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Until the last major recession, there was an approach in macroeconomics that income distribution was not significant for macroeconomic processes. However, the recent major recession has prompted policymakers and economists to take into account the phenomenon of income inequality, its economic and social causes and consequences related to poverty, social inclusion, social trust, support of democratic institutions, economic growth, financial and other issues.In recent years, income inequality has been rising in many countries, and the International Monetary Fund, the OECD and other organizations underline the importance of addressing this problem. It is important to choose the right measures to make the right decisions in order to address the issues of growing income inequality. Their choice is influenced by the identification of factors influencing the change of income inequality and the impact assessment.The scale and change of income inequality can be influenced by the factors related to the market economy (globalization, technological progress) and the institutional factors (setting the rules of the game on the market, creating a certain environment). According to the factors analysed in the research, three groups of authors can be distinguished. Some authors (Asteriou, Dimelis, Moudatsou, 2014, Cabral, García-Díaz, Mollick, 2016, Lim, McNelis, 2016, Sheng, 2015, Haan, Sturm, 2017, Wade, 2004, Alvarez, 2015, Elmawazini, Sharif, Manga, Drucker, 2013, Jaumotte, Lall, Papageorgiou, 2013, Çelik, Basdas, 2010, Hermes, 2014, Richmond, Triplett, 2017, Franco, Gerussi, 2013, Stockhammer, Guschanski, Köhler, 2016, Soons, 2016, Jaumotte, Lall, Papageorgiou, 2008) investigate and assess the impact of market factors (globalization, financialization, technological progress) on income inequality, while other authors or the group of authors (IMF, 2014, Arestis, Gonzalez-Martinez, 2016, Checchi, Josifidis, Supic, Beker Pucar, 2017, Feld, Schnellenbach, 2014, Obadić, Šimurina, Sonora, 2014, Calderón, Chong, 2009, Checchi, García-Peñalosa, 2008, Saez, 2017, Jaumotte, Buitron, 2015, Bastagli, Coady, Gupta, 2012, Kenworthy, Pontusson, 2005) distinguish the impact of institutional factors (labour market institutions, welfare state) on income inequality. According to J. E. Stiglitz (2016), the market does not operate in a vacuum – it operates within an institutional setting. Therefore, the third group of authors can be identified that assess the impact of both market and institutional factors on inequality (Stiglitz, 2016, Atkinson, 2003, Josifidis, Supic, 2017, Josifidis, Mitrović, Supić, Glavaški, 2016, Huber, Stephens, 2014, Darcillon, 2015, Lin, Fu, 2016, Ghossoub, Reed, 2017, Kristal, Cohen, 2017, Alderson, Nielsen, 2002, Kus, 2012, Tridico, 2015, Dabla-Norris, Kochhar, Ricka, Suphaphiphat, Tsounta, 2015, Jain-Chandra, Kinda, Kochhar, Piao, Schauer, 2016). The results of empirical studies assessing the impact of different factors on income inequality are contradictory. There is a disagreement on the distinction between different factors influencing the change of inequality as well as the direction and strength of their impact. Therefore, it is relevant to determine what factors determine income inequality and what is their impact on income inequality.The aim of the research is on the basis of empirical research to analyse the impact of factors influencing the change of income inequality, to identify which factors have the greatest impact. Research methods are as follows: analysis, grouping and generalization of scientific articles.On the basis of the analysis of the studies, which evaluated the factors determining income inequality, five groups of factors determining income inequality have been identified: 1) globalization; 2) technological progress; 3) financialization; 4) labour market institutions; 5) welfare state. It is possible to state that some studies assess the impact of only one set of factors on the change of income inequality: globalization, financialization, labour market institutions or technological progress, while other studies assess more than two groups of factors. This reflects the authors' differing views on the factors and how they influence the change of income inequality.On the basis of the empirical results analysed in this research, it can be concluded that globalization tends to increase income inequality. However, the results of some studies show that globalization increases income inequality in both developed and developing countries, while the results of other studies show that globalization reduces income inequality in developing countries. The research assessing the impact of factors determining income inequality in EU countries (Asteriou, Dimelis, Moudatsou, 2014) found that in some countries (Austria, Belgium, Germany, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Greece, Italy, Ireland, Portugal, Spain) the globalization led to the decrease in income inequality and in other countries (Finland, Sweden, Denmark and the new EU countries) it led to the increase. It has been found that: 1) the impact of trade globalization on changes of income inequality is ambiguous: in some studies it reduces income inequality, in others it increases income inequality or the impact is insignificant; 2) the impact of financial globalization on changes of income inequality is usually positive.Summarizing the impact of technological progress on income inequality, it has been found that technological progress increases income inequality, but the use of information and communication technologies (Internet and mobile communication) reduces income inequality. The impact of the group of financialization factors on income inequality is also ambiguous: 1) financial deepening increases income inequality by investigating the impact in many countries of the world, but it decreases it in developed countries; 2) if the impact of some financial development indicators on inequality is insignificant, then the impact of ratio between bank credits and GDP increases income inequality; 3) financial liberalization increases income inequality; 4) banking crises increase income inequality; 5) the intensity of microfinance reduces income inequality. One of the indicators of labour market institutions (trade union membership) is mentioned in the studies as both reducing and increasing (through channels of wage differences and unemployment rate) income inequality. The results of empirical research show that income inequality is reduced by labour protection laws, bargaining power in wage setting, and it is increased by labour market flexibility, capital per worker (through part of work and unemployment channels) and the ratio of minimum and average wage (through the gap of pay and unemployment rate channels). The factors of welfare state have a positive impact and reduce income inequality.The results of the research do not provide an unambiguous answer, but most evidence shows that labour market institutions and welfare state factors reduce income inequality, while factors of technological progress and financialization increase income inequality. In summary, technological advances, labour market institutions and globalization have the greatest impact on changes of income inequality. ; Straipsnyje analizuojami moksliniai tyrimai, kuriuose buvo vertintas skirtingų veiksnių poveikis pajamų nelygybės kitimui. Išskirtos penkios pagrindinės veiksnių grupės: globalizacijos, technologinės pažangos, finansializacijos, darbo rinkos institucijų ir gerovės valstybės. Aptariami veiksnių grupes sudarantys veiksniai ir juos atspindintys rodikliai, vertinamas jų poveikis pajamų nelygybės kitimui atskirose šalyse ar jų grupėse skirtingais laikotarpiais. Taip pat straipsnyje išskirti svarbiausi veiksniai, darantys įtaką pajamų nelygybei, ir veiksniai, dėl kurių poveikio labiausiai sutariama.

