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The Council of National Defence, established on 1 July 1920, was to be a temporary governmental body having full legislative and executive power in all matters relating to the conduct and ending of the war, and also with the conclusion of peace with Bolshevik Russia. As regards the above matters, the Council of National Defence was to issue orders and regulations, which were immediately enforceable. Despite acquiring very broad powers, both legislative and executive, none of its regulations went beyond its competence scope. The Council of National Defence regulations had to be approved by the Legislative Sejm in order to be valid. During the three months' period of its functioning, the Council of National Defense issued over 90 different legal acts aiming at strengthening of defense of the Polish State that was threatened with a loss of its independence. The Council of National Defense played a major role in holding back the Bolshevik invasion of Poland. It contributed to formation of a large army, and made the nation regain its faith in successful end of the military conflict with Soviet Russia. ; Utworzona w dniu 1 lipca 1920 r. Rada Obrony Państwa miała być organem tymczasowym, dysponującym pełnią władzy ustawodawczej i wykonawczej we wszystkich sprawach związanych z prowadzeniem i zakończeniem wojny oraz z zawarciem pokoju z bolszewicką Rosją. Rada Obrony Państwa miała wydawać w tych kwestiach zarządzenia i rozporządzenia podlegające rygorowi natychmiastowej wykonalności. Pomimo uzyskania znacznego zakresu uprawnień, zarówno w zakresie władzy prawodawczej, jak i wykonawczej, żadne z jej rozporządzeń nie wykraczało poza granice jej kompetencji. Rozporządzenia Rady Obrony Państwa dla uzyskania ważności wymagały zatwierdzenia przez Sejm Ustawodawczy. W okresie trzech miesięcy swojego funkcjonowania Rada Obrony Państwa wydała ponad 90 różnych aktów prawnych, służących wzmocnieniu obronności państwa polskiego narażonego na utratę niepodległości. Rada Obrony Państwa odegrała ogromną rolę w powstrzymaniu bolszewickiego najazdu na Polskę. Dzięki niej powstała liczna armia, a naród odzyskał wiarę w zwycięskie zakończenie konfliktu zbrojnego z sowiecką Rosją.

The article presents the history of the military higher education system, which is connected to the shaping of the Polish statehood as well as its present state. The structure of this type of education system was dependent on the e ectiveness of socio-economic, political and military activities of public authorities. However, it is only the November Uprising which is generally associated with the revolt of the o cers from the O cer Cadets School [Szkoła Podchorazych] in Warsaw. The changes which occur within the military education system on account of its adjustment to the requirements of the Act "Law on higher education" of 27 June 2005 are very positive. They accommodate military higher education institutions to the public system of higher education, they in uence the development and the quality of education in these institutions, they obliged them to implement the regulations arising from the National Quali cations Framework and to observe all the procedures arising from the legislations which are enacted in the domain of higher education by the competent public authorities.

Artykuł dotyczy ewolucji stanowiska rządów Polski wobec kolejnych etapów rozwoju europejskiej autonomii strategicznej (Europejska Tożsamości Bezpieczeństwa i Obrony), Europejskiej Polityki Bezpieczeństwa i Obrony oraz Wspólna Europejska Polityka Bezpieczeństwa i Obrony Unii Europejskiej). Wyodrębnione zostały dwa etapy polskiej Polityki; przed akcesją do UE oraz udział Polski w ESDP/WPBiO, po przystąpieniu do UE. Podczas sprawowania przez Polskę Prezydencji w Radzie, jednym z priorytetów było doskonalenie zdolności wojskowych i systemu reagowania kryzysowego. Scharakteryzowano oficjalne stanowisko władz polskich wobec integracji systemu bezpieczeństwa UE wyrażone w dokumentach strategicznych. Ostatni taki dokument został opublikowany w maju 2017 r. w Ministerstwie Obrony Narodowej. Zwrócono uwagę na sytuacje kryzysowe w problemach dotyczących integracji europejskiej oraz na brak zainteresowania aktualnych władz politycznych Polski udziałem w reformowaniu systemu bezpieczeństwa UE. ; The article is focusing on the evolution of Polish approach towards the development of the European strategic autonomy in the European military integration (European Security and Defense Identity), the European Security and Defense Policy and the Common European Security and Defense Policy after joining the EU. During Poland's Presidency, one of the priorities was to improve military capabilities and crisis management systems. The article characterizes an official position of the Polish authorities in the process of EU integration security system. The last strategic document has been published in May 2017 by the Ministry of National Defense. There have been identified two stages: prior to accession to the EU and Poland's participation in the ESDP/CSDP EU since 2004. Special attention was paid to the lack of interest of the current Polish political authorities in reforming the EU security system.

