Suchergebnisse

As already indicated by the title, this master thesis provides the analysis of public order and morality as grounds of refusal to register a Community trade mark. The thesis consists of two parts, the first of which presents various concepts and theories concerning the terms "public order" and "morality", cohesion between these two terms, and the relationship between law and morals, as well as evaluates the relationship between the protection of public order and morality and the freedom of expression. The second section focuses on the practise of international, European Union and national authorities examining cases regarding refusal to register a mark contrary to public order and morality. Furthermore, in the final part of the paper the author reveals the main guidelines and criteria for trade mark examination. The purpose of this study is to reveal the diversity of concepts of public order and morality and the dependence of their content on many factors, as well as to evaluate the relationship between the protection of public order and morality and the freedom of expression, and to determine the main guidelines and criteria for trademark examination. Thus, by achieving these goals, the thesis provides theoretical arguments backed up by case law and case study. Finally, it is concluded that the definition of public order and morality is relative and depends on many factors, such as political system and social order, legal tradition, customs, religion, civilization and cultural level, current events in the country, public opinion, social and spiritual environment; and the main guidelines and criteria for trade mark examination are summarized.

As already indicated by the title, this master thesis provides the analysis of public order and morality as grounds of refusal to register a Community trade mark. The thesis consists of two parts, the first of which presents various concepts and theories concerning the terms "public order" and "morality", cohesion between these two terms, and the relationship between law and morals, as well as evaluates the relationship between the protection of public order and morality and the freedom of expression. The second section focuses on the practise of international, European Union and national authorities examining cases regarding refusal to register a mark contrary to public order and morality. Furthermore, in the final part of the paper the author reveals the main guidelines and criteria for trade mark examination. The purpose of this study is to reveal the diversity of concepts of public order and morality and the dependence of their content on many factors, as well as to evaluate the relationship between the protection of public order and morality and the freedom of expression, and to determine the main guidelines and criteria for trademark examination. Thus, by achieving these goals, the thesis provides theoretical arguments backed up by case law and case study. Finally, it is concluded that the definition of public order and morality is relative and depends on many factors, such as political system and social order, legal tradition, customs, religion, civilization and cultural level, current events in the country, public opinion, social and spiritual environment; and the main guidelines and criteria for trade mark examination are summarized.

Although it is common to associate the thought of A. Jokubaitis with political philosophy, this article argues that his texts also allow us to talk about a specific moral philosophy of A. Jokubaitis. At the center of it we find an attempt to articulate and discuss the grounding ideas of morality. The article argues that the first two ideas – an idea of unconditional character of morality and an idea of ontological grounding – are related to Kant's influence on A. Jokubaitis philosophy. These two ideas allow us to explain morality as an autonomous part of reality, which is different from the empirical one but nonetheless real. This part of reality is grounded in the first-person perspective of a moral subject and can be characterized by implicit normativity and unconditionality. The first-person perspective structures a radically different relation to our reality, which allows us to be agents, not simply spectators. Such an interpretation of Kant allows to associate A. Jokubaitis with his contemporary Kantians, such as Ch. Korsgaard, B. Herman, O. O'Neill, and A. Reath. However, the third idea, the one of a person, which becomes more visible in his book Politinis idiotas, transcends the Kantian conception of practical reason and encourages to perceive morality and its grounding in a much wider context. The concept of a person allows A. Jokubaitis to distance himself from Kantian rationalism and integrate social and mystical aspects of morality, which he has always found important.

Although it is common to associate the thought of A. Jokubaitis with political philosophy, this article argues that his texts also allow us to talk about a specific moral philosophy of A. Jokubaitis. At the center of it we find an attempt to articulate and discuss the grounding ideas of morality. The article argues that the first two ideas – an idea of unconditional character of morality and an idea of ontological grounding – are related to Kant's influence on A. Jokubaitis philosophy. These two ideas allow us to explain morality as an autonomous part of reality, which is different from the empirical one but nonetheless real. This part of reality is grounded in the first-person perspective of a moral subject and can be characterized by implicit normativity and unconditionality. The first-person perspective structures a radically different relation to our reality, which allows us to be agents, not simply spectators. Such an interpretation of Kant allows to associate A. Jokubaitis with his contemporary Kantians, such as Ch. Korsgaard, B. Herman, O. O'Neill, and A. Reath. However, the third idea, the one of a person, which becomes more visible in his book Politinis idiotas, transcends the Kantian conception of practical reason and encourages to perceive morality and its grounding in a much wider context. The concept of a person allows A. Jokubaitis to distance himself from Kantian rationalism and integrate social and mystical aspects of morality, which he has always found important.

