Natural Rights Theory of Copyright Protection
In: Ad Valorem, Journal of Law, 2016
935050 Ergebnisse
Sortierung:
In: Ad Valorem, Journal of Law, 2016
SSRN
In: Social theory and practice: an international and interdisciplinary journal of social philosophy, Band 43, Heft 3, S. 569-587
ISSN: 2154-123X
In: Res Publica, 27: 329-345 (2021)
SSRN
In: Keizaigakushi kenkyū: The history of economic thought, Band 60, Heft 1, S. 40-57
ISSN: 1884-7358
In: American political thought: a journal of ideas, institutions, and culture, Band 8, Heft 2, S. 232-242
ISSN: 2161-1599
Abstract: The correctional process cannot be separated from its relationship with the respective elements in the correctional system, and also with the whole process in society itself. As creatures of God who in principle need each other, so that humans live in groups and where the law is present to create order and security for the wider community. Crime is an act that violates the rules, a group of people in a semi-closed or semi-open system where most of the interactions are between individuals who are in the group. The formulation of the problem in this study is how the juridical analysis of the fulfillment of the sexual rights of prisoners in the Class II A Bengkulu Penitentiary is based on the Natural Rights Theory. The legal research method used, which is normative-empirical, is basically a combination of normative legal approaches with the addition of various empirical elements, one of the basic needs of prisoners that still escapes the attention of this nation is the biological needs in correctional institutions. Based on the theory of natural rights (natural rights theory), the author analyzes that all humans have the same natural rights, including the fulfillment of sex inmates in prisons. But here the government has not seriously considered the negative impact of the absence of facilities and infrastructure on the fulfillment of sexual rights. If their sexual rights are not fulfilled, the prisoners do deviant things, such as masturbation, same-sex sex and so on.Keywords: Behavior, Sexual Rights, Inmates.
BASE
In: Human rights quarterly: a comparative and international journal of the social sciences, humanities, and law, Band 4, Heft 3, S. 391-405
ISSN: 0275-0392
IT IS A COMMON ASSUMPTION THAT A NATURAL RIGHTS THEORY OF HUMAN RIGHTS UNDERLIES CONTEMPORARY HUMAN RIGHTS DOCTRINES. THE TERM HUMAN RIGHTS IS GENERALLY TAKEN TO MEAN WHAT LOCKE AND HIS SUCCESSORS MEANT BY NATURAL RIGHTS: NAMELY, RIGHTS HELD SIMPLY BY VIRTUE OF BEING A PERSON. SUCH RIGHTS ARE NATURAL IN THE SENSE THAT THEIR SOURCE IS HUMAN NATURE.
This timely book by internationally regarded scholar of ethics and social/political philosophy, Michael Boylan, focuses on the history, application and significance of human rights in the West and China. Boylan engages the key current philosophical debates prevalent in human rights discourse today and draws them together to argue for the existence of natural, universal human rights. Arguing against the grain of mainstream philosophical beliefs, Boylan asserts that there is continuity between human rights and natural law and that human beings require basic, essential goods for minimum action. These include food, clean water and sanitation, clothing, shelter and protection from bodily harm, including basic healthcare. The achievement of this goal, Boylan demonstrates, will require significant resource allocation and creative methods of implementation involving public and private institutions. Combining technical argument with four fictional narratives about human rights, the book invites readers to engage with the most important aspects of the discipline
In: Journal of classical sociology, Band 13, Heft 2, S. 222-238
ISSN: 1741-2897
This paper re-assesses the significance of the idea of 'right' in the tradition of critical theory. Focusing on the work of Hannah Arendt and Theodor Adorno, especially their confrontation with totalitarianism, it addresses their conceptualization of rights, their engagement with the philosophies of right created by Kant and Hegel, and the ambivalent place of Marx in their thinking about rights. My argument is that critical theory turned to natural rights in response to the perceived difficulties positive sociology had in confronting the barbarities of fascism and Stalinism. Critical theory steered a path between philosophies of right that acknowledged the idea of right within an unacceptably naturalistic frame of reference, and a sociological consciousness that de-natured the idea of right at the cost of its devaluation. Arendt and Adorno both confronted the contradictions of an age in which the rights of the individual were elevated as a supreme value while individuality was subjected to the forces of technological and economic determination. Both understood the barbarism of their times in terms of the disintegration of mediations between freedom and determination. Both recognized the gulf that separates the concept of rights from the material interests, inequalities and prejudices concealed behind them. And both drew on the critical substance of natural right theory to distinguish between the critique of rights, which has as its end their revaluation, and the trashing of rights, which serves to reinforce their devaluation. I argue that there is much to be gained, in terms of our understanding both of rights and of critique, from critical theory's engagement with the natural law tradition.
