Ovaj se rad bavi jezičnom politikom i društvenim promjenama koje su se dogodile u Hrvatskoj za vrijeme i nakon rata koji je trajao od 1991. do 1995. godine. Počinjem opisom povijesne pozadine, rata i devedesetih godina 20. stoljeća, koje je obilježila velika količina jezičnog purizma i preskriptivizma u Hrvatskoj te stvaranje postjugoslavenskih država u kojima je pripadanje naciji predstavljalo ključ za definiranje državljanstva. Istraživanjem odnosa između promjena u jezičnom i društvenom poretku, problematiziram više tema. Tvrdim da je zakonski okvir prava manjinskog jezika osnažio i legitimizirao nacionalistički imaginarij, stvarajući daljnje društvene podjele i učvršćujući hijerarhije koje među nacionalnim kategorijama promoviraju određeni nacionalisti. Iz tog razloga, tvrdim da nekritičko odobravanje ili promoviranje lingvističke različitosti mogu biti opasni. Nadalje, u aktivističko-antropološkom smislu, razlažem moguće razloge zbog kojih su znanstvenici društvenih i humanističkih znanosti rijetko sudjelovali u sociolingvističkim raspravama koje se tiču novog hrvatskog standardnog jezika. Tvrdim da bi takvim raspravama u znatnoj mjeri doprinijelo sudjelovanje znanstvenika humanističkih i društvenih znanosti, jer bi se stvorila veza između sociolingvistike i ostalih grana humanističkih i društvenih znanosti te bi se tako odmaknuli od, prema mojem sudu problematične, politike usredotočene na "identitet". ; This paper focuses on language policy and social changes which have taken place in Croatia during and since the 1991-5 war. I first describe the historical background, the war and the nineties being marked by excesses of linguistic purism and prescriptivism, alongside the formation of post-Yugoslav states in which national belonging was key to defining citizenship. Through examining the relationship between changing linguistic and social orders, I raise a number of issues for discussion. I argue that the legal framework of minority language rights has consolidated and legitimated a nationalist imaginary, increasing social divisions and reinforcing hierarchies asserted by some nationalists between national categories. For this reason, I suggest that the uncritical endorsement of or promotion of linguistic diversity can be dangerous. Second, in an activist-anthropological vein, I discuss possible reasons why academics trained in the social sciences and humanities have rarely participated in sociolinguistic debates concerning the new Croatian standard. I suggest such discussions could greatly benefit from interventions by social scientists, so as to bring sociolinguistics into contact with other strands of the social sciences and humanities and move away from what I believe to be a problematic policy focus on "identity".
Ovaj rad donosi kratak povijesni pregled šogunata kako bi se objasnili uzroci njegova pada. Meiđijeva restauracija spada među najvažnije događaje u japanskoj povijesti u kojima je doživljena tranzicija s jednoga sustava vladavine na drugi. Tekst objašnjava kako su položajem nezadovoljni niži samuraji i marginalizirani tozama daimjoi, pod vodstvom provincija Sacume i Ćošua, izveli državni udar 1868. godine te poveli Bošinski rat protiv preostalih provincija vjernih šogunu. Neizostavno je bilo spomenuti i zapadne sile, koje su bile katalizatori za događaje koji su uslijedili, ali i za razvoj paranoične, nacionalističke ideologije. Spomenute su i posljedice izazvane Meiđijevom restauracijom te nastojanjima vlade da u što kraćemu roku modernizira zemlju, u čemu i uspijevaju. ; This paper brings a short historical review of the Shogunate with the aim of explaining the causes of its demise. Meiji restoration is one of the most important events in the Japanese history, where the transition from one ruling system to another can be observed. This paper explains how low ranking samurai, dissatisfied with their position, and marginalized tozama daimyos, under leadership of domains Satsuma and Choshu, had organized coup d'état in 1868 and had started Boshin war against remaining domains who were faithful to Shogun. It is important to mention Western powers, which assisted in accelerating the events that were to come and which were responsible for the development of a paranoid, nationalist ideology. The consequences of Meiji restoration and government's successful struggles to modernize Japan in short period of time are also mentioned in the paper.
Tema rada je desni populizam, vrlo jak i raširen na cijeloj sjevernoj polutki; ovdje nas zanima naša zemlja i njoj najbliže. Najprije općenito karakteriziramo populizam, a onda razmatramo njegov odnos s najbližim mu pojavama, nacionalizmom i patriotizmom. Zanimljiv je fenomen u Hrvatskoj odsutnost snažnih jasno populističkih stranki usprkos snažnoj nacionalističkoj orijentaciji u izbornoj bazi; najjednostavnije je objašnjenje da je HDZ uspio preuzeti važne teme desnog populizma, a ipak sačuvati formu i ideologiju parlamentarne demokracije. Koliko je to rješenje stabilno vidjet će se u budućnosti. Uspon populizma promijenio je okvir političkih dilema kod nas i u svijetu; zastupnici suprotnih stajališta sada moraju ponovno promisliti pretpostavke na kojima djeluju i ponuditi nova rješenja. ; The topic of the paper is right-wing populism, strong and widespread throughout the Northern Hemisphere; although the focus is on Croatia and its closest neighborhood. First, the author defines populism and then considers its relationship with its closest phenomena, nationalism, and patriotism. An interesting puzzle about Croatia is the absence of strong, clearly populist parties, despite a strong nationalist orientation in the electoral base; the simplest explanation is that the strongest party, HDZ (Croatian Democratic Union) has managed to take on important topics of right-wing populism while still preserving the form and ideology of parliamentary democracy. How stable this solution is will be seen in the future. The rise of populism has changed the frame of political contestation in our country and in the world; proponents of opposing political standpoints must now rethink the assumptions of their political action and offer new solutions.
