Suchergebnisse

URL del artículo en la web de la Revista: https://www.upo.es/revistas/index.php/ripp/article/view/1575 ; Es reseña de: Democratic Values in the Muslim World Moataz A. Fattah Boulder, Colorado, USA : Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2006 ; Universidad Pablo de Olavide

A partir de una doble pregunta atinente al Otro (¿Qué es el Otro?; ¿Quién es el Otro?), se busca pensar el racismo conceptualmente y el discurso racista en su actualidad, partiendo de la hipótesis de que desde los atentados del 11 de septiembre del 2001 la producción de las otredades se articuló en torno a lo religioso: El Islam pasó a ocupar el lugar de enemigo fundamental en la estructura del discurso hegemónico y los sujetos fieles a dicha religión fueron englobados en un todo homogéneo y sospechoso que posibilitó su persecución y su deshumanización a nivel mundial. El racismo no comienza a partir de la enumeración de una serie de características-incluso consideradas negativas por el discurso dominante-de las que podrían ser portadores los musulmanes, sino a partir de que se realiza una inversión y se plantea que esas características las tienen porque son musulmanes. Ese porque conlleva una esencialización que no sólo produce falsas diferencias y falsas identidades, sino que escinde a ciertas prácticas políticas de determinada situación histórica, social, política, cultural y económica de los pueblos de Medio Oriente. ; Taking as a starting point the question of the Other (What is the Other? Who is the Other?), it is sought to think of racism conceptually and also to think of racist discourse at present, starting from the hypothesis that since September 11 Otherness has had to do with the religious sphere. Islam became the main enemy in the structuring of hegemonic discourse and faithful subjects were encompassed in a suspicious coherent whole which made persecution and dehumanisation possible at a world level. Racism does not start from an enumeration of characteristicseven some considered negative by dominant discourse- which Muslim people could have. It has its starting point an inversion of principles by virtue of which those people have those characteristics BECAUSE they are Muslim. That BECAUSE implies some essential assumptions that not only produce false differences and identities, but it also separates certain political practices from a certain historic, social, political, cultural and economic situation for the peoples of the Middle East. ; Sección Estudios. ; Instituto de Relaciones Internacionales (IRI)

Avicena's Metaphysics is probably the most mature expression of the Muslim rationalist thinking from the Middle Ages. From a Marxist point of view, this essay investigates how this way of thinking came to be, its historical roots and the economic, political and social network that made it possible. It also tries to uncover the theoretical problems it addresses and the intellectual needs tries to solve. Finally, this paper outlines a brief review of its historical significance as well as its future projections, today our past. ; De Avicena es seguramente la expresión más madura del pensamiento racionalista musulmán de la Edad Media Este artículo investiga, desde una perspectiva marxista, cómo se hizo posible ese modo de pensar, cuáles fueron sus raíces históricas y qué organización económica, política y social justificó su aparición. Intenta averiguar también a qué problemas teóricos responde y qué necesidades intelectuales busca resolver. Finalmente esboza una breve exposición de su significado histórico y sus proyecciones hacia el futuro, hoy pasado nuestro.

Upon taking the reins of power in the South Asian Sub-continent, the East India Company officials, being aware of how sensitive Indians were of their socio-cultural traditions, adopted a policy of "non-interference" and kept aloof from all matters related to the socio-cultural and religious affairs of the local inhabitants. Instead, they busied themselves with the economic exploitation of the country, the objective for which they had come to the region.Nevertheless, following a vociferous clamour and pressure from the Christian missionaries who regarded the Indian people as "primitive" and "benighted", and who felt duty bound to "civilize" them, the British Government in London forced the East India Company in 1813 to forsake its, hitherto privileged, "no-interference policy" and give the evangelical movement unrestricted access to the country as an essential precondition for the renewal of the charter.Thus, upon setting foot in the Sub-continent, the missionaries, and even some British reform-minded officials, embarked on the process of reforming, as well as westernizing, the Indian society. Although some of the reforms being introduced were, when looked at objectively, positive, they were always despised by the native Indians. Indeed, this brought about a widespread malaise among the natives who interpreted the Company's actions as part of a scheme to forcefully convert them to Christianity. Thus, the task of this paper is to set out this socio-cultural malaise.

