Suchergebnisse

This report begins by documenting the Palestinian Authority's (PA's) ongoing fiscal crisis that threatens its ability to provide basic services to the population. In 2011, the PA required about US$1.5 billion dollars in budget support, of which US$200 million to cover development expenses not funded directly by donors. However, it only received about US$814 million in budget support and US$169 million in development financing, for a total of US$983 million. Ultimately, the PA can only hope to achieve fiscal sustainability through a combination of sustained private sector growth and continued internal reforms. Robust private sector growth is necessary for the PA to generate the revenues needed to sustain service delivery. Yet the private sector remains stifled as a result of Israeli restrictions on access to natural resources and markets. The West Bank has experienced a slowdown in economic growth in 2011, combined with double-digit growth in Gaza. The recovery in Gaza can be attributed to a combination of aid inflows and easing of restrictions on entry of goods from Israel-though it is important to keep in mind that the average Gaza today is worse off than s/he was back in the late nineties. The recent growth in Gaza is also driven largely by a boom in the construction sector, and Gaza infrastructure exhibits such gaps and disrepair that major investments are necessary and would generate important employment as well as future growth. The slowdown in growth in the West Bank, on the other hand, is the result of falling donor support, uncertainty caused by the PA's fiscal crisis, and lack of significant new easing of restrictions by the Government of Israel (GoI).

Doutoramento em Economia ; A política orçamental, através da gestão das receitas e despesas públicas, é usualmente utilizada pelos decisores políticos para influenciar a atividade económica, nomeadamente através do controlo do rendimento disponível, de uma reafectação eficiente dos recursos existentes, do fornecimento de bens e serviços, bem como da correção de falhas de mercado. De acordo com o disposto na teoria Keynesiana, elaborada durante a Grande Recessão (década de 1930), os efeitos da política orçamental deverão variar de acordo com a fase do ciclo económico e dos instrumentos utilizados, sendo estes mais necessários e eficazes durante recessões. Contudo, em alguns episódios históricos, a evidência empírica parece contrariar as previsões teóricas efetuadas à luz da teoria Keynesiana, originando os comumente chamados efeitos não-Keynesianos da política orçamental. Por sua vez, a última Grande Recessão trouxe, uma vez mais, o debate relativo à eficácia da política orçamental para a literatura económica. Os elevados montantes de dívida pública acumulados na generalidade das economias europeias ocidentais comprometeram a sua sustentabilidade e restringiram decisões políticas, o que gerou repercussões tanto nos custos de financiamento soberano como no bem-estar social. Assim, diversos Estados Membros da Zona Euro foram forçados a implementar medidas mais restritivas de forma a conseguirem reduzir os seus desequilíbrios orçamentais, num cenário em que a política cambial se encontrava inacessível, e em que a taxa de inflação se apresentou especialmente baixa. Neste contexto, a presente tese debruça-se sobre o impacto macroeconómico da política orçamental nos Estados Membros da UEM, averiguando como este poderá variar de acordo com os instrumentos utilizados e com fatores intrínsecos de cada país, tendo em atenção tópicos relevantes que ainda não estão suficientemente explorados na literatura. É ainda analisado se, e como, a política orçamental poderá ser manipulada de acordo com motivações eleitoralistas, nomeadamente se as evidências empíricas dão suporte às previsões do modelo de "despesa visível" de Rogoff, ou ao modelo de despesa pública direcionada. Por outras palavras, se um hipotético aumento de despesa estará associado a mais despesas correntes, ou se existirão investimentos direcionados para satisfazer as pretensões de grupos ou regiões específicas. Num primeiro momento, foram calculados os valores dos multiplicadores orçamentais desde a criação da União Monetária. De acordo com os resultados obtidos, a despesa pública nos Estados Membros tem um impacto positivo sobre a atividade económica (multiplicador de 0,44), sendo o impacto maior perante menores níveis de endividamento soberano, recessões económicas e fases negativas do ciclo económico (hiato do produto negativo). Por sua vez, a receita fiscal apresenta valores negativos, compreendidos entre -0,11 e -0,55, podendo, no entanto, revelar um impacto expansionista em países com menores níveis de dívida pública. Porém, nem sempre as políticas resultam nos resultados expectáveis. Foram estimadas elasticidades do consumo privado, face aos instrumentos orçamentais, durante o período de 1960-2017, de forma a aferir como as elasticidades variam perante episódios orçamentais (claras ações políticas, como expansões ou consolidações orçamentais). As evidências indicam que as transferências sociais poderão estar na origem dos efeitos não-Keynesianos da política orçamental, uma vez o consumo privado apresenta elasticidades negativas face às suas variações, durante períodos de consolidação. Ainda, os episódios não-Keynesianos tornaram-se menos prováveis de serem observados após os países integrarem a Zona Euro, dado que os gastos em investimentos e as outras despesas deixaram de apresentar uma relação negativa com o consumo privado. Foi também observado que as transferências sociais aparentam ter um impacto mais recessivo durante consolidações, que aquele observado perante expansões ou na ausência de episódios orçamentais. Utilizando uma abordagem alternativa para identificar consolidações orçamentais (abordagem narrativa), foi constatado que