REPO transaction is an agreement by which one party (the seller) undertakes to sell financial instruments or cash to the other party (the buyer), and the latter shall pay the purchase price, and thus it is agreed that the seller undertakes to repurchase from the buyer the same or equivalent financial instruments or the same amount of money for the repurchase price at the scheduled future date. This transaction determines relatively complex legal relations, and the investor 's risk to suffer monetary losses depends not only on the instability of the market price of the financial instruments, but also on genuine fulfillment of contractual obligations by the parties of the transaction. As in all contractual relations, in case of REPO transaction, there are situations where the parties violate the terms of the transaction and the disputes have to be solved in court. Although the Lithuanian case law is rather unified when solving disputes between the parties of the transaction where the investor does not comply with the obligation of the transaction to pay margin, sometimes non-compliance with this obligation is not the only reason for the resulting losses. The law, in cases where the investor violates the obligation to pay margin, grants the right to the financial intermediary to dispose of financial instruments, however giving the right, but not the obligation the law does not impose strict imperatives for the deadline of realization of financial instruments, for this reason in practice there are cases where the latter are in no hurry to implement their rights to realize the financial instruments, what increases the losses even more. In such cases the biggest problem is the legal qualification of the delay of financial intermediary to realize the financial instruments and the connection with the obligations applicable to the latter and influence of failure to comply with these obligations to the size of the loss. In such cases the question is whether if there is proof that the financial intermediary delayed realization of financial instruments, the losses of the REFO transactions still have to be covered by the investor who failed to fulfill their obligation to pay margin? Whether the losses shall be distributed in proportion to the two parties and whether such distribution of the losses for both parties is legally possible and reasonable in general? The aim of this thesis is to establish any contractual or statutory provisions that forbid the financial intermediary to delay realization of financial instruments, when the latter acquires such a right. The aim of the thesis is to assess whether the financial intermediary is responsible for the losses resulting from the delay in the realization of the financial instruments transferred to the intermediary during the REPO transaction where the investor does not pay margin (i.e. or one party, a financial intermediary, is responsible for the losses incurred because of his fault, as a result of the delay in realization of financial instruments transferred based on REPO transaction when such right incurred due to the fact that another party, investor, breaches his obligations (did not pay margin), and to determine the recovery mechanism of damages caused because of the fault of both parties that concluded transaction. In order to achieve these objectives, the paper has analyzed both the Lithuanian and the European Union law acts regulating investment services and protection of investors' rights, the thesis has also examined the Lithuanian case law and the various scientific sources. The hypothesis of the paper that a financial intermediary is responsible for the losses resulting from a delay in the realization of financial instruments transferred to him based on the REPO transaction where the investor does not pay the margin has been proven. The paper has found out that in cases where the investor does not pay the margin, the conditions under REPO transaction allow the financial intermediaries to realize the transferred financial instruments. In some cases REPO contracts shall provide the deadline of such right from the moment when the investor does not pay the margin, but this condition is not mandatory and is not always included in repurchase agreements. Actually, even in cases where such a term is provided for in the contract it does not require a financial intermediary to fulfill this right as soon as it occurs, the financial intermediary is free to determine how soon after the emergence of the right to realize the financial instruments he shall implement the latter. In cases where in the REPO transaction there is a dispute on realization of financial instruments in terms of timeliness of the financial intermediary in respect of realization of financial instruments, the provisions provided for in the Act of Markets of Financial Instruments in the Republic of Lithuania and in the Civil Code are applicable, such provisions establish the principles of care, diligence and fairness, and oblige the financial intermediary to operate for the best conditions and interests of the customer. Given the fact that this work has established that the obligations to the parties arising based on REPO transaction end only when both parties have fulfilled their obligations, the obligations arising based on the mentioned transaction, including the care, diligence and integrity requirements are to be applied even when the investor breaches his obligations, as in such case the obligations of the parties still can not be considered to be expired. Therefore, in cases where it is determined that the financial intermediary with the right to realize financial instruments, even in cases where this obligations occurred due to the fact that the investor has failed to fulfill his obligation according to REPO transaction to pay margin, delayed to implement it, such behavior is to be regarded as the breach of duty of care, diligence and fairness and the obligation to act for the best conditions for the customer. This thesis has also showed that during the settlement of disputes between an investor and a financial intermediary in court, in addition to special legal norms regulating the investment services, the contractual civil liability provisions are also applicable, which, in cases where both REPO counterparties violate the contractual obligations according to this transaction, allow the use of mixed fault institute, based on which when analyzing the causality of resulting losses and actions of each party two types of solutions are accepted: the debtor's liability is reduced in proportion to the creditor's fault, i.e. the court in determining the fault of each party for the occurred losses and reducing the borrower's responsibility by eliminating the creditor's liability or with the full exemption of the debtor's liability, having established that the damage was caused mainly due to the creditor's action. Thus, in cases where the investor violates the contractual obligation to pay margin and the financial intermediary delays to realize financial instruments, the influence of failure to comply with each of the obligations is assessed in respect of the losses, and when the influence is determined the losses are respectively distributed to both parties involved.