Baski, manjinski narod sa svojim zasebnim jezikom i kulturom, stoljećima je podijeljen između Španjolske i Francuske. U Francuskoj Baski nemaju status manjine ni institucionalnu autonomiju. U Španjolskoj, međutim, nakon teškog razdoblja Francove diktature i preustrojstva Španjolske 1978. na kvazifederalnom načelu, španjolski Baski dobivaju priznanje nacionalne posebnosti te znatnu institucionalnu autonomiju kroz tzv. Autonomnu zajednicu (AZ) Baskiju. Unatoč zadovoljavanju većine aspiracija Baska u Španjolskoj, u španjolskoj Baskiji i dalje je prisutan secesionizam, dok taj fenomen u francuskom dijelu Baskije gotovo da i ne postoji. Cilj disertacije bio je, binarnom studijom i dizajnom najsličnijih slučajeva, koristeći se kvalitativno-kvantitativnom metodom, istražiti je li autonomija, umjesto zadovoljavanja španjolskih Baska statusom u okviru Španjolske, pridonijela jačanju njihova nacionalizma i secesionizma. Ovi fenomeni obrađeni su kroz tri prizme: izgradnju subdržavnih institucija, izgradnju subdržavnih identiteta i izgradnju lokalnih elita. Uočeno je da je autonomija u španjolskoj Baskiji pridonijela izgradnji protodržave, od demokratski izabranog Parlamenta, preko izvršne vlasti, do djelomično izgrađenog sigurnosnog aparata. Iako usporen rascjepima u baskijskom društvu uslijed demografske heterogenosti, na djelu je proces izgradnje subdržavne baskijske nacije. Autonomija je omogućila i izgradnju lokalnih elita, dolazak baskijskih nacionalista na vlast, kao i stranačko nadmetanje u baskijskom nacionalizmu. Sve to omogućilo je i da AZ Baskija krene izrazito "baskijskim" smjerom. Ona je potencijalno samo korak do pune neovisnosti, kojoj nedostaje još "prozor mogućnosti", koji se dogodio npr. raspadom bivših komunističkih federacija. U francuskoj Baskiji ne postoji teritorijalna, odnosno institucionalna autonomija. Ne dajući im "prozor mogućnosti" za razvoj i jačanje, građanska i unitarna država u Francuskoj odigrale su značajnu ulogu u ublažavanju baskijskog nacionalizma i secesionizma. Slučajevi španjolske i francuske Baskije pokazali su kako (ne)postojanje autonomije znatno utječe na periferni nacionalizam i secesionizam, kao i na potencijal za secesiju. ; In the last couple of years, the rise of secessionism in several democratic, Western European countries - from the United Kingdom (Scotland) and Belgium (Flanders) to Spain (Catalonia and the Basque Country) has been noted. All of them have something in common. In addition to having a heterogeneous ethnic structure, that is, the existence of distinct historical ethnic communities, all of these states have also, in the last couple of decades, gone through dramatic administrative and structural changes. From unitary states they had once been, they have transformed in a way which resulted in the introduction of either a certain degree of devolution or even in federalization. Consequently, historical ethnic communities have achieved a certain degree of autonomy, ranging from a partial and asymmetric decentralization ("devolution") as in the case of Scotland, to an extensive autonomy of the so-called autonomous communities of Spain. The intention of the central state and the legislator has been, inter alia, to safeguard the state unity and strengthen the state by accommodating the grievances of ethnic communities and their elites. The final outcome, however, has often been adverse to initial intentions. In the newly formed administrative units, "proto-states" of the ethnic minorities, there has been a rise in nationalism and secessionism. The purpose of this dissertation is to tackle this phenomenon and explore the causal relationship of autonomy and nationalism/secessionism. That is, the idea whether the autonomy itself strengthened nationalism and secessionism in the autonomous territories, thus acting as "subversive institutions" towards the central State, has been examined. In order to test the hypothesis and the arguments of the theory of subversive institutions, a dual comparison of two cases, Spanish and French Basque Country, and the most similar systems design have been used. The most similar systems design holds that the two cases share many common features and differ in only one. For instance, French and Spanish Basque Country are situated in the same region, share common language and ethnic origins; they are both parts of wider nation-states, face situation of diglossia etc. A differing feature, in this case, autonomy in the Spanish Basque Country – Autonomous Community of the Basque Country –Euskadi, is held responsible for the different outcome (stronger peripheral nationalism and secessionism). The choice of these two cases has been prompted by the fact that they may be considered the most similar cases in extremis, given that it is the same people on the two sides of the state border.The Basques, minority group with their own language and culture, for centuries have been divided among Spain and France. In France of today the Basques enjoy neither status of a national minority nor an institutional autonomy. In Spain, however, after a difficult period of Franco's dictatorship and the country's restructuring in 1978 on a quasi-federal principle, the Spanish Basques got acknowledgement of their national uniqueness (through a status of a nationality), and the Basque Country gained a significant institutional autonomy through so-called Autonomous Community of the Basque Country. In spite of the accommodation of most of the Spanish Basques' grievances, both on a tangible level (economic, political and cultural) and on a symbolic level (national and state symbols), the Spanish Basque Country still faces secessionism, while that phenomenon is hardly visible in its French counterpart. The dissertation explores whether the autonomy, instead of accommodating the Spanish Basques in the framework of the Spanish State, has contributed to the growth of their nationalism and secessionism. Conversely, the dissertation explores also whether the French civic state has contributed to attenuation of the peripheral, in this case, Basque nationalism. In France there are no "autonomic" institutions, but as a result of political and societal changes in France and external pressure from the South, i.e. from the Spanish Basque Country (spill over effect or Galton's problem), a "new governance" with specially designed institutions has been developed to partially accommodate the Basque grievances. Deprived of any substantial competences, executive or financial, they are a pale shadow of their Spanish counterparts. However, precisely for that, they serve as a good example to make comparative research in order to show the immense difference the autonomy per se can make. The research relies on the Valerie Bunce' s theory of "subversive institutions", which she tested on the cases of the former communist federations Soviet Union (USSR), Czechoslovakia (CSFR) and Yugoslavia (SFRY). Valerie Bunce (1999), explaining the collapse of former communist federations USSR, CSFR and SFRY, put forward a thesis that their design created preconditions for creating states within state. Consequently, the structure itself brought about the collapse of the communist bloc, and within it, of the federations USSR, CSFR and SFRY. Therefore, Bunce holds that the federalism created nations at the republican level or, if they had already been "defined", the federalism strengthened them. In other words, federal structure where the autonomous/federal units enjoyed relatively wide autonomy, in the long term acted centrifugally and finally led to the collapse of states (federations). With the advent of Gorbatchev and perestroika, consequent abandoning of the Brezhnev doctrine, and array of events that brought upon the collapse of communism and of federations, federal units – new "nations-in-the-making", took advantage of the situation ("window of opportunity") and proclaimed their independence.Bunce's theory and arguments have been applied on the situation in Spain. In the second case of the French Basque Country, and especially in the following comparative analysis, the situation in Spain can be/ is compared with the situation in France. It is thus possible to test the hypothesis on subversive institutions and to note the differences produced by the existence of autonomy in Spain. Bunce's theory has been tested on Spain (Spanish Basque Country) particularly for its quasi-federal structure of so-called autonomous communities (comunidades autónomas), or in Spanish jargon, Autonomías. Spanish autonomías provide a certain framework of a proto-state, nation-state, "state-in-waiting", and strengthen the centrifugal forces and local nationalism in a way, maybe to a lesser extent, but similarly as former republics of the ex-socialist federations. There comes the idea to test the theory of subversive institutions on Spain, i.e. Spanish Basque Country. In the introductory chapters of the dissertation, the phenomena of identity and nationalism have been tackled, followed by the theory of subversive institutions, as well as other supportive theories of the official nationalism (Anderson, 1990), path dependency (Krasner, 1984) and logic of appropriateness (March and Olsen, 2009). Finally, the three main arguments of the theory of subversive institutions have been elaborated, as well as the fourth, "counter argument". The two case studies follow, of the Spanish and the French Basque Country, structured in the same or very similar way. Firstly, the phenomenon of the