Artykuł dotyczy ewolucji stanowiska rządów Polski wobec kolejnych etapów rozwoju europejskiej autonomii strategicznej (Europejska Tożsamości Bezpieczeństwa i Obrony), Europejskiej Polityki Bezpieczeństwa i Obrony oraz Wspólna Europejska Polityka Bezpieczeństwa i Obrony Unii Europejskiej). Wyodrębnione zostały dwa etapy polskiej Polityki; przed akcesją do UE oraz udział Polski w ESDP /WPBiO, po przystąpieniu do UE . Podczas sprawowania przez Polskę Prezydencji w Radzie, jednym z priorytetów było doskonalenie zdolności wojskowych i systemu reagowania kryzysowego. Scharakteryzowano oficjalne stanowisko władz polskich wobec integracji systemu bezpieczeństwa UE wyrażone w dokumentach strategicznych. Ostatni taki dokument został opublikowany w maju 2017 r. w Ministerstwie Obrony Narodowej. Zwrócono uwagę na sytuacje kryzysowe w problemach dotyczących integracji europejskiej oraz na brak zainteresowania aktualnych władz politycznych Polski udziałem w reformowaniu systemu bezpieczeństwa UE . ; The article is focusing on the evolution of Polish approach towards the development of the European strategic autonomy in the European military integration (European Security and Defense Identity), the European Security and Defense Policy and the Common European Security and Defense Policy after joining the EU . During Poland's Presidency, one of the priorities was to improve military capabilities and crisis management systems. The article characterizes an official position of the Polish authorities in the process of EU integration security system. The last strategic document has been published in May 2017 by the Ministry of National Defense. There have been identified two stages: prior to accession to the EU and Poland's participation in the ESDP /CSDP EU since 2004. Special attention was paid to the lack of interest of the current Polish political authorities in reforming the EU security system.

The last decade of 20th century as well as last 15 years were two frames of time where armed forces went under major transformation. Since 1999 almost all fields of regulations in Polish Army has been changed: organizational culture, professionalization of staff, drafting of women, procedures, technologies, armament and training. In spite of the above, some changes are still under debate, concerning mainly organizational structures, economic and political conditioning of its functioning. Transformation in military aspect has aspecial meaning, and due to universal coverage it is interpret in many different ways. Colloquially transformation identifies change and alteration, therefore we can differentiate political or system transformation and on the other hand military or Armed Forces. The objective of this article is to describe transformation process of the Polish Armed Forces, since Poland became amember of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, indication of important changes concerning professionalization, budget structure, financing and military expenditures of the Ministry of National Defense, as well as analysis of technical modernization process.

The aim of the article was to identify the subject areas related to the management of the proposals of some elements and to propose the concept of managing Poland's national security for the purposes of developing the act on national security management announced in the National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland-2020. The main research problem was the question: What key elements and solutions should be included in the concept of national security management for the purpose of developing a draft act on national security management? The following hypothesis was adopted: The national security system should form a coherent, in terms of organization and functionality, system of interrelated management and executive bodies. Unfortunately, the existing national security system of the Republic of Poland does not fully meet the above requirements, which has already been signaled many times, for example during successive strategic national security reviews and strategic defense reviews. Moreover, the concept of national security management should, in particular, specify the answers to the following questions: 1) What is contemporary national security? 2) What is national security management? 3) What are the key challenges facing national security management? 4) What is the role of policy and strategy in national security management? 5) What should be the architecture of the national security management system during the war. The verification of the above hypothesis and answering the above questions required a critical analysis of legal acts, strategic documents and selected items of literature on the subject. The results of the author's many years of research in this area were also taken into account.

