Suchergebnisse

Inhalt: - Wiederaufbau und ziviles Lagebild - Vertrauensbildende Maßnahmen - Herausforderungen und Grenzen - Folgerungen

"Die staatlichen Strukturen Afghanistans wurden maßgeblich durch externe Faktoren zerstört. Ein Strategiewechsel ist überfällig, ein 'Marshallplan' für den Wiederaufbau des Landes unabdingbar." (Autorenreferat)

How do the outcomes of international wars affect domestic social change? In turn, how do changing patterns of social identification and domestic conflict affect a nation's military capability? We propose a "second image reversed" theory of war that links structural variables, power politics, and the individuals that constitute states. Drawing on experimental results in social psychology, we recapture a lost building block of the classical realist theory of statecraft: the connections between the outcomes of international wars, patterns of social identification and domestic conflict, and the nation's future war-fighting capability. When interstate war can significantly increase a state's international status, peace is less likely to prevail in equilibrium because, by winning a war and raising the nation's status, leaders induce individuals to identify nationally, thereby reducing internal conflict by increasing investments in state capacity. In certain settings, it is only through the anticipated social change that victory can generate that leaders can unify their nation, and the higher anticipated payoffs to national unification makes leaders fight international wars that they would otherwise choose not to fight. We use the case of German unification after the Franco-Prussian war to demonstrate the model's value-added and illustrate the interaction between social identification, nationalism, state-building, and the power politics of interstate war.

1 Introduction -- 2 Nation-building and the Afghan state -- 3 Bureaucratic politics and Nation-building -- 4 The US Foreign Policy Bureaucracy and Nation-building in Afghanistan -- 5 Security -- 6 Infrastructure Development -- 7 Counter-Narcotics, Law & Governance -- 8 The Failure of collaborative Mechanisms -- 9 Provincial Reconstruction teams: -- 10 Conclusion.

Cover Page -- Half Title -- Title -- Copyright -- Contents -- Foreword -- Preface -- Contributors -- Introduction: Nation-Building and National Development: Some Issues for Political Research -- 1 The Historical Experience of Nation-Building in Europe -- 2 Nation-Building? -- 3 The Interlocking of Nation and Personality Structure -- 4 Nation-Building in America: The Colonial Years -- 5 Nation-Building in Latin America -- 6 Nation-Building and Revolutionary War -- 7 Nation-Building in Africa -- 8 Building the Newest Nations: Short-Run Strategies and Long-Run Problems -- BIBLIOGRAPHY A Selection of Recent Works on Nation-Building, Donald J. Puchala -- Some Recent Works on Nation-Building, 1963-1966 -- Index

AbstractNational identity in Africa is routinely viewed as underdeveloped relative to ethnic identity because most states did not follow classic forms of nation‐building, such as mass schooling with nationalist content. Yet recent survey data show that national identity across the continent is more robust than most scholars predicted. What is driving national identification in Africa? What unifies Africans around common national identity? Existing theories are not well suited to explaining this question, because factors that they see as essential, such as higher levels of development and cultural cohesion, often do not exist. In this article, I suggest a new understanding of the strength of national identity, based on the impact of political events, such as peace, political stability and conduct of elections. Drawing on over 200 original interviews with Ghanaian respondents, I demonstrate how political stability in Ghana, contrasted with political turmoil in neighbouring countries, produces narratives about national identity.

Why has the US so dramatically failed in Afghanistan since 2001? Dominant explanations have ignored the bureaucratic divisions and personality conflicts inside the US state. This book rectifies this weakness in commentary on Afghanistan by exploring the significant role of these divisions in the US’s difficulties in the country that meant the battle was virtually lost before it even began. The main objective of the book is to deepen readers’ understanding of the impact of bureaucratic politics on nation-building in Afghanistan, focusing primarily on the Bush administration. It rejects the ‘rational actor’ model, according to which the US functions as a coherent, monolithic agent. Instead, internal divisions within the foreign policy bureaucracy are explored, to build up a picture of the internal tensions and contradictions that bedevilled US nation-building efforts. The book also contributes to the vexed issue of whether or not the US should engage in nation-building at all, and if so under what conditions.

Why has the U.S. so dramatically failed in Afghanistan since 2001? Dominant explanations have ignored the bureaucratic divisions and personality conflicts inside the U.S. state. This book rectifies this weakness in commentary on Afghanistan by exploring the significant role of these divisions in the U.S.'s difficulties in the country that meant the battle was virtually lost before it even began. The main objective of the book is to deepen readers' understanding of the impact of bureaucratic politics on nation-building in Afghanistan, focusing primarily on the Bush administration. It rejects the 'rational actor' model, according to which the U.S. functions as a coherent, monolithic agent. Instead, internal divisions within the foreign policy bureaucracy are explored, to build up a picture of the internal tensions and contradictions that bedevilled U.S. nation-building efforts. The book also contributes to the vexed issue of whether or not the U.S. should engage in nation-building at all, and if so under what conditions.

Why has the US so dramatically failed in Afghanistan since 2001? Dominant explanations have ignored the bureaucratic divisions and personality conflicts inside the US state. This book rectifies this weakness in commentary on Afghanistan by exploring the significant role of these divisions in the US's difficulties in the country that meant the battle was virtually lost before it even began. The main objective of the book is to deepen readers' understanding of the impact of bureaucratic politics on nation-building in Afghanistan, focusing primarily on theBush administration. It rejects the "rational actor" model, according to which theUS functions as a coherent, monolithic agent. Instead, internal divisions within the foreign policy bureaucracy are explored, to build up a picture of the internal tensions and contradictions that bedevilled US nation-building efforts. The book also contributes to the vexed issue of whether or not the US should engage in nation-building at all, and if so under what conditions.

Why has the US so dramatically failed in Afghanistan since 2001? Dominantexplanations have ignored the bureaucratic divisions and personality conflictsinside the US state. This book rectifies this weakness in commentary on Afghanistanby exploring the significant role of these divisions in the US’s difficultiesin the country that meant the battle was virtually lost before it even began. Themain objective of the book is to deepen readers’ understanding of the impact ofbureaucratic politics on nation-building in Afghanistan, focusing primarily on theBush administration. It rejects the ‘rational actor’ model, according to which theUS functions as a coherent, monolithic agent. Instead, internal divisions withinthe foreign policy bureaucracy are explored, to build up a picture of the internaltensions and contradictions that bedevilled US nation-building efforts. The bookalso contributes to the vexed issue of whether or not the US should engage innation-building at all, and if so under what conditions.