En el presente trabajo se aborda la cuestión de los matrimonios mixtos, centrando la atención en los contraídos en forma canónica entre parte católica y musulmana. En este sentido, se estudia desde sus orígenes hasta la celebración en sí. La evolución de estas uniones en el derecho canónico también es analizada, a efectos de poder apreciar las diferencias producidas en los cánones en que se regulan. Este estudio ha sido planteado desde tres perspectivas claramente definidas: canónica, islámica y estatal. Abstract: In this document is approached the topic of mixed marriages, focusing on the ones got in a canonical way between catholic and muslim part. In this case, it is studied since it's origins until it's celebration. The evolution of those marriages in the canonical law is also analized to appreciate the differences produced by the canons which regulates them. This study is approached by three clear perspectives: canonical, islamic and governmental.

The proposed text reflects on the Muslim community and families in Padua including interviews in order to individuate the practices of the transmission of beliefs within the family and the continuity of the group. Mainly from the development of three main points: religious socialization, community representation as umma, according to the mandate of Give to Islam as well of the dichotomy we Muslims / they Christians discourses. Finally, the meanings of identities governed by ethnicity and / or religion and new generations with current debates and struggles identified as new collective identities. That is, the reinterpretation allows the emergence of a new collective identity that makes use of practices that are in tension with the host society emerging like a political force. ; El texto propuesto reflexiona sobre la comunidad musulmana en Padua y sobre las familias entrevistas en particular con el objetivo de individuar las prácticas de la transmisión de creencias al interior de la familia y de la continuidad del grupo creyente. Principalmente a partir del desarrollo de tres puntos centrales: la socialización religiosa, la representación de la comunidad como umma, según el mandato coránico de dar al islam y en la dicotomía nosotros/ellos de los discursos. Por ultimo se abordan las significaciones de las identidades regidas por lo étnico y/o lo religioso y las nuevas generaciones con sus debates y luchas actuales identificadas como Nuevas identidades colectivas. Es decir, la reinterpretación permite el surgimiento de una nueva identidad colectiva que hace uso de prácticas que entran en tensión con la sociedad de acogida emergiendo como fuerza política.

La creciente presencia de musulmanes en España configura nuevas reivindicaciones y tensiones que examinan la capacidad de la sociedad española para aceptar "otras" religiones y "otras" prácticas culturales. Partiendo de una noción de grupos de interés, cabe esperar la creación de asociaciones que representen dichos intereses. Este trabajo analiza el comportamiento colectivo y la configuración de intereses de los musulmanes a nivel local, en la ciudad de Granada. Partimos de dos estudios de caso para trazar nuestras conclusiones: por un lado, la larga reivindicación musulmana de disponer de un cementerio islámico y, por otro, la tensa negociación en torno a la celebración del Día de la Toma. Se ha empleado una metodología cualitativa basada en entrevistas a los actores principales así como referencias a prensa local, documentos oficiales e informes privados. Se exponen varias conclusiones: primero, en referencia a su organización, debemos entender a las comunidades islámicas, variadas, numerosas y no siempre conectadas, como los principales referentes asociativos. Segundo, su influencia vendrá caracterizada por su (hasta la fecha) situación de outsiders, aspecto que les impedirá desarrollar estrategias de alto impacto a corto plazo. Y, tercero, la persistencia en sus tareas de presión les lleva a lograr, de forma completa o parcial, sus objetivos. ; The growing presence of Muslims in Spain sets new demands and strains that examine the ability of Spanish society to accept "other" religions and "other" cultural practices. Based on a concept of interest groups, we can expect the creation of associations representing those interests. This paper analyzes the collective behaviour and configuration of interests of Muslims in the city of Granada. We rely on two case studies to draw our conclusions: first, the long Muslim claim to have an Islamic cemetery and, secondly, the tense negotiations about "el Día de la Toma". We have used a qualitative methodology based on interviews with key players and references to local press, official documents and private reports. We provide some conclusions: first, in regard to their organization, we must understand the Islamic communities -varied, numerous and not always connected- as the most representative interlocutors. Second, their influence will be characterized by their (to date) outsider position, something that will prevent them from developing high-impact, short-time strategies. And third, continuity in claims leads them to achieve, in whole or in part, their goals.

