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This paper examines some of the main assumptions on which the IR theory of political realism is based. According to the theory of political realism, national interest and not morality is the main criterion by which the state acts in its foreign affairs. In its first part this article examines three arguments in support of realists' skepticism towards morality in international relations. In the second part the concept of national interest and the possibility of its application as the main criterion in choosing the state action in international relations are examined. The author argues that the only plausible version of morality is universal morality based on respect for fundamental human rights. Realists' view of morality at the international level cannot be defended in a convincing manner. Still, the theory of political realism provides valuable insights about the nature of international morality and the limits of its application. Adapted from the source document.

Nenad Miscevic's Nationalism and Beyond: Introducing Moral Debate about Values (New York: CEU Press, 2001) is reviewed. Of the book's three parts, part 1 describes nationalism as a political program; part 2 discusses the relationship between culture, identity, & tradition; & part 3 proposes cosmopolitanism as an alternative to nationalism. The review focuses on Miscevic's debunking of the intellectual, political, cultural, & moral arguments advanced by proponents in favor of nationalism; the various arguments are presented & Miscevic's criticism is supported. It is concluded that the author's ethical-political argumentation against nationalism is very convincing, but his treatment of the relationship between the individual & society seems to be too general & perfunctory. 2 References. Z. Dubiel

The great story of don Quijote is the first novel in the literary West which attempts to restore the lost gestures (of mercy, chivalry, generosity, morality, & politicality as common interest), or rather bring them within the range of remembrance of the new epoch. Or, in the words of G. Agamben, "it tries for the last time to evoke that which threatens to elude it forever." The insanity of the epoch is manifest primarily through the insanity related to "loss of control over the gestures"; thus a demented gesticulation with absolute gestures of power becomes a universal symptom. It is precisely to this insanity of his time that the insane don Quijote responds with imagined or imaginary pure gestures of pure chivalry. This is the code of don Quijote's insanity: everyone claims that he alone is insane, but no one is aware that they themselves have fallen into the trap of insanity. The historical events testify to this fall into insanity, to the forgetting of every genuine chivalrous gesture, first & foremost towards adversaries, women, children, the elderly & the politically deprived. The end of religious tolerance is connected with the collapse of chivalrous idealism. The unhappy or lost mankind has lost its gestures of chivalry, morality & politicality, & this is the hour of the cruel world of outright political violence. The center of this world of dismay is the court as "the court of death," as the image of "evil giants" & "colossuses" which it sends forth from its deadly womb as the sole life-forces. Presently the court spreads the seed of wizardry as the seed of death to all corners of the world, as well as all arbitrary powers, from wizarding to nuclear, both in the present & in the future. Adapted from the source document.

In the wake of the 'Kant revival,' which has spawned a plethora of works on his philosophy by its contemporary interpreters & advocates such as Herbert Schnadelbach, Hans Lenk, Konrad Cramer, Wilhelm Vossenkuhl, Volker Gerhardt, Karl-Otto Apel, Otfried Hoffe & others (whose studies were published this year under the title of Kant in der Diskussion der Moderne), the author tries to prove, by means of an analysis of Kant's treatise Uber den Gemeinspruch: Das mag in der Theorie richtig sein, taugt aber nicht fur die Praxis, that not only did Kant in his later works draft & expound the program of a practical philosophy of morality & right, politics, & history, but also that in the last three chapters of this work, this philosophy evolves into a modern liberal theory of morality, state law, & international or "international civil" law built around the central principle of Kant's practical philosophy: "Was aus Vernunftgrunden fur die Theorie gilt, das gilt auch fur die Praxis.". Adapted from the source document.