In: The Routledge Companion to Social and Political Philosophy
In: Political theory: an international journal of political philosophy, Band 11, Heft 3, S. 393
ISSN: 0090-5917
In: Social philosophy & policy, Band 22, Heft 1, S. 111-147
ISSN: 1471-6437
Natural rights theorists such as John Locke and Robert Nozick provide
arguments for limited government that are grounded on the individual's
possession of natural rights to life, liberty, and property. Resting on
natural rights, such arguments can be no more persuasive than the underlying
arguments for the existence of such rights, which are notoriously weak. In
this article, John Hasnas offers an alternative conception of natural rights,
"empirical natural rights," that are not beset by the objections
typically raised against traditional natural rights. Empirical natural rights
are rights that evolve in the state of nature rather than those that
individuals are antecedently endowed with in that state. Professor Hasnas
argues that empirical natural rights are true natural rights, that is,
pre-political rights with natural grounds that can be possessed in the state
of nature, and that, when taken together, they form a close approximation of
the Lockean rights to life, liberty, and property. He furthers argues that
empirical natural rights are normatively well-grounded because respecting
them is productive of social peace, which possesses instrumental moral value
regardless of one's conception inherent value. Professor Hasnas thus
offers his conception of rights as solved problems as an alternative and
potentially more secure footing for the traditional natural rights arguments
for limited government associated with Locke and Nozick.
In: Clarendon law series
First published in 1980, Natural Law and Natural Rights is widely heralded as a seminal contribution to the philosophy of law, and an authoritative restatement of natural law doctrine. It has offered generations of students and other readers a thorough grounding in the central issues of legal, moral, and political philosophy from Finnis's distinctive perspective. This new edition includes a substantial postscript by the author, in which he responds to thirty years ofdiscussion, criticism and further work in the field to develop and refine the original theory.The book closely integrates the philosophy of law with ethics, social theory and political philosophy. The author develops a sustained and substantive argument; it is not a review of other people's arguments but makes frequent illustrative and critical reference to classical, modern, and contemporary writers in ethics, social and political theory, and jurisprudence.The preliminary First Part reviews a century of analytical jurisprudence to illustrate the dependence of every descriptive social science upon evaluations by the theorist. A fully critical basis for such evaluations is a theory of natural law. Standard contemporary objections to natural law theory are reviewed and shown to rest on serious misunderstandings.The Second Part develops in ten carefully structured chapters an account of: basic human goods and basic requirements of practical reasonableness, community and 'the common good'; justice; the logical structure of rights-talk; the bases of human rights, their specification and their limits; authority, and the formation of authoritative rules by non-authoritative persons and procedures; law, the Rule of Law, and the derivation of laws from the principles of practical reasonableness; the complexrelation between legal and moral obligation; and the practical and theoretical problems
In: Social philosophy & policy, Band 27, Heft 1, S. 21-52
ISSN: 1471-6437
AbstractClassical natural law theory derives moral conclusions from the essentialist and teleological understanding of nature enshrined in classical metaphysics. The paper argues that this understanding of nature is as defensible today as it was in the days of Plato, Aristotle, Augustine, and Aquinas. It then shows how a natural law theory of the grounds and content of our moral obligations follows from this understanding of nature, and how a doctrine of natural rights follows in turn from the theory of natural law. With this background in place, the implications of the theory for questions about property rights and taxation are explored. It is argued that classical natural law theory entails the existence of a natural right of private property, and that this right is neither so strong as to supportlaissez fairelibertarianism, nor so weak as to allow for socialism. Though the theory leaves much of the middle ground between these extremes open to empirical rather than moral evaluation, it is argued that there is a strong natural law presumption against social democratic policies and in favor of free enterprise.
In: Interpretation: a journal of political philosophy, Band 37, Heft 2, S. 183-202
ISSN: 0020-9635
The article explores Alexis de Tocqueville's appeals, both explicit and implicit, to the theory of rights, natural right and human nature in 'Democracy in America.' Tocqueville fails to articulate any strict theory of natural rights as well as any underlying philosophy of history, such as Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel or Karl Marx would develop. On the other hand, Tocqueville does offer specific comments on 'natural right' and 'human nature' in post-revolutionary-era Europe and democratic America that pose difficulties to anyone who would want to frame a modern natural rights theory. Tocqueville concludes that American democracy's origins are more informed by practice than theory. They were thus not inclined to the extreme practices that marred the revolutionary era in France. American tendencies, such as the presumption of equality of conditions, the abolition of caste, the sovereignty of the people, the influence of social power and the uniformity of rules, emerged as natural rights. Though Tocqueville's study makes use of general ideas, such as 'democracy' and 'equality of conditions,' he integrates them fully with a meticulous attentiveness to actual practice. Adapted from the source document.