Suchergebnisse

This article claims that, despite its ambivalent relationship with the heterarchical paradigm, A Union of Peoples is a truly innovative contribution to the complex debate on the European project, especially in the current troubled climate. Its ability to dismantle the prevailing positivist understanding of the interaction between legal orders and to stand out from the overwhelming and often repetitive literature on the philosophy of EU law should be praised. What is especially noteworthy is the idea of "corrective justice." This notion explains very well the adoption of financial assistance measures as expression of a new form of solidarity, based on the notion of fair redress for a committed wrong, namely the structural deficiencies detectable in the design of the eurozone. ; Peer reviewed

This article claims that, despite its ambivalent relationship with the heterarchical paradigm, A Union of Peoples is a truly innovative contribution to the complex debate on the European project, especially in the current troubled climate. Its ability to dismantle the prevailing positivist understanding of the interaction between legal orders and to stand out from the overwhelming and often repetitive literature on the philosophy of EU law should be praised. What is especially noteworthy is the idea of "corrective justice." This notion explains very well the adoption of financial assistance measures as expression of a new form of solidarity, based on the notion of fair redress for a committed wrong, namely the structural deficiencies detectable in the design of the eurozone.

Are there moral limits on what spies may do? And if so, what are they? The task of this chapter is not to set out a list of prohibitions or requirements, at least not in the first instance. Rather, it is to articulate and justify a moral framework that will result in such requirements. The framework faces the interesting and tricky problem that, for all practical purposes and with some limited exceptions, non-practitioners cannot identify any such list. Moreover, practitioners cannot do so non-mutably. One has to enjoy the epistemic privileges that come from currently being a spy in order to contribute. This is frustrating for philosophers who would like to exercise ex cathedra moral authority. But there is a more serious implication: the juridification of policy for spies should be resisted. The conclusion for which I argue is well summarised in the following slogan: spies play by big boys' rules. The framework that I defend does not apply only to spies; it also applies to other practitioners of unconventional force, such as special forces or cyber-spooks, who likewise enjoy the permissions and restrictions that come from rule-governed practices. This form of enquiry is important. The years since 9/11 have seen an increasing desire among policymakers to use unconventional force in pursuit of national security objectives. The reasons for this are various. There is an accepted practice of governmental denial when it comes to unconventional operations. Oversight procedures are not public. The organisations involved are more agile and more often able to avoid the media limelight. Most importantly, non-state actors now pose a degree of threat that was arguably not present in previous years, but war is neither a proportionate nor an effective means by which to conduct operations against these targets. Indeed, some think that the human rights violations consequent on war are so serious that there is moral imperative to seek forcible alternatives in countering threats (Dill 2014, 2016). Yet the kinds of activities in ...

Why does it matter that those who fight wars be authorized by the communities on whose behalf they claim to fight? I argue that lacking authorization generates a moral cost, which counts against a war's proportionality, and that having authorization allows the transfer of reasons from the members of the community to those who fight, which makes the war more likely to be proportionate. If democratic states are better able than non-democratic states and sub-state groups to gain their community's authorization, this means that some wars will be proportionate if fought by democracies, disproportionate if not.

Why does it matter that those who fight wars be authorized by the communities on whose behalf they claim to fight? I argue that lacking authorization generates a moral cost, which counts against a war's proportionality, and that having authorization allows the transfer of reasons from the members of the community to those who fight, which makes the war more likely to be proportionate. If democratic states are better able than non-democratic states and sub-state groups to gain their community's authorization, this means that some wars will be proportionate if fought by democracies, disproportionate if not.

U radu se razmatraju osnovni aspekti Lutherova i Calvinova shvaćanja morala, posebno u povezanosti s pojmom (moralne) individualizacije kao ključnog etičkog određenja. Također, razmatra se i pitanje uloge reformacijskog učenja u razgradnji srednjovjekovne »moralne slike svijeta«, kao i posljedice koje je ono izazvalo u političkom i ekonomskom smislu. ; This paper deals with the fundamental aspects of Luther's and Calvin's understanding of morality, particularly regarding the notion of moral individualisation as a key ethical definition. Additionally, the question of the role of Reformation teachings in the degeneration of the medieval "moral picture of the world" is also being considered, as well as the consequences it caused in the political and economic sense.

This paper reconsiders the contemporary moral reading of women's oppression, and revises our understanding of the practical reasons for action a victim of mistreatment acquires through her unjust circumstances. The paper surveys various ways of theorising victims' moral duties to resist their own oppression, and considers objections to prior academic work arguing for the existence of an imperfect Kantian duty of resistance to oppression grounded in self-respect. These objections suggest (1) that such a duty is victimblaming; (2) that it distorts the normative direction of self-regarding duties; and (3) that consequentialist reasons are inapt for justifying self-regarding ethical responsibilities. The paper then argues that the need for normative coherence in our very concept of a moral duty is of paramount importance, and especially so in the fight against patriarchal oppression. Accordingly, we should acknowledge the salient differences between pro tanto or defeasible moral reasons and fully fledged moral duties identifying agent-relative obligatory action. The paper concludes that we better respect and defend women's rights when first we understand them as having, at best, defeasible moral reasons to oppose their oppression; and second, ensure that we make adequate allowance for a woman's interpretative right to choose how to respond to her oppressive circumstances.