Kant's philosophy in its entirety outgrew its Humeist heritage of rational empiricism, ie, relativism. This relativism is particularly unwelcome in the realm of morality -- hence his philosophy of a priori concepts. Since law, as the minimum of morality, would be invalidated by the political (value) relativism, Kant has no politics apart from law -- specifically civil, Roman law -- which he declares natural (& absolutely rational). Roman private legal principles are the axiomatic foundations on which a structure of deductional theorems of political reasoning is erected. Ubi ius ibi remedium is the central principle, which serves to deny & circumvent rights -- including the right to revolt -- that would make up a set of political supra "rights." In the age of enlightened absolutism -- a schematic derivative of the philosophy of rationalism -- government ceased to be diffuse. Its bearers became too unequivocal, & the whole system turned into a highly visible & assailable target. For Kant (as well as for Hobbes), anarchy is the worst form of tyranny. While Montesquieu & Rousseau sought refuge from tyranny in the diffusion of power, & Raynal & Mably claimed that the right to resist oppression is not only the ultimate remedium but a civil duty, Kant (long before the French revolution & Burke) considers as nonpermissible not only the right to resist oppression but also that against revolutions instigated by legitimate sovereigns. Adapted from the source document.

The debate on this topic began in the 1950s in the texts by Patrick Devlin. Devlin argued that for the sake of its stability the community has the right to impose moral standards by means of law in relation to those actions that breed intolerance, anger & disgust. Devlin's arguments are challenged on several grounds. First, Hart's argument is accepted, that there is no direct connection between such moral attitudes & the stability of a community. Second, Devlin's foundations of morality are rejected. & finally, an alternative model of the stability of community is taken over from Rawls' social contract theory. References. Adapted from the source document.

The author analyzes the reinterpretation of the 17th-century English political philosopher Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) offered by contemporary American philosopher Gregory S. Kavka. The state of nature, the social contract (pact), the forming of the very first state, & the problem of compliance to its newly formed government are discussed. The question arises of how it is possible to make a social contract because it is still a "state of nature contract," & in these conditions, contracts do not oblige adherence while there is yet no one to punish rebellion or disobedience. (Rather, the state should be a result of that contract.) Another question concerns the possibility of establishing morality in the state of nature, because no authority is formed there, & therefore a moral code & positive law system are nonexistent. The author claims (together with Kavka) that, in spite of the fact that there exists no entire moral code, the possibility of elemental traces of morality exists, because morality & nature (from humanistic outlook) are timeless, as is the state of nature as well. 4 References. Adapted from the source document.

The author describes the spiritual climate at the time of the publication of Rawis' A Theory of Justice (1971) & describes its huge impact on the political philosophy of the 20th century. Then he analyses Rawls' acknowledgement of Kant. First he depicts Rawls' formulation of his original position along the lines of Kant's idea of the autonomy of the individual & the categorical imperative. There might be some problems with the possible convergence of Rawls' economism & Kant's moral position. According to Rawis, the original position parties may express their nature, but at the same time they belong to the intelligible world. Raws has tried to overcome this divergence from Kant's concept in his paper Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory by means of distinguishing between the rational & the full autonomy, from which the author concludes that Rawis was inclined to adopt a certain version of utilitarianism. According to the author, Rawis' attempt to bridge Kant's rigorous distinction between the law & the morality by means of his sense of justice is entirely alien to Kant. Hence there is an unbridgable chasm between Kant & Rawis, which does not mean that Rawis' attempt at using Kant's categories in the design of democratic societies is insufficiently legitimate. 71 References. Adapted from the source document.

The author looks into the meaning of law in Kant's practical philosophy for the constitution of a political community. First, he defines the specific character of modern knowledge by referring to Heidegger & Fink & how this knowledge is reflected in Kant's philosophy of morality & law. Then he goes on to define the external legislation & list its applications. After the author has defined Kant's concept of law, he shows how freedom & its security -- not happiness, well-being, or interest -- are central to Kant's political philosophy. Freedom becomes the foundation of all activities & laws, & freedom can only be based on law & not morality. Thus, individual freedom is possible solely within a law-abiding community. Adapted from the source document.