REPO transaction is an agreement by which one party (the seller) undertakes to sell financial instruments or cash to the other party (the buyer), and the latter shall pay the purchase price, and thus it is agreed that the seller undertakes to repurchase from the buyer the same or equivalent financial instruments or the same amount of money for the repurchase price at the scheduled future date. This transaction determines relatively complex legal relations, and the investor 's risk to suffer monetary losses depends not only on the instability of the market price of the financial instruments, but also on genuine fulfillment of contractual obligations by the parties of the transaction. As in all contractual relations, in case of REPO transaction, there are situations where the parties violate the terms of the transaction and the disputes have to be solved in court. Although the Lithuanian case law is rather unified when solving disputes between the parties of the transaction where the investor does not comply with the obligation of the transaction to pay margin, sometimes non-compliance with this obligation is not the only reason for the resulting losses. The law, in cases where the investor violates the obligation to pay margin, grants the right to the financial intermediary to dispose of financial instruments, however giving the right, but not the obligation the law does not impose strict imperatives for the deadline of realization of financial instruments, for this reason in practice there are cases where the latter are in no hurry to implement their rights to realize the financial instruments, what increases the losses even more. In such cases the biggest problem is the legal qualification of the delay of financial intermediary to realize the financial instruments and the connection with the obligations applicable to the latter and influence of failure to comply with these obligations to the size of the loss. In such cases the question is whether if there is proof that the financial intermediary delayed realization of financial instruments, the losses of the REFO transactions still have to be covered by the investor who failed to fulfill their obligation to pay margin? Whether the losses shall be distributed in proportion to the two parties and whether such distribution of the losses for both parties is legally possible and reasonable in general? The aim of this thesis is to establish any contractual or statutory provisions that forbid the financial intermediary to delay realization of financial instruments, when the latter acquires such a right. The aim of the thesis is to assess whether the financial intermediary is responsible for the losses resulting from the delay in the realization of the financial instruments transferred to the intermediary during the REPO transaction where the investor does not pay margin (i.e. or one party, a financial intermediary, is responsible for the losses incurred because of his fault, as a result of the delay in realization of financial instruments transferred based on REPO transaction when such right incurred due to the fact that another party, investor, breaches his obligations (did not pay margin), and to determine the recovery mechanism of damages caused because of the fault of both parties that concluded transaction. In order to achieve these objectives, the paper has analyzed both the Lithuanian and the European Union law acts regulating investment services and protection of investors' rights, the thesis has also examined the Lithuanian case law and the various scientific sources. The hypothesis of the paper that a financial intermediary is responsible for the losses resulting from a delay in the realization of financial instruments transferred to him based on the REPO transaction where the investor does not pay the margin has been proven. The paper has found out that in cases where the investor does not pay the margin, the conditions under REPO transaction allow the financial intermediaries to realize the transferred financial instruments. In some cases REPO contracts shall provide the deadline of such right from the moment when the investor does not pay the margin, but this condition is not mandatory and is not always included in repurchase agreements. Actually, even in cases where such a term is provided for in the contract it does not require a financial intermediary to fulfill this right as soon as it occurs, the financial intermediary is free to determine how soon after the emergence of the right to realize the financial instruments he shall implement the latter. In cases where in the REPO transaction there is a dispute on realization of financial instruments in terms of timeliness of the financial intermediary in respect of realization of financial instruments, the provisions provided for in the Act of Markets of Financial Instruments in the Republic of Lithuania and in the Civil Code are applicable, such provisions establish the principles of care, diligence and fairness, and oblige the financial intermediary to operate for the best conditions and interests of the customer. Given the fact that this work has established that the obligations to the parties arising based on REPO transaction end only when both parties have fulfilled their obligations, the obligations arising based on the mentioned transaction, including the care, diligence and integrity requirements are to be applied even when the investor breaches his obligations, as in such case the obligations of the parties still can not be considered to be expired. Therefore, in cases where it is determined that the financial intermediary with the right to realize financial instruments, even in cases where this obligations occurred due to the fact that the investor has failed to fulfill his obligation according to REPO transaction to pay margin, delayed to implement it, such behavior is to be regarded as the breach of duty of care, diligence and fairness and the obligation to act for the best conditions for the customer. This thesis has also showed that during the settlement of disputes between an investor and a financial intermediary in court, in addition to special legal norms regulating the investment services, the contractual civil liability provisions are also applicable, which, in cases where both REPO counterparties violate the contractual obligations according to this transaction, allow the use of mixed fault institute, based on which when analyzing the causality of resulting losses and actions of each party two types of solutions are accepted: the debtor's liability is reduced in proportion to the creditor's fault, i.e. the court in determining the fault of each party for the occurred losses and reducing the borrower's responsibility by eliminating the creditor's liability or with the full exemption of the debtor's liability, having established that the damage was caused mainly due to the creditor's action. Thus, in cases where the investor violates the contractual obligation to pay margin and the financial intermediary delays to realize financial instruments, the influence of failure to comply with each of the obligations is assessed in respect of the losses, and when the influence is determined the losses are respectively distributed to both parties involved.

