MONETARY UNION REVISITED
In: Scottish journal of political economy: the journal of the Scottish Economic Society, Band 24, Heft 1, S. 87-95
ISSN: 1467-9485
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In: Scottish journal of political economy: the journal of the Scottish Economic Society, Band 24, Heft 1, S. 87-95
ISSN: 1467-9485
In: Current history: a journal of contemporary world affairs, Band 98, Heft 627, S. 171-175
ISSN: 1944-785X
In: The Manchester School, Band 72, Heft s1, S. 19-33
ISSN: 1467-9957
In monetary unions, monetary policy is typically made by delegates of the member countries. This procedure raises the possibility of strategic delegation—that countries may choose the types of delegates to influence outcomes in their favor. We show that without commitment in monetary policy, strategic delegation arises if and only if three conditions are met: shocks affecting individual countries are not perfectly correlated, risk‐sharing across countries is imperfect, and the Phillips curve is nonlinear. Moreover, inflation rates are inefficiently high. We argue that ways of solving the commitment problem, including the emphasis on price stability in the agreements constituting the European Union, are especially valuable when strategic delegation is a problem.
In: Economic affairs: journal of the Institute of Economic Affairs, Band 9, Heft 6, S. 13-16
ISSN: 1468-0270
Is European Monetary Union desirable? Pascal Salin, of the Univeristy of Paris, argues that any system of fixed exchange rates such as the EMS Exchange Rate Mechanism, is likely to prove unsatisfactory.
In: Swiss political science review: SPSR = Schweizerische Zeitschrift für Politikwissenschaft : SZPW = Revue suisse de science politique : RSSP, Band 3, Heft 2, S. 1-8
ISSN: 1662-6370
In: Common Market Law Review, Band 7, Heft 4, S. 407-422
ISSN: 0165-0750
In: The economic journal: the journal of the Royal Economic Society, Band 113, Heft 491, S. F678-F680
ISSN: 1468-0297
In: International studies perspectives: ISP, Band 4, Heft 3, S. 275-292
ISSN: 1528-3585
In: Journal of European social policy, Band 8, Heft 2, S. 117-137
ISSN: 1461-7269
Establishing a single currency will launch the EU on a journey into the unknown. Thus while it is widely accepted that the fall-out from this decision will be far-reaching, little consensus exists on the impact on particular policy arenas. This article explores some of the main implications of monetary union for Social Europe-national systems of welfare pro vision and employment regulation. It is argued that efforts by virtually all the member states to meet the Maastricht criteria for joining the single currency club are impacting negatively on Social Europe. Moreover, with the member states signing a deflation-oriented Stability Pact, this cold climate threatens to spill over into the actual operation of the new Euro- zone. Thus the road to monetary union paved by Europe's political elite spells bad news for already beleaguered welfare and employment systems. At the same time, the article argues that a different form of monetary union is necessary to create more robust macroeco nomic foundations to Social Europe. At present, it is suggested that a big coordination deficit has emerged inside the European economy, causing an inhospitable environ ment for the social dimension in the absence of a single currency. Thus retreating to national mechanisms for economic management is rejected as an alternative project to the Maastricht plan for monetary union. Finally, the article investigates the viability of various reform paths to make the new Euro-zone more socially friendly.
In: Contemporary economic policy: a journal of Western Economic Association International, Band 9, Heft 2, S. 72-80
ISSN: 1465-7287
Inflation differentials in Europe have narrowed substantially since the inception of the European Monetary System in 1979. However, their persistence after more than a decade raises the question of why these differentials are so difficult to eliminate. Some European Community countries systematically use seignorage—financing government expenditures with money creation—while others do not. This increases the difficulty of achieving the convergence of monetary policies and inflation rates required for irrevocably fixed exchange rates in Europe. This paper, utilizing a model of government finance that minimizes the social cost of financing government expenditures, examines monetary finance in the European Community. It rejects soundly the social cost minimization model of seignorage collection.
In: Africa research bulletin. Economic, financial and technical series, Band 44, Heft 8
ISSN: 1467-6346
In: Swiss political science review: SPSR = Schweizerische Zeitschrift für Politikwissenschaft : SZPW = Revue suisse de science politique : RSSP, Band 3, Heft 1, S. 1-19
ISSN: 1662-6370
In: Common Market Law Review, Band 8, Heft 2, S. 206-212
ISSN: 0165-0750
In: International economics and economic policy, Band 8, Heft 1, S. 3-6
ISSN: 1612-4812
In: Scottish affairs, Band 45 (First Serie, Heft 1, S. 20-43
ISSN: 2053-888X