Suchergebnisse

Un déficit estructural de competitividad y unas políticas díscolas han causado una grave inestabilidad financiera en ciertos países de la zona euro, llevándolos a situaciones límite. Más aún, la propia Unión Europea padece ahora un elevado riesgo sistémico, económico y político. En este artículo se analizan las condiciones que generaron esta grave situación: a) las estructuras económicas y de ciertos Estados miembros; b) el carácter no óptimo de la zona euro; c) las políticas despilfarradoras de ciertos gobiernos e instituciones; y d) el déficit de gobernanza económica europea. Para afrontar los riesgos y retos de algunos Estados y a la propia Unión se necesitan nuevos y sólidos mecanismos para la estabilización financiera, así como protocolos detallados para la sostenibilidad fiscal y las reformas estructurales. ; Structural non-competiveness and unruly policies have provoked severe financial instability and put certain euro zone countries in a shocking situation. Indeed, the entire European Union is at economic and political systemic risk. In this paper we shall analyze the coinciding conditions which helped generate this perfect and fatal storm: a) the structures of the European economy and of some Member States; b) the non-optimal currency zone that is the euro area; c) the profligate policies of certain governments and institutions; and d) the deficit in European economic governance. Newer and tougher mechanisms for European financial stability and detailed government measures for budget sustainability and structural reforms need to be most effective to be able to address the risks and challenges many States, and the Union itself, are facing.

The European Union debt crisis has questioned the institutional design of the European Monetary System (EMS). In 2011, one of the most influential authors, Werner Sinn, argued that the European Central Bank (ECB) was financing the current account deficits in the periphery countries and for this reason, the TARGET2 imbalances were dangerously increasing the risk in core countries. This paper considers that the TARGET2 imbalances have their roots in the interbank market paralysis and in the ECB role in the crisis, avoiding the financial system collapse. However, these imbalances are not a single problem but to reflect the political economy decisions. Sinn's arguments hide a defence to austerity policies and the need to improve the competitiveness in the Southern countries and therefore the liabilities vis-à-vis the Euro-system. ; La crisis de deuda que atraviesa la Unión Europea ha cuestionado el diseño institucional del Sistema Monetario Europeo (SME). Uno de los autores alemanes más influyentes, Werner Sinn, argumentó en el año 2011 que el Banco Central Europeo (BCE) estaba financiando los déficits por cuenta corriente de los países de la periferia y que esto se estaba reflejando en un incremento de los desequilibrios en el sistema de pagos TARGET2, lo cual suponía un riesgo importante para los países del centro de Europa. Este trabajo pretende demostrar que estos desequilibrios surgen como consecuencia de la parálisis del mercado interbancario y de la actuación del BCE a la hora de evitar el colapso del sistema financiero. Estos desequilibrios no suponen un problema en sí mismos, sino que son el reflejo de decisiones de política económica adoptadas por el BCE frente a la crisis. La argumentación de Sinn esconde una defensa de las políticas de austeridad y la necesidad de mejorar la competitividad de los países del sur de Europa para reducir las posiciones deudoras de estos países frente al Euro-sistema.

From a very personal perspective, the article makes explicit the working of policies in favour of the monetary union, in which I participated. Likewise, it emphasises some teachings concerning the decision-making process of the European Commission. These policies and economic trends are analysed from the Spanish integration in 1986 to the recent crisis of the Spanish economy. The paper examines some of the most relevant transformations which took place in our structures, markets, social partners' attitudes, and in the social, economic and monetary institutions by means of a historical institutional economic perspective which follows Eichengreen's approach. Further, it takes account of the perspective of the varieties of capitalisms, originally elaborated by Hall and Soskice, and that of social protection systems according to Esping-Andersen's methodology. There were strong social resistances to the new institutional environment and a lack of political courage to implement the reforms that the Spanish economy necessitated. ; Desde una perspectiva muy personal, el artículo explicita la elaboración de las políticas a favor de la unión monetaria en las que participé. Asimismo, enfatiza algunas enseñanzas sobre la gestación de las decisiones de la Comisión Europea. Dichas políticas y tendencias económicas son analizadas desde la integración de España en 1986 hasta la reciente crisis de la economía española. El artículo examina algunas de las más importantes transformaciones en nuestras estructuras y mercados, agentes sociales, instituciones sociales, económicas y monetarias mediante una aproximación de la economía institucional histórica, a la manera de Eichengreen. Además, se completa desde la perspectiva de la diversidad de capitalismos, elaborada por Hall y Soskice, y de los sistemas de protección social de acuerdo con la metodología de Esping-Andersen. Hubo fuertes resistencias sociales para adaptarse al nuevo entorno institucional y faltó coraje político para aplicar las reformas que reclamaba la economía española.

