Morale privata e morale politica
In: http://hdl.handle.net/2027/chi.31860332
At head of title: Scipio Sighele. ; Bibliography: p. [267]-269. ; Mode of access: Internet.
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In: http://hdl.handle.net/2027/chi.31860332
At head of title: Scipio Sighele. ; Bibliography: p. [267]-269. ; Mode of access: Internet.
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In: Kappel , K 2018 , ' How moral disagreement may ground principled moral compromise ' , Politics, Philosophy & Economics , vol. 17 , no. 1 , pp. 75-96 . https://doi.org/10.1177/1470594X17729132
In an influential paper, Simon C. May forcefully argued that, properly understood, there can never be principled reasons for moral compromise (May 2005). While there may be pragmatic reasons for compromising that involve, for instance, concern for political expediency or for stability there are properly speaking no principled reasons to compromise. My aim in the paper is to show how principled moral compromise in the context of moral disagreements over policy options is possible. I argue that when we disagree, principled reasons favoring compromises or compromising can assume a more significant part of what makes a position all things considered best, and in this way disagreement can ground moral compromise. ; In an influential article, Simon C. May forcefully argued that, properly understood, there can never be principled reasons for moral compromise (May, 2005). While there may be pragmatic reasons for compromising that involve, for instance, concern for political expediency or for stability, there are properly speaking no principled reasons to compromise. My aim in the article is to show how principled moral compromise in the context of moral disagreements over policy options is possible. I argue that when we disagree, principled reasons favoring compromises or compromising can assume a more significant part of what makes a position all things considered best, and in this way disagreement can ground moral compromise.
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Letter from General Pedro Morales to Gen. Alvaro Obregón reporting that he sent him ten copies of the newspaper THE EVENTS. Response stating that he had not received them. Gen. Pedro Morales' letter to Gen. Alvaro Obregón requesting a record of military service to Col. Pablo Fernández de Lara. Response asking him to send the record for certification. / Carta del Gral. Pedro Morales al Gral. Alvaro Obregón informando que le envió diez ejemplares del periódico LOS SUCESOS. Respuesta manifestándole no haberlos recibido. Carta del Gral. Pedro Morales al Gral. Alvaro Obregón pidiéndole constancia de servicios militares del Corl. Pablo Fernández de Lara. Respuesta diciendo que le envíe la constancia para certificarla.
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The article «¿Puede la razonabilidad ser un criterio de corrección moral?» by Ernesto Garzón Valdés, analyzes the limits to the contents of normative ethics, and focuses on the concept of reasonableness. Besides, Garzón proposes a «negative way» to determine moral contents on the basis of radically evil. This paper examines the problems the negative way does not remove as regarding questions of moral foundations, and points out the aims of Garzón's article in the context of contemporary debates on moral and political philosophy. ; En el artículo «¿Puede la razonabilidad ser un criterio de corrección moral?» Ernesto Garzón Valdés analiza cuáles son los límites a los contenidos de la ética normativa, centrándose para ello en la noción de razonabilidad. En el presente escrito, y tras realizar una breve síntesis de los argumentos del autor, se indaga en la conexión entre la razonabilidad y el coto vedado, así como en las posibilidades de validar los valores morales a través de la razonablidad. La vía negativa propuesta por Garzón, es decir, la posibilidad de definir los contenidos morales partiendo de lo radicalmente malo, es examinada a la luz de las dificultades que esta vía no resuelve cuando se trata de afrontar cuestiones de fundamentación. Finalmente, se realizan algunas consideraciones sobre los objetivos del artículo analizado en el ámbito de los debates actuales en filosofía moral y política.
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Moral imagination provides leaders with insight into others and the world and helps them make moral decisions and form visions. Leaders need imagination to determine the values they embrace and the feelings that these values engender in themselves and others. Leaders use imagination to animate values, apply moral principles to particular situations, and understand the moral aspects of situations. Imagination and moral values are the fundamental components of a vision.