Marx has a threefold objective in "On the Jewish Question": to respond to Bruno Bauer's views on the same issue; to give us his own standing on the matter of the political emancipation of Jewish populations in Germany and the rest of Europe, while at the same time defining what political emancipation means for each citizen, no matter the religion, in a modern State; and lastly, to show us how political emancipation is not enough and how actual freedom (political plus social) is accessible to all once a new, final and imperative kind of emancipation is obtained: human emancipation. This paper will be divided into two parts: the first one will try to briefly review and explain Marx's text. Particular attention will be given to the differentiation between political and human emancipation and its implications. In this section, Marx's views on Judaism will be clarified by analyzing them on their proper socio-historical context. In the second one, an interesting and, hopefully, appropriate exercise will be put into consideration: taking into account Marx's concerns regarding the possibility of inclusion of a religious minority into the public spheres of a secular State, the Jewish question of 19th century's Europe will be altered into the Muslim question of 21st century's Europe. According to Yoav Peled the main difference between how Bauer and Marx confront the issue of Jewish emancipation is that the former one considers the problem as a theological one, while the latter does it as a sociological one (1). Bauer affirms that not only the Jews are longing for political emancipation, meaning being recognized by the State as equal citizens; but also the rest of the Gentile population is awaiting such recognition. The State cannot emancipate Jews if it still has not emancipated the rest. The Jewry cannot obtain full citizenship if there are no citizens. In order to attain political emancipation the State has to become a secular one, not to recognize any religion as its official one and to extend freedom of religion to all of its citizens. Religious freedom would require religion's removal from the public sphere and its "ostracism" into a private creed. This privatization of religion would eventually abolish it. Nevertheless, Bauer does not consider the Jews capable of becoming free because he does not consider Judaism able to become a private creed. Bauer characterizes Judaism as a religion of law not as, like Christianity, areligion of faith. Being a religion based on actions and not on beliefs would completely be opposed to freedom of religion, to its own removal from the public sphere. Judaism could not become free because there is a chance that its laws would contradict the laws of the State. Marx, instead, affirms that Jews (and Christians), in order to be really emancipated do not have to abandon Judaism in a theological way, but have to do it in a sociological manner. Political emancipation as stated by Bauer is not the final possible form of emancipation, but it is the last possible form of emancipation within the framework of the prevailing social order. For example, according to Marx the citizens of the United States of America, which at the time was the best case of a modern secular State, still practiced, and needed to practice, their religious beliefs as private creeds. Then, Bauer was wrong; religion survived the test and did not disappear after political emancipation. As reported by Marx this happened because when religion is expulsed from the sphere of public law to that of private law, religion becomes the spirit of civil society and the essence of differentiation which leads to, and presupposes, inequality. Political emancipation divides the human being into two antagonistic spheres: the individual, who is egoistic by nature and based in inequality and corresponds to civil society; and the citizen, who is based in common solidarity and equality and complements with the State. This separation can only be overcome by human emancipation. Human emancipation is the final and real kind of reachable and desired emancipation by all human beings. Human emancipation would erase all deficiencies that are found in civil society: private property, insecurity and religion. Human emancipation would, then, end social inequality. Only then, humans would achieve real and total freedom. Only when the individual and the citizen would synthesize their antagonisms in the species-being would humanity be free from all its social and political constraints and a truly democratic State would appear. (2)Marx's views on Judaism have been defined as anti-Semitic by several critics; but it is not the case (3). First of all, Marx was a strong advocate for political emancipation to the Jewish communities in Europe, especially in Germany, and he believed, in opposition to Bauer, that the Jewry was fully capable of becoming citizens in a secular State by privatizing their creed. Although, it has to be said that Marx, like Bauer, considered Judaism to be a religion based on laws; he did not directly consider the case if Judaism could withstand the transformation to a private form. Orthodox Jews, for example, would not become suitable for citizenship in the modern secular State. Because Marx could not resolve this argument in a direct form he chose to solve it by taking Judaism in its socio-historical context instead than in a purely theological way. To Marx Jews have embodied the mercantile spirit in a natural economy dominated Europe (4). Jews did not choose to be merchants or entrepreneurs: feudal society limited them to those kinds of activities. They could not legally own land or be members of any corporate guild. Jews could only deal with money or goods exchange(5). Then, Jews could only be considered as bourgeois, as capitalists, as financiers. Even if, like Marx says, the Jewish mercantile particularity had already generalized through the Christian world and there was no economic basis for distinguishing between Jews and Gentiles, which allowed the Jews to practically self-emancipate by the "Judaization" of society; the general public was still perceiving Judaism as a synonymous of "merchants"(6). It is rather interesting to note that in 1850 half of all entrepreneurs in Berlin were Jews and that in 1861 58% of the Prussian Jewry was engaged in commerce and credit, while only 2% of Christians was similarly employed (7). When Marx calls for the abolition of Judaism, he is calling for the abolition of the economic activity that was a reflection of the Jews social-historical role in society; he is calling for the end of the mercantile/capitalist elements that produce social inequality. The abolition of Judaism means the abolition of all religions through the correction of the secular defect of civil society(8). Finally, Marx's views on the political emancipation of a religious minority and of social emancipation as the only way to end all inequalities and distinctions could be helpful in order to understand the current Muslim Question that is concerning much of Europe. The Muslim question is significantly different from 19th century's Jewish question. Jews were asking for the State's recognition of the same basic constitutional rights that Christians already, or were about to, benefited from. Additionally, liberal-secularists, like Bauer, were concerned about Judaism's capability to remove their religious practices from the public sphere and privatize them. According to them, it was essential for the survival of the modern secular State that its citizens should exclude their religious distinctiveness from all of their public interactions with the State or with other fellow citizens. Today, Muslims in Europe enjoy all of the individual and social rights that are recognized in each of the European Constitutions; meaning political emancipation is not an issue. It is Islam's interactions with the secular, and almost irreligious, European public spheres that has become on of the most fervent debates in the last few years. Such debate extremely overcomes the purpose of this article, but a few points should be taken into account regarding the Muslim question and the relevance of Marx's work on the matter. Marx, just like with the political emancipation of the Jews, would not have been able to directly confront the possibility of a real privatization of Islamic beliefs, because he would have faced the same issue that arose in the