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The article analyses the situation derived from the "shooting down airplanes" but which can be extended to other similar cases, which generically could be conceptualize as community of danger. These cases are characterized by the concurrence of a risk to two (or more) legal assets, but both of them cannot be saved and both of them would be affected if nothing were done. The solution given by the majoritarian literature to this issue is insufficient, both from a dogmatic and a political-criminal point of view, creating an uncertainty that is revealed in the different views that political power and jurisprudence/caselaw have on the issue. In summary, this paper aims to overcome this state of uncertainty by providing a solution based on material, non-consequentialist criteria that respect the guarantees of the rule of law. ; En el artículo se analiza la situación derivada de los casos conocidos como "derribo de aviones", pero que puede ser extendida a otros casos semejantes que genéricamente podríamos conceptualizar como de comunidad de peligro, y cuya característica viene dada por la concurrencia de un peligro para dos o más bienes jurídicos que no pueden ser salvados conjuntamente y que si nada se hiciese, todos ellos se verían afectados. El tratamiento que la doctrina mayoritaria ha dado a la cuestión se muestra insuficiente, tanto desde un aspecto dogmático como político-criminal, generando una incertidumbre que se pone de manifiesto en las diferentes miradas que sobre la cuestión tienen el poder político y la jurisprudencia. Aquí se pretende superar ese estado de incertidumbre, aportando una solución con base en criterios materiales, no consecuencialistas, respetuosos de las garantías del Estado de derecho.

Reflecting about the necessity of adopting a constitutional jurisdictional proceeding code is not a whim nor a foolishness, instead it is a compelling need in order to: (i) ensure by a legislative measure a jurisdictional safeguard of the Constitution; (ii) unify the contents of constitutional jurisdictional proceeding law (to gain clarity and coherence in constitutional jurisdictional proceeding statutes); (iii) make constitutional supremacy and human rights to become more effective; (iv) guarantee law certainty to constitutional justice. ; Reflexionar sobre la necesidad de expedir un código procesal constitucional no obedece a un capricho o necedad, sino más bien a la imperiosa necesidad de: (i) asegurar legislativamente la garantía jurisdiccional de la Constitución; (ii) unificar los contenidos del derecho procesal constitucional (se obtiene orden, claridad y coherencia en la legislación procesal constitucional); (iii) dar eficacia a la supremacía constitucional y a los derechos humanos; y, (iv) dotar a la justicia constitucional de seguridad jurídica.

En el presente artículo, el autor ofrece una revisión de las características más relevantes de la nueva causal de estado de necesidad introducida en Chile por la Ley n° 20.480 y su incorporación dogmática a la teoría del delito. Se entregan algunos antecedentes respecto de su origen y se exponen fundamentos que permiten explicar el carácter doble de su naturaleza jurídica: causal de justificación o causal de exculpación, dependiendo del análisis comparativo entre el mal causado y mal evitado. En el trabajo se revisan los requisitos impuestos por el legislador para su aplicación, la interpretación que puede otorgárseles y los problemas que se advierten en su formulación. ; In this paper, the author offers a review of the most relevant features of the new legal excuse of necessity, introduced in Chile by Law n° 20.480, and its dogmatic incorporation into criminal law theory. The author presents some antecedents about its origin, and exposes some reasons that explain the double role of its legal nature: justification or exculpation, depending on comparative analysis between the harm caused and the harm avoided. In this essay are reviewed the conditions imposed by the legislator for its application, possible interpretations of these conditions, and the problems that can be noticed in the formulation of the same conditions.

'It is a lesson which all history teaches wise men, to put trust in ideas, and not in circumstances'.Ralph Waldo Emerson'It is precisely in times of national emergencies that civil liberties must be defended and protected most forcefully. If not, then governments will be given incentives to constantly create crises, or perceptions of crises, and declaring "official states of emergency" in order to grab more and more power and money and destroy more and more liberty and prosperity'.United States Supreme Court (Ex Parte Milligan. 1866)IntroductionSince the September 11 attacks, the notion of state of exception has been used in order to coin the legal and political repercussions of the 'War on Terror'. These, by being labeled within the state of emergency's legal -or extralegal- framework, have been able to be constitutionally justified and, also, ethically criticized. Proponents of draconian measures consider that, in certain circumstances, necessity dictates policies aimed at protecting the State from terrorist attacks. They deem terrorism an imminent and serious threat capable of destroying the institutions that give political cohesion to society. Denying, suspending and limiting certain individual rights amount to a lesser evil; compared to the, apparently, almost certain greater evil that terrorists embody. On the other hand, advocates of the inviolability of the rule of law believe that under any situation a democratic government should allow urgency and peril prevail over the constitutionally recognized political and human rights. For them, counterterrorism should not rely on extralegal actions 'legitimized' by the state of exception. The State already has the legal and adequate tools, provided by the police and criminal justice, to persecute terrorists. Democracies that recur to lesser evil arguments to fight terrorism always end up committing more damage that the one they were trying to prevent.This essay will analyze the state of exception by studying the legal and the political-social natures of it. Various arguments, in favor and against the exception, will be showcased by continuously referring to the War on Terror and its effects on the legal system and democracy. Lastly, a conclusion will address the importance of this debate in current politics and society. The State of ExceptionThe state of exception or emergency can be studied under two different kinds of views: the legal and the political-social ones. The former defines the state of emergency, within the various constitutional frameworks of current modern democracies, as a temporary measure that limits or suspends certain individual freedoms within the territory of the State . It is prompted by a critical and imminent, domestic or foreign, threat to the State's existence. Under this scenario, necessity overcomes the 'normal' rule of law. Consequentially, individual freedoms are limited while police, security and military agencies' powers are enhanced. The debate regarding the state of exception's legal aspect circles around the constitutionality of its enactment, the variety of faculties