Suchergebnisse

Das Buch befasst sich mit dem laufenden Reformprozess zur Investor-Staat Streitbeilegung in der UNCITRAL-Arbeitsgruppe III und insbesondere dem Vorschlag zur Schaffung eines multilateralen Investitionsgerichtshofs (MIC). Eine Einleitung gibt den Rahmen vor und verschafft einen Überblick zu historischem Hintergrund und aktuellen Entwicklungen. Auf dieser Grundlage werden in den folgenden Kapiteln verschiedene Aspekte der Schaffung und Implementierung eines MIC beleuchtet. Die Kapitel behandeln Schlüsselelemente des MIC-Vorschlags wie den institutionellen Rahmen des Gerichtshofs, die Ausgestaltung eines Berufungsmechanismus, den Einsatz von Verfahren zur Beilegung von Massenklagen und die Einrichtung eines Beratungszentrums für Entwicklungsländer. Darüber hinaus wird die Auswahl und Ernennung der Richter diskutiert. Neben der Struktur und den Verfahren des Gerichts stellen sich auch Fragen der Implementierung. Wie kann der MIC in das bestehende ISDS-System integriert werden? Wie kann die Durchsetzung seiner Entscheidungen sichergestellt werden? Auf politischer Ebene geht das MIC-Projekt auf eine Initiative der EU zurück. Daher wird die Rolle der EU im Reformprozess in einem eigenen Kapitel analysiert. Anmerkungen aus der Sicht der Rechtspraxis runden die Beiträge ab. Jedes Kapitel hebt die zu diskutierenden Rechtsfragen hervor und stellt sie in einen größeren Zusammenhang. Ziel ist es, den Leserinnen und Lesern ein Verständnis für die verschiedenen Teile der komplexen Gesamtdiskussion zu vermitteln, welche Kernfragen wichtig sind und wie diese miteinander zusammenhängen. Mit Beiträgen von Ingo Borgdorf, Johanna Braun, Alexander Dünkelsbühler, Leonard Funk, Moritz Keller, Caroline Kittelmann, Niclas Landmann, Carla Müller, Philipp Reinhold und Julian Scheu.

Abstract
The EU has now shifted from ad hoc investment arbitration to an envisaged Multilateral Investment Court. Its essential character is expected to be a two-instance standing court system, together with a random allocation of cases. This judicialized court system could address China's preference of correctness as to ISDS system to some extent, subject to the competence of judges, while at the same time it raises new problems and new concerns. Firstly, would the envisaged standing court, in the context of enhancing the regulatory powers of states, still be qualified as a neutral forum to strike the appropriate balance between the protection of investors' right and preservation of states' regulatory powers? Secondly, would the judicialized court system be effective and flexible enough to suit the current nature of ISDS? Thirdly, would the envisaged two-tier court system be put into efficient operation so as not to become a de facto bar to access of justice? In fact, a judicialized system has its pros and cons, and thus its successful establishment and operation would be subject to more detailed rules.

This open access book considers the potential setup for a future Multilateral Investment Court (MIC). The option of an MIC was first discussed by the EU Commission in 2016 and has since been made an official element of the EU Common Commercial Policy. In 2017, UNCITRAL also decided to discuss the possibility of an MIC, and on 20 March 2018, the Council of the EU gave the EU Commission the mandate to negotiate the creation of an MIC. The "feasibility study" presented here is intended to contribute to a broader discussion on the options for a new international court specialized in investment protection. The cornerstones of such a new permanent court are a strict orientation on the rule of law, reduced costs of investment protection, transparency considerations, aspects of consistency in case law, and the effective enforceability of MIC decisions.

In recent years, the current Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) system has been a subject of reform discussions triggered by several factors, amongst which includes the lack of consistency in ISDS decisions commonly rendered by arbitration tribunals. This undesirable fact places the current ISDS system in conflict with essential rule of law values such as stability, reliability, predictability, and equality - which inevitably diminish the legitimacy of the current system. Undeniably, the un-uniform investment treaties underlying ISDS decisions is a valid justification for divergent outcomes, however, the recognition that a majority of investment treaties share similar if not identical legal standards also makes the argument for consistent ISDS decisions legitimate and in fact necessary to foster the harmonious development of investment law across the network of identical treaty standards. To this end, the use of "precedent" is critical in achieving the aforesaid goal. Notably, albeit informally, the use of precedent is already a recognised practice in ISDS, yet inconsistent decisions persist. As a turning point, this article advocates that consistency in ISDS decisions can be best achieved through the "formal introduction of a system of precedent", in "a Multilateral Investment Court (MIC)", which is possible without jeopardizing the inherent differences contained in International Investment Agreements (IIA).

This open access book considers the potential setup for a future Multilateral Investment Court (MIC). The option of an MIC was first discussed by the EU Commission in 2016 and has since been made an official element of the EU Common Commercial Policy. In 2017, UNCITRAL also decided to discuss the possibility of an MIC, and on 20 March 2018, the Council of the EU gave the EU Commission the mandate to negotiate the creation of an MIC. The "feasibility study" presented here is intended to contribute to a broader discussion on the options for a new international court specialized in investment protection. The cornerstones of such a new permanent court are a strict orientation on the rule of law, reduced costs of investment protection, transparency considerations, aspects of consistency in case law, and the effective enforceability of MIC decisions.