Jewish question: Islam, like Judaism, is a religious of laws. As it has been said, a religion of laws will almost certainly contradict the laws of a secular State and would not be able to refrain from interrelate with the public sphere. For example, teachers wearing a Muslim veil or turban in public schools; Muslim women wearing burqas in public facilities; the introduction of Sharia law in order to legalize social relationships within Muslim communities and in their relations with non-Muslim communities; etc., are challenges to the secular State. Several European countries are juggling between the right of freedom of religion and absolute secularism(9): France chooses to ban burqas in public spaces; the Netherlands to expel teachers from public schools that insisted in wearing veils or turbans in class; Italy to reform family law in order to stop "honor killings" among Muslim families; etc. But like with Judaism, Marx would overcome Islam's inability to privatize its creed by arguing that such incapability is a symptom of the antagonism between civil society (the individual egoistic man) and the State (the solidary citizen) and that will never be surpassed until human emancipation is obtained. Interestingly enough, while during the 19th century Jews were an equivalent to bourgeois and entrepreneurs, Muslims of the 21st century, on the other hand, are identified with other kinds of socio-economic characterization. Muslims are identified either as proletarians or as lumpenproletarians. Remarkably, the occupational standing of 84% of Muslims living in Germany is either blue or white collar; compared to just 40% of non-Muslims Germans (10); 20% of young non-Muslim French are unemployed compared to 50% of young French Muslims(11); 9% of non-Muslim Dutch are unemployed, while 30% of Dutch Muslims are jobless(12); 10% of non-Muslim Belgians live below the poverty line, while 60% of Muslim Belgians are poor(13); 15% of non-Muslim British households are in poverty, but that percentage ascends to 55% when Muslim British households are considered(14). In Europe 80% of Muslim men are employed in low-skill/low-wage jobs and in routine manual and service occupations, only 45% of non-Muslim men are employed in the same kind of jobs(15). Finally, when the Human Development Index is taken into account and it is divided among the Muslim and non-Muslim population in the European countries it is evidenced that the standard of living of Muslim communities is significantly lower than that of the rest (16). This brief and expedited socio-economic context of Muslims in Europe would be employed by Marx in order to circumvent Islam's inability to privatize its creed: Muslims, although they live in modern secular States and enjoy political emancipation, persist in carrying on with their religious practices in public spaces, and sometimes in opposition to public laws, because they are suffering social inequality; they are suffering from not attaining human emancipation. Of course, all human beings lack of human emancipation, not only Muslims in Europe, but it is Muslims' special socio-economic situation in Europe that creates a secular deficiency from political emancipation and prevents their religion's transformation into a private creed. Jews did not have political emancipation and were, in their majority, entrepreneurs, which gave them a better socio-economic standing and allowed them to privatize their religion once political emancipation was conquered. Most of European Muslims, in contrast, are proletarians and, in worst cases, lumpenproletarians (17)and even if they enjoy political emancipation they find themselves in a position characterized by an extreme social inequality, that does not allow many of them to privatize their creed (18). Only through human emancipation and social equality they would be able to negate their religious differentiation; because in a true democratic State, a communist State according to Marx, communism itself would act as a religious belief and manner of living. That is, perhaps, how Marx intended to accomplish the abolition of all religions: by the emergence of a new politically and socially equal "religion for all human beings", that of communism.(1) Peled Yoad; "From Theology to Sociology: Bruno Bauer and Karl Marx on the Question of Jewish Emancipation";History of Political Thought; Vol. XIII, No. 3, Autumn, 1992. (2) Marx borrows the concept of species-being from Feuerbach. It seems to be implied in the text, although it is more possible to be influenced by later Marx's texts, that revolution is the mean to obtain human emancipation; the mean that those who suffer from social inequality will use in order to end that suffering. Once human emancipation is reached then the democratic/communist State is at hand. Again, this is not actually said in On the Jewish Question. (3) See Flannery Edward, Antisemitism: Myth and Hate from Antiquity to the Present, Palgrave Macmillan, London, 2005, pp.154-157; and Lewis Bernard, Semites and Anti-Semites: An Inquiry into Conflict and Prejudice, W. W. Norton & Company, New York, 1999, pp. 112.(4) Peled Yoad; "From Theology to Sociology: Bruno Bauer and Karl Marx on the Question of Jewish Emancipation"; History of Political Thought; Vol. XIII, No. 3, Autumn, 1992, pp. 475. (5) It was this image of the "financial Jew", embodied in the Rothschild dynasty, which begot the western anti-Semitic wave of the 19th and 20th century. See Arendt, Hannah, The Origins of Totalitarianism, Benediction Books, New York, 2009; Ferguson Niall, The Ascent of Money: A Financial History of the World, Penguin, New York, 2009; Ferguson Niall, The House of Rothschild, Penguin, New York, 2000; Landes David,Dynasties: Fortunes and Misfortunes of the World's Great Family Businesses, Penguin, New York, 2007.(6) Actually, the word "Judentum" came to be a synonymous with commerce.(7) Sorkin David, The Transformation of German Jewry, 1780-1840, Wayne State University Press, New York, 1999, pp. 108-9.(8) Peled Yoad; "From Theology to Sociology: Bruno Bauer and Karl Marx on the Question of Jewish Emancipation"; History of Political Thought; Vol. XIII, No. 3, Autumn, 1992, pp. 481.(9) For more about the interaction of Muslim minorities and political liberalism in a Rawlsian version see Benhenda, Mostapha, "For Muslim Minorities, it is Possible to Endorse Political Liberalism, but this is not Enough", Journal Of Islamic Law and Culture, Vol. 11, No. 2, May 2009, pp. 71-87. The article concludes that almost all Muslim minorities could and will endorse political liberalism, but many will not be able to do it because of a religious normative prohibition to reform their doctrine.(10) "Muslim Life in Germany", Federal Office for Migration and Refugees, German Government, http://www.bamf.de/SharedDocs/Anlagen/EN/Migration/Publikationen/Forschung/Forschungsberichte/fb6-muslimisches-leben,templateId=raw,property=publicationFile.pdf/fb6-muslimisches-leben.pdf(11) "Muslims in Europe", Open Society Institute; http://www.soros.org/initiatives/home/articles_publications/publications/muslims-europe-20091215/a-muslims-europe-20100302.pdf(12) Ibid.(13) Ibid.(14) Ibid.(15) Ibid.(16) For example, the HDI of Spain, Italy, Great Britain, France, Germany and Sweden are: 0,955; 0,951; 0,947; 0,961; 0.947 and 0,963 respectively; while the HDI of their respective Muslim communities are: 0,841; 0, 848; 0, 830; 0, 850; 0, 860; 0,912. Available at the European Social Survey http://ess.nsd.uib.no/ (17) Loïc Wacquant would call them "urban outcasts" or marginal. See Wacquant Loïc, Urban Outcasts: A Comparative Sociology of Advanced Marginality, Polity, Cambridge, 2007; Wacquant Loïc, Prisons of Poverty, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 2009; Wacquant Loïc, Los Condenados de la ciudad. Gueto, peripherias, Estado, Siglo XII Editores, Buenos Aires, 2007.(18) Certainly they are more religious than Christian and Jewish Europeans because they are perceived as a marginalized minority and in fierce competition with non-Muslim proletarians. It is civil society that enforces religious differentiation on them.*Estudiante de Doctorado, New School for Social Research, New YorkMaestría en Estudios Internacionales, Universidad Torcuato Di Tella, Buenos AiresÁrea de Especialización: Procesos de formación del Estado moderno, sociología de la guerra, terrorismo, genocidio, conflictos étnicos, nacionalismos y minorías.