attributed to the State's security forces and, more importantly, the personal rights suspension's lawfulness. Politically and socially, the state of emergency is conceived either as the pivotal attribute that defines the sovereign body as such; or, either as the transitional step required for -'legitimately'- transforming a democracy into a dictatorship. The former perception links the state of exception with the concept of sovereigntyunderstood as the State's existence as an organized polity . The latter one considers any type of restriction to individual freedoms as a permanent damage to the fabrics of democracy . The Legal Nature of the State of Exception The legal, and political, origin of the state of emergency is to be found in ancient Roman law. According to the lex de dictatore creando, whenever the Roman Republic was in grave danger, the Senate designated an extraordinary magistrate that was invested with absolute and total authority over the Republic . Subsequently, a provisional dictatorship was instituted that lasted for six months or until the threat passed. The republican and the dictatorship authorities, to the Romans, were complementary; quite the opposite of how democracies and authoritarian regimes are understood today. However, Roman dictators quickly learned how to indefinitely prolong their authority by perpetuating foreign wars through the creation of an Empire.The institution of the Roman provisional dictatorship is the historical legal inception of the various types of state of emergency that are currently present within modern constitutions. Broadly speaking, in every constitution the state of exception is declared by the head of the executive power whenever the normal functions of the State's institutions are no longer guaranteed because of foreign attack or domestic unrest. Fundamental liberties and rights -such as habeas corpus, freedom of movement and public gathering among others- are suspended or severely restricted. In most cases, the executive is entitled to order the arrest of individuals and to set military commissions for their trials. The security forces' faculties are enhanced and the military is allowed to take on police activities. Depending on the country, the state of emergency could be declared to last for days, months or years and it can even be extended indefinitely number of times . The debate concerning the state of exception's legal aspect comprises three main issues: its constitutionality; the amount of power given to the security forces; and, the limits set on fundamental freedoms, individual rights and constitutional guarantees. The state of emergency's constitutional validity considers under which cases it can be declared. As stated before, it is necessity that calls for the establishment of exception. It is necessary to give to the executive branch of government extraordinary powers and authority in order to prevent the State's breakdown from an imminent and grave danger. This peril can be prompted by a domestic or foreign threat. The latter are not sufficiently, and narrowly, defined by modern constitutions. Normally, they invoke a military invasion by a foreign country or an internal insurrection; but both of them are broad cases and can be loosely interpreted. Taking the U.S. Constitution, for example, the state of emergency is only referred to in Article I, Section 9 where it states: 'The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.'Therefore, only in the cases of rebellion –domestic threat- and invasion –foreign threat- the state of exception can be enacted. Regrettably, the Constitution does not define what constitutes a rebellion or an invasion. The task was left for legal experts and the Judiciary to tackle; but, it has not been easy or even coherent.The Supreme Court had the opportunity to take on the constitutionality of the state of emergency after President Lincoln had declared it in 1861 . In Ex Parte Milligan, it was decided that the suspension of the habeas corpus and the setting of military tribunals for citizens was unconstitutional because, even if a rebellion was in course, civilian courts were still operating. Additionally, the Supreme Court went even further by declaring that the theory of necessity, which justifies the state of exception, was false. It was argued that under the rule of law, guaranteed by the Constitution, the powers needed to protect the State's institutions are already set in place. Lastly, the Justices regarded the state of exception as a dangerous instrument that could only lead to despotism . Nevertheless, the Court did not pronounce itself about the issue of defining what constitutes a rebellion or invasion. Interestingly, even if it was deemed –correctly- that necessity never justifies the suspension of the rule of law, by not defining what constitutes an emergency, the Court considered the issue a political, and not a legal, matter . Rebellion and invasion remain broad, undefined, cases open to interpretation and to malleability by politics. In subsequent cases, the Supreme Court refrained itself from approaching the issue .The question of the security forces' enhanced powers, during the state of emergency, is a thornier one when compared to the former. Moreover, it is also deeply intertwined with the problem regarding limitations to fundamental liberties. During the state of exception the police and other security agencies are given extraordinary faculties aimed at facilitating the expedient resolution of the crisis. Therefore, they are allowed to search within premises without warrants, to arrest suspects without a court order, to hold individuals for a long period of time with no access to a lawyer or judge, to carry out aggressive interrogations, to set up wiretapping and close surveillance with no Judiciary control. Furthermore, it could also be the case that intelligence agencies and the military would be empowered to perform police and judicial activities. Since the declaration of the state of emergency by President George W. Bush, following 9/11, numerous enhanced and new attributes have been granted to the United States' security forces and agencies. Their faculties were augmented by several executive decrees and the three Patriot Acts. These pieces of legislation were said to be justified by the imminent and severe danger that terrorism embodied. But, are these prerogatives really needed to prevent future terrorist attacks? This is, of course, an endless debate; and one that again points out to the relationship between law and politics. As implied by the Supreme Court in Ex Parte Milligan, terrorists can be persecuted without declaring the state of emergency, by applying 'plain' criminal law and by letting the F.B.I -not the military- take the lead. To sum up, the 'normal' rule of law is perfectly suited for the task. However, depending on how terrorism is considered, as a war act or as a criminal one, is still a political issue.Just like in both the question of the constitutionality of the state of exception and the empowerment of security agencies, the concern regarding the suspension or restriction of fundamental liberties is one that is ascribed within the lesser evil debate. Legally, the selection between continuing the 'normal' rule of law or enacting