Suchergebnisse

AbstractAre 'white nationalists' really nationalists? This label is one that right‐wing, white activists themselves have chosen, and as such, compels rigorous investigation to avoid simply adopting the preferred nomenclature of these activists and their ambitions. The nation and nationalism are concepts with rich scholarly histories, and this paper seeks to examine the discussion, activities and statements of so‐called white nationalists in light of this literature. We argue through a three‐fold concept of the nation—based on territoriality, population and symbolic and/or cultural content—that the vision of the political community and ambitions of these activists falls short of the standard of a nation and that their aspirations do not conform to what the literature lays out as nationalism. We argue, therefore, that using the language of 'white nationalism' to describe these groups obfuscates and sanitises their motives and lends undue legitimacy to their standing in public discourse.

Reflections from Taiwan on the history of creole & official, linguistic & long-distance nationalisms in Asia & Europe, & their implications for China. Is there any significant difference here between East & West? Adapted from the source document.

This article analyzes ethnic nationalism and liberalism as expressed in the views of Croatians in the aftermath of the 1991-1995 war-a war during which ethnic-nationalist rhetoric played a large role. Because the war was part of systemic change in the nation, including the adoption of more democratic and capitalist social formation, we also anticipated economic and political liberalism to be present among a sizeable portion of the population. The authors provide an analysis of the structrual conditions fostering these sentiments, an analysis potentially applicable to a range of societies presently in transition. The authors find that three out of five Croatians embrace both ethnic-national views and views that are distinctly liberal, suggesting that liberal nationalism is now dominant in Croatia. The characteristics of groups holding differing views suggest that recent events and current changes in Croatia bode positively for continued growth of liberal sentiments, but this will not necessarily be at the expense of ethnic nationalism. (Nations and Nationalism, ECMI)

ABSTRACT. There is widespread agreement that nationalism emerged in the historical fountainheads of modernity, and was subsequently diffused outwards. Contrary to that, there is a long standing view that nationalism precedes modernity even in the broadly accepted cradles of both modernity and nationalism, such as England or France, neither of which was modern when it engendered nationalism. Besides, some emergent nationalisms ran concurrent with their English or French counterparts, with little evidence of having been spawned by diffusion. Such early or protonationalisms often sprang from resistance to foreign conquest, putting in doubt the invention‐diffusion hypothesis. I am therefore suggesting that nationalism has not emerged in few societies, but in many, and that it was engendered by social interactions, not by a particular social formation. While nationalism emerges within society, its genesis occurs in‐between social groups and societies, making it a product of their interactions. That makes it u‐topic, its cradles socially diverse, and its conception interactional, not gestational.

Abstract.This article analyses ethnic nationalism and liberalism as expressed in the views of Croatians in the aftermath of the 1991–5 war – a war during which ethnic‐nationalist rhetoric played a large role. Because the war was part of systemic change in the nation, including the adoption of more democratic and capitalist social formation, we also anticipated economic and political liberalism to be present among a sizeable portion of the population. We provide an analysis of the structural conditions fostering these sentiments, an analysis potentially applicable to a range of societies presently in transition. Based on 1996 survey interviews (N=2,202) conducted throughout Croatia, we show that ethnic nationalism in the Croatian context is more widely shared than is liberalism. The effect of religious fundamentalism, educational attainment and media exposure are as predicted, based on theories of liberalism and nationalism. Wartime experiences and position in the occupational system have a weaker and more mixed influence than hypothesised. Perhaps most importantly, we find that three out of five Croatians embrace both ethnic‐national views and views that are distinctly liberal, suggesting that liberal nationalism is now dominant in Croatia. The characteristics of groups holding differing views suggest that recent events and current changes in Croatia bode positively for continued growth of liberal sentiments, but this will not necessarily be at the expense of ethnic nationalism.

There is widespread agreement that nationalism emerged in the historical fountainheads of modernity, and was subsequently diffused outwards. Contrary to that, there is a long standing view that nationalism precedes modernity even in the broadly accepted cradles of both modernity and nationalism, such as England or France, neither of which was modern when it engendered nationalism. Besides, some emergent nationalisms ran concurrent with their English or French counterparts, with little evidence of having been spawned by diffusion. Such early or protonationalisms often sprang from resistance to foreign conquest, putting in doubt the invention-diffusion hypothesis. I am therefore suggesting that nationalism has not emerged in few societies, but in many, and that it was engendered by social interactions, not by a particular social formation. While nationalism emerges within society, its genesis occurs in-between social groups and societies, making it a product of their interactions. That makes it u-topic, its cradles socially diverse, and its conception interactional, not gestational. (Nations and Nationalism)