The author outlines the chief features of the constructivist moral conception in its Kantian variant & argues that such a moral conception had been unjustifiably looked over in relation to the traditional moral conceptions such as utilitariarism, intuitionism & perfectionism. The central idea of Kantian constructivism is linking certain notions of the person & principles of justice that should regulate basic social institutions by means of the constructivist procedure. The author's starting point is the conception of moral persons as free & equal. He claims that an appropriate connection among thus perceived persons & the first principles of justice is established in such a way that the first principles are chosen under reasonable conditions in which individuals possess solely such qualities. The reasonable conditions consist of the symmetrical situatedness of the "choosers," the veil of ignorance (which obscures the morally irrelevant features of persons' attributes) & the publicity condition. The author's goal is to reach a proper viewpoint on the basis of which citizens are to judge their fundamental social institutions & in that way achieve consensus on the need for & the direction of their reform. Adapted from the source document.

This paper examines some of the main assumptions on which the IR theory of political realism is based. According to the theory of political realism, national interest and not morality is the main criterion by which the state acts in its foreign affairs. In its first part this article examines three arguments in support of realists' skepticism towards morality in international relations. In the second part the concept of national interest and the possibility of its application as the main criterion in choosing the state action in international relations are examined. The author argues that the only plausible version of morality is universal morality based on respect for fundamental human rights. Realists' view of morality at the international level cannot be defended in a convincing manner. Still, the theory of political realism provides valuable insights about the nature of international morality and the limits of its application. Adapted from the source document.

The author contends that it is, in principle, legitimate to talk about global justice/fairness. Everybody has the right to humane living conditions, irrespective of borders & places of birth. However, we cannot expect the emergence of a world state, not even in the form of a world federation: namely, there is no analogy between the individual's natural state & the states' natural state. States are already an established legal state. This means that any association of states, any federation, even a world state, can come into being only by means of an agreement, which is not very likely. The question is how much the existing borders can & should be open? Is there a universal right to the freedom of movement, the freedom of entering a country, the freedom of employment & immigration? According to the author, the universal moral expectation that every person has exactly the same, unlimited rights in these respects founders over the ethical limitations of universalism. In modernity, the universalistic moral & the ethics of closeness, ie, the responsibilities towards people as such & the responsibilities towards one's own solitary community, have been at variance. To live in modernity means that we cannot apply only one criterion as there are at least two & they allow for the prevalence of one perspective over the other only on a case by case basis, but not generally. Adapted from the source document.

Hegel's teaching on the objective spirit, as a moment of the world spirit, is an idea based on objective morality, while modern state is the highest historical manifestation of that morality. The objective spirit understood in this way is juxtaposed by the subjective morality in the form of the contingency of instincts & concepts of individual subjects: these two elements make for the specific constitution of modern state. For a state to exist as the realization of freedom & to fulfill its world-historical task, it is necessary to eliminate & overcome the opposition of these two elements. That is why in Hegel's "ideal" concept of the structure of the state (which for him means communal life in freedom), the state-community is defined as a unity of free individuals-citizens, permeated with the idea of the good. Adapted from the source document.

The paper begins with an overview of contemporary liberal-egalitarian theories in order to show the diversity among different understandings of justice. Then, the paper draws a borderline between luck egalitarianism (Arneson, G. A. Cohen, Roemer) and a pro-democratic, relational egalitarianism (Rawls, J. Cohen, Anderson, Barry) that focuses on the society's structure, i.e. the production of its inner relations. The following part introduces the idea of reflective equilibrium and its theoretical benefits in terms of 'de-metaphysised' ethics. Furthermore, this part elaborates Dworkin's liberal principle of justice as the basis of his liberal moral doctrine. Finally, the paper shows that a 'de-metaphysised' ethics could not be equated with the conception of justice as mutual advantage, and neither is it lost in an Archimedean skepticism. By referring to Barry's work, the paper elaborates the idea of justice as impartiality through the debate between moral objectivism and skepticism. The paper ends with synthesising a conclusion of the previous three parts. Also, it defines justice as implied by Rawls' liberal egalitarianism. Ultimately, the paper identifies the need for further research of the topic that would elaborate and answer the questions highlighted by this paper. Adapted from the source document.