the state of exception weights the possible damage that not acting would cause against the harm that limiting individual freedoms would produce . It is here where the legal concept of necessity comes into play. It is necessary to inflict or withstand a lesser evil in order to prevent a greater evil. This is the pragmatic view of constitutional freedoms: the risk of harming individual freedoms is a lesser one when compared to the possibility of not having any State that protects those liberties . The moral point of view argues that, by restricting constitutional freedoms, the State is causing an irreversible damage that may, quite possibly, be greater than the one that necessity is trying to avoid . When a state of exception is enacted the fundamental liberties that are suspended are, normally, the right to habeas corpus; freedom of movement; the right to public and private gathering; and the right to due process among others. The United States Government, during both the Bush and the Obama Administrations, restricted and suspended several individual freedoms and constitutionally guaranteed rights in order to effectively and speedily fight terrorism and avert further attacks. The rights to habeas corpus, to due process, to unnecessary cruel punishment and to trial by jury have been gravely and irreversibly hampered by the legalization of indefinite detention, targeted killing, aggressive interrogation and military tribunals respectively. In nearly all these cases, there is no chance of contradictory or revisionary procedures that would allow the dismissal of their establishment by proving their unfairness or unconstitutionality . The issue, maybe, is that they are not only unfair, but that they are unnecessary and cause permanent damage. Targeted killing and aggressive interrogation, which would be better labeled as targeted assassination and torture, are completely detrimental to the rule of law and set up dangerous precedents for the future. Since both measures have to be sanctioned, in each case, by the President and there is no possibility of revision, it could be argued that the executive is taking on the exclusive attributes of the other two branches of government. The check and balances system, designed to avoid despotic power, is totally disregarded in these cases . Here, the effects of necessity are clearly the greater evil.Depending on the country, the state of emergency or exception is labeled as martial law or state of siege (état de siège or estado de sitio). Both, however, share the same objectives and are justified by necessity. See Ignatieff, Michael; The Lesser Evil: Political Ethics in an Age of Terror; Princeton University Press; New York; 2004; pp. 25-28. Schmitt, Carl; Political Theology. Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty; Chicago University Press; Chicago; 2005; pp. 5-6. See, Arendt, Hannah; 'Personal Responsibility under Dictatorship'; in Responsibility and Judgment; Kohn, Jerome (Ed.); Schocken Books; New York; 2003.Lintott, Andrew; The Constitution of the Roman Republic; Oxford University Press; Oxford; 1999; pp. 110.For example, in France l' état de siège can only last for 12 days, although the President is allowed to extend it for more time with the Parliament's confirmation. In the United States, the National Emergency Acts can only last for no more than two years, but the President is entitled to extend it for one more years indefinitely number of times by only notifying Congress of his decision. For the French case see Article 16 of the Constitution, available at http://www.vie-publique.fr/decouverte-institutions/institutions/approfondissements/pouvoirs-exceptionnels-du-president.html ; for the American case see the U.S. Code, Title 50, Chapter 34, available at http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/html/uscode50/usc_sup_01_50_10_34.html .See the United States Constitution, available at http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/ampage?collId=llsl&fileName=001/llsl001.db&recNum=138See Neely, Mark; The Fate of Liberty: Abraham Lincoln and Civil Liberties; Oxford University Press; New York; 1991; pp. 179-184. See Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2 (1866); available at http://supreme.justia.com/us/71/2/case.htmlSee, Roche, John; Executive Power and Domestic Emergency: The Quest for Prerogative'; Western Political Quarterly; Vol. 5; N. 4; December 1952. See Ex Parte Quirin , 317 U.S. 1 (1942), which declared constitutional the military trials of German saboteurs during the Second World War in U.S. soil, available at http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/scripts/getcase.pl?court=us&vol=317&invol=1 ; Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944), which determined constitutional the Japanese Americans internment camps, available athttp://supreme.justia.com/us/323/214/case.html ; and, Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008), where it was decided that all Guantanamo detainees had the right of habeas corpus, available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/07pdf/06-1195.pdf The national emergency was declared through Proclamation 7463 available athttp://ra.defense.gov/documents/mobil/pdf/proclamation.pdfSee Ignatieff, Michael; The Lesser Evil: Political Ethics in an Age of Terror; Princeton University Press; New York; 2004; pp. 40-44.See, Posner, Richard; Law, Pragmatism and Democracy; Harvard University Press; Cambridge; 2003. It is also interesting to consider here Margaret Somers' Arendtian view of political rights versus human rights because the former are recognized and protected by the State. See Somers, Margaret; Genealogies of Citizenship: Markets, Statelessness, and the Right to Have Rights; Cambridge University Press; Cambridge; 2008.See Dworkin, Ronald; Freedom's Law: The Moral Reading of the Constitution; Harvard University Press; Cambridge; 1996.Only regarding the cases of the restriction of habeas corpus and the setting up of military tribunals has the Supreme Court been able to declare their unconstitutionality and illegality. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004) and Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006); both available athttp://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/scripts/getcase.pl?court=US&vol=000&invol=03-6696&friend andhttp://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/05pdf/05-184.pdf respectively.For a better and more detailed analysis of the legality or illegality of targeted killings and torture see Banks, William; 'Targeted Killing and Assassination: the U.S. Legal Framework'; University of Richmond Law Review; Vol. 37; N. 667; 2002-2003; Dershowitz, Alan; 'When All Else Fails, Why not Torture?'; American Legion Magazine; July 2002; Blum, Gabriella, and Heymann, Philip; 'Law and Policy of Targeted Killing'; The Harvard National Security Journal; Vol. 2, Issue 2; 2010; and Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006). *Estudiante de Doctorado, New School for Social Research, New YorkMaestría en Estudios Internacionales, Universidad Torcuato Di Tella, Buenos AiresÁrea de Especialización: Procesos de formación del Estado moderno, sociología de la guerra, terrorismo, genocidio, conflictos étnicos, nacionalismos y minorías.