o consumo privado continua a exibir uma resposta não-Keynesiana a choques fiscais. Por último, a política orçamental aparenta ainda ser sensível a fatores políticos. Durante anos eleitorais, os decisores políticos tendem a aumentar as despesas correntes e a diminuir o peso dos impostos diretos. Porém, a estratégia orçamental tem sofrido algumas alterações ao longo dos anos. Desde a Grande Recessão, os Estados Membros aparentam ter perdido a sua capacidade para manipular a despesa pública com objetivos eleitoralistas, e começaram a diminuir os impostos indiretos. Também, após os Estados Membros aderirem à UEM, os decisores políticos começaram a aumentar a carga fiscal dos seus países face a choques na taxa de juro, uma vez que perderam a capacidade de recorrer à política monetária. ; The fiscal policy, through the management of public revenue and expenditure, is usually used by policy makers to influence economic activity, namely through the control of available income, the reallocation of resources, the supply of goods and services or the correction of market failures. Following the Keynesian perspective, designed during the Great Depression (1930's), the effects of fiscal policy should vary over the stages of the business cycle and over fiscal instruments used, being more needed and effective during recessions. However, in some historical cases, the empirical evidence seems to contradict the theoretical predictions in the spirit of the Keynesian theory, giving rise to the so-called non-Keynesian effects of fiscal policy. Therefore, the last Great Recession brought the effectiveness of fiscal policy back into debate in the economic literature. The high amounts of sovereign debt accumulated in the majority of the western European economies have been jeopardizing the sustainability of public debts, restricting political decisions, with repercussions on sovereign financing costs and on people's welfare. Thus, several Eurozone's Member States were forced to implement more restrictive policies in order to reduce their budgetary imbalances, in a scenario where the exchange rate policies are unavailable, and the inflation rate has been especially low. In this context, this thesis focuses on the macroeconomic impact of fiscal policy on the Member States, assessing how it may vary according to the fiscal instruments used, and to country specific characteristics, taking into account some relevant topics not very explored yet in the literature. It is also analysed whether, and how, the fiscal policy can be manipulated according to electoral motivations, namely if evidence supports the predictions of the Rogoff's "visibility expenditure" model or the Public expenditure targeting model, i.e., if the hypothetical expenditure increase will be associated with current expenditure, or if the capital expenditure will be used as a target to specific groups and locations. Firstly, it was computed the value of fiscal multipliers since the creation of the currency union. According to the results, public expenditure in Member States has a positive impact on economic growth (multiplier of 0.44), with a bigger impact on the less indebted countries, facing economic recessions and negative output gaps. In turn, tax revenue has negative values, between -0.11 and -0.55, but it can reveal an expansionary impact in countries with lower levels of public debt. However, policies do not always result in the expected results. Elasticities of private consumption to fiscal instruments were estimated during the period 1960-2017, to access how fiscal elasticities vary during fiscal episodes (clear policy actions, such as fiscal expansions or consolidations). Evidence indicates that social benefits may be a root of the non-Keynesian effects of fiscal policy, since private consumption shows negative elasticities facing social benefits' shocks, during periods of fiscal consolidation. In addition, non-Keynesian episodes became less likely to be observed after countries joined the Eurozone, given that investment spending and other expenditures have lost their non-Keynesian role. It was also perceived that social transfers seem to be more contractionary in consolidations than in both expansions and in the absence of fiscal episodes. Using an alternative approach to identify fiscal consolidations (narrative approach), it is seen that private consumption continues to exhibit a non-Keynesian response to tax increases. Lastly, fiscal policy in the Eurozone countries appears to be sensitive to political factors. During election years, the incumbent Governments seem to increase current spending and to decrease the direct tax burden. However, the fiscal strategy has changed over the years. Since the Great Recession, Member States have lost their ability to manipulate the Government spending for electoral purposes and began to decrease the indirect tax burden. Furthermore, after countries joined the EMU, policy makers began to increase tax burden facing interest rate shocks, since they have lost the ability to use monetary policy. ; info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion

Carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions are a global concern; impacts on the climate do not depend on where the CO2 is emitted. To meet this concern, a worldwide program for cutting greenhouse gases was formed in Kyoto, Japan in December 1997. The Kyoto protocol formulates the general principles for a worldwide treaty on cutting greenhouse emissions and specifies reductions for the industrialised world. The European Union has introduced an EU wide emission trading system (EUETS) that became operational in 2005 as an instrument for EU member states to meet their Kyoto obligations. Transports are not included, but may become a part of the EU-ETS in future revisions. Instead emissions from transports are regulated by other means, including fuel taxes. To further reduce CO2 emissions from passenger cars and to improve fuel efficiency, the European Community has adopted a separate strategy. An important element of this strategy are the Commitments of the European, Japanese and Korean Automobile Manufacturers Associations to achieve total new passenger car fleet average CO2 emissions of 140 g CO2/km by 2008/2009. In this paper we assess the option of introducing an EU wide certificate/emission permit trading system for new passenger cars as an alternative to the commitments made by the European Automobile Manufacturers Associations. An overview of alternative trading systems is presented, possible objectives and evaluation criteria are discussed, arguments for introducing separate systems for new passenger cars are discussed, the potential for emission reduction through technological advances and changed consumer behaviour is analysed and a possible design of a system of tradable permits for new passenger cars is presented. CAP-AND TRADE OR BASELINE-CREDIT? In a cap-and-trade system a total limit (a cap) on emissions is defined. Emission permits that sum up to the limit or cap are then allocated among the agents generating the emissions. Having allocated the permits, trade is introduced. If certain conditions are achieved, trade will continue to the point where marginal abatement costs are the same across sectors and nations. Cost-effectiveness is then achieved. The EU-ETS is an example of a cap-and-trade system. A baseline-credit system is an alternative. In such a system certificates or credits are based on the achievement of improvements in relation to a baseline. Agents with emissions lower than the predefined baseline receive credits and those exceeding the baseline will have to buy credits. The baseline is typically defined in relation to a rate-based value such as CO2-emissions per kilometre or emissions per unit of output. A relative baseline system of this kind is thereby designed to control average emissions, e.g. per car and kilometre, rather than total emissions. The cap-and-trade system has the advantage by allowing a larger variety of choices for adjusting emissions. Taking road transports as an example, total emissions can be reduced not only by reducing average emissions per car and kilometre but also by reducing total car fleet mileage e.g. by giving incentives to travellers to drive less, drive shorter distances or shifting to alternative modes of transport. If the overall objective is to reduce emissions in a cost-effective manner across sectors and nations, including the transport sector in current EU-ETS would be an option to consider. The advantage of such a system is that it has the potential of providing incentives to agents to act in a way that will equalise marginal abatement costs across sectors (assuming also that current CO2-based fuel taxes/other taxes linked to CO2 emissions are adjusted accordingly), thus leading to cost-effective abatement. The baseline-credit system, on the other hand, would concentrate on reducing average emissions and consequently target the behavioural changes necessary to reduce average emissions. If, for example, the objective is to increase energy efficiency through technological improvements, a baseline-credit system may therefore be the optimal choice. Moreover, myopic behaviour in the market for new passenger cars may lead to a situation where consumers' preferences and willingness to pay for CO2-reducing technology is insufficient to cover the costs of developing the technology and put it to the market even if car manufacturers were to trade in EU-ETS and thereby receive monetary gains by developing technology that reduces fuel consumption and CO2 emissions. A system such as the baselinecredit system may therefore be necessary in order to provide sufficient incentives to manufacturers to work towards increased energy efficiency in new cars through technological improvements. The average CO2 emissions from new cars sold in the market can be reduced in two ways; either by increasing the energy efficiency in each type of car put to the market (i.e. improved technology) or by providing incentives to consumers to choose the most energy-efficient cars already in the market. Achieving objectives such as 120 g CO2/km for new car fleet most likely requires both of these. Also, in order to influence consumer behaviour it is important to make technology available to consumers at low cost. Consumers choose to pay for new technology only if the benefits of improved gas-mileage exceed the costs of higher car prices. TECHNOLOGICAL IMPROVEMENT OR CHANGED CONSUMER BEHAVIOUR? Considering technological improvements there are two ways in which to reduce specific CO2 emissions: By reducing fuel consumption in vehicles with conventional combustion engines (petrol and diesel), or by using renewable, low-CO2fuels (partly) in conjunction with new engine technologies. Fuel consumption in vehicles with conventional combustion engines can in turn be reduced in a number of ways. Technological measures can be roughly divided into four categories: Improved engine technology, downsizing and enhanced transmission technology, energy management and hybridisation, and vehicle design. The literature shows that conventional combustion engines have considerable potential for fuel-saving. In the case of petrol engines, it is thought that measures involving the drive train in a middle-size vehicle could achieve fuel savings of around 38 per cent. Further measures such as weight reduction, reduced rolling and air resistance, and promotion of fuel-efficient driving habits can result in 40 per cent or greater decrease in overall consumption. Diesel engines have lower savings potential than petrol engines because diesel engines are less wasteful than petrol