Luis José García-Pulido y Jonathan Ruiz-Jaramillo. "Muslim heritage and environment: the case of the watchtowers of the nasrid kingdom of Granada (thirteenth to fifteenth century)". En: Heritage 2018. Proceedings of the 6th International Conference on Heritage and Sustainable Development (10th Anniversary Edition) Granada, Spain, 12-15 June 2018. Edited by Rogério Amoêda, Sérgio Lira, Cristina Pinheiro, Juan M. Santiago Zaragoza, Julio Calvo Serrano, Fabián García Carrillo. Editorial Universidad de Granada y Green Lines Institute for Sustainable Development, Granada, 2018. e-ISBN 978-84-338-6261-7 ; This paper is devoted to the study of the different towers of the Nasrid kingdom of Granada (1232 to 1492) and their linked landscapes, as well as the evolution, preservation, resilience or transformation of their environment until present days. These late Islamic territories in medieval Iberia occupied the mountainous areas of the southeastern area of today's Spain. There, a natural border was established between the Nasrid kingdom and the expansion of Castile during more than two centuries and a half. To control this frontier and establish visual communication between it and the Nasrid power centres lead by the Alhambra citadel, an extensive network of watchtowers and defensive towers linked to farmsteads was constructed. These towers are located in unique sites; being erected as reference landmarks of the territories on which they stand. These fortifications, with very diverse typology and morphology, are a faithful testimony to the different territorial structure that has taken place throughout history. ; Universidad de Málaga. Campus de Excelencia Internacional Andalucía Tech. This paper has been written within the framework of the Spanish Proyecto del Plan Nacional I+D+i (Programa Estatal de Fomento de la Investigación Científica y Técnica de Excelencia) entitled 'Las atalayas que defendieron el reino nazarí de Granada. Análisis y documentación científica (Nazalaya)' ('The watchtowers that defended the nasrid ...

