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This paper discusses the relationship between moral philosophy and political philosophy. It holds that political philosophy in some way is part of moral philosophy as the former deals with the content of moral standards governing the relations between individuals and institutions. That would be the purpose of the "morality of institutions", while the so-called "individual morality" would inform the standards applicable to individuals. On the basis of a conception of individual morality as it relates to contractualism and a discussion of the morality of institutions that closely follows John Rawls' theory of justice, the paper addresses the question of the foundations of the obligation to comply with institution- defined standards that are directed towards individuals. At the end, it focuses in particular on the difficulty of rationalizing that obligation in the case of unjust institutions.

This paper discusses the relationship between moral philosophy and political
philosophy. It holds that political philosophy in some way is part of moral
philosophy as the former deals with the content of moral standards governing
the relations between individuals and institutions. That would be the purpose
of the ?morality of institutions?, while the so-called "individual morality"
would inform the standards applicable to individuals. On the basis of a
conception of individual morality as it relates to contractualism and a
discussion of the morality of institutions that closely follows John Rawls?
theory of justice, the paper addresses the question of the foundations of the
obligation to comply with institution-defined standards that are directed
towards individuals. At the end, it focuses in particular on the difficulty
of rationalizing that obligation in the case of unjust institutions.

"Morality Policy" published on by Oxford University Press.

Discusses "the morality of fear," revisiting & revising the general understanding of the concept of morality & its foundation in intrinsic & universal value. The morality of fear is produced by the privileging of vulnerability & thus security over other interests as the structural bases of society. The morality of fear has been endorsed as a mode of morality by such social philosophers as Hobbes & Gracian, a partial & dysfunctional mode that should be countered by other interests such as honesty, courage, & self-actualization. K. Coddon

AbstractIt is commonly believed that the moral norms of "everyday" or "traditional" morality apply uniformly in all business contexts. However, Joseph Heath has recently argued that this is not the case. According to Heath, the norms of everyday morality apply with respect to "administered" transactions but not "market" transactions. Market transactions are, he argues, governed by a distinct, "adversarial" morality. In this article, I argue that Heath's attempt to show that competitive contexts are governed by a distinct, adversarial morality does not succeed. I then undertake the task of showing that, contrary to what is commonly thought, competitive actions can be reconciled with the norms of traditional morality.