REPO transaction is an agreement by which one party (the seller) undertakes to sell financial instruments or cash to the other party (the buyer), and the latter shall pay the purchase price, and thus it is agreed that the seller undertakes to repurchase from the buyer the same or equivalent financial instruments or the same amount of money for the repurchase price at the scheduled future date. This transaction determines relatively complex legal relations, and the investor 's risk to suffer monetary losses depends not only on the instability of the market price of the financial instruments, but also on genuine fulfillment of contractual obligations by the parties of the transaction. As in all contractual relations, in case of REPO transaction, there are situations where the parties violate the terms of the transaction and the disputes have to be solved in court. Although the Lithuanian case law is rather unified when solving disputes between the parties of the transaction where the investor does not comply with the obligation of the transaction to pay margin, sometimes non-compliance with this obligation is not the only reason for the resulting losses. The law, in cases where the investor violates the obligation to pay margin, grants the right to the financial intermediary to dispose of financial instruments, however giving the right, but not the obligation the law does not impose strict imperatives for the deadline of realization of financial instruments, for this reason in practice there are cases where the latter are in no hurry to implement their rights to realize the financial instruments, what increases the losses even more. In such cases the biggest problem is the legal qualification of the delay of financial intermediary to realize the financial instruments and the connection with the obligations applicable to the latter and influence of failure to comply with these obligations to the size of the loss. In such cases the question is whether if there is proof that the financial intermediary delayed realization of financial instruments, the losses of the REFO transactions still have to be covered by the investor who failed to fulfill their obligation to pay margin? Whether the losses shall be distributed in proportion to the two parties and whether such distribution of the losses for both parties is legally possible and reasonable in general? The aim of this thesis is to establish any contractual or statutory provisions that forbid the financial intermediary to delay realization of financial instruments, when the latter acquires such a right. The aim of the thesis is to assess whether the financial intermediary is responsible for the losses resulting from the delay in the realization of the financial instruments transferred to the intermediary during the REPO transaction where the investor does not pay margin (i.e. or one party, a financial intermediary, is responsible for the losses incurred because of his fault, as a result of the delay in realization of financial instruments transferred based on REPO transaction when such right incurred due to the fact that another party, investor, breaches his obligations (did not pay margin), and to determine the recovery mechanism of damages caused because of the fault of both parties that concluded transaction. In order to achieve these objectives, the paper has analyzed both the Lithuanian and the European Union law acts regulating investment services and protection of investors' rights, the thesis has also examined the Lithuanian case law and the various scientific sources. The hypothesis of the paper that a financial intermediary is responsible for the losses resulting from a delay in the realization of financial instruments transferred to him based on the REPO transaction where the investor does not pay the margin has been proven. The paper has found out that in cases where the investor does not pay the margin, the conditions under REPO transaction allow the financial intermediaries to realize the transferred financial instruments. In some cases REPO contracts shall provide the deadline of such right from the moment when the investor does not pay the margin, but this condition is not mandatory and is not always included in repurchase agreements. Actually, even in cases where such a term is provided for in the contract it does not require a financial intermediary to fulfill this right as soon as it occurs, the financial intermediary is free to determine how soon after the emergence of the right to realize the financial instruments he shall implement the latter. In cases where in the REPO transaction there is a dispute on realization of financial instruments in terms of timeliness of the financial intermediary in respect of realization of financial instruments, the provisions provided for in the Act of Markets of Financial Instruments in the Republic of Lithuania and in the Civil Code are applicable, such provisions establish the principles of care, diligence and fairness, and oblige the financial intermediary to operate for the best conditions and interests of the customer. Given the fact that this work has established that the obligations to the parties arising based on REPO transaction end only when both parties have fulfilled their obligations, the obligations arising based on the mentioned transaction, including the care, diligence and integrity requirements are to be applied even when the investor breaches his obligations, as in such case the obligations of the parties still can not be considered to be expired. Therefore, in cases where it is determined that the financial intermediary with the right to realize financial instruments, even in cases where this obligations occurred due to the fact that the investor has failed to fulfill his obligation according to REPO transaction to pay margin, delayed to implement it, such behavior is to be regarded as the breach of duty of care, diligence and fairness and the obligation to act for the best conditions for the customer. This thesis has also showed that during the settlement of disputes between an investor and a financial intermediary in court, in addition to special legal norms regulating the investment services, the contractual civil liability provisions are also applicable, which, in cases where both REPO counterparties violate the contractual obligations according to this transaction, allow the use of mixed fault institute, based on which when analyzing the causality of resulting losses and actions of each party two types of solutions are accepted: the debtor's liability is reduced in proportion to the creditor's fault, i.e. the court in determining the fault of each party for the occurred losses and reducing the borrower's responsibility by eliminating the creditor's liability or with the full exemption of the debtor's liability, having established that the damage was caused mainly due to the creditor's action. Thus, in cases where the investor violates the contractual obligation to pay margin and the financial intermediary delays to realize financial instruments, the influence of failure to comply with each of the obligations is assessed in respect of the losses, and when the influence is determined the losses are respectively distributed to both parties involved.