Although it is common to associate the thought of A. Jokubaitis with political philosophy, this article argues that his texts also allow us to talk about a specific moral philosophy of A. Jokubaitis. At the center of it we find an attempt to articulate and discuss the grounding ideas of morality. The article argues that the first two ideas – an idea of unconditional character of morality and an idea of ontological grounding – are related to Kant's influence on A. Jokubaitis philosophy. These two ideas allow us to explain morality as an autonomous part of reality, which is different from the empirical one but nonetheless real. This part of reality is grounded in the first-person perspective of a moral subject and can be characterized by implicit normativity and unconditionality. The first-person perspective structures a radically different relation to our reality, which allows us to be agents, not simply spectators. Such an interpretation of Kant allows to associate A. Jokubaitis with his contemporary Kantians, such as Ch. Korsgaard, B. Herman, O. O'Neill, and A. Reath. However, the third idea, the one of a person, which becomes more visible in his book Politinis idiotas, transcends the Kantian conception of practical reason and encourages to perceive morality and its grounding in a much wider context. The concept of a person allows A. Jokubaitis to distance himself from Kantian rationalism and integrate social and mystical aspects of morality, which he has always found important.

Although it is common to associate the thought of A. Jokubaitis with political philosophy, this article argues that his texts also allow us to talk about a specific moral philosophy of A. Jokubaitis. At the center of it we find an attempt to articulate and discuss the grounding ideas of morality. The article argues that the first two ideas – an idea of unconditional character of morality and an idea of ontological grounding – are related to Kant's influence on A. Jokubaitis philosophy. These two ideas allow us to explain morality as an autonomous part of reality, which is different from the empirical one but nonetheless real. This part of reality is grounded in the first-person perspective of a moral subject and can be characterized by implicit normativity and unconditionality. The first-person perspective structures a radically different relation to our reality, which allows us to be agents, not simply spectators. Such an interpretation of Kant allows to associate A. Jokubaitis with his contemporary Kantians, such as Ch. Korsgaard, B. Herman, O. O'Neill, and A. Reath. However, the third idea, the one of a person, which becomes more visible in his book Politinis idiotas, transcends the Kantian conception of practical reason and encourages to perceive morality and its grounding in a much wider context. The concept of a person allows A. Jokubaitis to distance himself from Kantian rationalism and integrate social and mystical aspects of morality, which he has always found important.

This master thesis provides the analysis of protection of religious symbols as part of public policy and morality in trademark law and advertising law. The thesis consists of three parts. First part presents cohesion between religion, law and morality and relationship between morality and public policy. First part findings are: with regard to separation of state and church constitutional principle, religion can not directly affect secular law, however, religion can make influence to secular law over morals principles. Also public morality should be interpreted as part of public policy, because universal morality does not exist. So protection of religious symbols is a part of public policy in this master thesis context. Second part focuses on analysis of Lithuania Law on Advertising and Trademark law norms related with protection of religious symbols. Following the evaluation of Europe Union acts, other countries regulation and Lithuania laws travaux préparatoires, is concluded that protection of religious symbols is not separate ground of refusal trademarks registration or prohibition of advertising, but protection of religious symbols is part of public policy and morality as a ground of refusal trademark registration or prohibition of advertising. Third section focuses on the practice of Lithuania, international, European Union and other countries national court or authorities examining cases regarding refusal to register trademark or prohibition of advertising contrary to protection of religious symbols. In this part author reveals the main criteria to trademark or advertising examination and problem aspects of cohesion between protection of religious symbols and freedom of expression.

