Suchergebnisse

Introduction -- Pattern and vital stuff -- Nature -- Heartmind -- Emotions -- Knowing -- Self-cultivation -- Virtues -- Governance and institutions -- The enduring significance of Neo-Confucianism -- Teaching Neo-Confucianism topically -- Table of Neo-Confucians

As in all living scholarly traditions one can see in traditional Chinese historiography a wide range of divergent opinion as to what history is and how it should be written. On one point, however, all schools of Chinese historiography agree, and this is the clear awareness of the evaluative character of their trade. The historian of every school was an arbiter who, by passing judgment assessed the value of, and gave meaning to, events. This consciously evaluative character of Chinese historiography demanded self-reliance and courage on the part of the historian, who was not only the keeper of documents and the recorder of events; his assessments assumed normative status like the sentences of a judge.

AbstractThe Song dynasty (960–1279 A.D.) witnessed a surge of scientific and technological development, notably in mechanical engineering, metallurgy, shipbuilding and nautics, civil engineering, manufacturing, etc. At the same time, Neo‐Confucianism, which advocated 'upholding heavenly principle and annihilating human desire', flourished in Song time. The rise of Neo‐Confucianism as a conservative movement appeared fundamentally at odds with the splendid technological achievements in Medieval China. To address the question, we dismantle the notion of Neo‐Confucianism in the Song dynasty context by constructing the indices of the Neo‐Confucian spirit characterized by the pursuit of principle (li), broad learning, and scepticism on the basis of Song Confucian works recorded in the Records of Song and Yuan scholarship (Song Yuan xue an). Our results show that the popularity of Neo‐Confucianism facilitated the development of science and technology during the Song period. Using historical Confucian academy data compiled from several extensive surveys, we show that the vigorous development of the Confucian academies served as a channel to propagate the Neo‐Confucian spirit in a locality, thereby influencing the scientific and technological output of the Song era.

Many modern scholars of Chinese history, and many Chinese intellectuals throughout the twentieth century, have charged neo-Confucianism with laying the ideological foundations for the growth of autocracy in China. They have especially condemned neo-Confucian political thinkers of the Northern Sung dynasty (960-1127) who promoted a policy of "revering the emperor and expelling the barbarian" (tsun-wang jang-i), accusing them of having advocated a doctrine of unconditional obedience to the ruler and thereby inhibiting the rise of democracy in China. In Limits to Autocracy Alan T. Wood leads readers to a reconsideration of this prevalent view by arguing that Sung neo-Confucianists did not intend to enhance the power of the emperor but limit it. Sung political thinkers, who embedded their most important ideas in commentaries on the Confucian classic the Spring and Autumn Annals, believed passionately in the existence of a moral cosmos governed by universal laws accessible to human understanding. These laws, they believed, transcended the ruler and were not subject to his authority. By affirming the existence of a moral law higher than the ruler, this neo-Confucian doctrine could be used to set limits to his power rather than indulge it. Wood makes a striking comparison of this view with a similar doctrine of universal morality - natural law - that also provided a basis for limiting the power of the ruler and ultimately gave rise to a doctrine of human rights in Europe

Many modern scholars of Chinese history, and many Chinese intellectuals throughout the twentieth century, have charged neo-Confucianism with laying the ideological foundations for the growth of autocracy in China. They have especially condemned neo-Confucian political thinkers of the Northern Sung dynasty (960-1127) who promoted a policy of "revering the emperor and expelling the barbarian" (tsun-wang jang-i), accusing them of having advocated a doctrine of unconditional obedience to the ruler and thereby inhibiting the rise of democracy in China. In Limits to Autocracy Alan T. Wood leads readers to a reconsideration of this prevalent view by arguing that Sung neo-Confucianists did not intend to enhance the power of the emperor but limit it. Sung political thinkers, who embedded their most important ideas in commentaries on the Confucian classic the Spring and Autumn Annals, believed passionately in the existence of a moral cosmos governed by universal laws accessible to human understanding. These laws, they believed, transcended the ruler and were not subject to his authority. By affirming the existence of a moral law higher than the ruler, this neo-Confucian doctrine could be used to set limits to his power rather than indulge it. Wood makes a striking comparison of this view with a similar doctrine of universal morality - natural law - that also provided a basis for limiting the power of the ruler and ultimately gave rise to a doctrine of human rights in Europe