engines when run at partial throttle, and significant increases in diesel motor efficiency have already been achieved. Nevertheless, hybridisation and improved transmission could result in savings of around 32 per cent. Additional savings could also be achieved with a reduction in vehicle weight, reduced rolling and air resistance, and by promoting fuel-efficient driving habits. Turning then to consumer behaviour, it is important to recognise that consumers consider a large variety of characteristics before finally choosing the car that best fits their needs and their personal preferences. From a CO2 point of view consumers should ideally be concerned about fuel efficiency more than any other characteristics. This, however, is not the case. Studies have shown that factors such as safety, prestige and powerful engines influence consumer behaviour more than does fuel efficiency, especially in times when disposable incomes increase. However, in spite of recent trends there seems to be a potential to provide incentives to consumers to shift to low-emitting cars without any large sacrifices being involved. Consider, for instance, Volvo V70, which was the most popular new car model in Sweden in 2005. The emissions from the different petrol versions range between 214 and 266 g CO2/km, whereas diesels are available with emissions ranging from 171 to 223 g CO2/km. A movement form the highest CO2/km per kilometre value to the lowest would thus imply savings of 95 grams per kilometre. To achieve these savings a consumer who currently prefers the highest emitting car has to change fuel, automatic transmission and engine power. However, brand, model or car size would not need to change. For most consumers the "adjustment cost" would thus be relatively low. The above is an extreme case scenario involving only one car model. Considering instead the whole fleet of new passenger cars, our calculations show that there is a general potential to reduce CO2 emissions from new cars by 13-30 g CO2/km within the same car model (or approximately 8-15 per cent). THE COST OF INCREASED ENERGY EFFICIENCY The main purpose of a baseline-credit system for new passenger cars would be to provide incentives for car manufacturers to develop and introduce the technology in new cars required to reach the specified CO2-objectives. However, this also means that consumers must find it worthwhile to buy a low-emitting car, i.e. the benefits of the improved technology, not the least in terms of increased gas mileage, must exceed the increase in sales price. The technological potential is large, but the benefits for consumers could be questioned since car buyers apparently do not judge energy efficiency as an important characteristic. Assuming unchanged market shares for petrol and diesel cars as well as small, medium and large sized cars, our calculations show that a reduction of the average emissions to 120 g CO2per car and kilometre in the EU would imply an increase in retail prices by 2 000 euro. There is technological potential to further reduce emissions to an average of 100 g CO2 per kilometre. However, the cost increase for this additional reduction is about 6 000 euro. THE DESIGN OF A SYSTEM FOR NEW PASSENGER CARS It is our conclusion that an emission trading system for new cars should be separated from the EU-ETS and designed as a baseline and credit system, based on emission intensity. Setting up a separate emission trading system for new cars as a baseline and credit system involves defining a baseline. It is natural to tie the baseline to the goals that are under discussion in the European Union i.e. 140 and 120 g CO2/km. Different time frames have been discussed. One possibility is to reach 140 CO2/km by 2008/2009 and 120 g CO2/km by 2012. Earlier discussions about technological development show that this time frame is feasible. Before trade can take place, demand and supply of credits need to be created. In a cap-and-trade system initial allocation of permits is a very important issue. In the baseline and credit system the allocation of credits is automatic: cars below baseline receive credits and cars above baseline need to purchase credits. In principle, this implies that no cost is imposed on the baseline car. High-emitting cars will become more expensive and low-emitting cars less expensive. The credits will work in a way similar to a system of subsidies for cars emitting below the baseline and taxes for those above. Trade with credits need to perform in a way that supports attainment of the baseline. A possible solution is that credits are traded in a market that is similar to a stock exchange. The offers of sellers and the bids of buyers will meet in a market that ideally clears each trading day. As long as markets clear, there is attainment of the baseline. To overcome imbalances, an accommodating system that handles short time excess credits or shortages will need to be worked out. There is also a need for an enforcement and compliance mechanism. Another issue to deal with is that there may be different incentives for buyers and sellers. Buyers will generally be obliged to buy credits. Sellers, on the other hand, may want to capitalise their credits later, or to bank them for coming periods. The differences in incentives can lead to shortages and an upward pressure on prices and fluctuating prices. The issue whether trade of credits should take place downstream or upstream includes several options in the production-consumption chain. The recommendation is that the retailers should be the trading entity. We also suggest gradual reductions in baseline. However, the details of a system of baseline and credits will need further analysis. Important issues in a future analysis will be designing mechanisms for compliance, monitoring and penalising. Incentive problems need also to be dealt with.

