Language is part of ethnic identity, and ethnic identity in many cases, especially in Eastern and Central Europe, where ethnic nationalism is the prevailing form of nationalism, constitutes an integral part of nationalism (its other part consists of national interests as perceived by dominant groups and/or the majority). However, in the context of regional integration, the relationship between these categories undergoes a major change alongside with shifts in the identity structure.
Language is part of ethnic identity, and ethnic identity in many cases, especially in Eastern and Central Europe, where ethnic nationalism is the prevailing form of nationalism, constitutes an integral part of nationalism (its other part consists of national interests as perceived by dominant groups and/or the majority). However, in the context of regional integration, the relationship between these categories undergoes a major change alongside with shifts in the identity structure.
Language is part of ethnic identity, and ethnic identity in many cases, especially in Eastern and Central Europe, where ethnic nationalism is the prevailing form of nationalism, constitutes an integral part of nationalism (its other part consists of national interests as perceived by dominant groups and/or the majority). However, in the context of regional integration, the relationship between these categories undergoes a major change alongside with shifts in the identity structure.
The focus of this research is Alexei Navalny's framing of nationalism in his personal blog during the years of 2013-2017. The main task of this research is to continue and supplement Natalia Moen-Larsen's research on how A. Navalny constructs "normal nationalism" in his LiveJournal blog. Lack of a full picture of A. Navalny's discourse on nationalism besides his globally-known specialization on anti-corruption is the problem of this research. Below are the main concluding points of the research that were revealed by fulfilling the tasks of the thesis: a) completed inductive content analysis resulted in 2271 read blog posts by the author; b) 61 blog entries were sampled for an in-depth frame analysis as they featured frames and discourse on nationalism; c) A. Navalny's ideas of nationalism become milder than they were in the beginning of his political career; d) A. Navalny frames nationalism as a combination of patriotism, ethno-nationalism, xenophobia, and anti-fascistic discourse; e) end of a rather successful campaign for A. Navalny of Moscow mayoral elections of 2013 marks a breaking point when Navalny starts to adopt a catch-all logic, in order to maintain and balance support of him by both liberals and nationalists; f) frames and discourse on nationalism become almost non-existent in A. Navalny's personal blog in the years of 2013-2017, compared to 2006-2012. Completion of this thesis has supplemented N. Moen-Larsen's research of 2014 by expanding the timeframe from 2013 to the April of 2017. In this way, empirical value of this study is a more complete picture of A. Navalny's discourse on nationalism – from 2006 until 2017. This research creates guidelines for future investigations. First of all, a similar investigation could be initiated, but with a focus on other social media platforms that are actively used by A. Navalny. One of these could be his Youtube channel where he and his anti-corruption investigation team upload popular videos that could possibly feature more frames of nationalist ideas. Detaching from A. Navalny, conclusions of this research raise a question of whether and, if so, how other politicians and/or political activists with right-wing origins change their discourses on nationalism in relation to time and increasing popularity and/or visibility, especially taking into consideration current political developments in Central Europe.
The focus of this research is Alexei Navalny's framing of nationalism in his personal blog during the years of 2013-2017. The main task of this research is to continue and supplement Natalia Moen-Larsen's research on how A. Navalny constructs "normal nationalism" in his LiveJournal blog. Lack of a full picture of A. Navalny's discourse on nationalism besides his globally-known specialization on anti-corruption is the problem of this research. Below are the main concluding points of the research that were revealed by fulfilling the tasks of the thesis: a) completed inductive content analysis resulted in 2271 read blog posts by the author; b) 61 blog entries were sampled for an in-depth frame analysis as they featured frames and discourse on nationalism; c) A. Navalny's ideas of nationalism become milder than they were in the beginning of his political career; d) A. Navalny frames nationalism as a combination of patriotism, ethno-nationalism, xenophobia, and anti-fascistic discourse; e) end of a rather successful campaign for A. Navalny of Moscow mayoral elections of 2013 marks a breaking point when Navalny starts to adopt a catch-all logic, in order to maintain and balance support of him by both liberals and nationalists; f) frames and discourse on nationalism become almost non-existent in A. Navalny's personal blog in the years of 2013-2017, compared to 2006-2012. Completion of this thesis has supplemented N. Moen-Larsen's research of 2014 by expanding the timeframe from 2013 to the April of 2017. In this way, empirical value of this study is a more complete picture of A. Navalny's discourse on nationalism – from 2006 until 2017. This research creates guidelines for future investigations. First of all, a similar investigation could be initiated, but with a focus on other social media platforms that are actively used by A. Navalny. One of these could be his Youtube channel where he and his anti-corruption investigation team upload popular videos that could possibly feature more frames of nationalist ideas. Detaching from A. Navalny, conclusions of this research raise a question of whether and, if so, how other politicians and/or political activists with right-wing origins change their discourses on nationalism in relation to time and increasing popularity and/or visibility, especially taking into consideration current political developments in Central Europe.