This article investigates the Neo-Confucian discourse on war, premised on the "Chinese versus barbarian" binary, and its impact on the Neo-Confucian scholar-officials of 17th-century Chosŏn Korea. It shows that Korean Neo-Confucians suffered invasions from the Jurchens, who they regarded as "barbarians," and that the political debate on how to respond to the "barbarians" drove the advocates of the pro-peace argument to reimagine Chosŏn's statehood. The article consists of three parts. First, it reconstructs the philosophical foundations of the mainstream Neo-Confucian discourse on the war with the "barbarians" with reference to Zhu Xi. Second, it discusses the strong impact of the Neo-Confucian paradigm of war on the orthodox Korean Neo-Confucians of the 17th century. Third, it examines how Ch'oe Myŏng-kil, one of the rare champions of the pro-peace argument at the time, justified making peace with the Jurchens through the judicious use of "the expedient."

This article aims to explore China's attempt to shift the tension between the global value and local difference over human rights debates. In other words, this article examines the relationship between West-promoted human rights and China-led neo-Confucian values within the context of globalisation rather than examining what Confucian values are. In what ways can a cultural discourse be viewed and employed to promote human rights without denying their universality, is the focal point of this article. This article: (a) reviews why universalist versus relativist is a false dichotomy; (b) introduces the reconstruction of Confucianism since the 1980s in China and examines the possibility of re-appropriating Confucian values; (c) elaborates the necessity of nation–states for resisting the threats of globalisation and for implementing human rights practices; and (d) concludes with Confucian discourse, developed in China, as an exemplary case that universal values and particular differences can be negotiated in a way that respecting cultural differences constitutes a universal value.

International audience ; The Great Learning has certainly been one of the most important texts of the Korean reception of Neo-Confucianism, for it provided a stimulating model to build up and strengthen the Chosŏn state. The Yuan orthodox understanding of the Song Neo-Confucian exegesis of the Great Learning conveyed a rather simple message, acceptable for both the Yi kings and their elites in search for a balance of power. The major characteristic of the Korean philosophical exegesis of the 'Learning of the Emperor' and the Great Learning paradigm was the focus on the necessary interaction and very close relationship between kings and scholar-officials. These ideas were developed at court, in royal lessons and daily audiences. The first outstanding commentaries on the Great Learning and especially Zhen Dexiu's Daxue yanyibu, which was the reference text in Chosŏn court from the 14th to the 16th century, were royal commands. Yet they mainly illustrate the self-interests of the scholar-officials anxious to maintain their own social and political status in the new regime officially intended to empower kings. In this general framework, Yi Yulgok's Sŏnghak chipyo might be regarded as both the continuation of previous tendencies and the dawn of a new era. When Neo-Confucianism became in the late 16th century a significant part of the identity and distinctive culture of the social and political elite trying to implement its ideas at both central and local levels, the Korean exegesis of the Great Learning became paradoxically more idealistic and moral. It might be said that, maybe for the first time in Korean history, Confucianism started being a holistic Weltanshauung rather than a vague reservoir used in political strategies. So, on similar Neo-Confucian grounds, the authoritarian Ming China produced the Daxue yanyibu, a technical textbook dedicated to an anonymous body of scholar-officials resembling much today's civil servants, whereas Chosŏn Korea gave birth to the Outline of the Sagely Learning, a jewel of the elitist culture of an aristocratic bureaucracy embodied in iconic figures like Yulgok Yi I whose portrait is even printed on South Korean bank notes nowadays.