Basque identity, its formation and its specifics for each of the two cases, has been elaborated. Secondly, the relation of the State towards the Basques and their identity has been examined in more depth. Within that framework, process of state building and other "counter-subversive action" of the state, with the aim of diminishing the peripheral nationalism and secessionism, has been tackled. Separate chapters have been dedicated to the transition to autonomy in the Spanish Basque Country (and to the Spanish Estado de las Autonomías /State of Autonomies) Bunce's theory and arguments have been applied on the situation in Spain. In the second case of the French Basque Country, and especially in the following comparative analysis, the situation in Spain can be/ is compared with the situation in France. It is thus possible to test the hypothesis on subversive institutions and to note the differences produced by the existence of autonomy in Spain. Bunce's theory has been tested on Spain (Spanish Basque Country) particularly for its quasi-federal structure of so-called autonomous communities (comunidades autónomas), or in Spanish jargon, Autonomías. Spanish autonomías provide a certain framework of a proto-state, nation-state, "state-in-waiting", and strengthen the centrifugal forces and local nationalism in a way, maybe to a lesser extent, but similarly as former republics of the ex-socialist federations. There comes the idea to test the theory of subversive institutions on Spain, i.e. Spanish Basque Country. In the introductory chapters of the dissertation, the phenomena of identity and nationalism have been tackled, followed by the theory of subversive institutions, as well as other supportive theories of the official nationalism (Anderson, 1990), path dependency (Krasner, 1984) and logic of appropriateness (March and Olsen, 2009). Finally, the three main arguments of the theory of subversive institutions have been elaborated, as well as the fourth, "counter argument". The two case studies follow, of the Spanish and the French Basque Country, structured in the same or very similar way. Firstly, the phenomenon of the Basque identity, its formation and its specifics for each of the two cases, has been elaborated. Secondly, the relation of the State towards the Basques and their identity has been examined in more depth. Within that framework, process of state building and other "counter-subversive action" of the state, with the aim of diminishing the peripheral nationalism and secessionism, has been tackled. Separate chapters have been dedicated to the transition to autonomy in the Spanish Basque Country (and to the Spanish Estado de las Autonomías /State of Autonomies) after the 1978 Constitution, possess almost the entire state administration. One of the 17 autonomous communities, Autonomous Community of the Basque Country - Euskadi has a clearly defined territory, a democratically elected Parliament (officially called the Basque Parliament), a Government, officially called the Basque Government, ministries (called departamentos, departments, headed by consejeros, counselors), a Prime Minister, Lehendakari, with some prerogatives of a President, including state honours and palace. His office includes a mini Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Acción Exterior – External Action), with its delegations abroad. Thus, the Basque Government can project its image abroad. The autonomous administration has some 60 000 employees, to which one has to add the 30 000 employees of the provincial and communal administration, and disposes of a 10.6 billion € budget. At the same time, the central state administration in the Basque Country counts only 15 000 employees. Euskadi disposes of its own police forces Ertzaintza. As mentioned before, several authors argue that with such a developed administrative apparatus, a "segment-state", in our case the Spanish Autonomous Community of the Basque Country- Euskadi, has been in power for most of the post-1978 Constitution period. Its institutions are consequently able to act as centrifugal ("subversive") institutions, transmitting nationalist messages through media, education system, and regional institutions. But their nationalist message is not of Spanish, but of peripheral, in this case, Basque nationalism. Given the specific, unfavourable linguistic situation of diglossia, and the importance of language for national (and Basque) identity, the Basque Governments took it as a mission to restore to the Basque language a status of a full-fledged official and education language, in a sense of Gellner's "language of high culture" (1998). (Re)Introducing the Basque language, not only in schools and universities, but literary everywhere, rebasquisating Euskadi, a Basque identity has been (re)enforced. Nowadays almost all institutions under the competence of local, autonomous institutions in the Spanish Basque Country are obliged to adopt Action plans or Five-year plans on the language normalization, that is, reinforced use of the Basque language. The Basque Government, in that way projects certain ideology and builds up and strengthens the Basque national identity. A new, Basque nation is being built.The statistics speak for themselves. Before the autonomy, that is, before 1978/1980, education language was 100% Spanish. Nowadays, only a tiny 0.5% of students study exclusively in Spanish (so called Model X), and 15.3% in Model A, with education in Spanish, and Basque language as one of the subjects. 18.9% study in bilingual schools (Model B) and the high 65.3% study in Basque schools (Model D), with Spanish language as one of the subjects. The presence of the Basque language is enforced in other areas as well. For instance, in public administration the targeted percentage of Basque speakers should be 48.46% and it should increase with the rise of knowledge of the Basque language in general population. Moreover, the presence of the Basque language is checked regularly in yearly evaluation reports. In the Parliament, in 2005-2009 legislature, 56% of deputies spoke Basque, while in 2013 the percentage rose to 68,5%. At the University of the Basque Country, in Academic year 1995/1996, 27.2% of the students studied in Basque, while in 2013/2014 the percentage rose to 64.3%. The number of bilingual professors (Basque and Spanish) rose from 35.1% in 2006 to 47.8% in 2013. Similar processes can be followed everywhere.As far as identity is concerned, the 35% of the interviewees in the opinion polls conducted by the University of the Basque Country declare themselves as "only Basques", 21% as "more Basque than Spanish", 35% "equally Basque and Spanish", 3% "more Spanish" and 3% "only Spanish". As it can be noted, Basque identity prevails, with a significant percentage of dual identity. Spanish identity (more or exclusively Spanish) is quite low. Opinion polls also testify of the presence of a strong local (Basque) patriotism, and at the same time, mistrust in Spanish State institutions. For example, 62% of the interviewees show trust in the Basque Government, 61% in the Basque Parliament and Basque police Ertzaintza, while only 39% in the King, 15% in the Spanish Cortes and 11% in the Spanish Government. Trust in the Basque Prime Minister is 56%, while in the Spanish Prime Minister it is only 7%. Regarding the attitude towards secessionism, 35% of interviewees support the present autonomous status, 29% favour federation (which understands a more autonomy), 7% favour more centralization and 25% favour secession. Although the latter percentage alone seems low as to provide proof of secessionism in stricto senso, the sum of the all percentages, except for 7% for centralization, should be taken into consideration if secessionism were to be regarded in a wider sense (as peripheral nationalism; autonomism and secessionism; Horowitz, 1985). From the data above, the conclusion can be drawn that the process of Basque nation-building maybe has not finished yet, but is well under way and that there is a "Basque direction" of the Euskadi. As for the Basque language in the French Basque Country, though it is increasingly present in its schools, public institutions and society, it still does not enjoy an official status. The improvement of linguistic situation is only partially due to the incitement on the part of the authorities. There is an immense difference from Spain. The French state after 1980-s allowed more freedom and space for "regional languages" to be taught, but did not impose it, force it by "dictate", as has been in the case of Euskadi. The main credit for the improvement of status of the Basque language is due to the efforts of the civil society, associations and citizens themselves. The results, comparing the Spanish and the French Basque Country, vary accordingly. Only 36,6% of school children attend some Basque language classes, while in Spanish Basque Country it is 99,5%. There is the Public Office of the Basque Language (OPLB), that helps and promotes teaching Basque language in the French Basque Country, but it has no authority to impose the Basque language in education as the Viceconsejería de Política Lingüística of the Gobierno Vasco and the Gobierno Vasco in the Spanish Basque Country. Only 11% of the interviewees feel "only Basques", 5% "more Basques", 24% "equally Basques and French", 16% "more French and 36% "only French". In the French Basque Country, the French identity and the French language in both education and