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This paper examines the historical pattern of aggregate demand and supply shocks in several European Monetary System countries in order to assess the desirability of monetary union. Countries with similar patterns of shocks are presumably better candidates for monetary union than those hit by wildly disparate shocks. The historical time series of shocks is identified by estimating a vector autoregressive model while imposing the restriction that demand shocks have no permanent effect on real output. In most cases supply shocks are positively correlated with those of Germany, but the negative correlation of demand shocks suggests that monetary union may not be desirable.

Europe's financial crisis cannot be blamed on the Euro, Harold James contends in this probing exploration of the whys, whens, whos, and what-ifs of European monetary union. The current crisis goes deeper, to a series of problems that were debated but not resolved at the time of the Euro's invention. Since the 1960s, Europeans had been looking for a way to address two conundrums simultaneously: the dollar's privileged position in the international monetary system, and Germany's persistent current account surpluses in Europe. The Euro was created under a politically independent central bank to meet the primary goal of price stability. But while the monetary side of union was clearly conceived, other prerequisites of stability were beyond the reach of technocratic central bankers. Issues such as fiscal rules and Europe-wide banking supervision and regulation were thoroughly discussed during planning in the late 1980s and 1990s, but remained in the hands of member states. That omission proved to be a cause of crisis decades later. Here is an account that helps readers understand the European monetary crisis in depth, by tracing behind-the-scenes negotiations using an array of sources unavailable until now, notably from the European Community's Committee of Central Bank Governors and the Delors Committee of 1988–89, which set out the plan for how Europe could reach its goal of monetary union. As this foundational study makes clear, it was the constant friction between politicians and technocrats that shaped the Euro. And, Euro or no Euro, this clash will continue into the future.

The tax burden on wages, profits, property, and goods or services has a serious impact on cross-country competiveness, something that, in turn, impinges strongly on the actual economy of common markets such as the European Union (EU). While the mobility of productive factors is directly related with country tax-regime differences, government budget funding from tax revenues and rates are the main fiscal policy tools. This article analyzes the trends, similarities and differences between the tax regimes of European Monetary Union (EMU) for the period from1995 to 2019. The methodologies we employ include time series analysis, regression analysis and multivariate cluster analysis. The data are mainly collected from the OECD database and tax revenue departments at country level. We argue that there are significant differences among the tax regimes of EU countries and that no policy has been implemented to ensure tax homogeneity across the EU, nor is there any likelihood of such. The anarchy in fiscal policy is an obstacle for the European Integration. Budget deficits have an impact on taxation and countries, invariably, manage the recent debt crisis by selecting different taxes as fiscal policy tools. Our article presents the differences between tax regimes of EMU countries and shows that the level of economic growth affects the structure of taxes at work and alters the performance of different types of taxes; is also wishes to explain the factors that differentiate tax regimes by using multi dimensional criteria and variance analysis. Our work contributes to the debate toward a common tax regime between EU countries and our analysis is concentrated on this. ; peer-reviewed

The creation of the EMU and the introduction of the Euro is a historic event for the EU countries. The debates on the desirability of the EMU provoked a vast economic literature dealing with the theory of the optimum currency area, costs and benefits of the EMU, symmetric versus asymmetric shocks, alternative mechanisms of adjustment in a monetary union and so forth. Until recently, for the Central European candidate countries for a full membership in the EU, these issues seemed to be too far away, as they concentrated on devising their own monetary and exchange rate systems suitable for their transition period. The challenges of the EMU for the Central European countries have scarcely been dealt with in both Western and Eastern economic literature. Inclusion of Central European Countries in the European Monetary Union aims to fill this gap, by focusing on the most direct issue of relevance for the Central European countries with respect to the EMU - why, how and when these countries are expected to join the EMU. The papers included in this volume study the relationship between the EU accession process of the Central European candidate countries and their involvement in the process of European monetary integration. The book focuses on two main issues. First, are these countries - now or possibly later - a part of the European optimum currency area so that they should belong to the Euro area in the near future? Second, if so, how and when should they undertake necessary adjustments in their monetary and exchange rate policies and join the ERM 2 and the EMU?