This paper argues that neoliberal globalization is presenting a challenge to welfare provisioning in the industrialized countries and to the prospects for equitable social development in developing and transition economies. This challenge flows partly from the unregulated nature of the emerging global economy and partly from intellectual currents dominant in the global discourse concerning social policy and social development. The paper contends that certain global conditions are undermining the prospects for the alternative: equitable public social provision in both developed and developing countries. These conditions include the World Bank's preference for a safety-net and privatizing strategy for welfare; the self-interest of international non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in providing basic education, health and livelihood services that might otherwise be provided by the state; and the World Trade Organization's (WTO's) push for an open global market in health services, education and social insurance. Yet these disturbing trends are taking place in parallel with an apparent shift in the politics of globalization from orthodox economic liberalism to global social concern. The paper begins by reviewing the challenges faced by countries seeking to secure the social welfare of citizens and residents in the context of globalization. In the North, globalization has set welfare states in competition with each other. Moreover, the different kinds of welfare state are differently challenged by globalization, and have responded differently. Anglo-Saxon countries, which have residualized and privatized welfare provision, are in tune with liberalizing globalization, but at the cost of equity. Workplace-based welfare systems of the former state socialist countries, and payroll tax-based 'Bismarkian' insurance systems common in many Western European countries, are proving vulnerable to global competitive pressures. The social democratic, citizenship-based welfare systems funded out of consumption and income taxes, found in the Nordic countries, have been surprisingly sustainable in the face of global competitive pressures due to political will to maintain them. In the South, globalization has generated indebtedness that has undermined the capacity of governments to secure education, health and social protection. It has threatened social and labour standards, segmented social policy within countries and created zones excluded from any of the benefits of globalization. Next the paper considers the current global social policy discourse within and between international organizations and aid agencies. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has recently shown signs of taking the social dimensions of globalization more seriously, by beginning to consider whether some degree of equity within countries is beneficial to economic growth. The World Bank has articulated more clearly its 'individual risk management approach' to social protection in the context of globalization. The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) has asserted that globalization may lead to the need for more, not less, social expenditure. While the International Labour Organization (ILO) has begun to show signs of making concessions to the Bank's views on privatizing some aspects of social security, it has also shown an interest in a new universalism emerging from bottom-up movements in several countries. The views of the WTO on the desirability of a global market in health and social service provision are assuming new prominence. International NGOs are now more clearly divided into those acting as substitutes for government, and those advocating greater government responsibility for welfare. Yet within this discordant global discourse can be discerned elements of a new politics of global social responsibility. Orthodox economic liberalism and inhumane structural adjustment appear to be giving way to concern in the World Bank and the IMF with the social consequences of globalization. International development assistance is increasingly focusing on social development. United Nations agencies are giving more attention to the negative social consequences of globalization. Among the shifts in policy thinking and concrete steps that are being taken, which could herald more socially responsible globalization, are moves to globalize social rights, indications that social policy issues are moving up the development agenda and steps to regulate the global economy. The paper looks at each of these in turn, and at the disagreements as to how to proceed with this new orientation. It examines the dangers of the North moralizing about global social rights without providing the resources to realize them in practice. It also discusses whether the initiative to establish a code of principles and best practice for social policy will enable these dangers to be overcome. The paper then questions whether the move to establish development targets, such as basic education for all by 2015, represents global social progress or the legitimation of residual social policy. The obstacles to progressive North-South social policy and social development dialogue are also examined. In terms of the moves to inject social concerns into the global economy, the paper reviews conflicts of interest surrounding the failed WTO conference in Seattle, the proliferation of codes of conduct for transnational corporations and the debate about raising global taxes to finance social programmes. The paper argues that despite the apparent shift from global neoliberalism to global social responsibility, four tendencies within the new global paradigm, if pursued, will undermine equitable social progress and development-at a time when the resources exist to fund such advances. These tendencies are: the World Bank's belief that governments should provide only minimal levels of social protection; the concern of the OECD's Development Assistance Committee (DAC) to focus funding on only basic education and healthcare; the self-interest of international NGOs in substituting for government provision of services; and the moves being made within the WTO to open the global market in private healthcare, education and social insurance. Within the context of minimal and basic-level-only state provision, the middle classes of developing and transition economies will be enticed to purchase private social security schemes, private secondary and tertiary education, and private hospital and medical care. The wider repercussions are predictable. We know that only services for the neediest will remain-and that services for the poor are poor services. We know that those developed countries without universal public health and education provision are not only more unequal than those that do, but also more unsafe and crime ridden. This is the prospect for all countries that buy into this new global social development paradigm. Some policy measures to counteract this trend and to re-establish the place of equity in the discourse and practice of global social policy and development are suggested in this paper, together with an assessment of global forces that might be sympathetic to them. It is concluded that a major problem is the fragmentation and functional separation of agencies (WTO, World Bank, IMF, ILO, WHO, UNDP, UNESCO, OECD, regional groupings), and conflict and competition within and between them for the right to determine the content and other aspects of global social policy. Whether the five-year review of the World Summit for Social Development (Geneva 2000) begins the process of establishing a responsible and accountable global system of governance in the social sphere will depend to a large extent on political support from the European Union. It will also hinge on progressive voices from the South speaking out for improvements in the structure of global governance-in the interests of the North and the South, and of equity within and between countries.

