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This title aims to trace the various uses of the concept of necessity in international law, with the goal of determining whether there is any overarching unity to these uses across the subdisciplines of international law. The authors not only discuss necessity in international humanitarian law and jus in bello, but also aim to situate necessity as understood in IHL within a larger discourse of international law generally, and to untangle the confusing and often inconsistent usages of the term 'necessity' in these broad areas of international law, including human rights law. The authors argue that the concept of necessity in international law has three different conceptions that cut across the various domains of international law: necessity as exception, necessity as license, and necessity as regulation

This title aims to trace the various uses of the concept of necessity in international law, with the goal of determining whether there is any overarching unity to these uses across the subdisciplines of international law. The authors not only discuss necessity in international humanitarian law and jus in bello, but also aim to situate necessity as understood in IHL within a larger discourse of international law generally, and to untangle the confusing and often inconsistent usages of the term 'necessity' in these broad areas of international law, including human rights law. The authors argue that the concept of necessity in international law has three different conceptions that cut across the various domains of international law: necessity as exception, necessity as license, and necessity as regulation

Abstract
Investment tribunals have fleshed out the requirements of the defence of necessity in Article 25 of the Articles on State Responsibility. This article considers the impact of necessity in international investment law and in general international law. The decided cases of the early twenty-first century have revealed three difficulties in Article 25 and in the defence of necessity. First, rather than assessing necessity from the vantage point of the State invoking necessity, they assess it ex post with hindsight bias. Second, the standard of proof required to demonstrate the existence of a grave and imminent peril is infeasible for many situations of risk and uncertainty. Third, the 'only way' criterion is not only unduly strict and virtually impossible to prove, but is wholly unrealistic for macro-level crises, such as pandemics or financial crises. To account for these difficulties, tribunals should avoid hindsight bias, especially with respect to 'grave and imminent peril' and the 'only way' criterion. The defence of necessity is a blunt instrument and has not afforded States a significant 'safety valve'. As a result, States have begun to reconsider the substantive standards in investment treaties and to include internal exceptions in their investment treaties.

Exigent circumstances can extinguish or suspend a wide range of legal obligations. They may empower governments to seize property or quarantine individuals. They may excuse the nonperformance of private or public contractual obligations. And, of especial interest here, they may permit governments to deviate from their obligations under treaties or customary international law (CIL).

Introduction -- The development of the treaty framework for the protection of cultural heritage -- The concept and scope of military necessity -- Military necessity within the framework for the protection of cultural heritage in armed conflicts -- The impact of individual criminal responsibility for offences against cultural property on military necessity -- Military necessity vis-à-vis the protection of cultural heritage in non-international armed conflicts -- Military necessity and the responsibility of states -- Lessons on necessity resulting from the interplay of environmental protection and armed conflict -- Concluding remarks.

To many international lawyers and army officers the terms "law of war" and "military necessity" are mutually incompatible. Many army officers consider the law of war as no more than a collection of pious platitudes, valueless, so they think, because it has no force and effect. Some international lawyers regard military necessity as the bête noire of international jurisprudence, destroying all legal restriction and allowinguncontrolled brute force to rage rampant over the battlefield or wherever the military have control.