society prevail. There is no "Basque direction" or Basque nation-building process. The third argument of the theory of subversive institutions is about elites' building. In Euskadi, there is the local (Basque) Parliament, where the Basque nationalists have dominated since the first elections after the establishment of autonomy (1980), with an average of 60% of votes/seats, except for the period 2009-2012 (due to a ban of the Basque radicals before the elections). In the current legislature, 2012-2016, the nationalists (moderate PNV-EAJ and radical EH Bildu) have 48 out of 75 seats. That means that they have been able to impose a "Basque direction", e.g. policies of rebasquization (termed language normalization), or vote the Ibarretxe Plan. There are also numerous examples of party competition in nationalism and local patriotism, e.g. the issue of Basque language use, flag, coat of arms or anthem. In the French Basque Country, due to non-existence of a local Parliament or self-rule, there are no such phenomena. There have been since decades Basque nationalist parties, and they score up to 10% of the votes. Nowadays, there is also a Basque nationalist party, AB (Abertzaleen Batasuna), which is relatively successful at the lower, communal level, having around 100 councillors. However, the non-existence of a Basque administrative unit,département, and centralist French electoral and administrative system, result in a situation where only two Basque nationalist councillors managed to enter the General Council of the Département Pyrénées-Atlantiques, of which French Basque Country is a part. And there they are only two of the 54 councillors. Therefore, even if at the lower, communal level, Basques nationalists can enter the local communes and be part of ruling coalitions, or form associations of local councillors and mayors, they cannot impose a more "Basque direction" of the whole French Basque Country, like their Spanish Basque counterparts. The autonomy, embodied in the Euskadi's Basque parliament, enabled Basque nationalists in the Spanish Basque Country (Autonomous Community of the Basque Country – Euskadi) to come to power at the local level and to direct the (Spanish) Basque Country towards a "Basque direction". In addition, it helped also to build up their own elites – party elites and leaders, Government and Parliament dignitaries, above all the Prime Minister- Lehendakari, local public company managers, University, Academy, institutes' directors etc. If a potential future new country needs the infrastructure (i.e. state administration, the framework), it also needs identity/ideology and leaders (the contents and experts). And here they are! Not only are they in place, but they are in power! Finally, having their own Basque University will help to reproduce new Basque elites. In contrast, the French Basque Country does not possess almost any of the above. Indeed, the difference produced by autonomy is immense. A special attention has been given to the Ibarretxe Plan which represents at the same time a peak of the autonomy, but also shows its limits. Juan Jose Ibarretxe, Euskadi's Prime Minister (Lehendakari) from 1999 to 2009, put forward in 2003 his Proposal for Reform of the Political Statute of Community of Euskadi, popularly known as Ibarretxe Plan. It was actually a proposal for a confederation between the Basque Country and Spain. The relations between them would be based on a "free association"(Art.1). Without going into details of the Proposal, suffice it to say that, had it been enacted, even without a completely independent Basque Country, it would mean the end of Spain as we know it today. The Plan was approved by the Basque Government in 2003, and a year later, by the Basque Parliament, although with a narrow majority of 39 out of 75 votes. However, in order to be enacted, the Proposal should have passed in the Spanish Parliament. It was not surprising that the Spanish Parliament had rejected any discussion about it. Today a Spanish "carte blanche" for an independent Basque Country seems completely unimaginable. Nevertheless, remembering the "velvet divorce" of Czech and Slovak Republics and bearing in mind as well the development of situation in Catalonia, one cannot exclude, under different circumstances and leadership in Madrid and Euskadi, a possibility of a "new Ibarretxe Plan" leading to a "velvet divorce" and eventually to an independent Basque Country. To conclude, the autonomy enabled institutions (Parliament/Argument 1), nurtured Basque identity (Argument 2), enabled Basque nationalists to come to power, created a space for Basque elites and leaders and created space or even incentives for party competition in Basque nationalism (Argument 3). The thing the autonomy has not produced, and that lacks for secessionists, is a "window of opportunity" (Bunce, 1999). But if the "window" opens, as in the case of e.g. Czechoslovak "velvet divorce", an opportunity for a potential sovereign Basque state could be created. The comparative analysis has showed more sharply the differences between the two cases resulting from the existence of the autonomy in the Spanish Basque Country (Autonomous Community of the Basque Country- Euskadi) and its absence in the French Basque Country. While in Euskadi the nationalists have since 1980 scored around 60% of the votes in the Basque Parliament and dominated local politics for most of the time, in the French Pays Basque they never score more than 10% and have always been quite irrelevant at the regional local level (except for the lower local level of municipalities). The Basque identity prevailed in Euskadi and French in the Pays Basque. The Basque nationalists have been able to impose a "Basque direction" and an intensive "basquization" within the language normalization policy in Euskadi, which has not been the case in Pays Basque. Finally, a serious sovereignist/secessionist attemps – Ibarretxe Plan occurred, materialized, and was voted in the Basque Parliament of Euskadi, while in the Pays Basque anything of a kind is beyond imagination. There is no French Basque Government to conceive such a plan, no French Basque Parliament as a forum where such a Plan could be voted and no prevalence of Basque nationalists to vote such a plan…All of these phenomena are direct or indirect results of the autonomy or were allowed and fostered by the autonomic institutions in the Spanish Basque Country. Conversely, they are missing in the French Basque Country due to lack of autonomy. The two cases confirmed the hypothesis that the autonomy in ethno-federal arrangements fosters peripheral nationalism and secessionism and a potential for secession, while civic State attenuates them. Interestingly enough, even the consultative institutions of the French "new governance", initially quite powerless, managed to acquire some of the features of the "subversive institutions". They have become increasingly "Basque" and have taken a "Basque direction". However, the civic, centralised and unitary State prevented these institutions stripped of a real power from taking a lead in the Basque nationalism, to gain any significant power, or to direct the French Basque Country in any "Basque direction". The civic State in France indeed acted in attenuating peripheral, Basque nationalism by not providing it a "window of opportunity" to grow.
U radu se analizira ideja nacije Antuna Gustava Matoša (1873. – 1914.), odnosno konstitutivni elementi koji čine njezine temelje. Polazeći od pretpostavke da nacija nije proizvoljni politički konstrukt jednoga vremena nego proizvod povijesne evolucije niza kohezivnih identifikacijskih čimbenika određene skupine ljudi, nastojimo izdvojiti njezinu formulu u hrvatskim okvirima. Temeljne sastavnice Matoševe ideje nacije sukladne su srednjoeuropskomu načelu razvoja nacija pa analiziramo njegove misli o jeziku, teritoriju, povijesnome iskustvu te mitovima i simbolima svojstvenima za ljude sa zajedničkim etničkim podrijetlom. U skladu s tezom da se nacija politički želi ostvariti u državi, posebna se pozornost pridaje istociljnomu političkom i gospodarskomu djelovanju koji otkrivaju važnost voljnoga elementa u izgradnji i bivanju dijelom nacije. Matoševa ideja nacije otkriva se kao koherentan, dinamičan i interkulturan ideal koji odbacuje isključivost nacionalističkoga diskursa te tako i danas pokazuje aktualnost i korisnost. ; The paper analyzes idea of nation of Antun Gustav Matoš (1873 – 1914), i.e. constitutive elements which form its foundations. Starting from the presupposition that nation is not an arbitrary political construction of one time but a product of historical evolution of a number of cohesive identification factors of a certain group of people, we are trying to sort out its formula in Croatian frameworks. Basic components of Matoš's idea of nation are coherent with Middle-European principle of nations' development, so we analyze his thoughts about language, territory, historical experience, myths and symbols characteristic for people with common ethnic origin. In accordance to the thesis that a nation wants to be politically accomplished in a state, special attention is given to the same political and economic activity which reveals significance of willing element in building and being a part of a nation. Matoš's idea of nation is revealed as a coherent, dynamic and intercultural ideal which rejects exclusiveness of the nationalist discourse and therefore it shows its actuality and usefulness.