ABSTRACT This research is devoted to the specifics of the influence of demographic processes in the muslim community of Russia on political aspects. The study of the data obtained made it possible to determine the specific aspects of the impact of demographic processes on muslim community and to describe the socio-political mean of these processes for russian society. The results obtained are consistent with the conclusions of a number of researchers, expand the existing understanding of the nature of demographic processes among muslims, and determine the specific results of their impact on russian society.RESUMEN Esta investigación está dedicada a los detalles de la influencia de los procesos demográficos en la comunidad musulmana de Rusia en los aspectos políticos. El estudio de los datos obtenidos permitió determinar los aspectos específicos del impacto de los procesos demográficos en la comunidad musulmana y describir el significado sociopolítico de estos procesos para la sociedad rusa. Los resultados obtenidos son consistentes con las conclusiones de una serie de investigadores, amplían la comprensión existente de la naturaleza de los procesos demográficos entre los musulmanes, y determinan los resultados específicos de su impacto en la sociedad rusa.

La actitud negativa de los españoles hacia el islam y los musulmanes está entre las más bajas de las democracias europeas. La islamofobia no aparece como un tema de confrontación en el debate público acerca de qué es ser español, no obstante haberse convertido la nacionalidad marroquí en la mayoritaria de cuantas conforman la población inmigrante y contarse España entre los tres Estados miembros con mayor entrada de extranjeros procedentes del Magreb y de Oriente Próximo. El objeto de este artículo es, mediante la teoría del encuadre, analizar la medida en que la prensa ha proyectado una imagen de lo islámico como algo extraño, monolítico y problemático. Se abordan asimismo posibles variaciones en función de la ideología de los periódicos y de la naturaleza de los acontecimientos de que se informa. El estudio, empírico y longitudinal, analiza el año 2017 en su integridad. Se espera que las conclusiones contribuyan a estudios comparados ; Spain ranks low among European democracies regarding negative attitudes toward Muslims and Islam. Islamophobia does not appear to be a contentious issue in the Spanish political arena as to the definition of 'us,' even though Moroccans have become the largest migrant community, and even though Spain is currently one of the three major Member States of first entry into the Union from Middle East and North Africa. By conducting a media frame analysis, the aim of this paper is to know whether and to what extent the Spanish large-circulation quality newspapers portray Muslims and Islam as strange, monolithic and problematic. Variations according to ideology and the nature of the events reported are taken into account. This is an empirical and longitudinal study covering an entire year. Conclusions are expected to further contribute to comparative investigations ; Investigación desarrollada en el marco del proyecto DER2017-84178-P (Plan Nacional de I+D+I, Ministerio de Economía, Industria y Competitividad)