Objective: The aim of the article is in examining the characteristics of the relevant samples of successful experience of the developed countries in the sphere of combating bioterrorism. Method: The following methods were used by the authors in evaluating the efficiency of the research which involved: historical, analysis as well as bibliographic. Results: The current threats posed by such a phenomenon as bio-terrorism are identified and characterized, as well as successful international examples of its overcoming are analyzed. The level of danger of bio-terrorism has been established, as well as the negative consequences it causes. Cases of real use of biological weapons in different periods of human existence are characterized. It was during this period that various manifestations of bioterrorism around the world became much more active. Emphasis is placed on the fact that combating such a phenomenon as bioterrorism should be based on a comprehensive approach to solving this problem. Among other things, it should be a combination of effective law enforcement, a stable political situation and systematic interaction between the state and the population. Conclusions: The bio-terrorism can be divided into that carried out by criminal organizations, individuals or religious on the one hand, and that carried out by the state on the other. The bioterrorism, together with many of its harmful effects, poses a significant danger to humanity and society. It greatly damages the lives and health of individuals, destroys and destroys nature and the environment, and can create political and economic crises or social upheavals.

La evolución del paradigma prohibicionista ha incidido en múltiples ámbitos jurídicos. No se trata sólo de la producción legislativa en la que toma cuerpo, sino, además, de múltiples líneas jurisprudenciales que se han instalado como escenarios justificacionistas y no correctivos del tratamiento represivo al problema construido sobre las drogas. Este fenómeno no ha sido ajeno ni a la legislación española, ni a la jurisprudencia de sus Tribunales. La Tesis demuestra que, con seguridad bajo la influencia de la ideología prohibicionista, la doctrina del TSE sobre el tratamiento del estado de necesidad en relación con las drogas le niega cualquier ámbito aplicativo a dicha causa de no responsabilidad penal, ora como justificante, ya como exculpante. Y ello, a contrapelo de las regulaciones del derecho positivo, de conformidad con el cual el bien jurídico de la salud pública sería un interés perfectamente ponderable de cara a las posibilidades del estado de necesidad, y a despecho de la ciencia jurídico-penal, cuyos esfuerzos han sido notables para mostrar las condiciones que harían justificable o disculpable el comportamiento de quien actúe en una situación de necesidad. Desde una perspectiva multidisciplinar, se pretende describir cómo esa doctrina del TSE que se acusa de anular los efectos del estado de necesidad en los casos relacionados con el tráfico de drogas, se encuentra enmarcada como un instrumento de las políticas globales que han llevado a la criminalización de las drogas. ; The evolution of the prohibitionist paradigm has affected many areas of law. It does not only take shape in the production of legislation, but also in multiple lines of jurisprudence that have been set as justificationist rather than corrective scenarios for the repressive treatment of the problem constructed around drugs. This phenomenon has not been alien to Spanish legislation or the jurisprudence of its courts. This thesis demonstrates that, surely under the influence of the prohibitionist ideology, the doctrine of the Spanish ...

The Political and Social Natures of the State of ExceptionThe main questions regarding the political and social natures of the state of emergency concern: the restriction of individual freedoms as an innate power of the State to assure its continued existence –and of its democratic regime- in times of national crisis; the exception as being a transitional phase from democracy to autocracy or dictatorship; and, the legitimization of a permanent state of exception through consensus.Carl Schmitt stated that 'sovereign is he who decides on the exception' (1). This means that the exception, which he defined as the application of extraordinary measures, is what constitutes the essence of the highest power of the State. Schmitt, following Bodin and Hobbes, emphasized the extralegal nature of the State's sovereign power. The State could not exist without the possibility of exception. In fact, the State was born from the exception and relied on it for its survival (2). Therefore, the state of exception could not be framed within the legal order. Sovereignty cannot be limited; it is an absolute. Laws are created by the State, but the State's sovereign power –the exception- has to remain outside the boundaries of the rule of law. This was the only way that the exception could function as the mechanism that guaranteed the State's survival in moments of grave peril. To Schmitt, there was no point arguing about lesser or greater evils. The State had to prevail always. Order, even a dictatorial one, was preferable to revolution and anarchy. The permanent elimination of individual freedoms was, at all times, more desirable than the extinction of the State. Schmitt was deeply influenced by the 1918-1919 Revolution, following Germany's defeat in World War I, and by the early chaotic years of the Weimer Republic. He considered, taking on Weber in extremis, that the State was the absolute embodiment of the monopoly of the use of violence. Legitimacy did not matter because authority –the sovereign- was the real source of law, not a Rousseaunian state of nature or the people's will (3). The State creates and maintains law through force. When the monopoly is broken, because violence is being used against the State from outside or within, the exception assures its reestablishment. Other authors have considered the survival of the sovereign body at all costs, perceived as a lesser evil when weighted against the greater evil of its possible decease, as the driving force behind the state of emergency's employment in moments of real or perceived national crisis (4). Exception, to them, is a legal tool that restores order by rapidly extricating the threats to the polity's existence. Supporters of this view consider that in times of foreign war or internal strife the State is compelled to undermine individual freedoms. Dictatorships react to crisis in a much effective way than democracies. The very nature of the latter –mainly enacting decisions after deliberation, consensus and the rule of law- may be its own Achilles' heel. In order for modern democracies to survive, they have to recur to non-liberal, but legally framed and provisional, measures (5). After 9/11, the War on Terror has been defined as a national crisis that cannot be overcome within the 'normal' rule of law. The long term peril to democracy, which terrorism poses, is far greater and more permanent than the one that the state of exception causes to democratic liberties in the short term. The