Polazište ovog rada nedavni je prijepor suvremenih realista oko aktualne dvojbe je li vanjskopolitička doktrina američkog predsjednika Donalda Trumpa realistička. Autor ukazuje da je navedena polemika posljedicom zastarjelog, tautološkog, ali još uvijek i neprevladanog dualističkog diskursa u teorijama međunarodnih odnosa, koji dijeli teoriju i vanjskopolitičku praksu na dva dominantna pravca: realizam i liberalizam. Na temelju dosadašnje teorijske kritike novog realizma, ili neorealizma, članak potvrđuje da ovaj suvremeni realistički pravac epistemološki ne pripada tradiciji realizma na koju se poziva, nego se svojim predodžbama o moći, državi i međunarodnom sustavu utemeljuje u političkom idealizmu: pravcu mišljenja koji se redovno pripisuje liberalima I kojemu je tradicionalni, ili "klasični" realizam bitno suprotstavljen. Analizirajući glavne podudarnosti između pretpostavki neorealizma i načela Trumpove doktrine, ovaj rad navodi na zaključak da Trump nije realist nego protuliberalni idealist. Pojam "protuliberalni idealizam" prikladniji je za razmatranje aktualne američke vanjske politike u kontekstu njene hegemonijske pozicije u liberalnom međunarodnom poretku. ; The article's initial motive is the recent controversy among contemporary realists, who questioned the supposed realism of US president Donald Trump's foreign policy doctrine. The author argues that the polemic is a consequential outgrowth of outdated, tautological, and yet still actual binary discourse, that divides international theory and foreign policy practice on Realism and Liberalism. Referring to the established critique of Neorealism, the article argues that Neorealism does not in epistemic terms belong to the tradition of Realism, to which it is a self-proclaimed successor. On the contrary, with its notions of power, state and international system it is established in political idealism: the tradition of thought that is conventionally attributed to Liberalism, and to which "classical" Realism was fundamentally opposed. By analyzing evident congruence between principles of Neorealism and Trump's America First doctrine, the article concludes that Trump is not a realist, but illiberal idealist. His idealistic nationalist world-view, when translated into foreign policy objectives, is in stark contrast to the professed principles of Realism. Furthermore, the concept of illiberal idealism offers an analytical framework for further analysis of present US foreign policy in the context of its hegemonic position in the Liberal International Order.
Ova analiza društvenog konteksta manjinske politike u Republici Srbiji u razdoblju od 2000. do 2016. godine posebnu je pozornost posvetila osnovnim odrednicama i dostignućima manjinske politike u procesu tranzicije i pretpostavkama, kao i mehanizmima izgradnje integrativne manjinske politike. Vladajuća etno-nacionalistička mobilizacija otežava prevladavanje nedavne prošlosti i teških posljedica međuetničkog sukobljavanja, uključujući i oružane sukobe, zločine etničkog čišćenja i genocida. To otežava međuetničku i međudržavnu suradnju sa susjedima, državama na prostoru bivše Jugoslavije odnosno Zapadnog Balkana. Posljedice ovakve politike najvidljivije su u položaju "novih nacionalnih manjina" i u odnosima sa susjednim državama koje su "matične države" ovih nacionalnih manjina. Odgovor na ove izazove Srbija bi trebala pronaći u okolnostima pojačanog značaja regionalne suradnje i pristupanja Europskoj Uniji (EU). Pritom ovaj odgovor najviše ovisi o tome hoće li se reformama dostići cilj održivog razvoja kao temelja socijalne inkluzije, a i pretpostavka je nužnih reformi i "europske budućnosti" (Janjić, 2011: 1 - 3). ; This analysis of the social context of minority policy in the Republic of Serbia betveen 2000 and 2016 deals with major determinants and achievements of minority policy in the transition process, including preconditions and mechanisms aimed at achieving the integrative minority policy in Serbia. The basic experience with minority policy and overall post-socialist transition in Serbia is marked by contradictions in the triangle of solidarity, social inclusion and ethnic nationalism. The dominant ethno-nationalist mobilization hinders the ability of Serbia to overcome the legacy of recent past and serious consequences of inter-ethnic conflicts, including armed conflicts, ethnic cleansing and genocide. This hinders inter-ethnic and inter-state cooperation with its neighbors, countries of the former Yugoslavia and Western Balkans. The consequences of such policy are most clearly visible in the status of "new" national minorities and in relations with Serbia's neighbors - "kin-states" of its national minorities. Likewise, it is difficult to implement supporting policies for the Serbs in the region who perceive Serbia as their "kin-state". Serbia should seek to respond to these challenges in attaching more importance to regional cooperation and joining the European Union (EU).
Sukladno terminologiji Stanka Lasića, koji je do sada dao najcjelovitiji pregled kritike o Miroslavu Krleži, a katoličku je kritiku svrstao u "'nacionalistički' centar", autor je katoličku kritiku zbog njezine brojnosti i intenziteta, osobito u razdoblju između dvaju svjetskih ratova, izdvojio kao poseban kritički centar. Ovaj rad nastoji predstaviti temeljna polazišta, smjerove i ciljeve katoličke kritike o Krleži u spomenutom razdoblju. Autor ju je svrstao u dva podcentra – paradigmatske cjeline: Marakovićevu (marakovićevsku) i Lendićevu (lendićevsku). Oba podcentra zahvaćaju dijapazon religijskih, filozofijskih – posebice etičkih i aksiologijskih – te političkih kritičkih objekcija i ciljeva. Vidljivo je da se dva paradigmatska pristupa sastaju u točkama kritike Krležina negatorstva hrvatske duhovne i književne tradicije te njegova "metafizičkog pesimizma", a(nti)teizma, društvene dekadencije i "literarnog marksizma". Razlikuju se u percepciji Krleže kao pisca. Maraković i bliskomišljenici uvažavaju Krležu kao književnika, dok ga Lendić i lendićevski podcentar isključuju iz hrvatske književne tradicije. ; In line with the terminology devised by Stanko Lasić, author of the most comprehensive review so far of the critique on Miroslav Krleža, who classified the catholic critique under "nationalist centre", the author of this paper decided to also address this critique as a separate centre of critique, due to its volume and intensity (especially in the period between the two World Wars). The paper attempts to present the fundamentals, directions and objectives of catholic critique in the said period. The critique is classified into two sub-centres: Circle of Maraković (Marakovician) and Circle of Lendić (Lendician). Both sub-centres encompass a range of religious, philosophical – ethical and axiological in particular – and political critical observations and objectives. It is evident that the two paradigmatic approaches converge at the point of the criticism of Krleža's routine negation of Croatian spiritual and literary tradition and his "metaphysical pessimism", a(nti)theism, social decadence and the "literary Marxism". They differ in perception of Krleža as a writer. Maraković and his fringe supporters find merit in Krleža as a writer, while Lendić and Lendician sub-centre exclude him from the Croatian literary tradition.
