Suchergebnisse

Die wirtschaftliche Abhängigkeit Weißrußlands von Rußland, insbesondere im Energieträgerbereich, hat konservative Politiker in Belarus dazu bewogen, für einen Verbleib in der Rubelzone und eine Wirtschaftsunion mit Rußland zu plädieren. Während weißrussische Kritiker der am 12. April 1994 vereinbarten Währungsunion der beiden Länder einen Souveränitätsverlust des Landes befürchten, erwarten russische Kritiker des Vertrages demgegenüber einen Anstieg der Inflation in Rußland, da Weißrußland nicht im gleichen konsequenten Maße wie Rußland seine Wirtschaftsreformen betreibe. Wirtschaftliche Konzessionen beim Zustandekommen der Währungsunion scheinen im wesentlichen von weißrussischer Seite gekommen zu sein. (BIOst-Mrk)

We derive the optimal fiscal transfer scheme for countries in a monetary union to off-set the welfare losses resulting from asymmetric shocks and nominal rigidities. Optimal transfers involve a trade-off between reducing national output gaps and the provision of consumption insurance across countries, where the weight of the former increases relative to the latter as consumption home bias rises. The welfare gains from optimal transfers increase in both home bias and export substitutability. When these parameters are calibrated to the data for specific euro area countries, the welfare gains from optimal transfers are as high as 3.6% of permanent consumption. ; The ADEMU Working Paper Series is being supported by the European Commission Horizon 2020 European Union funding for Research & Innovation, grant agreement No 649396.

This paper takes a first step in analysing how a monetary union performs in the presence of labour market asymmetries. Differences in wage flexibility, market power and country sizes are allowed for in a setting with both country-specific and aggregate shocks. The implications of asymmetries for both the overall performance of the monetary union and the country-specific situation are analysed. It is shown that asymmetries are not only critical for country-specific performance but also for the overall performance of the monetary union. A striking finding is that aggregate output volatility is not strictly increasing in nominal rigidities but hump-shaped. Moreover, a disproportionate share of the consequences of wage inflexibility may fall on small countries. In the case of country-specific shocks, a country unambiguously benefits in terms of macroeconomic stability by becoming more flexible, while this is not necessarily the case for aggregate shocks. There may thus be a tension between the degree of flexibility considered optimal at the country level and at the aggregate level within the monetary union.

The future European Central Bank needs monetary policy instruments which have yet to be agreed. At present, the range of instruments is very heterogeneous in the potential member states. This book offers a systematic analysis of the issue, considering general theoretical arguments as well as the concrete institutional situation in European countries. Taking the Bundesbank's instruments as the starting point, their rationale is discussed against the background of experience elsewhere. The theoretical and empirical treatment leads to several competing concepts. Taking the three goals of monetary efficiency, fair competition and decentralization establishes a strong case for the use of "standing facilities" and to a lesser extend "reserve requirements", albeit modified and brought up-to-date