Suchergebnisse

Climate change has renewed the debate about shipping in the Arctic due to an expected reduction of ice in these sea lanes. Because of the Arctic slowly opening, allowing for more activity, navigational rights for ships have caught the attention of the world once again, including those of warships. Through analysing the navigational regime for warships in the Northwest and Northeast Passages, this article aims to introduce the different rules for navigation and the consequences for maritime operations in the Arctic, including the right to overflight. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea provides navigational rights for warships and overflight in peace time operations, but the matter of which navigation rules should apply in the passages is under debate. Based on an analysis of the Convention, case law, legal theory and customary law, the article aims to shed light on different interpretations of the legal regimes of navigation in the passages and which rules should apply to warships and overflight in the future.

As Arctic navigation increases and states work, both at the international and the domestic level, at ensuring legal readiness, this article takes a closer look at regulation of Arctic Shipping in Canada and Russia. The analysis first focuses on the current domestic regimes that have developed over the past decades. It highlights that dissimilar political, economic and environmental contexts have shaped not only different shipping patterns off the Canadian and Russian coasts, but also dissimilar coastal state approaches that do not seem to converge noticeably under the influence of the Polar Code. The analysis then turns to challenges that lay ahead as existing regimes could be called into question due to receding ice cover and may need to adapt to evolving shipping patterns and technological innovations.

New uncertainties in international relations have presented several states in the West with important choices regarding their national strategies for the Arctic. This article analyzes security challenges in the Arctic and North Atlantic region, as understood by some key North-Atlantic states, namely: the USA, Canada, Denmark, Norway, the UK, Germany and France. By analyzing how, or to what degree, the colder east-west security landscape since 2014 is reflected in these selected North Atlantic states' Arctic security strategies, this article seeks to improve our understanding of how the security situation in the northernmost part of the world is developing and being understood. Through applying a traditional understanding of security, the article identifies similarities but also significant differences among the Arctic and North-Atlantic states. Most notable when comparing the strategies is the rather unique global perspective laid out in the US security strategy for the region. The British, Norwegian, Danish and Canadian perspectives, on the other hand, stand out as more regional in nature. Germany displays a rather low profile in its approach to international security in the Arctic, considering its economic status in Europe. France reveals a strong concern for Arctic shipping and freedom of navigation, a perspective similar to the USA's, but with less global ambition.

The 2010s was a busy decade for the Northern Sea Route (NSR). It started with the first shipping season to feature the international use of the NSR for commercial purposes, followed by a significant reform of the domestic legal regime, as well as the adoption of the Polar Code. The traffic has gradually picked up, and although the expectations of a significant surge in trans-Arctic navigation have not materialized, the NSR's annual turnover has grown beyond the old records set by the USSR. While the Russian authorities have struggled to find the most optimal means of development of the NSR, the latter has recently been re-marketed as a Polar Silk Road, part of the grand Chinese One Belt One Road initiative. While Russia has been rebuilding its military presence in the Arctic, the French Navy vessel BSAH Rhone unexpectedly navigated through the NSR, inciting strong political, but yet not legal, response. The present article aims to take stock of the last decade, paying primary attention to the Russian State practice in developing, adopting, and enforcing legislation in the NSR. By describing the current status and identifying some of the regulatory trends, the article will draw cautious predictions on the role of the law of the sea in the management of the NSR in the near future.

This comparative article reveals how the general focus of Canadian and Russian threat perceptions in the Arctic have shifted from a Cold War fixation on hard defence to accommodate soft security issues over the last three decades. Both countries now pay greater attention to threats and challenges stemming from climate change, security, and safety risks associated with resource development and increasingly accessible sea routes. Although concern about military conflict arising from Arctic disputes continues to frame some media discussions in both countries, most strategic analysts and academics have moved away from this line of argument. Instead, military functions now include assertion of Canadian and Russian sovereignty over their respective internal waters, as well as protection of resources in their exclusive economic zones and on and in extended continental shelves; protection of economic interests in the North, including mineral and bio-resources; prevention of potential terrorist attacks against critical industrial and state infrastructure; and dual-use functions, such as search and rescue operations, surveillance of air and maritime spaces, support to safe navigation, and mitigation of natural and human-made catastrophes.
The authors argue that analysts should parse two forms of military modernization in the Arctic: one of capability development related to the global strategic balance, where the Arctic serves as a bastion or a thoroughfare; and a second intended to address emerging non-traditional security challenges. They contend that these modernization programs do not inherently upset the Arctic military balance and need not provoke a regional arms race.