Suchergebnisse

Intro -- Contents -- Preface -- Chapter 1 -- Central Banks, Monetary Policy, and Their Efficiency -- Abstract -- I. Introduction: History of Central Bankning -- (i) The North American Banks (1781-1912) -- (ii) The Creation of the Federal Reserve System (1913-Present) -- II. Monetary Policy and Its Instruments and Objectives -- (i) The Goals of Monetary Policy -- (ii) The Instruments and Implementation of Monetary Policy -- III. Modern Monetary Policy and Its Fficiency -- (i) Macroeconomic Theory and Modern Monetary Policy -- (ii) The Latest Pursued Inefficient Monetary Policies -- (iii) A Theoretical Model of Monetary Policy Efficiency -- (iv) Some Empirical Results -- IV. Some Socio-Politico-Economic Considerations of Central Banking -- (i) Social Implications of the Central Banks Efficiency -- (ii) Monetary Policy and Its Effects on Wall Street and Main Street -- V. Conclusion: Monetary Policy and Social Welfare -- References -- Chapter 2 -- Asymmetric Monetary Policy Action Effects: Evidence and Implications Regarding Europe -- Abstract -- 1. Introduction -- 2. Literature Review -- 3. Estimating the Euro Area - Country Specific Effects of Monetary Policy Shocks -- 3.1. The Empirical Model: A Bayesian Panel Var Approach -- 3.2. Data, Country Specific Characterisics and Model Estimation -- 3.2.1. The Data -- Macroeconomic Variables -- Stock Market Performance Variables -- Monetary Policy Measure -- 3.2.2. Stylized Facts of the 19 EU Countries (or the Dynamics of the Major Indicators in EU Area) -- 3.2.3. Model Estimation -- 3.3. Impulse Response Functions -- Monetary Policy Effects on Real Economic Activity Variables -- Monetary Policy Effects on Stock Market Performance Indicators -- Impulse Response Functions of Real Economic Activity Variables to Interest Rate Shocks for the 19 Countries

Is European Monetary Union desirable? Pascal Salin, of the Univeristy of Paris, argues that any system of fixed exchange rates such as the EMS Exchange Rate Mechanism, is likely to prove unsatisfactory.

Despite the increasing number of studies on monetary policy uncertainty, its role on the strategic interaction between fiscal and monetary policies has not been fully explored. Our paper aims to fill this gap by evaluating the consequences produced by multiplicative uncertainty in such a context. Strategic interaction between fiscal and monetary policies under monetary policy uncertainty. Symbiosis result no longer holds under unknown multiplicative shocks on monetary policy effects. Monetary uncertainty and fiscal uncertainty are not symmetric. Monetary uncertainty may induce both more and less aggressive effects on the final outcomes according to the kind of existing interaction between the government and the central bank. Multiplicative uncertainty implies an endogenous Phillips relationship between inflation and output, which does not emerge under fiscal uncertainty. [Copyright Elsevier B.V.]

The future European Central Bank needs monetary policy instruments which have yet to be agreed. At present, the range of instruments is very heterogeneous in the potential member states. This book offers a systematic analysis of the issue, considering general theoretical arguments as well as the concrete institutional situation in European countries. Taking the Bundesbank's instruments as the starting point, their rationale is discussed against the background of experience elsewhere. The theoretical and empirical treatment leads to several competing concepts. Taking the three goals of monetary efficiency, fair competition and decentralization establishes a strong case for the use of "standing facilities" and to a lesser extend "reserve requirements", albeit modified and brought up-to-date

This paper investigates the dynamic effects of monetary and fiscal policy in a monetary union, which is characterized by asymmetric interest rate transmission. This asymmetry gives rise to intertemporal reversals in the relative effectiveness of policy on member country outputs. The direction and the number of these reversals depend on whether policies are unanticipated or anticipated. We also study the coordination between monetary and fiscal policy in a monetary union. Monetary policy may completely stabilize European output after unanticipated fiscal policy shocks. With anticipated fiscal policy shocks, complete stabilization throughout the overall adjustment process requires monetary policy to be time-inconsistent.

Regional monetary and financial cooperation in Asia has been discussed for years. To move towards a coordinated exchange rate policy, Ogawa and Shimizu (2005) proposed both an Asian Monetary Unit (AMU), which is a common currency basket computed as a weighted average of the thirteen ASEAN+3 currencies, and AMU Deviation Indicators (AMU DIs), which indicates the deviation of each Asian currency in terms of the AMU compared with the benchmark rate. The AMU and the AMU DIs are considered both as surveillance measures under the Chiang Mai Initiative and as benchmarks for coordinated exchange rate policies among Asian countries. In this paper, the authors show that monitoring the AMU and the AMU DIs plays an important role in the regional surveillance process under the Chiang Mai Initiative. By using daily and monthly data of AMU and AMU DIs for the period from January 2000 to June 2010, which are available from the website of the Research Institute of Economy, Trade, and Industry (RIETI), they examine their usefulness as a surveillance indicator. Our studies of AMU and AMU DIs confirm the following: first, an AMU peg system stabilizes the nominal effective exchange rate (NEER) of each Asian country. Second, the AMU and the AMU DIs could signal overvaluation or undervaluation for each of the Asian currencies. Third, trade imbalances within the region have been growing as the AMU DIs have been widening. Fourth, the AMU DIs could predict huge capital inflows and outflows for each Asian country. The above findings support the usefulness of using the AMU and the AMU DIs as surveillance indicators for monetary cooperation in Asia.

We use the two-country model of the euro area developed by Quint and Rabanal (2014) to study policymaking in the European Monetary Union (EMU). In particular, we focus on strategic interactions: 1) between monetary policy and a common macroprudential authority, and; 2) between an EMU-level monetary authority and regional macroprudential authorities. In the first case, price stability and financial stability are pursued at the EMU level, while in the second case each macroprudential authority adopts region-specific objectives. We compare cooperative equilibria in the simultaneous-move and leadership solutions, each obtained assuming policy discretion. Further, we assess the effects on policy performance of assigning shared objectives across policymakers and of altering the level of importance attached to various policy objectives.