Suchergebnisse

This paper examines features common to both policy analyses and community-power studies, focusing on the conceptualization of power, the boundary specification of the system, the content of relationships and the effects of institutional frameworks. Two community studies, `Altneustadt' and `Towertown', provide the empirical basis. The effects of the institutional frameworks on policy-domain networks and the relation between policy-domain networks and policy networks are analyzed empirically, with information relationships as the most important content of the networks. With regard to boundary specification, actors in issue-specific networks differ from the discussion partners of actors within the social system, depending on the phase in the political process. Both pluralistic approaches and structural aspects of the policy domains are analyzed. In theory, the different institutional conditions in the German and American communities lead one to expect differences that can, in fact, be demonstrated empirically.

This study considers the social organisation of the economic elite in Germany and Britain. Specifically, the analysis focuses on the internal structure of this social group, which is termed an `elite network'. The resources on which the dominance of the economic elite is based are bureaucratic power, ownership and social capital. In institutional capitalism the power of managers is based not only on their hierarchical position within large corporations, but also on the fact that they `represent' ownership within the network of associated firms. Additional topics considered in the course of the analysis include the forms of social control to which the economic elite is subject, the degree of internal competition and co-operation, and the stability of networks over time (circulation of the elite). The analysis shows how bureaucratic control over a company is linked with ownership of a company in the context of specific network configurations. These network configurations vary between countries and lead to differing forms of managerial control within institutional capitalism.

Cover -- Half Title -- Title -- Copyright -- Dedication -- Contents -- List of Figures and Tables -- List of Acronyms -- Preface -- Acknowledgments -- 1 Generating Change -- What Happened to Big Blue? -- Organizational Structures and Environments -- Forces Driving Changes -- Plan of the Book -- 2 Theorizing About Organizations -- Theoretical Elements -- Five Basic Organization Theories -- Conclusions -- 3 Resizing and Reshaping -- How Many Business Organizations? -- Organizational Size -- Entries and Exits -- Which Organizations Create New Jobs? -- What Forms of Organizations? -- Why Did the Multidivisional Form Spread? -- Corporate Merger Waves -- Refocused Organizations -- Conclusions -- 4 Making Connections -- Varieties of Interorganizational Relations -- Varieties of Alliance Networks -- Trust Relations -- Alliance Formation and Outcomes -- Conclusions -- 5 Changing the Employment Contract -- The Traditional Employment Contract -- Eroding Firm Attachments -- The New Employment Contract -- High-Performance Workplace Practices -- Penetration Problems -- Automotive Lean Production -- High-Performance Impacts -- The Trouble with Teams -- Conclusions -- 6 Investing in Social Capital -- Networked Organizations -- Mentoring Protégés -- Networking Fundamentals -- A Small Firm Example -- Network Outcomes -- Social Capital -- Conclusions -- 7 Governing the Corporation -- Power and Authority -- A Political-Organization Model -- Legal Theories of Corporate Governance -- Nexus of Contracts and Stakeholder Theories -- Board Rules and Realities -- Executive Pay Politics -- Farewell to the Chief -- Institutional Investors Are Revolting -- Conclusions -- 8 Struggling in the Workplace -- Social Movements Inside Organizations -- Eroding Unionization -- Legalization of the Workplace -- Employee Ownership -- Conclusions -- 9 Influencing Public Policies

After World War Two, Japan attained economic growth but suffered environmental disaster. In response to massive protest in the 1960s and 1970s, the Japanese government rapidly reduced the worst air and water pollution. Jeffrey Broadbent's case study of industrial growth and pollution in a rural Japanese prefecture explains this response while testing political, social movement and environmental theory. The state, conservative political party and big business pushed rampant growth until movements posed a political and disruptive challenge. Then, the elites passed some pollution control, but also demobilized local protest, quashed discontent, and prevented the formation of national environmental groups. Without the protest threat, business stymied other government pollution-control plans. The interaction of material, institutional and cultural factors, especially informal institutions, explained the dominance of actors and the pattern of outcomes. Through this syncretic lens in a non-Western setting, this study refines our theories of the state, protest movements, political process, and environmental problems