U radu se analiziraju četiri slučaja diplomacije prinude od kojih svaka predstavlja jedan aspekt suvremenih sigurnosnih ugroza: teritorijalna agresija motivirana nacionalističkim i etničkim aspiracijama (Bosna), agresija protiv vlastitog stanovništva zbog želje za samoodređenjem (Kosovo), terorizam (Afganistan) i oružje za masovno uništavanje (Irak). Cilj je provedene analize identificirati čimbenike koji su utjecali na ishod (uspjeh/neuspjeh) provedene strategije. Kao kriterij vrednovanja ishoda koristi se Jentlensonov cost/benefit model koji se temelji na zadovoljenju kriterija proporcionalnosti, recipročnosti i vjerodostojnosti. Uspjeh diplomacije prinude u Bosni imao je značajan utjecaj na odabir strategije za Kosovo, koji se smatra graničnim uspjehom s obzirom na dugotrajnost zračne kampanje. Diplomacija prinude u slučaju Afganistana i Iraka nije polučila željene rezultate te su ciljevi ostvareni primjenom sveobuhvatne vojne sile. Uzevši u obzir rezultate analize koji upućuju na zaključak da je diplomacija prinude, unatoč konceptualnoj jednostavnosti, kompleksna strategija čiji je ishod uvelike određen nizom kontekstualnih varijabli uz prilično ambivalentan karakter, svrha je ovoga rada spoznaja korisnosti i perspektive primjenjivosti Jentlensonova modela u objašnjenju uspjeha, odnosno neuspjeha strategije prinude. ; This paper analyzes four cases of coercive diplomacy each representing one aspect of contemporary security threats: territorial aggression motivated by nationalist and ethnic aspirations (Bosnia), aggression motivated by self-determination (Kosovo), terrorism (Afghanistan) and weapons of mass destruction (Iraq). The aim of the analysis is to identify factors that had impact on the outcome (success/failure) of coercive strategy. Jentleson cost benefit model based on the criteria of proportionality, reciprocity and credibility is used as the criterion for valuing outcome. The successfull aplication od coercive diplomacy in Bosnia played a major role in creating Kosovo`s coercive strategy witch is regarded as a marginal success due to continuance of the air campaign. Coercive diplomacy in cases of Afganistan and Iraq had faild and goals were achieved through application of brute force. Taking into account the results of the analysis that points to the conclusion that coercive diplomacy, despite conceptual simplicity, is a complex strategy whose outcome is influenced by a number of contextual variables with rather ambivalent character, the purpose of this paper is to comprehend the effectiveness and perspectives of the applicability of Jentlenson model in verification of success or failure of coercive strategy.
Hrvatski referendum o ulasku u EU pokazao je da je najveći dio hrvatskog biračkog tijela – euroravnodušan. Euroravnodušnost bila je preferirana opcija i za političku elitu, koja je – za razliku od biračkog tijela – unisono podržala članstvo Hrvatske u EU-u. Članak analizira uzroke euroravnodušnosti i euroskepticizma oslanjajući se na dosad provedena istraživanja. U drugom dijelu članak analizira moguće posljedice hrvatskog članstva u EU-u na smanjeni Zapadni Balkan. Te posljedice mogu biti ambivalentne, a konačan ishod ovisit će o faktorima kao što su: 1) stvarna privrženost EU-a politici daljnjeg proširenja, 2) daljnji razvoj krize u EU-u, 3) unutrašnja dinamika u svim zemljama kandidatima. Proširenje EU-a ovisit će i o sposobnosti političkih elita da ignoriraju javno mnijenje. Ujedinjenje Europe ostaje ideokratski projekt elita koji se ne temelji na ideji predstavljanja stvarnosti, nego transformacije te stvarnosti. No ignoriranje javnog mnijenja povećat će osjećaj demokratske nelegitimiranosti EU-a. Hrvatski referendum o članstvu u EU-u ponudio je neke instrumente kojima se politička elita poslužila kako bi marginalizirala rašireni euroskepticizam i suverenizam u široj javnosti. O sposobnosti ignoriranja i marginaliziranja suverenističke alternative ovisi i daljnje ponašanje Hrvatske – odnosno svake zemlje članice EU-a – unutar same Unije. ; The Croatian referendum on EU membership demonstrated that the Croatian electorate is highly indifferent towards the EU. The political elite too preferred EU-indifferentism to Euroscepticism. Unlike the largest segment of the electorate, the Croatian political elite is almost unanimously supportive of the EU membership for the country. The article analyses the main sources of Croatian EU-indifferentism and Euroscepticism. In addition, it discusses consequences of the outcome of the Croatian referendum to now reduced region of Western Balkans. Consequences of Croatian membership in the EU might be ambivalent, and will depend on factors such as: 1) EU's commitment to the policy of further enlargement (or the lack of this commitment), 2) development of political, economic and social crises in the EU, and 3) internal dynamics in candidate countries. The EU enlargement will also depend on the ability of political elites to ignore Euroscepticism in their own countries. Unification of Europe remains an ideocratic project led by political elites. It is not about representing reality as it is, but rather about changing it through thorough transformation of European societies. However, further ignoring of the electorate will result in an enhanced sense of democratic deficit and might further question the legitimacy of the EU. The Croatian EU referendum offered some instruments and lessons on how to marginalise Euroscepticism and nationalism in the general public. If it is to be a constructive member of the EU, Croatia will have to continue ignoring and marginalising nationalists and Eurosceptics. This is also the case with other EU member-states.