suspension and restriction of fundamental freedoms are a small price to pay when a democratic regime is faced with the kind of foe that terrorism is. Even such strong advocates of liberal democracy, like Michael Ignatieff, believe that the state of emergency is a necessary tool to protect society from terrorist attacks (6). To him, the exception in a modern democracy can be effectively restrained from committing the kind of human rights violations and abuses that were present during the French-Algerian War and the Dirty War in Argentina. Ignatieff considers that those cases can be avoided, in the current War on Terror, by setting up contradictory procedures after targeted killing and aggressive interrogation have been implemented(7). Lastly, the provisional characteristic of the state of exception must also be properly defined by introducing a time limit or by setting up attained objectives. The problem with the latter is that it is difficult to discern when terrorism has been actually defeated. Regarding the temporal nature of the exception, it has been the case that governments have continued to extend, indefinitely, the state of emergency (8). In this sense, Charles Tilly was right when he noticed that once the State acquires more power it is extremely difficult, or almost impossible, to go back to the previous situation (9). Ignatieff's notion that the state of exception can be controlled if it is properly framed within the legal order is mistaken. First, following Tilly, the State's behavior is not controllable, particularly within a legal framework. Even if the State seems to be making concessions, it is actually gaining more command. It is in the State's nature to increase its control over society in order to assure its survival(10). Therefore, the state of exception will never be controlled by the legal order. Terrorism overtly defies the essence of the State: its monopoly of the use of violence. To protect itself the State will disregard the rule of law if necessary. Secondly, the exception cannot be legal in any sense because, as said by Giorgio Agamben, it is the negation of law (11). Agamben considers exception as it has been defined by Schmitt: the nature of sovereign power. Consequently, it can never be framed by the rule of law. In fact, when the exception is enacted law ceases to exist. When national crisis occur, a State will make decisions based on necessity, not on lawfulness. Accordingly, if the rule of law is negated and the newly acquired faculties are not relinquished after the crisis has passed, the exception represents the transition of a democratic regime into an authoritarian or autocratic one. There is a divide in literature regarding this issue: some deem that the exception creates a provisional dictatorship but once the crisis is over democracy returns in full force, others see the exception as a one way ticket ride. According to Rossiter when the state of exception is declared, a democratic regime turns into a provisional dictatorship by granting extraordinary authority and powers to the executive (12). Ignatieff, following Rossiter, considers Italy and Germany during the 70s, by naming them 'selective dictatorships', to show how modern democracies used the state of exception to tackle terrorism and returned to the rule of law once the threat had ended (13). However, the provisional and extraordinary measures passed in both countries have never been suspended. They are still in place and sporadically and selectively used. As a result, the provisional feature of the exception never actually materializes. Authors, like Hannah Arendt and Frances Fox Piven, explain how the suspension, restriction and infringement of constitutional rights and individual freedoms by the necessity of the state of exception permanently erode democracies by introducing autocratic measures (14). Arendt wonderfully describes how democracy died in the Weimer Republic when Chancellor Bruning declared the state of emergency in 1930, and not the moment Hitler raised into power in 1933 (15). For Arendt, from the moment the exception was enacted until Hitler took over the Chancellery, the path to dictatorship was irreversibly one. Piven regards the declaration of the state of emergency in the United States in September 2001 as the crucial moment where democratic liberties started to irrevocably fade away in the name of necessity (16). The subsequent restrictions to individual freedoms were accepted as necessary sacrifices to avert a catastrophe. It was not considered that the greater evil was not the one posed by terrorists; but, the permanent damage made to democracy by the State. Democracy is still far from dying in the United States, but its agony may have already started. The state of exception requires another ingredient to remain in effect indefinitely and permanently harm democracy. The State's intentions –if there is such an oxymoron- are not sufficient alone. Legitimacy, as Weber so cleverly insisted upon, is also needed (17). Arendt showcased how the transformation of the Weimar Republic, from a democracy into a totalitarian regime, mainly depended on the masses (18). In modern democracies it is the general public, the citizenship or the masses who always have the final voice on any matter. Governments' actions have to be legitimized by the public in order to be truly effective. They are accepted if they are not broadly contested or if they are enthusiastically received. They are not perceived as legitimate when they produce protests against them (19). The measures taken by the U.S. Government after 9/11 have received its share of criticism, but they have not been openly contested by the public in a massive way. In fact, there has been a strong consensus from the American citizenship. It may have been a tacit consensus between the executive, Congress and the citizens; but, the case remains that the suspension, restrictions and infringement to fundamental liberties have been seen as a necessary sacrifice to assure the security of the nation (20). Even controversial and dangerous measures as targeted assassination or torture have been widely accepted -in an extremely cheerfully way in some cases (21)- by the general public. Perhaps, the public truly considers them appropriate and it is willing to risk democracy for security. However, it would seem that the compliance comes from the perception that they will never be subject to those measures. The majority of the people of the United States do not consider themselves targeted by the restrictions to individual freedoms, and will never feel that way. For them it is easy to make sacrifice a minority's fundamental liberties. It has been the case in every country where the state of exception has been declared for terrorist activities. The idea that 'it will never happen to me' precludes the perception of being on the verge of loosing any kind of freedom. Interestingly, Karl Marx, in the XVIII Brumaire, warned us about the dangers of a massive support for an autocratic State in the name of security (22).ConclusionThe current War on Terror shows how close a stable and mature,democratic regime is to absolutely