This master thesis provides the analysis of protection of religious symbols as part of public policy and morality in trademark law and advertising law. The thesis consists of three parts. First part presents cohesion between religion, law and morality and relationship between morality and public policy. First part findings are: with regard to separation of state and church constitutional principle, religion can not directly affect secular law, however, religion can make influence to secular law over morals principles. Also public morality should be interpreted as part of public policy, because universal morality does not exist. So protection of religious symbols is a part of public policy in this master thesis context. Second part focuses on analysis of Lithuania Law on Advertising and Trademark law norms related with protection of religious symbols. Following the evaluation of Europe Union acts, other countries regulation and Lithuania laws travaux préparatoires, is concluded that protection of religious symbols is not separate ground of refusal trademarks registration or prohibition of advertising, but protection of religious symbols is part of public policy and morality as a ground of refusal trademark registration or prohibition of advertising. Third section focuses on the practice of Lithuania, international, European Union and other countries national court or authorities examining cases regarding refusal to register trademark or prohibition of advertising contrary to protection of religious symbols. In this part author reveals the main criteria to trademark or advertising examination and problem aspects of cohesion between protection of religious symbols and freedom of expression.

This master thesis provides the analysis of protection of religious symbols as part of public policy and morality in trademark law and advertising law. The thesis consists of three parts. First part presents cohesion between religion, law and morality and relationship between morality and public policy. First part findings are: with regard to separation of state and church constitutional principle, religion can not directly affect secular law, however, religion can make influence to secular law over morals principles. Also public morality should be interpreted as part of public policy, because universal morality does not exist. So protection of religious symbols is a part of public policy in this master thesis context. Second part focuses on analysis of Lithuania Law on Advertising and Trademark law norms related with protection of religious symbols. Following the evaluation of Europe Union acts, other countries regulation and Lithuania laws travaux préparatoires, is concluded that protection of religious symbols is not separate ground of refusal trademarks registration or prohibition of advertising, but protection of religious symbols is part of public policy and morality as a ground of refusal trademark registration or prohibition of advertising. Third section focuses on the practice of Lithuania, international, European Union and other countries national court or authorities examining cases regarding refusal to register trademark or prohibition of advertising contrary to protection of religious symbols. In this part author reveals the main criteria to trademark or advertising examination and problem aspects of cohesion between protection of religious symbols and freedom of expression.

This master thesis provides the analysis of protection of religious symbols as part of public policy and morality in trademark law and advertising law. The thesis consists of three parts. First part presents cohesion between religion, law and morality and relationship between morality and public policy. First part findings are: with regard to separation of state and church constitutional principle, religion can not directly affect secular law, however, religion can make influence to secular law over morals principles. Also public morality should be interpreted as part of public policy, because universal morality does not exist. So protection of religious symbols is a part of public policy in this master thesis context. Second part focuses on analysis of Lithuania Law on Advertising and Trademark law norms related with protection of religious symbols. Following the evaluation of Europe Union acts, other countries regulation and Lithuania laws travaux préparatoires, is concluded that protection of religious symbols is not separate ground of refusal trademarks registration or prohibition of advertising, but protection of religious symbols is part of public policy and morality as a ground of refusal trademark registration or prohibition of advertising. Third section focuses on the practice of Lithuania, international, European Union and other countries national court or authorities examining cases regarding refusal to register trademark or prohibition of advertising contrary to protection of religious symbols. In this part author reveals the main criteria to trademark or advertising examination and problem aspects of cohesion between protection of religious symbols and freedom of expression.

Researchers of Kant's political philosophy have not paid enough attention to the problem of certainty in politics which is inseparable from the distinction between phenomenon and noumenon. The primacy of practical reason means that morality has a higher value than knowledge. This is a fundamental presupposition of Kant's philosophy. However, this emphasis on the importance of morality leads to the problematic question of certainty in politics. The recognition of the primacy of morality seems to lead to a situation where politics loses the certainty that belongs to the sphere of noumenon. Such a situation seems to lead to an impossible situation when the distinction between phenomenon and noumenon reappears in the theory of practical reason. The paper puts forward a thesis that for Kant morality is the only ground that allows speaking about the certainty of politics. However, his understanding of certainty in politics has its drawbacks. Politics is dependent not only on the ontology of morality that was emphasized by Kant, but it is also dependent on the kind of certainty that one finds in the sphere of interpersonal relationships. Kant did not pay enough attention to this aspect which remains outside the sphere of the universal law of morality.