The focus of this research is Alexei Navalny's framing of nationalism in his personal blog during the years of 2013-2017. The main task of this research is to continue and supplement Natalia Moen-Larsen's research on how A. Navalny constructs "normal nationalism" in his LiveJournal blog. Lack of a full picture of A. Navalny's discourse on nationalism besides his globally-known specialization on anti-corruption is the problem of this research. Below are the main concluding points of the research that were revealed by fulfilling the tasks of the thesis: a) completed inductive content analysis resulted in 2271 read blog posts by the author; b) 61 blog entries were sampled for an in-depth frame analysis as they featured frames and discourse on nationalism; c) A. Navalny's ideas of nationalism become milder than they were in the beginning of his political career; d) A. Navalny frames nationalism as a combination of patriotism, ethno-nationalism, xenophobia, and anti-fascistic discourse; e) end of a rather successful campaign for A. Navalny of Moscow mayoral elections of 2013 marks a breaking point when Navalny starts to adopt a catch-all logic, in order to maintain and balance support of him by both liberals and nationalists; f) frames and discourse on nationalism become almost non-existent in A. Navalny's personal blog in the years of 2013-2017, compared to 2006-2012. Completion of this thesis has supplemented N. Moen-Larsen's research of 2014 by expanding the timeframe from 2013 to the April of 2017. In this way, empirical value of this study is a more complete picture of A. Navalny's discourse on nationalism – from 2006 until 2017. This research creates guidelines for future investigations. First of all, a similar investigation could be initiated, but with a focus on other social media platforms that are actively used by A. Navalny. One of these could be his Youtube channel where he and his anti-corruption investigation team upload popular videos that could possibly feature more frames of nationalist ideas. Detaching from A. Navalny, conclusions of this research raise a question of whether and, if so, how other politicians and/or political activists with right-wing origins change their discourses on nationalism in relation to time and increasing popularity and/or visibility, especially taking into consideration current political developments in Central Europe.
The focus of this research is Alexei Navalny's framing of nationalism in his personal blog during the years of 2013-2017. The main task of this research is to continue and supplement Natalia Moen-Larsen's research on how A. Navalny constructs "normal nationalism" in his LiveJournal blog. Lack of a full picture of A. Navalny's discourse on nationalism besides his globally-known specialization on anti-corruption is the problem of this research. Below are the main concluding points of the research that were revealed by fulfilling the tasks of the thesis: a) completed inductive content analysis resulted in 2271 read blog posts by the author; b) 61 blog entries were sampled for an in-depth frame analysis as they featured frames and discourse on nationalism; c) A. Navalny's ideas of nationalism become milder than they were in the beginning of his political career; d) A. Navalny frames nationalism as a combination of patriotism, ethno-nationalism, xenophobia, and anti-fascistic discourse; e) end of a rather successful campaign for A. Navalny of Moscow mayoral elections of 2013 marks a breaking point when Navalny starts to adopt a catch-all logic, in order to maintain and balance support of him by both liberals and nationalists; f) frames and discourse on nationalism become almost non-existent in A. Navalny's personal blog in the years of 2013-2017, compared to 2006-2012. Completion of this thesis has supplemented N. Moen-Larsen's research of 2014 by expanding the timeframe from 2013 to the April of 2017. In this way, empirical value of this study is a more complete picture of A. Navalny's discourse on nationalism – from 2006 until 2017. This research creates guidelines for future investigations. First of all, a similar investigation could be initiated, but with a focus on other social media platforms that are actively used by A. Navalny. One of these could be his Youtube channel where he and his anti-corruption investigation team upload popular videos that could possibly feature more frames of nationalist ideas. Detaching from A. Navalny, conclusions of this research raise a question of whether and, if so, how other politicians and/or political activists with right-wing origins change their discourses on nationalism in relation to time and increasing popularity and/or visibility, especially taking into consideration current political developments in Central Europe.
