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A comment on Will Kymlicka's "Western Political Theory and Ethnic Relations in Eastern Europe" (2001) disagrees with his assertion that it is the kind of nation building that impacts the handling of ethnocultural diversity rather than the fact that nation building occurs. After characterizing the nation-state, it is argued that nation building presupposes an international regime of nation-states. After elaborating on the notion of nation building, attention turns to establishing Kymlicka's claim that if ethnocultural justice requires that the one-nation state be superceded by a multination state, ie, minority self-government is necessary, then ethnocultural justice requires that exclusive jurisdiction be superceded by overlapping jurisdiction, ie, governance across nation-state borders. Hungarian nationalism is taken as a case to consider the practical relevance of overcoming the nation-state regime, demonstrating that shifts in the international environment have already affected perceptions of political alternatives. J. Zendejas

A comment on Will Kymlicka's "Western Political Theory and Ethnic Relations in Eastern Europe" (2001) disagrees with his assertion that it is the kind of nation building that impacts the handling of ethnocultural diversity rather than the fact that nation building occurs. After characterizing the nation-state, it is argued that nation building presupposes an international regime of nation-states. After elaborating on the notion of nation building, attention turns to establishing Kymlicka's claim that if ethnocultural justice requires that the one-nation state be superceded by a multination state, ie, minority self-government is necessary, then ethnocultural justice requires that exclusive jurisdiction be superceded by overlapping jurisdiction, ie, governance across nation-state borders. Hungarian nationalism is taken as a case to consider the practical relevance of overcoming the nation-state regime, demonstrating that shifts in the international environment have already affected perceptions of political alternatives. J. Zendejas

As the demand for nation-building increases and outpaces the supply of nation-builders, the United Nations should remain the first source of nation-building activities; NATO, as another source of peacekeeping capability, should strengthen its capacity and develop reliable arrangements with the European Union, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, and the United Nations to receive civil assets in support of Alliance-led operations. NATO also needs to generate, train, and equip more troops for peacekeeping operations.

Cover Page -- Half Title -- Title -- Copyright -- Contents -- Foreword -- Preface -- Contributors -- Introduction: Nation-Building and National Development: Some Issues for Political Research -- 1 The Historical Experience of Nation-Building in Europe -- 2 Nation-Building? -- 3 The Interlocking of Nation and Personality Structure -- 4 Nation-Building in America: The Colonial Years -- 5 Nation-Building in Latin America -- 6 Nation-Building and Revolutionary War -- 7 Nation-Building in Africa -- 8 Building the Newest Nations: Short-Run Strategies and Long-Run Problems -- BIBLIOGRAPHY A Selection of Recent Works on Nation-Building, Donald J. Puchala -- Some Recent Works on Nation-Building, 1963-1966 -- Index

AbstractNational identity in Africa is routinely viewed as underdeveloped relative to ethnic identity because most states did not follow classic forms of nation‐building, such as mass schooling with nationalist content. Yet recent survey data show that national identity across the continent is more robust than most scholars predicted. What is driving national identification in Africa? What unifies Africans around common national identity? Existing theories are not well suited to explaining this question, because factors that they see as essential, such as higher levels of development and cultural cohesion, often do not exist. In this article, I suggest a new understanding of the strength of national identity, based on the impact of political events, such as peace, political stability and conduct of elections. Drawing on over 200 original interviews with Ghanaian respondents, I demonstrate how political stability in Ghana, contrasted with political turmoil in neighbouring countries, produces narratives about national identity.

Why has the US so dramatically failed in Afghanistan since 2001? Dominant explanations have ignored the bureaucratic divisions and personality conflicts inside the US state. This book rectifies this weakness in commentary on Afghanistan by exploring the significant role of these divisions in the US’s difficulties in the country that meant the battle was virtually lost before it even began. The main objective of the book is to deepen readers’ understanding of the impact of bureaucratic politics on nation-building in Afghanistan, focusing primarily on the Bush administration. It rejects the ‘rational actor’ model, according to which the US functions as a coherent, monolithic agent. Instead, internal divisions within the foreign policy bureaucracy are explored, to build up a picture of the internal tensions and contradictions that bedevilled US nation-building efforts. The book also contributes to the vexed issue of whether or not the US should engage in nation-building at all, and if so under what conditions.