Researchers of Kant's political philosophy have not paid enough attention to the problem of certainty in politics which is inseparable from the distinction between phenomenon and noumenon. The primacy of practical reason means that morality has a higher value than knowledge. This is a fundamental presupposition of Kant's philosophy. However, this emphasis on the importance of morality leads to the problematic question of certainty in politics. The recognition of the primacy of morality seems to lead to a situation where politics loses the certainty that belongs to the sphere of noumenon. Such a situation seems to lead to an impossible situation when the distinction between phenomenon and noumenon reappears in the theory of practical reason. The paper puts forward a thesis that for Kant morality is the only ground that allows speaking about the certainty of politics. However, his understanding of certainty in politics has its drawbacks. Politics is dependent not only on the ontology of morality that was emphasized by Kant, but it is also dependent on the kind of certainty that one finds in the sphere of interpersonal relationships. Kant did not pay enough attention to this aspect which remains outside the sphere of the universal law of morality.

Researchers of Kant's political philosophy have not paid enough attention to the problem of certainty in politics which is inseparable from the distinction between phenomenon and noumenon. The primacy of practical reason means that morality has a higher value than knowledge. This is a fundamental presupposition of Kant's philosophy. However, this emphasis on the importance of morality leads to the problematic question of certainty in politics. The recognition of the primacy of morality seems to lead to a situation where politics loses the certainty that belongs to the sphere of noumenon. Such a situation seems to lead to an impossible situation when the distinction between phenomenon and noumenon reappears in the theory of practical reason. The paper puts forward a thesis that for Kant morality is the only ground that allows speaking about the certainty of politics. However, his understanding of certainty in politics has its drawbacks. Politics is dependent not only on the ontology of morality that was emphasized by Kant, but it is also dependent on the kind of certainty that one finds in the sphere of interpersonal relationships. Kant did not pay enough attention to this aspect which remains outside the sphere of the universal law of morality.

Researchers of Kant's political philosophy have not paid enough attention to the problem of certainty in politics which is inseparable from the distinction between phenomenon and noumenon. The primacy of practical reason means that morality has a higher value than knowledge. This is a fundamental presupposition of Kant's philosophy. However, this emphasis on the importance of morality leads to the problematic question of certainty in politics. The recognition of the primacy of morality seems to lead to a situation where politics loses the certainty that belongs to the sphere of noumenon. Such a situation seems to lead to an impossible situation when the distinction between phenomenon and noumenon reappears in the theory of practical reason. The paper puts forward a thesis that for Kant morality is the only ground that allows speaking about the certainty of politics. However, his understanding of certainty in politics has its drawbacks. Politics is dependent not only on the ontology of morality that was emphasized by Kant, but it is also dependent on the kind of certainty that one finds in the sphere of interpersonal relationships. Kant did not pay enough attention to this aspect which remains outside the sphere of the universal law of morality.

The aim of the paper is to prove the incompatibility of Kantian philosophy with empirical political science. The nonexistence of such a science in Kant's structure of reason is not a coincidence that was determined by historical contingencies, it is a necessary position of his teaching. The domination of morality in Kant's conception of practical reason does not leave any room for empirical science of politics. Firstly, introduction of methods borrowed from the natural sciences would lead to the demoralization of politics. Secondly, empirical science of politics deforms our understanding of politics. Thirdly, when politics is divorced from morality it loses its ontological foundation. Empirical science of politics that only attempts to investigate facts is incapable of understanding the role of ideas and for this reason does not distinguish between empirical and conceptual factors. Such a science does not recognize the human person as a free subject of morality and sees him as a consequence of external factors. Finally, political science that is divorced from morals deforms understanding of practical reason.