disregard the rule of law in favor of necessity. History and political theory has demonstrated that many authoritarian governments and dictatorships originate with a declaration of the state of exception. The measures taken by the enactment of the exception are not only immoral, they are unnecessary and illegal. The lesser evil is always less when it is not applied to the majority of the population. No matter how small the amount of individuals affected by the restrictions on their liberties, the damage done to democracy –and to their lives- is permanent and with grave repercussions for the future. Terrorism is a strategy used by a small group of people that pose no vital danger to the State's institutions or to democracy. The real danger to a democratic regime is the State's reaction to terrorism and the public's acceptance of them. Terrorists can be effectively persecuted within the rule of law. No worst case scenario can justify the torture, the indefinite imprisonment and the assassination of an innocent individual. The possible avoidance of a worst case scenario is never the lesser evil when it requires fundamental freedoms to be sacrificed. Finally, it is the public who always has the last word, and who is ultimately responsible for the known actions taken by their government. The choice between the rule of law and necessity, eventually, relies on them.(1) Schmitt, Carl; Political Theology. Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty; Chicago University Press; Chicago; 2005; pp. 5.(2) Ibid; pp. 7-12.(3) Ibid; pp. 35.(4) See Huntington, Samuel; Political Order in Changing Societies; Yale University Press; New Heaven; 2006; and Krasner, Stephen;Sovereignty. Organized Hypocrisy; Princeton University Press; New York; 1999.(5) See Walzer, Michael; Just and Unjust Wars; Basic Books; New York; pp. 335-360.(6) See Ignatieff, Michael; The Lesser Evil: Political Ethics in an Age of Terror; Princeton University Press; New York; 2004; pp. 130-143.(7) See Ignatieff, Michael; The Lesser Evil: Political Ethics in an Age of Terror; Princeton University Press; New York; 2004; pp. 150-156.(8) See http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2010/09/10/letter-president-continuation-national-emergency-with-respect-certain-te(9) See Tilly, Charles; Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990-1992; Wiley-Blackwell; New York; 1995.(10) See Tilly, Charles; "War Making and State Making as Organized Crime," Bringing the State Back In, Eds. Peter Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, Theda Skocpol. Cambridge University Press, 1985.(11) See Agamben, Giorgio; State of Exception; University of Chicago Press; Chicago; 2005; pp. 32-40.(12) See Rossiter, Clinton; Constitutional Dictatorship - Crisis Government In The Modern Democracies; Rossiter Press; New York; 2008. Rossiter takes the cases of the United States and the United Kingdom during the Second World War and analyses the 'dictatorial' powers held by Roosevelt and Churchill to command both countries during the crisis.(13) See Ignatieff, Michael; The Lesser Evil: Political Ethics in an Age of Terror; Princeton University Press; New York; 2004; pp. 174-178.(14) See Arendt, Hannah; Origins of Totalitarianism; Benediction Books; New York; 2005; pp. 305-341; andSee Piven, Frances Fox;The War at Home: The Domestic Costs of Bush's Militarism; New Press; New York; 2006.(15) See Arendt, Hannah; Origins of Totalitarianism; Benediction Books; New York; 2005; pp. 389-400.(16) See Piven, Frances Fox; The War at Home: The Domestic Costs of Bush's Militarism; New Press; New York; 2006.(17) See Weber, Max; "Politics as a Vocation," in From Max Weber, Eds. Gerth and Mills.(18) See Arendt, Hannah; Origins of Totalitarianism; Benediction Books; New York; 2005; pp. 305-341(19) See Piven, Frances Fox; and Cloward, Richard; Poor People's Movements: Why They Succeed, How They Fail; Random House; 1979; pp.1-41.(20) See, Posner, Richard; Law, Pragmatism and Democracy; Harvard University Press; Cambridge; 2003. (21) Like it was seen immediately after President Obama announced the targeted assassination of Osama Bin Laden.(22) See Marx, Karl; "The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte," in The Marx/Engels Reader, Ed. Robert Tucker. *Estudiante de Doctorado, New School for Social Research, New YorkMaestría en Estudios Internacionales, Universidad Torcuato Di Tella, Buenos AiresÁrea de Especialización: Procesos de formación del Estado moderno, sociología de la guerra, terrorismo, genocidio, conflictos étnicos, nacionalismos y minorías.E-mail: guere469@newschool.edu

International customary law presents an (apparently) irresoluble conflict on a central issue as the existence in International law of an equivalent of the national laws on equivalent to national laws on prescription. For instance, only 132 over approximately 3000 bilateral and multilateral investment treaties include a statute of limitations. Theoretically, the balance would allow to indefinitely present outdated complaints or, alternatively, to introduce them on a random basis in ad hoc prescription periods. Therefore, lacks of uniformity and standard regulations have determined uncertainty and insecurity: the very same problems that the statute of limitations' doctrine aims to eradicate. The author states public International law fragmentation on the prescription period's doctrine lays on: (i) massive enclosure of domestic legislation on statute of limitations into public International law disregarding International law politics and aspirations; and (ii) industrialised States' economic agendas, ruling out developing countries and transitional economies. In order to develop the present proposal a descriptive and prescriptive methodology is applied. ; El derecho internacional consuetudinario tiene en un –aparentemente– irreconciliable conflicto sobre una cuestión tan fundamental como si reconoce en el derecho internacional un equivalente a las leyes nacionales sobre prescripción extintiva. A modo de ejemplo, sólo 132 de los aproximadamente 3000 tratados bilaterales y multilaterales de protección de inversiones vigentes tienen un período de prescripción. El balance teóricamente permitiría la presentación de reclamaciones obsoletas a perpetuidad o de otro modo injertos con base aleatoria en períodos ad hoc de prescripción. Por lo tanto, la falta de uniformidad y de regulaciones estándares han dado lugar a la incertidumbre y a la inseguridad: los mismos que la propia doctrina sobre el período de prescripción pretende erradicar. El autor afirma que el estado fragmentado del derecho internacional público con respecto a la doctrina sobre el período de prescripción es atribuible a: (i) la importación a gran escala de leyes nacionales-domésticas sobre prescripción extintiva al derecho internacional público, sin haber considerado las políticas y aspiraciones del derecho internacional; y (ii) a las agendas económicas de los países industrializados, con exclusión de los intereses de los países en desarrollo y las economías en transición. Una metodología descriptiva y prescriptiva es aplicada en el desarrollo de esta propuesta.