The European Monetary Union demands a budgetary discipline. Nonetheless, at the same time, it drastically reduces the possibilities of autonomous decision making. This paper examines the mismatch between the political debate in Spain and the actual possibilities for independent policy making; particularly, once the ECJ has recalled (in the "Pringle" case), the severe obligations arising out of the European solidarity principle. The paper concludes with a critical analysis of some of the recent regulatory reforms. ; La Unión Monetaria exige disciplina presupuestaria, pero al mismo tiempo, reduce drásticamente las posibilidades de una gobernación independiente. El trabajo examina el desfase entre el debate político interno en España y las posibilidades reales de una política autónoma, una vez que el Tribunal de Justicia (asunto "Pringle") ha recordado los severos límites de la solidaridad europea. Por último se analizan críticamente algunas de las reformas legislativas recientes.

Unsuccessful attempts to join the euro zone enables the authors to state that Lithuania's integration into the European Monetary Union is an insufficiently researched topic. Identification of the problems and prospects of Lithuania's integration into the European Monetary Union is especially important, because only when the problems are rectified, will it be possible to join the European Monetary Union successfully. It will also be possible to assess the potential risks and benefits of changing the national currency to the euro. Therefore, Lithuanian macroeconomic indicators are analyzed and compared with the convergence criteria. In addition, Estonia's and Slovenia's experience is investigated, because these countries have joined the euro area despite having a difficult macro-economic environment. It should be noted that the establishment of a single currency completed the integration of European countries and preconditioned the belief that joining the European Monetary Union will maintain price stability and a sustainable economic growth. Performed analysis of macro-economic indicators allows the authors to state that the major risk factor for Lithuania's integration process into the European Monetary Union has been and remains a too high rate of inflation. The main factors influencing the high inflation are a large amount of money in circulation, low inflation control, budget imbalances and a lack of execution about strict fiscal policy. In 2013, it is predicted that Lithuania will have a 2.5 percent inflation rate and the convergence criteria is expected to be equal to 2.6 percent, so the risk that inflation may be uncontrolled remains. In order to finally integrate into the monetary union, the Lithuanian government should pursue strict fiscal policy as well as structural reforms to ensure stability for prices and finance in the government sector. Establishment of the euro would promote foreign investment in the country, [.]

Unsuccessful attempts to join the euro zone enables the authors to state that Lithuania's integration into the European Monetary Union is an insufficiently researched topic. Identification of the problems and prospects of Lithuania's integration into the European Monetary Union is especially important, because only when the problems are rectified, will it be possible to join the European Monetary Union successfully. It will also be possible to assess the potential risks and benefits of changing the national currency to the euro. Therefore, Lithuanian macroeconomic indicators are analyzed and compared with the convergence criteria. In addition, Estonia's and Slovenia's experience is investigated, because these countries have joined the euro area despite having a difficult macro-economic environment. It should be noted that the establishment of a single currency completed the integration of European countries and preconditioned the belief that joining the European Monetary Union will maintain price stability and a sustainable economic growth. Performed analysis of macro-economic indicators allows the authors to state that the major risk factor for Lithuania's integration process into the European Monetary Union has been and remains a too high rate of inflation. The main factors influencing the high inflation are a large amount of money in circulation, low inflation control, budget imbalances and a lack of execution about strict fiscal policy. In 2013, it is predicted that Lithuania will have a 2.5 percent inflation rate and the convergence criteria is expected to be equal to 2.6 percent, so the risk that inflation may be uncontrolled remains. In order to finally integrate into the monetary union, the Lithuanian government should pursue strict fiscal policy as well as structural reforms to ensure stability for prices and finance in the government sector. Establishment of the euro would promote foreign investment in the country, [.]

The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union provides that all Member States of the European Union shall harmonize their economic and exchange rate policies, conduct an appropriate fiscal policy, and join the euro area once they fulfill the conditions for the adoption of the single currency set out in the Treaty. The European Union institutions assess the economic convergence with the euro area of a country which is preparing to adopt the euro and it's eligibility for the changeover to the single currency of the European Union. In the 1st of May, 2004, when Lithuania became an official member of the European Union, automatically goal was set to abandon the national currency and become a full member of the euro zone, when Lithuania meet the convergence criteria. The first attempt to join the euro zone has been since 1st of January, 2007, but Lithuania met only three if the four convergence criteria. When inflation exceeded the convergence criteria by 0.1 percent, the European Commissions report on Lithuanias accession to the euro zone was negative. Unsuccessful attempts to join the euro zone shows that Lithuania‗s integration into the European Monetary Union is not properly analyzed topic in Lithuania, therefore for achieving the final success of the integration into European Monetary Union since 1st of January, 2015 the identification and assessment of integration problems and prospects extremely important. So the basic aim of the article is to assess the costs of Lithuania fully integrate into the European Monetary Union since 1st of January, 2015 by simulating the most favorable economic environment adoption of the euro. The object is the costs of Lithuania's integration into the European Monetary Union. And the tasks are to analyze the positive and negative aspects in order to join into the European Monetary Union and to assess the costs of Lithuania's integration into the European Monetary Union.