Introduction: European enlargement generally refers to the inclusion of new states into the European Union's Treaty area. This article considers instead the enlargement of Economic and Monetary Union into Africa. We know that no part of Africa is in the EU, though Morocco has sought to join, and the island of Mayotte belongs to an EU member state (France) and uses the euro. But the EU's single currency area is not identical with its monetary area. This article is about EMU beyond the EU itself, and in particular about the monetary shadow European colonial history has cast over western and central Africa. Here as well as in the Comoros islands three local currencies were long in the monetary area of France, and are now but local expressions of the euro. That was why in the late 1990s the impending introduction of the single European currency aroused considerable interest and some anxiety in those African countries that faced possible inclusion in the EU's monetary union. The question was whether the EC institutions should take over responsibly for monetary policy in the former French African overseas territories, although they are not in the EU now, and were never part of the EEC before independence. Alternatively, experts in Europe and in Africa considered whether France should maintain its monetary guarantee, and if so, whether the CFA franc should be decoupled from the future European currency. Finally, the CFA franc zones could simply disappear. Today currencies in the fourteen Francophone states plus those of two of Portugal's former African overseas countries are simply local variants of the euro. This paper briefly puts this strange situation in its historical context, considering what has changed and what has not with the changeover from the franc CFA pegged to the French franc, to a franc CFA pegged to the euro. I shall then ask, together with mainly African economists, political analysts and politicians, whether Africa's proxy euro zone should expand to take in perhaps the entire sub Saharan continent, which has a privileged trade and aid relationship with the EU. Alternatively, do Africans and Europeans see a European monetary zone in Africa as an opportunity or as an anachronistic burden? Do Africans within the zone want to remain tied to the EU to a degree that exists in no other sovereign states outside Europe? Two of the three CFA franc cum euro monetary zones have expanded both in nature and in geographical extent, having become economic unions and taken in two ex Portuguese dependencies. Do these now wish to form even larger units and turn themselves into regional common markets, with a common currency that in reality is not a currency at all, but only one or several local variants of the euro? How do other African states regard such ambitions? The answers to these questions require first a brief historical comment.

This paper addresses the issue of how the stability of the Greek economy will be affected by Greece's accession to the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). The theoretical basis for most of the discussion of this issue to date is found in the theory of optimum currency areas (OCA), which identifies the nature of economic disturbances as key to whether currency unions provide a net benefit. We use vector autoregression to identify the nature of the disturbances that the Greek economy has experienced in the past, and add such disturbances to stochastic simulations of a structural macroeconomic model of the Greek economy, part of a larger model of the European economy known as QUEST II. The main conclusion is that the EMU will make output slightly more stable in the Greek economy. Therefore, the Greek economy will reap the efficiency gains of the common currency without suffering significantly from the elimination of its monetary sovereignty. ; peer-reviewed

Europe's financial crisis cannot be blamed on the Euro, Harold James contends in this probing exploration of the whys, whens, whos, and what-ifs of European monetary union. The current crisis goes deeper, to a series of problems that were debated but not resolved at the time of the Euro's invention. Since the 1960s, Europeans had been looking for a way to address two conundrums simultaneously: the dollar's privileged position in the international monetary system, and Germany's persistent current account surpluses in Europe. The Euro was created under a politically independent central bank to meet the primary goal of price stability. But while the monetary side of union was clearly conceived, other prerequisites of stability were beyond the reach of technocratic central bankers. Issues such as fiscal rules and Europe-wide banking supervision and regulation were thoroughly discussed during planning in the late 1980s and 1990s, but remained in the hands of member states. That omission proved to be a cause of crisis decades later. Here is an account that helps readers understand the European monetary crisis in depth, by tracing behind-the-scenes negotiations using an array of sources unavailable until now, notably from the European Community's Committee of Central Bank Governors and the Delors Committee of 1988-89, which set out the plan for how Europe could reach its goal of monetary union. As this foundational study makes clear, it was the constant friction between politicians and technocrats that shaped the Euro. And, Euro or no Euro, this clash will continue into the future.