The images of flattened buildings and tent cities that dominated the news following the Haitian earthquake of January 12, 2010 triggered an emergency response from the global aid and development community. Foreign governments, multilateral organizations including the World Bank, and NGOs dramatically increased the flow of funding to the devastated country. The money helped pay for emergency relief but also for higher public investment spending that sought to repair damage and press ahead with development projects that had begun before the disaster. Six years later, the flow of aid is declining, and Haiti faces pivotal challenges: how to adapt to the reductions, raise more resources internally, spend more efficiently, and safeguard the fragile social gains it has achieved in a time of extreme hardship. The infrastructure Haiti has acquired in the recent surge of investment is something like a newly built house that lacks furniture and running water, it may look good from the outside but does little for its occupants. For the present, life remains a struggle for most of the country's 10.4 million people. Thus in addition to growth, the country needs policies that will foster inclusiveness. Analysis and past experience suggest that two factors are key: human capital and political stability. To achieve this goal, Haiti will require a new outlook favoring fair, efficient government and social inclusiveness.

Over the past decade, donors of foreign aid quadrupled their annual contributions to trust funds at the World Bank. This earmarking of contributions to donors' preferred recipient countries and issues has raised concerns about the alignment of trust funds with the performance-based allocations of aid by the International Development Association, the World Bank's concessional lending arm, and raises the question of the role of this new "multi-bi" aid channel. This study finds that the cross-country allocations of aggregate trust fund aid are poverty- and policy-selective. In this respect, they are much more similar to allocations from the International Development Association than from bilateral donors. The allocations of trust fund types that are more closely controlled by donor countries—recipient-executed and single-donor trust funds—are more strongly related to the strategic interests of donor countries than trust fund aid in general. Trust funds for health and education aid are poverty selective and positively correlated with the World Bank's assessment of the quality of countries' sector policies, while environmental trust funds are neither poverty selective nor correlated with the assessed quality of countries' environmental policies. Overall, the evidence indicates that multi-bi funds administered by the World Bank do not undermine the International Development Association's allocation criteria.

This Report on Observance and Codes-Accounting and Auditing (ROSC-A&A) assesses the corporate sector accounting, financial reporting, and auditing practices in Jamaica. It builds on its predecessor, a 2003 ROSC-A&A, and its aims to assist the Government of Jamaica's efforts to strengthen accounting and auditing practices and to enhance financial transparency in the corporate sector, so as to support the Government's economic reform program and provide greater confidence to current and potential investors with respect to the financial reporting environment. Jamaica has embarked on an economic reform program whose main objectives are to contain the country's growing economic and external vulnerabilities and address economic imbalances, while putting the country on a path to sustainable growth. Important reforms include: (a) strengthening public finances, including through comprehensive tax reform, expenditure rationalization, and improved public debt management and public financial management; (b) enhancing the resilience of the financial sector through strengthened supervisory, regulatory, and crisis-management frameworks; and (c) improving growth generating efficiency through enhancements to the business environment and strengthened institutional capacity and governance.