The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union provides that all Member States of the European Union shall harmonize their economic and exchange rate policies, conduct an appropriate fiscal policy, and join the euro area once they fulfill the conditions for the adoption of the single currency set out in the Treaty. The European Union institutions assess the economic convergence with the euro area of a country which is preparing to adopt the euro and it's eligibility for the changeover to the single currency of the European Union. In the 1st of May, 2004, when Lithuania became an official member of the European Union, automatically goal was set to abandon the national currency and become a full member of the euro zone, when Lithuania meet the convergence criteria. The first attempt to join the euro zone has been since 1st of January, 2007, but Lithuania met only three if the four convergence criteria. When inflation exceeded the convergence criteria by 0.1 percent, the European Commissions report on Lithuanias accession to the euro zone was negative. Unsuccessful attempts to join the euro zone shows that Lithuania‗s integration into the European Monetary Union is not properly analyzed topic in Lithuania, therefore for achieving the final success of the integration into European Monetary Union since 1st of January, 2015 the identification and assessment of integration problems and prospects extremely important. So the basic aim of the article is to assess the costs of Lithuania fully integrate into the European Monetary Union since 1st of January, 2015 by simulating the most favorable economic environment adoption of the euro. The object is the costs of Lithuania's integration into the European Monetary Union. And the tasks are to analyze the positive and negative aspects in order to join into the European Monetary Union and to assess the costs of Lithuania's integration into the European Monetary Union.

The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union provides that all Member States of the European Union shall harmonize their economic and exchange rate policies, conduct an appropriate fiscal policy, and join the euro area once they fulfill the conditions for the adoption of the single currency set out in the Treaty. The European Union institutions assess the economic convergence with the euro area of a country which is preparing to adopt the euro and it's eligibility for the changeover to the single currency of the European Union. In the 1st of May, 2004, when Lithuania became an official member of the European Union, automatically goal was set to abandon the national currency and become a full member of the euro zone, when Lithuania meet the convergence criteria. The first attempt to join the euro zone has been since 1st of January, 2007, but Lithuania met only three if the four convergence criteria. When inflation exceeded the convergence criteria by 0.1 percent, the European Commissions report on Lithuanias accession to the euro zone was negative. Unsuccessful attempts to join the euro zone shows that Lithuania‗s integration into the European Monetary Union is not properly analyzed topic in Lithuania, therefore for achieving the final success of the integration into European Monetary Union since 1st of January, 2015 the identification and assessment of integration problems and prospects extremely important. So the basic aim of the article is to assess the costs of Lithuania fully integrate into the European Monetary Union since 1st of January, 2015 by simulating the most favorable economic environment adoption of the euro. The object is the costs of Lithuania's integration into the European Monetary Union. And the tasks are to analyze the positive and negative aspects in order to join into the European Monetary Union and to assess the costs of Lithuania's integration into the European Monetary Union.

The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union provides that all Member States of the European Union shall harmonize their economic and exchange rate policies, conduct an appropriate fiscal policy, and join the euro area once they fulfill the conditions for the adoption of the single currency set out in the Treaty. The European Union institutions assess the economic convergence with the euro area of a country which is preparing to adopt the euro and it's eligibility for the changeover to the single currency of the European Union. In the 1st of May, 2004, when Lithuania became an official member of the European Union, automatically goal was set to abandon the national currency and become a full member of the euro zone, when Lithuania meet the convergence criteria. The first attempt to join the euro zone has been since 1st of January, 2007, but Lithuania met only three if the four convergence criteria. When inflation exceeded the convergence criteria by 0.1 percent, the European Commissions report on Lithuanias accession to the euro zone was negative. Unsuccessful attempts to join the euro zone shows that Lithuania‗s integration into the European Monetary Union is not properly analyzed topic in Lithuania, therefore for achieving the final success of the integration into European Monetary Union since 1st of January, 2015 the identification and assessment of integration problems and prospects extremely important. So the basic aim of the article is to assess the costs of Lithuania fully integrate into the European Monetary Union since 1st of January, 2015 by simulating the most favorable economic environment adoption of the euro. The object is the costs of Lithuania's integration into the European Monetary Union. And the tasks are to analyze the positive and negative aspects in order to join into the European Monetary Union and to assess the costs of Lithuania's integration into the European Monetary Union.