This paper focuses on how growth theory can guide growth policy design. It first argues that policy matters for growth, in particular when policy variables are interacted with country?specific variables (financial development, institutional environment, technological development, and so forth). Second, it argues that the Schumpeterian paradigm does a better job at delivering policy prescriptions that vary with country characteristics. Third, it discusses the advantages and drawbacks of growth regression analysis. Finally, it briefly describes and then questions the recently proposed 'growth diagnostic' approach.

Fiscal indicators for resource-rich and resource-poor low- and middle-income countries are compared using annual data from 1996 to 2012. Resource richness is defined by export composition: fuel greater than a 25 percent share and/or ores and metals greater than a 10 percent share. Fuel exporters have a significantly better general government fiscal balance than the rest of the sample, and higher revenues and expenditures, which are approximately evenly split between extra consumption expenditure and extra capital expenditure. Only about a quarter of their extra revenue goes into extra consumption expenditure, and this proportion has been lower since 2005. Fuel exporters' expenditure reacts with a lag to oil price fluctuations. There are no significant differences between ores and metals exporters and resource-poor countries, or between new and old resource exporters, in aggregate expenditures and revenues. Ores and metals exporters spend more on investment and less on government consumption. Some individual country cases are briefly discussed.

The Republic of Congo (Congo) boasts numerous assets that can be harnessed to build a strong and robust economy. These assets are oil, ore such as iron and potash, arable lands, and a young population. Congo is the fourth largest oil producer among West and Central African countries, both in total production (260,000 barrels per day) and production per capita terms. In addition, the country is endowed with substantial iron and potash that are yet to be exploited; it has a vast arable lands that could be useful for agricultural development; and the country boasts a young population, which, if well-educated, could be a dynamic labor force helping to spur economic growth.

This edition of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) regional economic update shows that recovery in the region is below historical trends. Its economic prospects depend on global developments and continued strengths in emerging-market demand and oil price trends. Growth in the region is expected to average 4% in 2010, an increase of slightly less than 2 percentage points (pp) over growth in 2009 and weak compared to increases of 5.6pp in advanced economies and 4.5pp in developing nations. Only by 2011 and 2012 is MENA s growth expected to return to the average rates achieved prior to the economic and financial crisis. Recovery has been driven by the global economic rebound and, to varying degrees, by domestic stimulus. Industrial production, which in MENA is dominated by oil, has nearly reached its pre-crisis peak, largely due to the strong recovery in emerging markets, especially Asia. However, the upturn has weakened in recent months because the global slowdown has arrived sooner and is occurring faster than previously anticipated, and there are serious concerns about the sustainability of the global recovery. In response, MENA governments have continued to stimulate their economies in 2010, and even those that did not use any type of fiscal stimulus in 2009 have started implementing fiscal measures in 2010. The economic recovery in MENA has been much less vigorous than the recovery in countries that suffered sharp output contractions. The sustainability of the recovery in Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) economies depends on developments in the rest of the world, and on the extent to which they affect oil markets. The outlook for the global economy and oil markets in the second half of 2010 remains uncertain, and a decline in oil prices cannot be ruled out.