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En el artículo «¿Puede la razonabilidad ser un criterio de corrección moral?» Ernesto Garzón Valdés analiza cuáles son los límites a los contenidos de la ética normativa, centrándose para ello en la noción de razonabilidad. En el presente escrito, y tras realizar una breve síntesis de los argumentos del autor, se indaga en la conexión entre la razonabilidad y el coto vedado, así como en las posibilidades de validar los valores morales a través de la razonablidad. La vía negativa propuesta por Garzón, es decir, la posibilidad de definir los contenidos morales partiendo de lo radicalmente malo, es examinada a la luz de las dificultades que esta vía no resuelve cuando se trata de afrontar cuestiones de fundamentación. Finalmente, se realizan algunas consideraciones sobre los objetivos del artículo analizado en el ámbito de los debates actuales en filosofía moral y política. ; The article «¿Puede la razonabilidad ser un criterio de corrección moral?» by Ernesto Garzón Valdés, analyzes the limits to the contents of normative ethics, and focuses on the concept of reasonableness. Besides, Garzón proposes a «negative way» to determine moral contents on the basis of radically evil. This paper examines the problems the negative way does not remove as regarding questions of moral foundations, and points out the aims of Garzón's article in the context of contemporary debates on moral and political philosophy.
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Le radici politiche delle opere dell'artista turca Sukran Moral analizzate attraverso alcuni lavori particolarmente significativi.
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This article examines long-standing debates in moral philosophy that are relevant to international human rights law. It discusses the political conception of human rights and the four challenges to moral philosophy which include the notion that no particular religious tradition or particular comprehensive doctrine (or morality) grounded human rights and the belief that natural rights theories end up misrepresenting and narrowing the scope of human rights. This article also highlights the importance of the work of moral philosophers to the understanding of contemporary human rights and explains that the traditions of natural rights theories still influence contemporary human rights language in profound ways
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Many political issues like abortion, gay marriage or assisted suicide are strongly contested because individuals have preferences not only over their own choice but also about other individuals? actions. How should society decide these issues? This paper compares three regimes (centralization, decentralization and federalism) in an economy where individuals choose their residence and vote over a single-dimensional regulatory policy at the regional and national level. The main results are: (i) A move from decentralization to federalism, called moral federalism, is welfare improving behind the veil of ignorance if and only if centralization dominates decentralization, and (ii) for the group that favors a restrictive policy moral federalism is the more attractive the smaller its group size (subject to being the majority group), the larger the suffering from a given policy, and the smaller the regions? weight in determining the federal policy limit. The results are consistent with the Bush administration's attempt to restrict liberal policy choices at the state level after its narrow election victory in 2000.
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Background: Ageing population, high levels of sick leave among eldercare personnel and financial constraints on municipal budgets impact eldercare. Daily care work is complex and ethical dilemmas are constantly present for eldercare personnel. This project aims to a) identify situations that give rise to moral stress, b) study the relationship between moral stress and moral agency c) explore how moral agency can be fostered in eldercare. The argument underpinning this research project is that ethical dilemmas in the work cause moral stress among staff in eldercare. While much research on moral stress highlights the connection between moral stress and negative effects on health and wellbeing, our focus is on the possible connection between moral stress and moral agency. Moral agency encompasses cognitive capacity, feelings, skills, and actions. Methods/Design: This project has a systemic approach to eldercare and interprets eldercare as an advanced system where a range of different skills is required. Participatory action research (PAR) will be used as an overall methodology. Focus-groups and research circles will be conducted with care workers, first line manages and needs assessors. Discussion: An ongoing discussion on relevant knowledge production in research, stresses the importance of participation. This is expressed by concepts such as deliberative democracy, user participation, empowerment, collaboration, follow-up research and citizen dialogue. In our research project we refer to robust knowledge as relevant knowledge that is valid in the eyes of care workers, care municipal needs assessors and first line managers. As the research is performed in collaboration with these three vocational groups, local politicians, and trade unions in three municipalities as well as two educational settings, different sorts of knowledge will be present. This unique stand will show how moral agency, as a response to moral stress, can be the ground for social changes and improve quality of care.