El presente trabajo tiene por objeto analizar el régimen jurídico de los decretos de necesidad y urgencia luego de la reforma constitucional del año 1994, como también de su ley reglamentaria. Se hace referencia a cómo ha sido empleado este instituto por los distintos gobiernos desde el dictado de la Constitución Nacional hasta nuestros días y cuál es el alcance del control del Congreso a su respecto. También se menciona abundante jurisprudencia de la Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nación en distintos casos en que ha debido intervenir para juzgar acerca de la constitucionalidad de diversos decretos de necesidad y urgencia. ; This paper aims to examine the legal regime of the decrees of necessity and urgency after the 1994 constitutional reform, as well as its regulatory law. It also refers to how the institute has been used by various governments since the enactment of the Constitution until today and what is the scope of control of Congress thereon. Besides, it mentions the case law of the Supreme Court of Justice's Office in individual cases it had to intervene to judge the constitutionality of various decrees of necessity and urgency.

The purpose of the research was to consider the essence of the principles of criminal, administrative law and the peculiarities of their application in conditions of war, considering the case of Ukraine invaded by the Russian Federation. It has been substantiated that the main idea of the existence of the principles of administrative criminal law consists in their systematic, balanced and comprehensive implementation in relation to the subjects of criminal and administrative legal relations. The mentioned principles are used as a support for the elaboration and application of the law, both in peacetime and in wartime. The methodological basis of the research was presented as comparative-legal and systematic analysis, formal-legal method, method of interpretation, hermeneutic method, as well as methods of analysis and synthesis. A conclusion has been reached on the necessity of observing human rights norms in the criminal prosecution of persons who have committed crimes against humanity and have been involved in such crimes. Consequently, the civilized world must comply with international standards and ensure security through legal and legitimate means.

In the Prison Notebooks there is a critique of sociology that leads to the elaboration of a "science of politics". In this essay, it is argued how this critique —that starts off as political intervention in the context of the Third International— is related to the main points of Gramsci's reflection, as the relationship between theory and politics (and the status of theory), and between philosophy and ideology, the concepts of historical necessity, law and science. It is shown how the result of the research is not, for Gramsci, mainly the rebuttal of the idea of a social legality, but the redefinition of the law in terms of "regularity", a notion in which political will and economic necessity are synthesised. ; En los Cuadernos de la cárcel la crítica de la sociología conduce a la elaboración de una "ciencia de la política". En este ensayo se muestra cómo esa crítica —que nace como intervención política en el contexto del comunismo de la Tercera Internacional— se entrelaza con los nudos cruciales de la reflexión de Gramsci, como la relación entre teoría y política (y el estatus de la teoría) y entre filosofía e ideología, y los conceptos de necesidad histórica, ley y ciencia. Se muestra cómo el resultado de la investigación consiste, para Gramsci, no tanto en el rechazo de la idea de una legalidad social, sino en la redefinición de la "ley" social e histórica en términos de "regularidad", noción en la cual se sintetizan voluntad política y necesidad económica.

Prolegomena Liberty and authority (power) are two main principles of modern Constitutional Law (A. Hauriou); that have their acid test in the Right of Exception typical of a "state of necessity", of a "constitutional dictatorship" or simply of a "crisis government". ; Prolegómenos Libertad y autoridad (poder) son dos principios torales del Derecho Constitucional moderno (A. Hauriou); que tienen su prueba de fuego en el Derecho de Excepción propio de un "estado de necesidad", de una "dictadura constitucional" o simplemente de un "gobierno de crisis".