ÖZETSon yıllarda tüm dünyada yoğun biçimde özellikle de gelişmekte olan ülkelerde bankacılık krizleri yaşanmaktadır. Gelişmekte olan ülkelerde finansal liberalizasyon sürecinde denetleme ve düzenleme kurumlarına yeterince önem verilmemesi ve iç ve dış etmenlerden kaynaklanan makroekonomik istikrarsızlıklar bankacılık krizlerinin ana nedenleri olarak gösterilebilir. Faiz oranları ve döviz kurlarındaki dalgalanmalar ve vade uyumsuzlukları finansal ve finansal olmayan kurumlar için piyasa riskinin ve kırılganlığın artmasına neden olmuştur. Bankacılık sektöründe devletin verimsiz bir şekilde bulunması ve kredilerin banka sahipleri ile bağlantılı kişilere verilmesi ve sektörde etkinliğin arttırılmaması sistemik banka krizlerinin artış trendinde önemli etmenlerdir. Diğer yandan muhasebe standartları, yasal düzenlemeler, şeffaflık, risk yönetimi konularındaki eksiklikler bankacılık sektörü gözetim ve denetim otoritelerindeki boşluktan kaynaklanmıştır. Tüm bu bileşenler ülke ve zamana göre farklılık göstermekle birlikte bankacılık sektöründe yaşanan sistemik krizlere neden olan en temel etmenlerdir.Türkiye'de 1980 sonrası yaşanan finansal liberalizasyon 1989 yılında sermaye hareketlerinin de serbestleştirilmesi ile tamamlanmıştır. Bu süreçte finansal piyasaların derinleştirilmesi hedefine ulaşılsa da, seksenli yılların ilk yarısında yakalanan ekonomik istikrar doksanlı yıllarla birlikte kendini ekonomik dalgalanmalara bırakmıştır. Yüksek kamu açıkları iç borçlanma ile finanse edilmiş, devletin borçlanma gereği özel sektör yatırımlarını dışlamıştır. Bankacılık sektöründe finansal aracılık faaliyetlerinin payı düşmüş, kamu borcunun finansmanı ve arbitraj gelirleri sektörün en önemli gelir kaynakları haline gelmiştir. Makroekonomik istikrarsızlığa son vermek amacıyla IMF ile 2000 yılı başında döviz kuru çıpasına dayalı bir istikrar programı anlaşması imzalanmıştır. Ne var ki programın maliye ve para politikası hedefleri tutturulsa da enflasyon beklentilerinin inatçılığı istenen ölçüde kırılamamıştır. Döviz kurunun olağanüstü değerlenmesi ve büyüme sürecine giren ekonomide ithalat harcamalarının artması, cari dengenin beklenenin iki katı (GSMH'nın%5'i) açık vermesine neden olmuştur. İç politikadaki belirsizlikler ve dış ekonomik dalgalanmalar programa olan güvenin azalmasına neden olmuş ve ard arda yaşanan iki kriz sonrası kur çıpası hedefi terk edilip döviz kuru serbest dalgalanmaya bırakılmıştır.İstikrar programının uygulanma sürecinde, zaten zayıf olan bankacılık sistemi programın yapısı gereği piyasa risklerine çok daha açık hale gelmiş ve kırılgan bir hal almıştır. Kriz döneminde faiz oranlarının inanılmaz seviyelere ulaşması, döviz kurunun ise aşırı değer kaybetmesi birçok bankanın sermaye yapısını olumsuz yönde etkilemiştir. Kamu bankalarının büyük montanlı "görev zararlarını" çok kısa vadeli kaynaklarla fonlaması piyasada baskı yaratmıştır. Ekonomideki yavaşlama reel sektör bilançolarının da bozulmasına neden olmuş finansal sektörde geri dönmeyen kredilerin oranı giderek artmıştır. Bütün bu problemlerin çözümü için 2001 yılı ortasında Bankacılık Sektörü Yeniden Yapılandırma Programı yürürlüğe konmuştur. Kamu bankalarının yeniden yapılandırılması ile işe başlanmış, kısa vadeli borçlanma ihtiyacını ortadan kaldıracak önlemler alınmış, eriyen sermaye yapısı onarılmıştır. Tahsili gecikmiş alacakları toplam kredilerinin 'ine ulaşan kamu bankalarına aktarılan kaynağın 2001 GSMH'na oranı .8'i bulmuştur. Kriz sonrası zor duruma düşen ve bankacılık sektöründe toplam paya sahip olan pek çok özel bankaya Tasarruf Mevduatı Sigorta Fonu (TMSF) tarafından el konulmuştur. Bu bankaların rehabilitasyon ve satışı için kamu kaynaklarından 2001 yılı GSMH'nın .9'u kadar kaynak ayrılmıştır. Bunlara ilaveten krizden olumsuz etkilenen diğer özel bankalar için sermayelerinin güçlendirilmesi ve tahsili gecikmiş alacaklarının çözümü için girişimlerde bulunulmuştur. Ayrıca etkin çalışan, global rekabete açık ve daha güçlü bir bankacılık sektörüne sahip olabilmek için düzenleme ve denetleme yapısının güçlendirilmesi çalışmalarına hız verilmiştir. Şimdiye kadar kayda değer bir ilerleme kaydedilmiş olsa da, yeniden yapılandırma programının başarısı, istikrarlı bir ekonomik ve politik düzenle doğrudan ilişkilidir. Uzun dönemdeki hedef büyüme sürecini yeniden yakalayıp ve o çizgide devam edip olası Avrupa Birliği üyeliğine zemin hazırlamaktır.SUMMARY (Banking Crises and Turkish Banking Sector Restructuring Program)In recent years there have been an increasing trend in banking crises in both developing and developed countries. Attaching inadequate importance to the regulatory and supervisory institutions during the financial liberalization process and macroeconomic instability due to domestic and foreign disturbances are the main determinants of banking crises in the developing countries. Volatility in interest and foreign exchange rates and maturity mismatches increased market risk and vulnerability of both financial and nonfinancial institutions. Inefficient occurrence of government in the banking sector, increase in connected lending and no correction policies for the inefficiencies in the sector are important factors contributing to the increasing trend of the systemic banking crises. Deficiencies in accounting and disclosure standards, legal arrangements and risk management arise from the absence of sound regulatory and supervisory framework in these countries. Even if it can change from country to country and from time to time all the above stated distortions are the main determinants of banking crises.Financial liberalization process in Turkey after 1980 has been completed by the liberalization of capital account in 1989. During this process even if the target of financial deepening is attained, the economic stability that is reached in 1980s has to be abandoned with the economic instability years of the 1990s. High borrowing requirement of government has been financed through domestic borrowing and the private sector investments are crowded out. Share of financial intermediation declined and financing government debt and arbitrage gains became the main sources of income for the banking sector. In the beginning of 2000, Turkey signed a stabilisation program with IMF, which was based upon