As world leaders gather in New York for the United Nations General Assembly, there is a palpable sense that the global balance of power is shifting. Three decades after the end of the Cold War, the unipolar moment appears to have given way to a far more complex system of geopolitics.BRICS — a non-Western geopolitical grouping led by Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa — doubled its size a few weeks ago when it invited six states from the Global South to join its ranks. And well over a year into the war in Ukraine, most countries have chosen not to join the West in its sanctions regime against Russia despite intense diplomatic pressure. "As the unipolar era that followed the end of the Cold War recedes, the global South is coming alive once again," wrote Sarang Shidore in a recent essay for Foreign Affairs. "But its guiding principle this time is not idealism but realism, with an unhesitating embrace of national interests and increased recourse to power politics."To better understand these trends, RS sat down with Shidore, who recently took over the new Global South Program at the Quincy Institute. Shidore brings an unconventional yet realist perspective on the end of the unipolar moment and the rise of a new world order. His message is clear: The U.S. can't stop the rise of a new order, but it can help shape certain trends in its favor if policymakers can accept that unipolarity is, in fact, dead. The following conversation has been edited for length and clarity.RS: Why do you find the category of the "Global South" useful? Why is it analytically valuable?Shidore: The key is to understand that the world is not equitable when it comes to power — not just wealth, not just income, but power. Power is a squishy quality, but it is, at the end of the day, what makes things happen.When you look at the power map of the world, you see some clear winners and some others who are not quite in the room. The winners are the United States and its core allies in Europe, probably Japan, probably Korea to a large degree. You have the other great powers, Russia and China, who by virtue of being great powers can exercise influence and resist various pressures.What's left is a huge number of states. Now, not all of them are poor. The majority of them are quite poor, but there are some middle-income countries or even some countries that have become wealthy. Nevertheless, they are not in the inner rooms of decision making in the world order. They feel they cannot shape the world order in any substantial way. They're deeply dissatisfied in terms of their status and their influence.As with all labels, there is ambiguity. It's not a precise formula that you can punch in and get a precise answer. The point is that any definition like the "Global South" or the "West", if it's useful to describe an important dynamic in the world order, then it is of value.Of course economics is going to come into it. Of course the colonial past is a part of it. It's a tapestry. But nevertheless, it's a geopolitical fact. Broadly speaking, I would center it on geopolitics and power.RS: It's the geopolitical haves and the have-nots.Shidore: That's right. RS: So we've got this group of countries that's dissatisfied, that doesn't want to play great power politics, that wants to be involved in the system. Is that just a desire, and or is there an actual momentum towards change?Shidore: This is a debate. I think most people would agree that we are less unipolar than we were in the 1990s. Most people have accepted that something was lost in the war on terror, that America lost significant amounts of credibility and even took an economic hit and [suffered] a strategic setback. Then, of course, you had the financial crisis. With the financial crisis and then the Covid shock, you create a lot of damaging impact in the Global South. But nevertheless, after these three crises have happened, when we look at the world you still see that today, there are middle powers with significantly more influence than they had in 1992. There's easily nine or 10 of those. Not only do they have more economic power, but they also have more political savviness and ability to play the game of international politics, get their preferences noticed and acted upon, and sometimes really chart their own futures in their regions and beyond.Turkey is an example of that. It plays its game quite cleverly. Of course, it overshoots and has suffered economic shocks recently, and so forth. But the bottom line is, it's no longer the country it was in the 1990s, [when it was] economically much weaker, knocking on the door and patiently trying to get into the European Union saying, "We are Europeans. Please accept us as Europeans." They're now saying, "We don't care if you admit us or not. We are striking out on our own." One can agree or disagree with specific policies, but as an actor, Turkey is asserting itself. It's a variable thing. If you take military power, there's no doubt that the United States dominates the world, and no middle power can come close. If you take financial power, the U.S. again dominates the world. If you take economic power in a broad sense of the term, there things have really changed. Now you have China, of course, the big other in the room, by some measure bigger than the United States. In material terms, China is actually a bigger economy than the U.S. But all these other middle powers have actually achieved a relative economic level of consumption, travel, connectivity through technology. What they had in the 1990s was much less than what they have now. They're able to muscle their way into the debate, at least in some form. But there's still a long way to go for genuine change in institutions.This contestation is happening as we speak. It's going to play out over one, two, maybe three decades, and this is when we are going to have winners and losers on all sides. Ultimately, I'm most interested in what we do in the United States about it. Are you going to be in denial until it's too late? Or are you going to understand what's happening in the world and craft a strategy that benefits the American people and allows the U.S. to navigate the shoals of what is a more complicated and, in some ways, more treacherous world?RS: You're getting at something there about the difficulty of having an American state coming out of the unipolar moment and being in this position where it