The article analyzes the strategy and principles of building the national security strat-egy of the Russian Federation, considers the priorities of ensuring national security. Security doc-trines are aimed at security in the military, political, and informational environment. The article highlights the priority tasks in the field of national defense of the Russian Federation. The review analyzes the integrated security strategies of the countries of the Baltic region – Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia; analyzes the effectiveness of the doctrine of "total defense" of Estonia, the procedure and forms of its implementation. It is stated that the Baltic countries are considering various options to improve security, the concept of "total defense", is based on the protection of the position of neu-trality, the defense policy of the countries is based on cooperation with large European and regional countries (Finland, Sweden, Poland). The article states that the military security of countries is associated with the need to deepen cooperation with NATO. The doctrine of territorial defense of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, directions of defense policy and territorial security is analyzed.

Unmanned aerial vehicles are used for a wide range of fire protection tasks, includ-ing search and rescue operations. Today, unmanned aerial platforms patrol coastal zones, par-ticipate in road incidents patrolling, and perform many other tasks in various areas of the infra-structure, economy, etc. The Military Fire Protection Inspectorate organizes, supervises, and conducts rescue operations in divisions supervised by Ministry of National Defense. Due to advanced technology, FlyEye unmanned aerial vehicles effectively help to eliminate fire risks in military units and other organizational units.

Publikacja recenzowana / Peer-reviewed publication ; Właściwym do zapewnienia powszechnej i przestrzennej gotowości obronnej państwa, a jednocześnie realizacji zadań w ramach obrony kolektywnej Sojuszu, jest system obronny, dysponujący efektywnym potencjałem odstraszania w którym ważne miejsce zajmuje obrona terytorialna, włączona w proces powszechnego wychowania i szkolenia wojskowego młodzieży, szkolenia rezerw, wsparcia lokalnych społeczności i układu pozamilitarnego w działaniach zapewniających ochronę ludności i mienia w sytuacji zaistnienia kryzysu (militarnego lub niemilitarnego), a w okresie wojny i ewentualnej okupacji prowadzenia ochrony i obrony ważnych obiektów i rejonów na całym terytorium kraju, współdziałania z wojskami operacyjnymi oraz wsparcia, a także elementami układu pozamilitarnego. ; In order to provide effective, universal and spatial defense of the Polish State, and at the same time to carry out the collective defence tasks of the Alliance, it is indispensable to create a defense system with an effective deterrence potential. Effective defence requires effective coordination between the military and other state institutions. Territorial Defence as a component of a genuinely effective, modern military structure – included in the process of universal youth education and training, Polish Army reserve training, support to local communities and non-military cells in the event of a crisis (military or non-military), and during the war and possible occupation, protection and defence of important facilities and areas throughout the territory of the country, cooperation with regular operational units, and support units and civilian defence and defence structures, provide an effective and up-to-date defence of both military and non-military threats to national security.