El objetivo general del artículo es contribuir a la reflexión en torno de las relaciones entre el islam político, la democracia liberal y el neoliberalismo económico. En tal fin estudia el caso de la organización de los Hermanos Musulmanes egipcios en el poder, centrado en la dimensión económica. Esta elección se explica, por un lado, por la ausencia del factor económico en la lectura hegemónica de la Primavera Árabe y, por otro lado, por su fuerte presencia en los discursos de los centros de poder internacionales que clamaban porque la reforma política (instauración de la democracia) fuera acompañada por una económica (establecimiento o profundización del libre mercado). Con este fin, en primer lugar, analiza el concepto de democracia, y plantea que su concepción hegemónica está referida a la democracia liberal. Esta última es definida a través de tres elementos: el proceso electoral como uno de carácter técnico, la construcción de individuos-ciudadanos y el neoliberalismo económico. Para la elucidación de este último, el artículo se basa en los análisis de Michel Foucault, para afirmar que el neoliberalismo se encuentra basado en el libre mercado entendido como competencia y, por lo tanto, en la desigualdad. El liberalismo económico está enmarcado en el proceso de secularización atravesado por Europa, uno de cuyos corolarios fue la separación entre economía y política, pero también entre economía y religión. La falta de separación entre las últimas dos da lugar a que ciertos autores sostengan que el eje de la economía islámica es la justicia social, y la definen como una economía moral. El artículo se detiene en el concepto de economía islámica y contrapone la lectura anterior con otra que relaciona el islam político con el neoliberalismo económico. Con el objetivo de evitar esencializaciones y, en cambio, analizar prácticas, el trabajo no adopta a priori ninguna de las dos perspectivas, sino que aborda la cuestión de manera contextualizada. Luego de hacer un breve repaso histórico del neoliberalismo en Egipto se analiza la sección de la plataforma electoral de los Hermanos Musulmanes referida a la política económica; asimismo, se hace lo propio con los discursos en torno de los levantamientos árabes tanto del Grupo de los Ocho como del Fondo Monetario Internacional, particularmente en su relación con el gobierno de los Hermanos Musulmanes. Se concluye que el partido político islámico buscó un equilibrio entre las prácticas económicas neoliberales y aquellas propias de un programa que privilegia la justicia social, para inclinarse por estas últimas. De este modo, intentó funcionar como una barrera al neoliberalismo económico. Esto le valió la negativa del Fondo Monetario Internacional de un préstamo que se consideraba necesario para incentivar la inversión. Esta negativa, sumada a una acción coordinada de potencias regionales y grupos de poder locales, llevó al derrocamiento del primer gobierno egipcio elegido democráticamente. ; The paper's general objective is to reflect on relations between political Islam, liberal democracy and economic neoliberalism. To this end, it studies the case of the organization of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood during its period in power, focusing on the economic dimension. This choice is explained, on the one hand, by the absence of the economic factor in the hegemonic reading of the "Arab Spring" and, on the other hand, by its strong presence in the international power centers' discourses which claimed that the political reform (democracy) had to be accompanied by an economic one (establishment or deepening of the free market). To this end, first, it analyzes the concept of democracy, stating that the hegemonic conception of it is heavily indebted to liberal democracy. The latter is defined by three elements: the elective process as a technical one, the construction of individuals-citizens and economic neoliberalism. For the elucidation of the latter, the article's bases are Michel Foucault's analysis, stating that neoliberalism is based on the free market understood as competition and, therefore, inequality. Economic liberalism is framed in the European process of secularization, one of whose corollaries has been the separation between economics and politics, but also between economics and religion. The non-separation between economy and religion results in the argument followed by some authors that the axis of Islamic economics is social justice, defining it as a moral economy. The article analyzes the concept of Islamic economics and contrasts the latter reading with another that links political Islam with economic neoliberalism. In order to avoid essentialization and to analyze practices, the paper does not a priori adopt any of these perspectives. Instead, it addresses the issue in a contextualized way. After a brief historical review of neoliberalism in Egypt, it analyzes the section of the electoral platform of the Muslim Brothers which makes reference to its economic policy. Also, it does the same with the discourse on the Arab uprisings of both the G8 and the International Monetary Fund, with particular emphasis on the latter's relationship with the government of the Muslim Brotherhood. It concludes that the Islamic political party sought a balance between neoliberal economic practices and those specific to a program that favors social justice, leaning toward the latter. Thus, the Muslim Brotherhood tried to act as a barrier to economic neoliberalism. This earned it the refusal by the International Monetary Fund of a loan that was considered necessary to encourage investment. This refusal, coupled with coordinated action by regional powers and local elites, led to the overthrow of the first democratically elected Egyptian government. ; Fil: Cuadro, Mariela. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - La Plata; Argentina. Universidad Nacional de La Plata. Facultad de Ciencias Jurídicas y Sociales. Instituto de Relaciones Internacionales; Argentina