A common critique of nudges is that they reduce someone's of choices or elicit behavior through means other than rational persuasion. In this paper, I argue against this form of critique. I argue that, if there is anything distinctively worrisome about nudges from the standpoint of morality, it is is their tendency to hide the amount of social control that they embody, undermining democratic governance by making it more difficult for members of a political community to detect the social architect's pulling of the strings. This concern is particularly salient as to choices where it is important for people to directly engage with a certain set of values, "big personal decisions" (to use a simplifying phrase). Many healthcare decisions are exactly these kinds of choices.

Reprinted from the Annals of the American academy of political and social science, July, 1909. ; Mode of access: Internet.

Reprinted from the Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, July, 1909, for the Playground Association of America. ; Mode of access: Internet.

This article examines debates over local economic development policies and practices in contemporary Slovakia, particularly regarding property and land development. Debates about economic development often occur in relation to economic outcomes, driven by quantitative data and empirical assessments provided by city officials or consultants. In this article, I find that such debates are more likely to be driven by normative concerns, including moral outcomes. I develop a theoretical framework to understand why policy debates occur not in purely objective terms, but the more subjective normative and moral frameworks. The analysis provides greater insight into political debates and policymaking in the postsocialist context.

Dworkin`s political theory is characterized by the interpretative integrity of morality, law, and politics, the so-called "hedgehog's approach". The interpretative integrity approach functions on multiple levels. Firstly, philosophical foundations of his theory of justice are linked to his conception of just liberal society and state. Secondly, from the perspective of political morality, interpretative concepts of law and morality are internally connected, in addition to interpretative concepts of equality, liberty, and democracy. Thirdly, from the perspective of philosophical foundations, individual ethics, personal morality and political morality are mutually connected. The aforementioned ethical and moral foundations are also related – in a wider sense of philosophical foundations - with his gnoseological conception regarding value concepts in law, politics and morality, and with his episthemological conception regarding an objective truth in the field of values, in a sense that the value concepts are interpretative and can be objectively true when articulated in accordance with methodological rules and standards of a »reflexive equilibrium« and an interpretative integrity, and in accordance with the so-called internal scepticism in the context of value pluralism. The term "ethics" in a "narrower" sense refers to individual ethics, the study of how to live well, while the "ethics" in a "broader" sense refers to personal morality, the study of how we must treat other people. The term "morality" however, is used primarily to denote a political morality, the issue of how a sovereign power should treat its citizens. Philosophical foundations of Dworkin`s political theory of justice, his conception of two cardinal values of humanity, his concievement of individual ethics, personal morality and political morality will be in the focus of consideration.

"Some Reflections on Multiculturalism, 'Equal Concern and Respect,' and the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment" lecture given by Sanford Levinson, who occupies the W. St. John Garwood and W. St. John Garwood Jr., Regents Chair in the Law at the University of Texas Law School. "Abraham, Isaac, and the State: Faith-healing and Legal Intervention" lecture given by Henry J. Abraham, who is the James Hart Professor of Government and Foreign Affairs at the University of Virginia. "Is the Idea of Human Rights Ineliminably Religious?" lecture given by Michael Perry who occupies the Howard J. Trienens Chair in Law at Northwestern University.

In recent years, the Supreme Court has taken inconsistent approaches to the question of whether morality can be a legitimate government interest sufficient to survive constitutional review. This article identifies three such approaches: (1) cases where morality is not considered as a legitimate government interest; (2) cases where morality is a legitimate government interest; and (3) cases where the Supreme Court has substituted its own moral judgment for those of the state actor under review. None of these approaches is wholly satisfactory. This article will argue that, in most cases, deferential review of morality-based state action fosters moral diversity, which is a social good to be sought through the law. In cases of certain minorities, however, a more searching review is justified, and the expression of public morality should be subordinated to the protection of minority rights.

We analyze the impact of tax morality on progressive income (wage) taxation. We assume that transfers (cash-back) and public expenditures are financed from linear wage taxes. We derive the reported wages from individual utility maximization, when individuals obtain partial satisfaction from reporting wages (depending on their tax morality), and cannot be excluded from the use of public services. The government maximizes a utilitarian social welfare function, also taking into account the utility of public services. The major conjecture is illustrated by numerical examples: the optimal degree of redistribution and the size of the public services are increasing functions of the individuals' tax morality.