La evolución del paradigma prohibicionista ha incidido en múltiples ámbitos jurídicos. No se trata sólo de la producción legislativa en la que toma cuerpo, sino, además, de múltiples líneas jurisprudenciales que se han instalado como escenarios justificacionistas y no correctivos del tratamiento represivo al problema construido sobre las drogas. Este fenómeno no ha sido ajeno ni a la legislación española, ni a la jurisprudencia de sus Tribunales.La Tesis demuestra que, con seguridad bajo la influencia de la ideología prohibicionista, la doctrina del TSE sobre el tratamiento del estado de necesidad en relación con las drogas le niega cualquier ámbito aplicativo a dicha causa de no responsabilidad penal, ora como justificante, ya como exculpante. Y ello, a contrapelo de las regulaciones del derecho positivo, de conformidad con el cual el bien jurídico de la salud pública sería un interés perfectamente ponderable de cara a las posibilidades del estado de necesidad, y a despecho de la ciencia jurídico-penal, cuyos esfuerzos han sido notables para mostrar las condiciones que harían justificable o disculpable el comportamiento de quien actúe en una situación de necesidad.Desde una perspectiva multidisciplinar, se pretende describir cómo esa doctrina del TSE que se acusa de anular los efectos del estado de necesidad en los casos relacionados con el tráfico de drogas, se encuentra enmarcada como un instrumento de las políticas globales que han llevado a la criminalización de las drogas. ; The evolution of the prohibitionist paradigm has affected many areas of law. It does not only take shape in the production of legislation, but also in multiple lines of jurisprudence that have been set as justificationist rather than corrective scenarios for the repressive treatment of the problem constructed around drugs. This phenomenon has not been alien to Spanish legislation or the jurisprudence of its courts.This thesis demonstrates that, surely under the influence of the prohibitionist ideology, the doctrine of the Spanish Supreme Court (TSE) on the treatment of necessity in relation to drugs inhibits any application of this motive in order to eliminate criminal responsibility, neither as justification, nor as exculpation. And this, contrary to the regulations of positive law, under which the legal right of public health would be a perfectly worthy interest with respect to the possibilities of necessity, and despite juridical and penal science, which has made significant efforts to show the conditions that would make the behavior of those who act in a situation of necessity justifiable or excusable.From a multidisciplinary perspective, we aim to describe how the doctrine of the Spanish Supreme Court, which is alleged to annul the effects of necessity in cases related to drug trafficking, finds itself to be an instrument of the global policies that have led to the criminalization of drugs.

La evolución del paradigma prohibicionista ha incidido en múltiples ámbitos jurídicos. No se trata sólo de la producción legislativa en la que toma cuerpo, sino, además, de múltiples líneas jurisprudenciales que se han instalado como escenarios justificacionistas y no correctivos del tratamiento represivo al problema construido sobre las drogas. Este fenómeno no ha sido ajeno ni a la legislación española, ni a la jurisprudencia de sus Tribunales.La Tesis demuestra que, con seguridad bajo la influencia de la ideología prohibicionista, la doctrina del TSE sobre el tratamiento del estado de necesidad en relación con las drogas le niega cualquier ámbito aplicativo a dicha causa de no responsabilidad penal, ora como justificante, ya como exculpante. Y ello, a contrapelo de las regulaciones del derecho positivo, de conformidad con el cual el bien jurídico de la salud pública sería un interés perfectamente ponderable de cara a las posibilidades del estado de necesidad, y a despecho de la ciencia jurídico-penal, cuyos esfuerzos han sido notables para mostrar las condiciones que harían justificable o disculpable el comportamiento de quien actúe en una situación de necesidad.Desde una perspectiva multidisciplinar, se pretende describir cómo esa doctrina del TSE que se acusa de anular los efectos del estado de necesidad en los casos relacionados con el tráfico de drogas, se encuentra enmarcada como un instrumento de las políticas globales que han llevado a la criminalización de las drogas. ; The evolution of the prohibitionist paradigm has affected many areas of law. It does not only take shape in the production of legislation, but also in multiple lines of jurisprudence that have been set as justificationist rather than corrective scenarios for the repressive treatment of the problem constructed around drugs. This phenomenon has not been alien to Spanish legislation or the jurisprudence of its courts.This thesis demonstrates that, surely under the influence of the prohibitionist ideology, the doctrine of the Spanish Supreme Court (TSE) on the treatment of necessity in relation to drugs inhibits any application of this motive in order to eliminate criminal responsibility, neither as justification, nor as exculpation. And this, contrary to the regulations of positive law, under which the legal right of public health would be a perfectly worthy interest with respect to the possibilities of necessity, and despite juridical and penal science, which has made significant efforts to show the conditions that would make the behavior of those who act in a situation of necessity justifiable or excusable.From a multidisciplinary perspective, we aim to describe how the doctrine of the Spanish Supreme Court, which is alleged to annul the effects of necessity in cases related to drug trafficking, finds itself to be an instrument of the global policies that have led to the criminalization of drugs.

La pena de prisión permanente revisable lleva conviviendo con el resto de nuestro ordenamiento jurídico algo más de tres años. En ese tiempo, lejos de su derogación o su declaración de inconstitucionalidad, se ha asentado como una pena más a imponer por parte de Jueces y Tribunales. A las acusaciones particulares y populares, así como al Ministerio Fiscal ya no les tiembla el pulso a la hora de solicitar la imposición de una pena que posiblemente no cumpla los estándares nacionales e internacionales de respeto de derechos humanos y libertades fundamentales. De igual forma, una gran parte de la sociedad, enaltecida por diversos grupos de presión como los medios de comunicación y las asociaciones de víctimas, siguiendo sus propios y legítimos fines, han apoyado esta pena desde sus inicios, llegando a solicitar su endurecimiento, de lo cual han sacado claro redito electoral algunos partidos políticos de corte fascista y de extrema derecha. En este marco jurídico y social surge la presente obra, en la que se analiza la legalidad y necesidad de una pena perpetua dentro de un Estado democrático de Derecho como es España, desde que así se constituyera en el año 1978. Se tratan temas como su constitucionalidad y ajuste al marco legal internacional, su repercusión social y política en el marco legislativo, la jurisprudencia tanto española como europea, y finalmente se expondrán soluciones de lege ferenda de cara a satisfacer tanto a las víctimas y sus intereses como a dar cumplimiento a la legalidad vigente. ; The revisable life imprisonment as a punishment has been living along with the rest of our legal system for over three years. Nowadays, far from its repeal or its declaration of unconstitutionality, it has been established as a punishment to be imposed by Judges and Courts in which the private and popular accusations, as well as the Public Prosecutor's Office are not afraid to request the imposition of a penalty that probably not fitted with national and international human rights' standards and fundamental ...