A distinctive feature of the State of Autonomies is the recognition of political autonomy of the Autonomous Communities and, inherent to it and at the same time a necessary instrument to make it possible, the financial autonomy. The Spanish constitutional system provides protection to that autonomy, both at the textual and case-law levels. The Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), however, has led a substantial transformation of the financial autonomy as a constitutional value, from the perspective of the spending power, of the Autonomous Communities. This article explores this transformation and identifies three stages —EMU precrisis, EMU in crisis and the current efforts of reforming the EMU and the allocation and management of the European funds for recovery— which have shaped the financial autonomy of the Autonomous Communities. The article analyzes the interaction between the Spanish constitutional system and the European Union Law and points out the latter as an engine of a constitutional transformation and as a decisive factor in the evolution of the State of Autonomies. ; Un rasgo distintivo del Estado de las Autonomías es el reconocimiento de la autonomía política de las CCAA y, consustancial a ella y a la vez instrumento necesario para hacerla posible sobre todo en su vertiente de la potestad de gasto, también la autonomía financiera. El ordenamiento constitucional español ha amparado esta autonomía, tanto a nivel textual como a través del moldeamiento del Tribunal Constitucional. Sin embargo, la Unión Económica y Monetaria (UEM) ha comportado una transformación sustancial de la perspectiva constitucional de la autonomía financiera, en su vertiente de la potestad de gasto, de las CCAA. Este artículo explora esta transformación, identificando tres etapas distintas —UEM precrisis, UEM en crisis y los intentos actuales de reforma de la UEM y la gestión de los fondos europeos de rescate— que han ido moldeando el principio constitucional de autonomía financiera de las CCAA. Se analiza la interacción entre el ...

La constatación de la existencia de grandes diferencias entre dos legislaciones comunitarias, la Unión Europea y la Unión Económica y Monetaria de África Occidental, por lo que se refiere al control de concentraciones, fue lo que dio origen a este trabajo. En los dos ordenamientos comunitarios que tienen como finalidad la coordinación de la política económica de los Estados miembros en el mercado común de cada órgano con la definición de objetivos comunes, la economía ocupa un lugar destacado en la reglamentación que establecen para la realización de estos objetivos. Se trata de zonas económicas que facilitan la libre circulación de personas, bienes, servicios, capitales, lo que da lugar a importantes reestructuraciones de las empresas, particularmente en forma de concentraciones. Hacer una comparación descriptiva de estas dos legislaciones nos ha permitido entender que, según el espacio comunitario considerado, las circunstancias varían, así como el grado de control y la autonomía de los Estados miembros. De hecho, si en la Unión Europea hay una reglamentación específica y detallada, en la Unión Económica y Monetaria de África Occidental, las operaciones de concentración se consideran como una subcategoría del abuso de posición dominante. Eso lleva a que los criterios y métodos empleados en la definición por las autoridades, del control de los mercados relevantes, son diferentes de una legislación a otra. De hecho, la Comisión Europea sólo controla las concentraciones de dimensión comunitaria mientras que la UEMOA establece una protección de manera uniforme del Mercado común controlando todas las operaciones realizadas en su ámbito geográfico.

Este trabajo presenta un modelo teórico de determinación del nivel de provisión de bienes públicos regionales (BPR) por parte de gobiernos nacionales que buscan maximizar la probabilidad de ganar las próximas elecciones. Partiendo de la consideración de la constitución de un área monetaria regional como un caso particular de BPR, se demuestra que bajo ausencias de mecanismos de coordinación (instituciones) el equilibrio de Nash del modelo produce un resultado subóptimo, porque los países no tienen incentivos para incorporar dentro de sus decisiones el efecto que sus BPR causan sobre terceros. Una tecnología de compromiso gradual a la Maastricht puede lograr, sin embargo, que los países jueguen una estrategia de Grim Trigger que conduzca a una provisión óptima de BPR, incrementando los niveles de gobernabilidad, aunque bajos niveles de cohesión social (alta heterogeneidad) pueden comprometer el éxito del acuerdo obligando a la introducción de un esquema de transferencias interjurisdiccionales para salvarlo. ; This paper develops a theoretical model of the determination of regional public goods (RPG) provision at the national level, based on the assumption that the objective of governments is to win the next election. Using a monetary union as particular case of a RPG, we show that in the absence of coordination mechanisms (institutions), the Nash equilibrium predicts suboptimal provision because countries lack incentives to internalize into their decisions any RPG's spillovers. A Grimm Trigger strategy may arise, however, if the countries can develop a gradually commitment technology a la Maastricht, leading to an optimal provision of RPG with boosting consequences in terms of governability. Nevertheless, low levels of social cohesion (high heterogeneity) may compromise the success of the agreement forcing the introduction of a between jurisdiction trnasfer schemes to save tne monetary union. ; Publicado en la sección "Estudios" ; Instituto de Integración Latinoamericana