Štićene su osobe fizičke osobe zaštićene tjelesnom i tehničkom zaštitom, a osobita se briga pridaje štićenju vodećih političkih dužnosnika, kao i predstavnika najviših tijela vlasti. Poslovi tjelohranitelja moraju biti regulirani zakonom gdje će biti izričito navedeno ono bitno za uspješnu provedbu zahtjevnih poslova, a samo iznimni pojedinci mogu zadovoljiti potrebne uvjete posla. Društvo je u današnje vrijeme osobito izloženo političkom sukobljavanju i nasilju, te je potrebno posebnu brigu dati zaštiti vodećih političkih dužnosnika i predstavnika najviših tijela vlasti države. Svakako je najosjetljiviji trenutak u sveukupnom procesu nasilja dolazak počinitelja u konkretnu priliku da počini napad iz neposredne udaljenosti pogodnim oružjem. Kada dođe do ugrožavanja njihove sigurnosti postavlja se pitanje o učinkovitosti sustava sigurnosti u cijelosti. Atentati imaju isti učinak kao terorizam, a to znači da je krajnji cilj atentata kompatibilan s krajnjim ciljem i efektima. Primarni učinak izazivaju osjećaj straha, panike i nesigurnosti većeg broja ljudi što snažno utječe na djelovanje vlasti, a što je krajnji cilj političkog nasilja. Kad je riječ o državnicima, atentati su osjetljivi događaji koji mogu imati katastrofalne posljedice. Upravo je stoga kao tema ovog rada odabrana studija slučaja atentata na srbijanskog premijera Zorana Đinđića. Đinđić je pokušao reformirati i modernizirati Srbiju zbog čega je došao u sukob s radikalnim nacionalističkim krugovima. ; Protected persons are natural persons protected by physical and technical protection, and particular care is given to the protection of leading political officials as well as representatives of the highest authorities. Bodyguard jobs must be regulated by law, which will explicitly state what is essential for the successful execution of demanding jobs, and only exceptional individuals can meet the required job requirements. Today, the society is particularly exposed to political conflict and violence, and special care must be taken to protect leading political officials and representatives of the highest bodies of state power. Certainly the most sensitive moment in the overall process of violence is the arrival of the perpetrator in a concrete opportunity to commit an attack from close range with a suitable weapon. When their security is compromised, the question arises as to the effectiveness of the security system as a whole. Assassinations have the same effect as terrorism, which means that the end goal of the assassination is compatible with the end goal and effects. The primary effect is caused by the feeling of fear, panic and insecurity of a large number of people, which significantly influences the work of the authorities, which is the ultimate goal of political violence. When it comes to statesmen, assassinations are sensitive events that can have catastrophic consequences. That is why the case study of the assassination of Serbian Prime Minister Zoran Djindjic was chosen as the topic of this paper. Djindjic tried to reform and modernize Serbia, which led him to clash with radical nationalist circles.
Srpska demokratska stranka (akr. SDS) bila je radikalna, etnonacionalistička stranka srpskoga puka koja je osnovana 17. veljače 1990. na platou ispred Željezničkoga kolodvora u Kninu, a 6. ožujka 1990. upisana je u Registar društvenih organizacija SR Hrvatske. Osnivačkoj skupštini nazočilo je sedam tisuća građana srpske nacionalnosti koji su aklamacijom podržali pročitani programski dokument. SDS osnovao je akademik Jovan Rašković, šibenski psihijatar, pod "dirigentskom palicom" srbijanske Službe državne bezbednosti (akr. SDB), na čijem se čelu u to vrijeme nalazio haški optuženik Jovica Stanišić, vjerni Miloševićev sljedbenik. SDS je imao vodeću političku ulogu u ratnim događanjima u Hrvatskoj i Bosni i Hercegovini. Njezini su članovi organizirali naoružavanje Srba, podržavali ubijanje, protjerivanje i druge ratne zločine protiv pripadnika nesrpskoga puka na području Hrvatske i Bosne i Hercegovine. Općinski je odbor SDS-a za Općinu Podravska Slatina na čelu s Milunom Karadžićem na području Općine Podravska Slatina organizirao naoružavanje srpskoga puka, iskazao građanski neposluh i blokirao rad Općinske skupštine Podravska Slatina. Nakon SDS-ove blokade rada Izvršnoga vijeća Općinske skupštine Podravska Slatina reagirao je ministar pravosuđa i uprave Branko Babac. On je 24. srpnja 1991. donio Naredbu o poduzimanju posebnih mjera u općini Podravska Slatina kojom je raspuštena Skupština Općine Podravska Slatina, a istovremeno je imenovao povjerenika Vlade Republike Hrvatske. ; The Serbian Democratic Party (SDS) was a radical ethnic-nationalist Serbian party, founded on the platform in front of the railway station in Knin on February 17, 1990 and registered in the Register of Social Organizations of the Socialist Republic of Croatia on March 6, 1990. The Founding Assembly was attended by seven thousand citizens of Serbian nationality, who gave their support to the program document by acclamation. Academician Jovan Raskovic, a psychiatrist from Sibenik, founded SDS under control of the Serbian State Security Sevice ("SDB"), at that time led by the Hague indictee Jovica Stanisic, a faithful Milosevic follower. SDS had a leading political role in war events in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Its members organized the arming of Serbs, supported killing, expelling and other war crimes against non-Serbs in the territory of Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. SDS Municipal Committee for the Municipality of Podravska Slatina headed by Milun Karadic organized the arming of Serbs in the area of the Municipality of Podravska Slatina, expressed civil disobedience and blocked the functioning of the Municipal Assembly of Podravska Slatina. After SDS had blocked the function of the Executive Council of the Municipal Assembly of Podravska Slatina, a reaction came from the Justice and Administration Minister Branko Babac. On July 24, 1991 he issued the Order to take special measures in the Municipality of Podravska Slatina, whereupon the Assembly of the Municipality of Podravska Slatina was dissolved and a Commissioner of the Croatian Government was appointed at the same time.
Članak se bavi karakterom i zastupljenošću etničkoga diskursa u srbijanskim opozicijskim glasilima Demokratija i Srpska reč u periodu 1990./1991. Jedno od pitanja koje razmatra ovaj rad odnosi se na preispitivanje teze o nepostojanju relevantne političke alternative tzv. nacionalnom programu Slobodana Miloševića i njegove političke partije u Srbiji u predvečerje raspada Jugoslavije. ; A statistical analysis of the presence of ethnic discourse (ED) and its subcategory, discourse of ethnic intolerance (DEI), in the party organs Demokratija and Srpska reč shows the indisputably different political character and physiognomy of these two papers. Namely, the average presence of ED in the Srpska reč in the period from June 1990 to June 1991 was four times higher, and the prevalence of DEI ten times higher, than in the Demokratija. In addition to the varying prevalence and character of their ED content, these two organs were fundamentally different as regards the character of their remaining contents. In the Serbian Renewal Movement's organ, the predominant part of the remaining discourse consisted of revisionist serials and essays dedicated to promoting the Chetnik Movement. These texts made up as much as half of the contents of individual issues of the monthly Srpska reč. Putting together all the pro-Chetnik contents and the ED contents of the Srpska reč, we can conclude that, on average, over 60 percent of each issue's contents were exceptionally irrational, conservative, and nationalist. On the other hand, after its first few issues, the Demokratija preserved an ethic of responsibility and a critical stance towards the social reality and political situation in the country. After these first few issues, the ethnic discourse in this organ was present only as a precedent and derailment, and was not a commonplace of political rhetoric, unlike in the case of the Srpska reč. The leadership of the Democratic Party certainly played a role in setting up these standards of civil discourse in this organ but, paradoxically, it often also took responsibility for sharpening the 'national' line of reasoning within the frame of (forced) political pragmatism. Đinđić's or Mićunovićev's ethnic discourse from August 1990 and May 1991 was not supported by a corresponding change in the physiognomy of the paper, which remained predominantly rational, critically oriented, civil, and socially responsible. The analytical verification of facts in this paper certainly supports the thesis of Dubravka Stojanović from 1996 that there was no alternative to this programme in Serbia, at least not within the frame of these two most relevant opposition parties. Furthermore, this paper indicates that, in the summer and autumn of 1990 and in May 1991, the rhetoric of the party leaders of the Serbian Renewal Movement and Democratic Party attempted to be—and often was—more belligerent than Milošević's. As regards almost all questions of the internal order of Yugoslavia, and especially regarding the status of the autonomy of Kosovo and the regulation of the position of Serbian people outside Serbia, the solutions advocated by the opposition were more radical than the ones advocated by Slobodan Milošević's regime.