The "Lithuanian Tautininkai" (Nationalists) was a strong political party in Lithuania in the 1930s. It was a "pro patria" party with a strong nationalistic ideology and vision of Lithuania as the national state of the Lithuanian people. After the coup in 1926, they became the ruling party and their leader Antanas Smetona became the President of Lithuania. In the 1930s the Tautininkai had their own attitude toward the national state of Lithuania that could not be realized without the support of the Lithuanian people. Trying to achieve this goal, the Tautininkai had to propagate their ideas among Lithuanians very actively. The official governmental press, such as "Lietuvos aidas" (Lithuanian echo), "Jaunoji karta" (Young generation), and "Tėvų žemė" (Land of fathers) had to do this. These newspapers reflected the attitude toward the national state and the role of different social and national groups in the political, social, economical or cultural life. The Tautininkai press also used some propagandistic instruments and linguistic constructions that were intended to improve the social effect of the official propaganda.
The "Lithuanian Tautininkai" (Nationalists) was a strong political party in Lithuania in the 1930s. It was a "pro patria" party with a strong nationalistic ideology and vision of Lithuania as the national state of the Lithuanian people. After the coup in 1926, they became the ruling party and their leader Antanas Smetona became the President of Lithuania. In the 1930s the Tautininkai had their own attitude toward the national state of Lithuania that could not be realized without the support of the Lithuanian people. Trying to achieve this goal, the Tautininkai had to propagate their ideas among Lithuanians very actively. The official governmental press, such as "Lietuvos aidas" (Lithuanian echo), "Jaunoji karta" (Young generation), and "Tėvų žemė" (Land of fathers) had to do this. These newspapers reflected the attitude toward the national state and the role of different social and national groups in the political, social, economical or cultural life. The Tautininkai press also used some propagandistic instruments and linguistic constructions that were intended to improve the social effect of the official propaganda.
The "Lithuanian Tautininkai" (Nationalists) was a strong political party in Lithuania in the 1930s. It was a "pro patria" party with a strong nationalistic ideology and vision of Lithuania as the national state of the Lithuanian people. After the coup in 1926, they became the ruling party and their leader Antanas Smetona became the President of Lithuania. In the 1930s the Tautininkai had their own attitude toward the national state of Lithuania that could not be realized without the support of the Lithuanian people. Trying to achieve this goal, the Tautininkai had to propagate their ideas among Lithuanians very actively. The official governmental press, such as "Lietuvos aidas" (Lithuanian echo), "Jaunoji karta" (Young generation), and "Tėvų žemė" (Land of fathers) had to do this. These newspapers reflected the attitude toward the national state and the role of different social and national groups in the political, social, economical or cultural life. The Tautininkai press also used some propagandistic instruments and linguistic constructions that were intended to improve the social effect of the official propaganda.
