthened supervisory, regulatory, and crisis-management frameworks; and (c) improving growth generating efficiency through enhancements to the business environment and strengthened institutional capacity and governance.

This study provides an overview of Arab official development assistance (ODA) over the past four decades. Trends in volume, composition, and direction are discussed in chapter two and the institutional framework is discussed in chapter three. Over 90 percent of Arab development assistance is provided by three countries: the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA), Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE).

This is the tenth year that the paying taxes indicator has been part of the World Bank Doing Business project. The journey over the period of the study has been an eventful and interesting one and the economic backdrop continues to present a challenging environment for governments as they consider their future fiscal policies. Globalization, the march of technological change, changing demographic patterns and the persistent challenges that continue around climate change and the environment all come together to generate a turbulent mix of issues which have a significant impact on fiscal policy and the associated tax systems. Against this backdrop, this year the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) has put forward proposals for changing the international tax rules to modernize them for today s globalized business and to address concerns over base erosion and profit shifting (BEPS). It is apparent that these proposals are already changing the way some tax authorities apply existing rules, leading to new and increased uncertainty for business, at least in the short term. Alongside all of this however there are two simple, mutually supportive objectives for governments; to ensure that there are sufficient public revenues for the future, to lay a foundation for sustained improvements in productivity, while at the same time incentivising investment and economic growth. This year the authors have also focused more on the compliance aspects of the information that authors collect through the study. Stable tax systems and strong tax administrations are important for businesses, helping them to operate in an environment where the tax treatment of transactions is predictable, and where governments operate transparently. The paying taxes study provides an unrivalled global database which supports an ongoing research program.

This Fifth Edition of the Uganda Economic Update presents evidence that if the urbanization process is well managed, it has the potential to stimulate economic growth and to provide productive jobs for a greater proportion of Uganda's young and rapidly expanding population. In many countries across the world, the growth of cities has stimulated the establishment and expansion of productive businesses by reducing the distance between suppliers and customers. The growth of cities has also facilitated provision of social services and infrastructure through economies of scale. These positive effects from urbanization are already visible in Uganda since the poverty rate is seven percentage points lower in urban areas than in rural areas. Most of the recent job creation is found in cities, and social indicators are also better in urban areas, especially in education and health.