National missile defense
In: Defense & security analysis, Band 25, Heft 2, S. 205-213
ISSN: 1475-1798
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In: Defense & security analysis, Band 25, Heft 2, S. 205-213
ISSN: 1475-1798
World Affairs Online
In: FP, Heft 117, S. 120-137
ISSN: 0015-7228
World Affairs Online
A letter report issued by the General Accounting Office with an abstract that begins "Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the National Missile Defense program, focusing on: (1) programmatic changes to the program and whether significant performance and schedule risks remain; and (2) program officials' efforts to control costs, program estimate, and the potential for cost increases."
BASE
In: RUSI journal, Band 146, Heft 1, S. 39-42
ISSN: 0307-1847
World Affairs Online
A letter report issued by the General Accounting Office with an abstract that begins "The Department of Defense (DOD) awarded contracts to three companies in 1990 to develop and test exoatmospheric kill vehicles. One of the contractors--Boeing North American--subcontracted with TRW to develop software for the kill vehicle. In 1998, Boeing became the Lead System Integrator for the National Missile Defense Program and chose Raytheon as the primary kill vehicle developer. Boeing and TRW reported that the June 1997 flight test achieved its primary objectives but detected some sensor abnormalities. The project office relied on Boeing to oversee the performance of TRW. Boeing and TRW reported that deployed target objects displayed distinguishable features when being observed by an infrared sensor. After considerable debate, the program manager reduced the number of decoys planned for intercept flight tests in response to a recommendation by an independent panel. The Phase One Engineering Team, which was responsible for completing an assessment of TRW's software performance within two months using available data, found that although the software had weaknesses, it was well designed and worked properly, with only some changes needed to increase the robustness of the discrimination function. On the basis of that analysis, team members predicted that the software would perform successfully in a future intercept test if target objects deployed as expected."
BASE
World Affairs Online
World Affairs Online
In: The bulletin of the atomic scientists: a magazine of science and public affairs, Band 56, Heft 2, S. 22-41
ISSN: 0096-3402, 0096-5243, 0742-3829
World Affairs Online
A letter report issued by the General Accounting Office with an abstract that begins "The Department of Defense (DOD) awarded contracts to three companies in 1990 to develop and test exoatmospheric kill vehicles. One of the contractors--Boeing North American--subcontracted with TRW to develop software for the kill vehicle. In 1998, Boeing became the Lead System Integrator for the National Missile Defense Program, and chose Raytheon as the primary kill vehicle developer. Boeing and TRW reported that the June 1997 flight test achieved its primary objectives, but that some sensor abnormalities were detected. The project office relied on Boeing to oversee the performance of TRW. Boeing and TRW reported that deployed target objects displayed distinguishable features when being observed by an infrared sensor. After considerable debate, the program manager reduced the number of decoys planned for intercept flight tests in response to a recommendation by an independent panel. The Phase One Engineering Team, which was responsible for completing an assessment of TRW's software performance within two months using available data, found that although the software had weaknesses, it was well designed and worked properly, with only some changes needed to increase the robustness of the discrimination function. On the basis of that analysis, team members predicted that the software would perform successfully in a future intercept test if target objects deployed as expected."
BASE
In: Arms control today, Band 29, Heft 7, S. 3-6
ISSN: 0196-125X
World Affairs Online
The basic arguments of this paper are, first, that the current US-missile defense, being operative from fall 2004, is based upon the former experiences with missile defense, second, that missile defense closely associated with weapons of mass destruction has gained the highest priority in American national security policy due to the 9.11 attacks, and third, that the superior argument for establishing an American missile defense is to maintain global, long term political-strategic superiority. The main argument of this brief is that besides the need for meeting current new threats and challenges there are long term agendas behind the US missile defense program: for the United States to ensure a continuing and increasing strategic-political-technological world wide superiority, while at the same time being able to assist allies against WMD-threats from rogue states and rogue actors.
BASE
In: Comparative strategy, Band 12, Heft 1, S. 57-66
ISSN: 0149-5933
THE UNITED STATES IS NOT PROTECTED FROM BALLISTIC MISSILE ATTACK. THE SUBJECT OF THIS ESSAY IS WHAT TO THINK ABOUT A NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE. TOPICS COVERED ARE: SEMANTIC INFLITRATION; MUTUAL VULNERABILITY AND THE ABM TREATY; THE FUTURE OF SDI; AND MDA POLITICAL COMMITMENT. IT CONCLUDES THAT THE TIME FOR SDI IS NOW.
In: Comparative strategy, Band 19, Heft 3, S. 263-281
ISSN: 0149-5933
World Affairs Online
In: The Journal of social, political and economic studies, Band 22, S. 131-141
ISSN: 0278-839X, 0193-5941
Examines reasons underlying reluctance to deploy an anti-ballistic missile defense system. Factors include an undisputed recognition of the threat, a military requirement to counter the threat, public and government support, technical capability, financial commitment, and freedom to proceed under international treaties.
World Affairs Online