The author's goal is to analyze the impact of changes in the international security environment on the defense policy of New Zealand in the second decade of the 21st century. It was found that the changes have a direct impact on New Zealand's policy during the governments lead by the National Party. The evidence can be found in the documents and decisions e.g. increase of defence spending and modernization of armed forces. Moreover, the start of developing the national security policy, which combines a number of different policies regarding state's security. There is no doubt that the National Party implemented a program of strengthening defence capabilities. The author will prove that it happened due to new threats to international security. The content of documents issued in the years 2008–2016 cleary confirm that argument eg. military spending of 20 billion NZD in the coming years. It should be considered as a correct direction because of opposing the negative consequences of changes in the natural environment, the growing role of the People's Republic of China, the nature of contemporary armed conflicts and terrorism is possible only by using a holistic approach to security. This point of view is strongly supported by an opinion that geographic isolation is no longer a guarantee of peace for New Zealand. It is impossible in the times of the 21st Century globalization and the rapid technological development manifested by a series of new, previously unknown cyber-threats. These are particularly dangerous for New Zealand's society due to the level of use of new technologies in ordinary life.To sum it up, the author of the issue will be based on the neorealist perspective and try to prove that the changes in the international security environment have direct impact on the defence and security policy of New Zealand. Key words: New Zealand; defence policy; national security policy; international security environment; New Zealand Defence Force. ; Celem Autora jest analiza wpływu zmian w międzynarodowym środowisku bezpieczeństwa na politykę obronną Nowej Zelandii w drugiej dekadzie XXI wieku. Stwierdzono, że zachodzące zmiany mają bezpośredni wpływ na politykę nowozelandzką w czasie rządów, na których czele stała Partia Narodowa. Ich odzwierciedleniem jest zawartość dokumentów dotyczących polityki w wymienionym obszarze i wynikające z nich działania m.in. wzrost wydatków na obronność wraz z towarzyszącym mu programem modernizacyjnym sił zbrojnych Nowej Zelandii. Dodatkowo zaś ze względu na charakter współczesnych wyzwań i zagrożeń bezpieczeństwa rządzący państwem zdecydowali się rozpocząć budowę kompleksowej polityki bezpieczeństwa narodowego. Biorąc to pod uwagę można stwierdzić, że Partia Narodowa realizowała swoje postulaty przedwyborcze, w których akcentowano konieczność wzmacniania zdolności obronnych, w szczególności rozwoju nowozelandzkich sił zbrojnych oraz integracji prowadzonych polityk związanych z bezpieczeństwem państwa. Zawartość dokumentów wydanych w latach 2008–2016 wyraźnie dowodzi działań w tym kierunku. Należy je uznać za słuszne, ponieważ przeciwstawienie się negatywnym konsekwencjom zmian w środowisku naturalnym, rosnącej roli Chińskiej Republiki Ludowej, charakterowi współczesnych konfliktów zbrojnych oraz obawom o rozwój organizacji terrorystycznych, możliwe jest przy zastosowaniu całościowego podejścia do bezpieczeństwa. Odpowiada temu pogląd głoszony silnie w tym okresie, że geograficzna izolacja nie jest już gwarantem pokoju dla Nowozelandczyków. Trudno bowiem o to nie tylko w czasach XXI wiecznej globalizacji, ale i tak gwałtownego rozwoju technologicznego przejawiającego się szeregiem nowych, nieznanych wcześniej cyber-zagrożeń. Analiza zagadnienia prowadzona będzie w oparciu o perspektywę neorealistyczną.Słowa kluczowe: Nowa Zelandia; polityka obronna; polityka bezpieczeństwa narodowego; międzynarodowe środowisko bezpieczeństwa; Siły Obronne Nowej Zelandii.

Introduction of Preventive Censorship in 1920 in the Former Prussian PartitionDuring the restitution of the Polish Statehood in 1918, the individual provinces maintained the laws of the previous occupying powers with regard to regulatingthe freedom of the press and specific procedures of the oversight that state authorities had over the press activities. Since January 1919, there was an optionto impose a confiscation of any publication in the part of Polish Republic, in which a martial law was in effect. This route, allowing for the introduction of preventive censorship, was used in June 1919 by the Supreme People's Council, an organization that was in power in the Wielkopolska district (of the former Prussian partition). The volatile situation at the front of the Polish–Bolshevik war prompted the Polish authorities to uniform the laws regarding preventive censorships.Subsequently, the Council of National Defense issued on July 19th, 1920 a decree introducing the preventive censorship on the territory of the Polish state. Despite the lack of respective executive directives from the Ministries of Internal Affairs and Ministry of Former Prussian Partition, the Poznań city mayor [starostagrodzki] started implementing the preventive censorship regulations already on July 22, 1920. These restrictions pertained to publications relevant to the army and matters of state defense. However, the implementation of these regulations was aborted after the Polish Parliament approved on October 29, 1920 a bill abolishing a preventive censorship. Nonetheless, the Wielkoposka district waited until November 25, 1920 when the Poznań city mayor [starosta grodzki] issued a document revoking his previous decree about preventive censorship.

