Suchergebnisse

Cover -- Half Title -- Series -- Title -- Copyright -- Contents -- Acknowledgements -- Chapter One Murdoch and lived experience -- Introduction -- A philosophical novelist? -- Sartre and Under the Net: Philosophy and the novel at the outset of Murdoch's career -- The dialectic of Murdoch's life and work -- Chapter Two Murdoch and metaphysics -- Introduction -- Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals -- Murdoch and the 'Manuscript on Heidegger' -- Appraising Heidegger -- Conclusion -- Chapter Three Murdoch and the novel -- Introduction -- Murdoch on the novel and history -- Form, content and the reader in Murdoch's novels -- Murdoch on Plato on art -- Conclusion -- Chapter Four Murdoch and morality -- Murdoch: Moral theory, history and dialectic -- Plato, Murdoch and morality -- Morality in modern times -- Unselfing, attention and the novel -- 'The Idea of Perfection' -- 'On "God" and "Good".' -- 'The Sovereignty of Good over Other Concepts' -- Conclusion -- Chapter Five Murdoch and the political -- Is Murdoch political? -- Politics and the novel -- 'A House of Theory' and early novels -- Murdoch's later political thought -- Conclusion -- Chapter Six Murdoch: Her life and times -- Introduction: The personal and the public -- Letters to Frank Thompson and David Hicks -- Letters to Queneau -- Letters to Michael Oakeshott -- Letters to David Morgan -- Letters to Brigid Brophy -- Letters to Philippa Foot -- Conclusion -- Chapter Seven Conclusion -- Introduction -- Murdoch on Plato -- Hegel on Plato -- Murdoch, Plato and Hegel -- Why Iris Murdoch matters -- Notes -- Biblioghraphy -- Iris Murdoch -- Plays -- Dialogues -- Unpublished writings -- Novels -- Short story -- Other authors -- Unpublished writing -- Index

Iris Murdoch was a notable philosopher before she was a notable novelist and her work was brave, brilliant, and independent. This volume presents essays by critics and admirers of her work, together with a long Introduction on her career, reception, and achievement, an unpublished piece by Murdoch herself, and a memoir by her husband John Bayley.

These notes cover the important unpublished sources on Iris Murdoch that were drawn upon in the writing of the book, 'Why Iris Murdoch Matters' by Gary Browning. Sources include 'Heidegger Manuscript', Letters from Philippa Foot, Michael Oakeshott and Raymond Queneau, Iris Murdoch's application for the post of Tutor in Philosophy at St. Anne's College, and recollections of Murdoch, 'Iris Murdoch's Political Theory Class' by Jennifer Hinton.

Philosophy of the third way -- Reading Murdoch : literary form and philosophical precedents -- Romanticism reconsidered -- Resistance and reconciliation -- Murdoch's romantic vision

Iris Murdoch was one of the great philosophers and novelists of the twentieth century and The Sovereignty of Good is her most important and enduring philosophical work. She argues that philosophy has focused, mistakenly, on what it is right to do rather than good to be and that only by restoring the notion of 'vision' to moral thinking can this distortion be corrected. This brilliant work shows why Iris Murdoch remains essential reading: a vivid and uncompromising style, a commitment to forceful argument, and a courage to go against the grain. With a foreword by Mary Midgley.--

Čak i nedostatno poznavanje suvremenih kulturnih i filozofskih pravaca odmah će ukazati na raširenu sklonost subjektivističkim oblicima moralnog promišljanja. Pod "subjekvističkim" mislim na razne ne-kognitivne i konstruktivističke paradigme u moralnoj filozofijii popularnom govoru koji etičke tvrdnje svode na izričaje osobnih i kolektivnih sklonosti, osjećaja ili predrasuda lišenih bilo kakve objektivne normativnosti. Slijede samo neki čimbenici koji pothranjuju ovakva gledišta: poslovična dihotomija činjenica/vrednota i ntirealistički nazori koji prožimaju znatna područja analitičke filozofije; poststrukturialistička i postkolonijalna "rodoslovlja" koja jezik opće moralnosti vezuje sa diskursima moći, patrijarhata i totalitarnog djelovanja te uporaba govora o vrlinama, vrednotama i "moralnoj jasnoći" za specifi čan skup domaćih i inozemnih političkih interesa i opredjeljenja. Shodno tome, ovakva gledišta vode dvostrukom odmaku od etike: od strukture stvarnosti ali i ljudske egzistencije i ljudskog procvata. Zbog potpunijeg propitivanja ovih pitanja ukratko ću se osvrnut na moralnu fi lozofi ju Iris Murdoch i istražiti kako njen specifi čan oblik etičkog realizma pristupa ovakvim tvrdnjama o etici. Usprkos suzdržanosti u vezi s uvjerljivošću njenog pristupa nastojat ću obrazložiti da je njena temeljna intuicija u povezivanju moralnosti sa širim područjem smisla i prikazima čovjekovog procvata neophodna za teološki prikaz počovječenja života. ; Even a scant acquaintance with current cultural and philosophical trends will readily point to a widespread predilection for subjectivist forms of moral reasoning. By "subjectivist" I refer to various non-cognitivist and constructionist paradigms in moral philosophy and popular parlance that reduce ethical statements to expressions of individual or collective preferences, feelings, or prejudices stripped of any object-given normativity. Th e following are but some of the factors that fuel such perspectives: the proverbial fact/value dichotomy and anti-realist sentiments pervading large swaths of analytic philosophy; poststructuralist and postcolonial "genealogies" that tie the language of universal morality to discourses of power, patriarchy, and totalitarian agency; and the utilization of the language of virtues, values, and "moral clarity" for a specifi c set of domestic and foreign policy commitments. Such intellectual positions, accordingly, result in a double remove of ethics: from the structure of reality on the hand and from human existence and accounts of human fl ourishing on the other. In order to interrogate these issues at a greater length, I will briefl y turn to Iris Murdoch's moral philosophy in order to examine how her specifi c form of ethical realism addresses such claims about ethics. Despite some reservations about the cogency of her approach, I will argue that her basic intuition to connect morality with the wider realm of meaning and accounts of human fl ourishing is indispensable for any theological account of the humanization of life.