an exchange rate anchor. Main target of the program was to attain macroeconomic stability. Even if the fiscal and monetary targets of the program have been achieved, inflation expectations could not be reduced. Extraordinary valuation of the foreign exchange rate and economic growth induced increase in import expenses resulted twice of the targeted current account deficit reaching 5%of GNP. Uncertainties in domestic politics and instability in foreign economic environment caused a decline in confidence to the program. After the Nov.2000 and Feb.2001 crises the program became unsustainable; the government has to abandon the peg and to float the currency.During implementation process of the stabilisation policy, due to the structure of the program already weak banking sector became more open to market risks and more fragile. Increase in interest rates to incredible levels and excessive valuation of exchange rate influenced negatively the capital structure of banks. State banks created pressure on the markets through their large amount of financing requirements for "Duty losses". The crises led to a serious contraction in the economy, which exerted an adverse impact on the asset quality of the banking sector and increased the nonperforming credits. In consequence, the government adopted in mid-2001 "Banking Sector Restructuring Program" in order to eliminate these problems. The program started with the restructuring of state banks, measures are taken to limit the short-term exposure and support is given to dissolved capital. While the state banks' 45% of the total loans were nonperforming, total cost of the financial restructuring was 15.8% of 2001 GNP. On the other hand those banks which became insolvent after the crises and taken over by Saving Deposit Insurance Fund totalled 14% of banking sector assets. For the rehabilitation and sale of these banks a resource of 11.9% of 2001 GNP is allocated from public funds. In addition, for other banks that have been affected adversely by the crises, steps have been taken to strengthen capital base and to solve the problem of nonperforming assets. Achieving an efficiently working, globally competitive and sound Turkish Banking sector, strengthening the regulatory and supervisory framework is important. Up to now even if a significant progress has been taken in the implementation of the program, the successful completion of the program depends on the political and economic stability. For the longer term, the challenge is to recapture growth momentum and translate it into sustained economic convergence, as a basis for prospective entry into the European Union.

Seit einem Vierteljahrhundert ist die Management Revue Plattform für Forschungsergebnisse der Verwaltungswissenschaft und Management Studies. Die Zeitschrift richtet sich in erster Linie an Autoren, die institutionelle Besonderheiten von Managementinfrastrukturen und Organisationen im europäischen Kontext untersuchen. Die Beiträge dieses Sonderband beschäftigen sich u.a. mit Personalführung, Arbeitsgeber-/Arbeitnehmerbeziehungen sowie Theoriebildung.Mit Beiträgen vonWolfgang Mayrhofer und Chris Brewster; Paul Boselie; Erik Poutsma, Paul E.M. Ligthart und Roel Schouteten; Ingo Singe und Richard Croucher; Walther Müller-Jentsch; Stefan Kirchner; Dudo von Eckardstein und Stefan Konlechner; Wenzel Matiaske; Jörg Freiling; Werner Nienhüser; Kirsten Foss und Nicolai J. Foss

Botswana represents one of the few development success stories in Sub-Saharan Africa. Real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth averaged almost 9 percent between 1960 and 2005, far above the Sub-Saharan Africa average. Real GDP per capita grew even faster, averaging more than 10 percent a year -- the most rapid economic growth of any country in the world. The crucial question is: Why has Botswana grown the way it has done, and what lessons does it offer? This evidence-based story is an account of policy and institutional dynamics of sustained growth and development in Botswana -- illuminating the role of leadership. It shows how a secure political elite has pursued growth-promoting policies and developed, modified, and maintained viable inherited traditional and modern institutions of political, economic, and legal restraint. These institutions have remained robust in the face of initial large aid inflows and spectacular mineral rents, producing a growth pattern that has been both rapid and cautious. The nature of the Botswana developmental state is illustrated by the way in which the state mobilized development resources-especially savings, investment, and human resources, widely known as the primary drivers of economic growth, and prudently managed the economy without becoming excessively involved in the nuts. It demonstrates that through intentional policy choices and countercyclical instruments, countries can shift from aid-dependent to trade-led natural resource development (though probably with narrow-based growth), to a broader development strategy as long as the state is capable and operates within effective institutional design. Botswana's story is sterling example of how the critical issue in development is not so much access to resources but how resources are managed.

In its report to the September 22, 2008 meeting of the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee (AHLC), the World Bank noted that the Palestinian Authority (PA), Israel, and the international donor community made some progress on the three parallel conditions for Palestinian economic revival, albeit to different degrees. The report notes the dramatic impact of Israel s recent three-week offensive in Gaza and analyzes the variety of recovery and reconstruction schemes being explored by the donor community. We find that these have not yet led to any significant impact on the ground due to the continued closure imposed on Gaza. The devastation in Gaza, coupled with a fluid political environment in both the PA and Israel, has made it necessary for this report to revisit the fundamentals of donor support to the PA in view of the long-term goal of establishing an economically viable Palestinian state independent of external aid. Examination through this lens reveals a fundamentally flawed picture.