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Since the start of the Ukrainian crisis in 2014, the Nordic states have sought to advance their defence cooperation "beyond peacetime" to also encompass operational military cooperation in crisis and armed conflict. Relations between the two Nordic non-NATO members, Sweden and Finland, have formed a vanguard, encompassing bilateral operational planning beyond peacetime. While no formal security policy guarantees have been exchanged, Sweden and Finland have created strong expectations that they will lend each other support in a crisis. In short, while no formal alliance treaty exists, the two states have nevertheless become closely aligned. In 2020, Sweden and Finland joined NATO member Norway in signalling their intention to strengthen their trilateral defence relationship. The following year, NATO members Norway and Denmark signed a similar agreement with Sweden. The goal of these documents was to coordinate their national operational plans – their "war plans" – and perhaps develop some common operational plans. In this article, it is argued that these agreements fall short of a formal military alliance, but that they represent an alignment policy between the Nordic states.

Since Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014, Northern Europe has increasingly aligned its national defence arrangements with the United States and NATO. This contrasts with the Cold War period, when Sweden and Finland were neutral, and Norway and Denmark put self-imposed restraints on their NATO memberships. Providing Northern Europe with a stable "buffer" between East and West, this so-called Nordic balance kept the United States and Soviet Union at an arm's length. Since 2014 however, Northern Europe has de facto slid from "buffer" to "springboard" for US forces. This slide may counter Russian assertiveness, but there is also reason to argue that it may increase regional tension and unpredictability. If so, this may leave the entire region with less rather than more security. Using the case of Norway, it is argued that too close an alignment with NATO may have accelerated Norway's role as a "springboard" for US forces. This is because cost-intensive reforms needed to accommodate US expectations abroad have also exacerbated critical vulnerabilities at home. Increased dependency on US forces thereby makes difficult the balance between deterrence and restraint vis-à-vis Russia.

The U.S. Department of the Navy released A Strategic Blueprint for the Arctic on 5 January 2021. The Navy is focused on preparing for an Alaskan and "Blue" Arctic. Recognizing the changing landscape of the Arctic, the US Navy seeks to maintain a competitive edge, freedom of the seas, and deterrent effect. For the Marine Corps, both the 2021 document and the previous Advantage at Sea: Prevailing with Integrated All-Domain Naval Power, highlight the Marines' mission to assist the Navy in sea control and sea denial. These strategic documents reflect the direction both the Navy and Marine Corps are taking to better engage in the Arctic, and, therefore on NATO's northern flank and elsewhere in the world. The Marine Corps' new concept for warfighting, represented in The Tentative Manual for Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (EABO) presumes that Marines are a "stand-in" force, i.e., they are already in areas within an adversary's weapon's engagement zone (WEZ). However, this is not the case on NATO's northern flank, where Marines conduct training with NATO and under bilateral agreements. In order to better understand how these new concepts and strategic documents influence the USMC's engagement on NATO's northern flank, it is important to relate them to the overall strategic context in this region, as well as the possible gaps that exist down to include operational and some tactical levels implications.