Este artículo analiza el recorrido de las conexiones entre el islam y los procesos democratizadores que se aglutinaron en tono a la "primavera árabe", originados por las multitudes en las calles. Este proceso, aún inconcluso, vislumbra un final menos feliz de lo esperado en el cual juega un rol definitorio la religión coránica, enemiga de la democracia. Frente a ello, el autor propone, en primer lugar, los rasgos que definen la democracia para luego relacionarlos con el núcleo de la tradición coránica y, finalmente, establecer cómo los movimientos religiosos han obrado en relación a los principios democráticos. ; This article analyses the extend of the connections between islam and the democratization processes that came together with the "arab spring", originated by the crowds on the streets. This process, even, envisages a less happy ending than what was expected, in which Coran's religion plays a definitive role, enemy of democracy. In face of this, the author proposes, firstly, the features that define democracy to then relate them with the nucleus of Coran's tradition and, finally, establishes how religious movements have acted in relation to democratic principles.

Este artículo analiza el recorrido de las conexiones entre el islam y los procesos democratizadores que se aglutinaron en tono a la "primavera árabe", originados por las multitudes en las calles. Este proceso, aún inconcluso, vislumbra un final menos feliz de lo esperado en el cual juega un rol definitorio la religión coránica, enemiga de la democracia. Frente a ello, el autor propone, en primer lugar, los rasgos que definen la democracia para luego relacionarlos con el núcleo de la tradición coránica y, finalmente, establecer cómo los movimientos religiosos han obrado en relación a los principios democráticos. ; This article analyses the extend of the connections between islam and the democratization processes that came together with the "arab spring", originated by the crowds on the streets. This process, even, envisages a less happy ending than what was expected, in which Coran's religion plays a definitive role, enemy of democracy. In face of this, the author proposes, firstly, the features that define democracy to then relate them with the nucleus of Coran's tradition and, finally, establishes how religious movements have acted in relation to democratic principles.

This article analyses the extend of the connections between islam and the democratization processes that came together with the "arab spring", originated by the crowds on the streets. This process, even, envisages a less happy ending than what was expected, in which Coran's religion plays a definitive role, enemy of democracy. In face of this, the author proposes, firstly, the features that define democracy to then relate them with the nucleus of Coran's tradition and, finally, establishes how religious movements have acted in relation to democratic principles. ; Este artículo analiza el recorrido de las conexiones entre el islam y los procesos democratizadores que se aglutinaron en tono a la "primavera árabe", originados por las multitudes en las calles. Este proceso, aún inconcluso, vislumbra un final menos feliz de lo esperado en el cual juega un rol definitorio la religión coránica, enemiga de la democracia. Frente a ello, el autor propone, en primer lugar, los rasgos que definen la democracia para luego relacionarlos con el núcleo de la tradición coránica y, finalmente, establecer cómo los movimientos religiosos han obrado en relación a los principios democráticos.