Building on the latest scholarship in the nationalism-economy nexus studies, the arti cle examines how nationalism inhabits other ideologies in the economic realm. First ly, the article presents the latest strands in the nationalism-economy nexus research, namely compatibility between economy and nationalism understood as ideology. Then, using Foucault's concept of governmentality, the article shows how the two phe nomena are compatible on the theoretical level. Going further, the article connects the latest nationalism-economy nexus scholarship with existing literature on national neoliberalism in the post-socialist Baltic states. The article argues that national neo liberalism in the Baltics provides an example of what the compatibility of nationalism and economy may look like in practice. The Baltic states' Soviet experience encour aged their elites to undertake radical neoliberal reforms, in which the processes of na tion-state and market economy building overlapped. The states were built to create the markets which would in turn guarantee the prosperity of their respective nations. The article juxtaposes different, yet related scholarships and provides a basic theoretical toolkit that could facilitate potential inquiries into the nationalism-economy nexus in Lithuania and a
Building on the latest scholarship in the nationalism-economy nexus studies, the arti cle examines how nationalism inhabits other ideologies in the economic realm. First ly, the article presents the latest strands in the nationalism-economy nexus research, namely compatibility between economy and nationalism understood as ideology. Then, using Foucault's concept of governmentality, the article shows how the two phe nomena are compatible on the theoretical level. Going further, the article connects the latest nationalism-economy nexus scholarship with existing literature on national neoliberalism in the post-socialist Baltic states. The article argues that national neo liberalism in the Baltics provides an example of what the compatibility of nationalism and economy may look like in practice. The Baltic states' Soviet experience encour aged their elites to undertake radical neoliberal reforms, in which the processes of na tion-state and market economy building overlapped. The states were built to create the markets which would in turn guarantee the prosperity of their respective nations. The article juxtaposes different, yet related scholarships and provides a basic theoretical toolkit that could facilitate potential inquiries into the nationalism-economy nexus in Lithuania and a
Building on the latest scholarship in the nationalism-economy nexus studies, the arti cle examines how nationalism inhabits other ideologies in the economic realm. First ly, the article presents the latest strands in the nationalism-economy nexus research, namely compatibility between economy and nationalism understood as ideology. Then, using Foucault's concept of governmentality, the article shows how the two phe nomena are compatible on the theoretical level. Going further, the article connects the latest nationalism-economy nexus scholarship with existing literature on national neoliberalism in the post-socialist Baltic states. The article argues that national neo liberalism in the Baltics provides an example of what the compatibility of nationalism and economy may look like in practice. The Baltic states' Soviet experience encour aged their elites to undertake radical neoliberal reforms, in which the processes of na tion-state and market economy building overlapped. The states were built to create the markets which would in turn guarantee the prosperity of their respective nations. The article juxtaposes different, yet related scholarships and provides a basic theoretical toolkit that could facilitate potential inquiries into the nationalism-economy nexus in Lithuania and a
Building on the latest scholarship in the nationalism-economy nexus studies, the arti cle examines how nationalism inhabits other ideologies in the economic realm. First ly, the article presents the latest strands in the nationalism-economy nexus research, namely compatibility between economy and nationalism understood as ideology. Then, using Foucault's concept of governmentality, the article shows how the two phe nomena are compatible on the theoretical level. Going further, the article connects the latest nationalism-economy nexus scholarship with existing literature on national neoliberalism in the post-socialist Baltic states. The article argues that national neo liberalism in the Baltics provides an example of what the compatibility of nationalism and economy may look like in practice. The Baltic states' Soviet experience encour aged their elites to undertake radical neoliberal reforms, in which the processes of na tion-state and market economy building overlapped. The states were built to create the markets which would in turn guarantee the prosperity of their respective nations. The article juxtaposes different, yet related scholarships and provides a basic theoretical toolkit that could facilitate potential inquiries into the nationalism-economy nexus in Lithuania and a
The aim of the research is to analyze the most important ideologies of Lithuanian family since the beginning of the XIXth century to the 80s of the XXth century. Ideology is understood here as a value system that has crucial impact on family and interpersonal relations, and is internalized by the family. Accordingly, three family value systems are under the research scrutiny. The first one was related to the XIXth century traditional Lithuanian family. The second one evolved as a consequence of Lithuanian nationalism at the turn of the XXth century. Finally, the third family ideology was based on the Soviet family policy during the period 1944–1970. Family life in the XIXth century Lithuanian community was based on the Lithuanian common law, the teachings of Catholic Church and patriarchalism as a way of living. These norms influenced interpersonal realtionships in the traditional Lithuanian community and legitimized the only possible way of living, that of marriage with a partner from the same social group and a sedentary life of a farmer. On the other hand Lithuanian nationalism at the turn of the XXth century led to new ideas of family life and interpersonal relationships. Hovewer, even though Lithuanian nationalists desired to promote a nationally "pure" family, they did not treat it as an exclusively reproductive institution. Lithuanian ideology emphesized interpersonal relationships within the family instead of reproduction. Lithuanian nationalists believed that the idea of a strong national family would succeed only if wife and husband treated each other as equal partners and comrades in arms. The Soviet family policy during 1944-1970 inculcated the idea of a family as a small open collective instead of a private sphere. Soviet family structure did not necessarily consist of two parents and their children. Single mother and her children were considered to be a full legitimate family. Likewise in terms of nationality Lithuanian family was not expected to concist of two Lithuanians. The main purpose of the Soviet family was reproduction and successful internalization of the Soviet values through the family.