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In: Crimston , D , Bain , P G , Hornsey , M J & Bastian , B 2016 , ' Moral expansiveness : Examining variability in the extension of the moral world ' , Journal of Personality and Social Psychology , vol. 111 , no. 4 , pp. 636-653 . https://doi.org/10.1037/pspp0000086
The nature of our moral judgments-and the extent to which we treat others with care-depend in part on the distinctions we make between entities deemed worthy or unworthy of moral consideration- our moral boundaries. Philosophers, historians, and social scientists have noted that people's moral boundaries have expanded over the last few centuries, but the notion of moral expansiveness has received limited empirical attention in psychology. This research explores variations in the size of individuals' moral boundaries using the psychological construct of moral expansiveness and introduces the Moral Expansiveness Scale (MES), designed to capture this variation. Across 6 studies, we established the reliability, convergent validity, and predictive validity of the MES. Moral expansiveness was related (but not reducible) to existing moral constructs (moral foundations, moral identity, "moral" universalism values), predictors of moral standing (moral patiency and warmth), and other constructs associated with concern for others (empathy, identification with humanity, connectedness to nature, and social responsibility). Importantly, the MES uniquely predicted willingness to engage in prosocial intentions and behaviors at personal cost independently of these established constructs. Specifically, the MES uniquely predicted willingness to prioritize humanitarian and environmental concerns over personal and national self-interest, willingness to sacrifice one's life to save others (ranging from human out-groups to animals and plants), and volunteering behavior. Results demonstrate that moral expansiveness is a distinct and important factor in understanding moral judgments and their consequences.
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This is the text of The Lindley Lecture for 1972, given by Alan Gewirth (1912-2004), an American philosopher.
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The study was funded by the research project FFI2010-20759 (Spanish Government: Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness), and by the Chair of the Three Religions (Government of the Balearic Islands) of the University of the Balearic Islands, Spain. Julia F. Christensen and Albert Flexas were supported by FPU PHD scholarships from the Spanish Ministry of Education, Culture and Sports (AP2009-2889 and AP2008-02284). Nadine K. Gut was supported by a scholarship of the School of Psychology and Neuroscience, University of St Andrews, UK. ; We propose a revised set of moral dilemmas for studies on moral judgment. We selected a total of 46 moral dilemmas available in the literature and fine-tuned them in terms of four conceptual factors (Personal Force, Benefit Recipient, Evitability, and Intention) and methodological aspects of the dilemma formulation (word count, expression style, question formats) that have been shown to influence moral judgment. Second, we obtained normative codings of arousal and valence for each dilemma showing that emotional arousal in response to moral dilemmas depends crucially on the factors Personal Force, Benefit Recipient, and Intentionality. Third, we validated the dilemma set confirming that people's moral judgment is sensitive to all four conceptual factors, and to their interactions. Results are discussed in the context of this field of research, outlining also the relevance of our RT effects for the Dual Process account of moral judgment. Finally, we suggest tentative theoretical avenues for future testing, particularly stressing the importance of the factor Intentionality in moral judgment. Additionally, due to the importance of cross cultural studies in the quest for universals in human moral cognition, we provide the new set dilemmas in six languages (English, French, German, Spanish, Catalan, and Danish). The norming values provided here refer to the Spanish dilemma set. ; Publisher PDF ; Peer reviewed
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Georg Lind, visit this Moral ist lehrbar. Handbuch zur Theorie und Praxis moralischer und demokratischer Bildung, Verlag Oldenbourg, München 2009, SS. 169.
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In: http://mdz-nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bvb:12-bsb10235064-1
trad. du grec. par M. Thurot ; Volltext // Exemplar mit der Signatur: München, Bayerische Staatsbibliothek -- A.gr.b. 808-1
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