seems like this trend is a threat to American power. A lot of people will say China is the big problem, but it seems like you're laying out a much larger, broader threat to American power and its ability to enforce its will. Do you see it in those zero sum terms?Shidore: I think people are seeing it in zero sum terms. That's the problem. First of all, I think it's futile. If there was a button we could push and return to 1992, would many people press it? I think a lot of people would say, "Let's go back and give ourselves a second chance." Maybe a world in which America in 1992 had taken its victory humbly and said unipolarity is something we're going to sustain through an enlightened understanding of interests, maybe that would have been a wonderful thing. But that's not what happened. Now, it's too late to put the genie back into the bottle. We are inevitably heading in a certain direction, we cannot have the debates on whether we're gonna return to unipolarity, or whether that would have been a better world. What we have now is the reality of today's world and the world of the future.There are dangers in all orders. There is no perfect global order where all the bases are covered, everybody's safe, rich, and happy, and the environment is perfect. As it is there are threats. Climate change is a major threat. If we start adding threats and inflating threats, then we will have one of two reactions. One is that we will take measures that are far in excess of the real threat. And we have done that before, in the war of terror. We could have another version of it. The other end of the spectrum is we lose hope and confidence, and that's not a good thing either. So let's understand the reality of the world and understand that a lot of what are now called threats are either relatively minor, or they're actually opportunities. There are opportunities here to increase influence in the Global South. Just because country X has invited China to build a port doesn't mean China's going to have a base there. If you push it to choose, then maybe that will happen.There's an anxiety at work here. Behind the facade of confidence is the deep anxiety of losing America's mojo. I don't think America's mojo is lost. This is a huge country with a diverse set of people, and people still want to come and live here. It's got enormous resources. It's secure. There's no reason to lose confidence and get so stricken with anxiety.RS: We've got the General Assembly coming up this week in the UN. Something that Biden and the whole administration have planted a flag on is this idea of Security Council reform. BRICS, too, recently endorsed as a bloc the idea of Security Council reform. Is that one of the key things to move forward into an equitable system for some of these middle powers that really want a higher level of influence?Shidore: There's no doubt that that's a gold standard. The UN is the only really global body. We don't have anything comparable. But everything that I know about it tells me it's hard to change because the bar for reform is very high.I'm more looking at the other major global institutions, the Bretton Woods institutions: the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. There are possibilities there. But because that isn't moving either, alternative institutions are cropping up, whether it's the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, whether it's the New Development, whether it's bilateral projects like China's Belt and Road Initiative, they're stepping in and doing things on the ground. The World Bank System still remains among the biggest. It sets a lot of norms and standards. People look to the World Bank for a lot of things. But if it doesn't reform, there's gonna come a day when it just becomes one of many. That's not beneficial to the U.S. The impatience for change is growing. As we know well, the current design of the order is a 1945 design. We are practically 20 years away from 2045. So how are you going to reach 2045 and after 100 years there's been no significant change to the world order's design? I think that's just not a sustainable proposition.

This study provides an overview of Arab official development assistance (ODA) over the past four decades. Trends in volume, composition, and direction are discussed in chapter two and the institutional framework is discussed in chapter three. Over 90 percent of Arab development assistance is provided by three countries: the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA), Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE).

This is the tenth year that the paying taxes indicator has been part of the World Bank Doing Business project. The journey over the period of the study has been an eventful and interesting one and the economic backdrop continues to present a challenging environment for governments as they consider their future fiscal policies. Globalization, the march of technological change, changing demographic patterns and the persistent challenges that continue around climate change and the environment all come together to generate a turbulent mix of issues which have a significant impact on fiscal policy and the associated tax systems. Against this backdrop, this year the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) has put forward proposals for changing the international tax rules to modernize them for today s globalized business and to address concerns over base erosion and profit shifting (BEPS). It is apparent that these proposals are already changing the way some tax authorities apply existing rules, leading to new and increased uncertainty for business, at least in the short term. Alongside all of this however there are two simple, mutually supportive objectives for governments; to ensure that there are sufficient public revenues for the future, to lay a foundation for sustained improvements in productivity, while at the same time incentivising investment and economic growth. This year the authors have also focused more on the compliance aspects of the information that authors collect through the study. Stable tax systems and strong tax administrations are important for businesses, helping them to operate in an environment where the tax treatment of transactions is predictable, and where governments operate transparently. The paying taxes study provides an unrivalled global database which supports an ongoing research program.