Cilj ovog rada jest analizirati povijesnu pozadinu trenutnih događanja poput kurdske borbe za neovisnost i jačanja feminističke misli, kao i kulturne te političke okolnosti koje su pokrenule niz događaja koji su na posljetku doveli do radikalne promjene u političkoj i društvenoj klimi današnje Sirije. U jeku građanskog rata, Kurdi su iskoristili priliku da započnu borbu za vlastiti suverenitet u sjevernoj Siriji, na kurdskom jeziku poznatoj kao Rojava. Budući da je utemeljena na nadasve progresivnoj ideji demokratskog konfederalizma, osmišljenoj od strane kurdskog nacionalističkog vođe i osnivača PKK-a (Kurdistanske radničke partije) Abdullaha Öcalana, revolucija u Rojavi često se smatra jednim od najvećih društvenih eksperimenata našega vremena. Iako već sama implementacija demokratskog konfederalizma može biti dovoljna kako bi se istaknula važnost ove revolucije u kontekstu današnjeg Bliskog istoka, procvat ženskih prava u Rojavi za trajanja revolucije od još je većeg značaja. Jedna od ključnih ideja Öcalanove filozofije, poznata kao Jineologija (znanost žena), ne postavlja ništa drugo do žene u sam centar revolucije. Promatrajući rad ženske vojske, tako zvane Jedinice ženske zaštite (YPJ) jasno je vidljivo da se spomenuta ideologija očituje u praksi, ne samo na bojištu, već i u svakodnevnom životu. U ovom radu nastojat ću dati pregled povijesnih okolnosti koje su dopustile iskru koja je zapalila vatru ženske revolucije u jednom od najpatrijarhalnijih društava i među jednom od najpotlačenijih manjina u današnjem svijetu te nadalje istražiti značaj sadašnje situacije u Rojavi. ; The following paper aims to analyze the historical background of the current happenings such as the Kurdish endeavors towards independence and the strengthening of feminist thought, as well as cultural and political circumstances which put into motion a series of events that ultimately lead to a radical change in the political and social climate of the present day Syria. In the midst of a civil war, the Kurdish people seized the opportunity to fight for their own sovereignty in northern Syria, or as it is known by the Kurds – Rojava. Rooted in the strongly progressive idea of Democratic Confederalism designed by a Kurdish nationalist leader and the PKK (Kurdistan Workers' Party) founder Abdullah Öcalan, the Rojava Revolution is often deemed one of the greatest social experiments of our time. Even though the implementation of Democratic Confederalism may be in itself enough to highlight the importance of this revolution in the context of today's Middle East, what is of even greater significance is the blossoming of women's rights in Rojava. Another one of Öcalan's pivotal ideas, known as Jineology (the science of women) puts none other than women at the very center of the revolution. By observing the work of the all-female Women's Protection Units (YPJ) it is clearly evident that the aforementioned ideology manifests itself in practice, not only in the battlefield, but in everyday life as well. In this paper I will try to provide an overview of the historical circumstances that allowed for a spark that started the fire of the Women's Revolution within one of the most patriarchal societies and among one of the most repressed minorities in the world today and further examine the significance of the current situation in Rojava.
U radu autor analizira djelovanje Samostalne demokratske stranke (SDS) u Slavoniji i Srijemu 1924.-1929. Čitatelj se upućuje na okolnosti nastanka stranke, ustroj stranačke infrastrukture, etničku i socijalnu strukturu, tisak te rezultate na parlamentarnim, oblasnim i lokalnim izborima. SDS je, usprkos isticanju unitarističke dogme o jedinstvenom jugoslavenskom narodu, počivao na podršci srpskih birača i nalazio se u stalnom nadmetanju s radikalima za poziciju najjače srpske stranke slavonsko-srijemskog prostora. ; In this paper the author analyses the activities of the Independent Democratic Party (SDS) in Slavonia and Syrmia from 1924 to 1929. The reader will be familiarised with the circumstances of the development of the party, the organization of the party's infrastructure, the ethnic and social structure, the press and the results of parliamentary, regional and local elections. Although the Independent Democratic Party advocated the unitary dogma of a single Yugoslav nation, it was drew on the support of Serbian voters and constantly competed with the Radicals for the position of the most powerful Serbian party in the Slavonian-Syrmian territory. The Independent Democratic Party in Slavonia and Syrmia managed during the last four and a half years of the parliamentary regime of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes to make itself into a significant political factor. In the territories of the Virovitica and Požega County it was in a constant struggle with the Radicals for the position of the second most important political power, while in the territory of the Syrmian County it lagged behind the Radicals. However, it did not succeed in approaching Radić's Party which during that period succeeded in keeping the position of dominant political party. With respect to the Democratic Party that it had emerged from, the conclusion can be drawn that it attracted the majority of the members and adherents of the former united Democrats. The Independent Democratic Party in Slavonia and Syrmia drew heavily on the support of the Serbian electorate. On the one hand, this implies that the party had not entirely succeeded in affirming its unitary Yugoslav political platform, since it was evident that it was rejected by the Croats, the majority population. The struggle for the sympathy of the Serbian voters naturally led to fierce political confrontations with the Radicals, which were only temporarily calmed by the coalitions of the two parties at the level of the state as a whole. At the same time the Independent Democratic Party above all proved to be the political representative of the Serbian peasantry of the Slavonian-Syrmian area which implied confrontations with the Radicals and also with the ever-greatger influence of farmers. Various forms of para-political organization on which the unique Democratic Party had been successfully working before the party split (Peasant Councils, Voluntary Association and the Organization of Yugoslav Nationalists) considerably supplemented and thereby strengthened the power of the Independent Democratic Party after spring 1924. While monarchism and the Serbian electoral base considerably facilitated a short-term coalition with the Radicals in 1925 (National Block), the Independent Democratic Party and the Croatian Peasant Party (Peasant Democratic Coalition) shared lesser connecting features. The party leadership and certain sincere supporters of a coalition with Radić's Party (the leader of the Party in Osijek, Milan Stijić or the Pakrac Orthodox priest Danilo Podunavac) endeavoured to ease the ideological and programme differences by emphasizing the mutual menace to both the Croats and Serbs of the transriparian Serb areas. However, other Slavonian-Syrmian party leaders (Svetislav Popović and Milenko Marković) considered an alliance with the Croatian Peasant Party to be a great violation of the dogma of the national unity of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes or a threat to the centralistic state. Hence, it would be no exaggeration to state that Alexander's undemocratic act (probably) pre-empted a schism within the Independent Democratic Party.