Suchergebnisse

"In this article the author addresses the question of the ontology of power and rule-setting in the international monetary system. By distinguishing between two dimensions of monetary power - autonomy and influence - he offers an innovative approach towards power in the international monetary system. Within this context he examines and analyses different developments, outlining a diffusion of power among states as well as between states and non-state actors rather in the dimension of autonomy than in the dimension of influence. The author introduces the concept of leaderless diffusion, meaning that leadership in the system has been more scattered than relocated. He argues that a power shift has taken place from few very powerful states towards a growing number of autonomous actors, especially when it comes to rule-setting abilities within the monetary system. Furthermore, he outlines that on the level of governance, a distinction should be made between the individual state and the global system and thus offers an elaborated approach towards understanding monetary and economic power in the 21st century." (author's abstract)

A discussion of Poland's membership in the Economic & Monetary Union (EMU) as an expected consequence of EU membership focuses on possible options related to Poland's negotiating position. It is noted that there is no conflict between the EU & Polish negotiating positions in regard to the EMU. However, in light of current economic difficulties it is contended that the Polish position fails to ensure adequate flexibility in the timing to assume obligations related to EMU membership, especially its provisions about a single monetary policy. A review of the Polish negotiating position shows that Poland committed itself to begin preparations for participation at a fairly early date. The implications of this commitment are discussed, along with special problems related to the unilateral adoption of the euro. Suggestions are made for ways the Polish government & the Central Bank can improve the strategy for joining the EMU in order to both enhance EU membership & advance crucial Polish interests. J. Lindroth

The reductionist new materialism gripping contemporary political science understanding of preference formation is critiqued in the case of the monetary union in Europe. Contemporary comparative political economy counters to explanation based on interests, ideas, or institutions are not complete alternatives. Effective accounts of preference formation require exploration of factor interaction through a focus on the fundamental preferences over potential courses of prestrategic action. The author proposes a framework of basic postulates to deduce key features of the process of preference formation. Application of this framework to the case of the European Monetary Union describes the inadequacy of new material approaches in the cases of France, Germany & Great Britain. Preference formation is concluded to not be primarily about how institutions structure action but about how other factors induce preference change. References. J. Harwell

President John F. Kennedy's frequent visits to West European capitals created an image of the American dream that included Europe in a "transatlantic community that was symbolized by modernity, technological progress, & economic prosperity." The dream died with the president. Neither Lyndon Johnson nor Richard Nixon wanted such a cooperative economic relationship with Europe. This chapter examines the nature of the American challenge to Western Europe with regard to technological development & monetary policy, 1965-1973 -- its moments both of conflict & of cooperation. Focus is on what lay behind the policy shift & what happened in Europe as a result, ie, the development of a Europe-centered view of economic cooperation & development, without which the European Union might never have come to fruition. J. Stanton