Introduction of Preventive Censorship in 1920 in the Former Prussian PartitionDuring the restitution of the Polish Statehood in 1918, the individual provinces maintained the laws of the previous occupying powers with regard to regulatingthe freedom of the press and specific procedures of the oversight that state authorities had over the press activities. Since January 1919, there was an optionto impose a confiscation of any publication in the part of Polish Republic, in which a martial law was in effect. This route, allowing for the introduction of preventive censorship, was used in June 1919 by the Supreme People's Council, an organization that was in power in the Wielkopolska district (of the former Prussian partition). The volatile situation at the front of the Polish–Bolshevik war prompted the Polish authorities to uniform the laws regarding preventive censorships.Subsequently, the Council of National Defense issued on July 19th, 1920 a decree introducing the preventive censorship on the territory of the Polish state. Despite the lack of respective executive directives from the Ministries of Internal Affairs and Ministry of Former Prussian Partition, the Poznań city mayor [starostagrodzki] started implementing the preventive censorship regulations already on July 22, 1920. These restrictions pertained to publications relevant to the army and matters of state defense. However, the implementation of these regulations was aborted after the Polish Parliament approved on October 29, 1920 a bill abolishing a preventive censorship. Nonetheless, the Wielkoposka district waited until November 25, 1920 when the Poznań city mayor [starosta grodzki] issued a document revoking his previous decree about preventive censorship.

Introduction of Preventive Censorship in 1920 in the Former Prussian Partition During the restitution of the Polish Statehood in 1918, the individual provinces maintained the laws of the previous occupying powers with regard to regulating the freedom of the press and specific procedures of the oversight that state authorities had over the press activities. Since January 1919, there was an option to impose a confiscation of any publication in the part of Polish Republic, in which a martial law was in effect. This route, allowing for the introduction of preventive censorship, was used in June 1919 by the Supreme People's Council, an organization that was in power in the Wielkopolska district (of the former Prussian partition). The volatile situation at the front of the Polish–Bolshevik war prompted the Polish authorities to uniform the laws regarding preventive censorships. Subsequently, the Council of National Defense issued on July 19th, 1920 a decree introducing the preventive censorship on the territory of the Polish state. Despite the lack of respective executive directives from the Ministries of Internal Affairs and Ministry of Former Prussian Partition, the Poznań city mayor [starosta grodzki] started implementing the preventive censorship regulations already on July 22, 1920. These restrictions pertained to publications relevant to the army and matters of state defense. However, the implementation of these regulations was aborted after the Polish Parliament approved on October 29, 1920 a bill abolishing a preventive censorship. Nonetheless, the Wielkoposka district waited until November 25, 1920 when the Poznań city mayor [starosta grodzki] issued a document revoking his previous decree about preventive censorship.

During the restitution of the Polish Statehood in 1918, the individual provinces maintained the laws of the previous occupying powers with regard to regulating the freedom of the press and specific procedures of the oversight that state authorities had over the press activities. Since January 1919, there was an option to impose a confiscation of any publication in the part of Polish Republic, in which a martial law was in effect. This route, allowing for the introduction of preventive censorship, was used in June 1919 by the Supreme People's Council, an organization that was in power in the Wielkopolska district (of the former Prussian partition). The volatile situation at the front of the Polish–Bolshevik war prompted the Polish authorities to uniform the laws regarding preventive censorships. Subsequently, the Council of National Defense issued on July 19th, 1920 a decree introducing the preventive censorship on the territory of the Polish state. Despite the lack of respective executive directives from the Ministries of Internal Affairs and Ministry of Former Prussian Partition, the Poznań city mayor [starosta grodzki] started implementing the preventive censorship regulations already on July 22, 1920. These restrictions pertained to publications relevant to the army and matters of state defense. However, the implementation of these regulations was aborted after the Polish Parliament approved on October 29, 1920 a bill abolishing a preventive censorship. Nonetheless, the Wielkoposka district waited until November 25, 1920 when the Poznań city mayor [starosta grodzki] issued a document revoking his previous decree about preventive censorship. ; Agnieszka Uziębło