This Fifth Edition of the Uganda Economic Update presents evidence that if the urbanization process is well managed, it has the potential to stimulate economic growth and to provide productive jobs for a greater proportion of Uganda's young and rapidly expanding population. In many countries across the world, the growth of cities has stimulated the establishment and expansion of productive businesses by reducing the distance between suppliers and customers. The growth of cities has also facilitated provision of social services and infrastructure through economies of scale. These positive effects from urbanization are already visible in Uganda since the poverty rate is seven percentage points lower in urban areas than in rural areas. Most of the recent job creation is found in cities, and social indicators are also better in urban areas, especially in education and health.

This Fifth Edition of the Uganda Economic Update presents evidence that if the urbanization process is well managed, it has the potential to stimulate economic growth and to provide productive jobs for a greater proportion of Uganda s young and rapidly expanding population. In many countries across the world, the growth of cities has stimulated the establishment and expansion of productive businesses by reducing the distance between suppliers and customers. The growth of cities has also facilitated provision of social services and infrastructure through economies of scale. These positive effects from urbanization are already visible in Uganda since the poverty rate is seven percentage points lower in urban areas than in rural areas. Most of the recent job creation is found in cities, and social indicators are also better in urban areas, especially in education and health. This report conveys the following key messages: (1) over the past 12 years, the number of people living in Uganda s urban areas has been increasing by an average of 300,000 people per year, (2) during the past few decades, similarly rapid rates of urbanization have been recorded in many emerging countries, (3) as is the case in many other developing countries, the prospects of good jobs, higher incomes and better living conditions in the cities continue to attract Ugandans from rural areas, (4) currently, the opportunity presents itself for Uganda to leverage urbanization to benefit a large proportion of the population, and (5) through the implementation of smart policies, Uganda can ensure that its cities are both competitive and livable.

Chinas economic growth is gradually slowing as the structural transformation of the economy continues. Output grew by 7.7 percent in 2013, matching its 2012 growth rate and exceeding the governments 7.5 percent indicative target. In recent months economic activity, including industrial production, started to show signs of acceleration. The recent acceleration, expected to continue into the next two quarters, is partly reflecting the effect of new growth-supporting measures, robust consumption, and a recovery of external demand. Chinas growth will continue to moderate over the medium term, and the structural shifts will become more evident. Growth in China is expected to decrease marginally to 7.6 percent in 2014 and 7.5 percent in 2015, from 7.7 percent in 2013. Fiscal and financial sector reforms are needed to address financial stability risks in the medium run. The first task involves effectively managing the process of rapid credit growth, including less well-regulated shadow banking system. The second involves gradual and orderly deleveraging of large stock of local government debt accumulated through off-budget and quasi-fiscal platforms.

The economy continues to recover with most sectors rebounding strongly from the sharp drop in output late 2008 and early 2009. Preliminary estimates suggest that real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) grew by 6.1 percent year-on-year in 2010, following an outturn of minus 1.3 percent in 2009. However, winter arrived in Mongolia with the agriculture sector still feeling the impact from last year's dzud. The sector has now experienced double-digit contractions for the third quarter in a row. The exchange rate against the US dollar has been slowly appreciating back to the pre-crisis level. In December 2010, the average monthly exchange rate against the US$ appreciated by 3.0 percent, compared to the previous month, or 15 percent compared to December 2009. The latest survey conducted in informal labor markets in December 2010 revealed a reduction in number of casual workers by about 40 percent compared to September due to the seasonal closure of construction labor markets, and reduced outdoor sales activities due to cold weather. Mongolia has made significant progress in improving budget transparency, but there is still considerable room for improvement. Finally, although Mongolia's laws are easily accessible online and court processes are generally impartial and transparent, the predictability of court decisions is limited and the courts, enforcement and registration agencies are often perceived as corrupt by the public.

China's remarkable economic performance over the last 30 years resulted from reforms that met the specific conditions of China at any point in time. Starting with a heavily distorted and extremely poor economy, China gradually reformed by improving incentives in agriculture, phasing out the planned economy and allowing non-state enterprise entry, opening up to the outside world, reforming state enterprises and the financial sector, and ultimately by starting to establish the modern tools of macroeconomic management. The way China went about its reforms was marked by gradualism, experimentation, and decentralization, which allowed the most appropriate institutions to emerge that delivered high growth that by and large benefited all. Strong incentives for local governments to deliver growth, competition among jurisdictions, and strong control of corruption limited rent seeking in the semi reformed system, whereas investment in human capital and the organizations that were to design reforms continued to provide impetus for the reform process. Learning from other countries' experience was important, but more important was China's adaptation of that experience to its own particular circumstances and needs.