Why has the U.S. so dramatically failed in Afghanistan since 2001? Dominant explanations have ignored the bureaucratic divisions and personality conflicts inside the U.S. state. This book rectifies this weakness in commentary on Afghanistan by exploring the significant role of these divisions in the U.S.'s difficulties in the country that meant the battle was virtually lost before it even began. The main objective of the book is to deepen readers' understanding of the impact of bureaucratic politics on nation-building in Afghanistan, focusing primarily on the Bush administration. It rejects the 'rational actor' model, according to which the U.S. functions as a coherent, monolithic agent. Instead, internal divisions within the foreign policy bureaucracy are explored, to build up a picture of the internal tensions and contradictions that bedevilled U.S. nation-building efforts. The book also contributes to the vexed issue of whether or not the U.S. should engage in nation-building at all, and if so under what conditions.

Why has the US so dramatically failed in Afghanistan since 2001? Dominant explanations have ignored the bureaucratic divisions and personality conflicts inside the US state. This book rectifies this weakness in commentary on Afghanistan by exploring the significant role of these divisions in the US's difficulties in the country that meant the battle was virtually lost before it even began. The main objective of the book is to deepen readers' understanding of the impact of bureaucratic politics on nation-building in Afghanistan, focusing primarily on theBush administration. It rejects the "rational actor" model, according to which theUS functions as a coherent, monolithic agent. Instead, internal divisions within the foreign policy bureaucracy are explored, to build up a picture of the internal tensions and contradictions that bedevilled US nation-building efforts. The book also contributes to the vexed issue of whether or not the US should engage in nation-building at all, and if so under what conditions.

Examines issues surrounding the prospect of nation building, taking Afghanistan as an example of a country well behind the curve when it comes to society-building communitarianism. The primacy of tribes characterizing Afghan community is addressed, asserting that Afghanistan is little more than a geographic distinction void of any nationalist underpinnings. It is suggested that rather than begin the nation-building process with so-called design questions, resources ought to be focused on riding unfolding trends & redirecting them rather than trying to create totally new ones. The tribal forces in Iraq, Pakistan, & Afghanistan are briefly noted & their implications for forming native security forces discussed, focusing on Afghanistan. The need for the US to work with Afghanistan's tribal forces & religious leaders in some manner is stressed. Adapted from the source document.

Why has the US so dramatically failed in Afghanistan since 2001? Dominantexplanations have ignored the bureaucratic divisions and personality conflictsinside the US state. This book rectifies this weakness in commentary on Afghanistanby exploring the significant role of these divisions in the US’s difficultiesin the country that meant the battle was virtually lost before it even began. Themain objective of the book is to deepen readers’ understanding of the impact ofbureaucratic politics on nation-building in Afghanistan, focusing primarily on theBush administration. It rejects the ‘rational actor’ model, according to which theUS functions as a coherent, monolithic agent. Instead, internal divisions withinthe foreign policy bureaucracy are explored, to build up a picture of the internaltensions and contradictions that bedevilled US nation-building efforts. The bookalso contributes to the vexed issue of whether or not the US should engage innation-building at all, and if so under what conditions.

Explores the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO's) role in nation-building, challenged by smaller Western armed forces and increasingly populous and urbanized developing societies. While NATO's capacity for peacekeeping should be strengthened, it needs to develop more reliable arrangements with the European Union, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and the United Nations, the West's nation-builder of first resort, to ensure that these organizations contribute civil assets in support of Alliance-led operations.

A discussion of how &/or whether nation building works focuses on the US government's invasion & occupation of Afghanistan & Iraq & its continuing efforts in nation building. America is unlikely to stop there. Deploying armed forces to 'fix' other countries is seen as a tempting idea, one that has gained support among the academic & foreign-policy community. William Kristol & Robert Kagan (1996) opined that the US should adopt a posture of "benevolent global hegemony," promoting American principles of free markets, democracy, & respect for liberty around the world. It is argued here that the experts & theorists have failed to seriously consider the historical record of this type of policy: it usually fails, or if it seems to succeed, it is probably for other reasons. Lacking a theory, proven techniques, or carefully designed methods, establishment of a democracy through military occupation is not a coherent, defensible policy. Tables, References. J. Stanton