Social entities create institutional frameworks, i.e. internal systems of rules which govern (but do not control) the actions of their members. Both scientific communities and scientific organisations are social entities whose institutional frameworks include rules promoting internal collaboration. Based upon a diffuse reciprocity, members of the social entities are stimulated to collaborate with other members. The tendency to prefer other members as collaborators is accompanied by a relative exclusion of non-members from collaborations. Thus, in this way institutional frameworks create institutional boundaries hindering collaboration. In order to overcome institutional boundaries both within universities and between scientific communities, in Germany collaborative research centres (CRCs) were established. These are networks of research groups from different departments of one or more universities, i.e. from different organisations and different scientific communities. They contain their own institutional framework, which overlaps with the institutional frameworks of both organisations and scientific communities. Because the network's institutional framework includes rules promoting collaborations, these necessarily span the original institutional boundaries. A detailed discussion of these rules shows the functional equivalence of the different social entities' (communities, organisations and networks) institutional frameworks. ; Scientific communities und formale Organisationen wie Forschungsinsitute oder Universitäten bilden jeweils eigene Institutionensysteme aus. Diese Institutionensysteme fördern direkt oder vermittelt Kooperationen zwischen den Mitgliedern der communities bzw. Organisationen. Indem sie Kooperationen zwischen ihren Mitgliedern fördern, errichten sie aber zugleich institutionelle Schranken für die Kooperation mit Außenstehenden. Solche Kooperationen werden durch die Institutionensysteme meist nicht unterstützt und damit relativ erschwert. Die Mitglieder einer scientific community oder Organisation wählen deshalb tendenziell Kooperationspartner aus derselben community bzw. Organisation. Um solche institutionellen Schranken zu überwinden, hat die Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft das Förderprogramm 'Sonderforschungsbereiche' (SFB) etabliert. Dabei handelt es sich um Netzwerke von Forschungsgruppen, die aus verschiedenen Fachbereichen einer oder mehrerer Universitäten stammen. Die Sonderforschungsbereiche bilden ein eigenes Institutionensystem aus, das die der scientific communities und der Organisationen überlagert. Weil auch dieses Institutionensystem kooperationsfördernde Regeln enthält, werden innerhalb eines SFB solche Kooperationen gefördert, die die klassischen institutionellen Grenzen überschreiten. Eine Analyse der kooperationsfördernden Regeln von SFB zeigt, daß sie den in scientific communities und Organisationen entstehenden Regeln funktional äquivalent sind.

ABSTRACTThe literature on environmental justice indicates that there is a strong presence of grass‐roots activity. This research uses the political process model to investigate whether the environmental justice groups are a social movement or a network of nongovernmental organizations. The results indicate that the majority of these groups do not track the theoretical tenets. There are two groups operating under the penumbra of the environmental justice movement: a social movement and a nongovernmental organization (NGO s) network. There is a modest degree of insurgent action, i.e., blocking the siting of landfills. The NGO's predominate and are the driving force behind this movement through the use of orthodox strategies, formal organizations, ample institutional capacity, lack of protest politics and a strong perception of injustice. These groups do not perceive success in their efforts. This research contributes to the scarcity of literature on the role of minority NGO's in domestic policy‐making.

This concept paper examines the nature and role of social networks in the complex production and service relations of the contemporary globalizing political economy. As structural patterns of social interaction and relations among sets of actors or nodes, strategic networks are conceived as new organizational forms and as alternatives to institutional constructs such as bureaucratic hierarchies, rational or natural systems, democratic associations, governmental polities, and markets. The emergence and operation of networks are seen as instances of institutional transformation or extrainstitutional exchange, strategic alliance, and governance at the level of organizations as well as regional, national, and transnational political economies. Contemporary interactive information and telecommunications technology has significantly enhanced the effectiveness and innovativeness of informal, privatized, non-regulated and unaccountable social networks as alternatives to their institutional counterparts in production, research and development, marketing, and transnational, knowledgeintensive business services. ; Der Artikel analysiert die Art und Funktionsweise sozialer Netzwerke in den komplexen Produktions- und Dienstleistungsverhältnissen der gegenwärtig sich global entwickelnden politischen Ökonomie. Strategische Netzwerke werden begrifflich als strukturelle Muster sozialer Interaktionen und Beziehungen zwischen Akteuren oder Knotenpunkten erfasst und stellen neue organisatorische Formen dar, sowie Alternativen zu institutionellen Strukturen wie bürokratische Hierarchien, rationale oder natürliche Systeme, demokratische Verbände, Regierungsordnungen und Märkte. Die Entstehung und Funktionsweise von Netzwerken werden als Beispiele des Institutionenwandels gesehen sowie als ausser-institutionelle Formen des Tausches, strategischer Bündnisse, und der Steuerung auf organisatorischer Ebene wie auch auf der Ebene regionaler, nationaler, und transnationaler politischer Ökonomien. Die gegenwärtige Informations- und Kommunikationstechnik hat die Wirkungskraft und Innovationsfähigkeit informeller, privater, nicht-regulierter und unantastbarer sozialer Netzwerke als Alternativen zu ihrem institutionellen Spiegelbild in Produktion, Forschung und Entwicklung, Vertrieb und transnationalen, wissensintensiven, unternehmensorientierten Dienstleistungen bedeutend erhöht.

The question of third-party access to the networks has become central to the debate around the liberalisation of the European electricity markets due to the natural monopoly characteristic of the transmission network. The European Union?s electricity directive provides three institutional options for the organisation of network access: the single buyer procedure, the negotiated third-party access and the regulated third-party access. This paper analyses these regimes in a framework of an imperfect decision-making regulation authority which can commit errors when supervising the transmission tariffs. It will be shown that the equivalence of the systems required in the directive is usually not achieved. In addition, conditions for deciding between the three systems are derived under social welfare considerations. ; Bei der Liberalisierung der europäischen Elektrizitätsmärkte ist wegen der natürlichen Monopoleigenschaft des Übertragungsnetzes die Frage des Netzzugangs Dritter von zentraler Bedeutung. Die EU-Stromrichtline bietet drei institutionelle Alternativen zur Organisation des Netzzugangs an: Das Alleinkäufersystem, den regulierten und den verhandelten Netzzugang. Dieser Beitrag untersucht diese drei Netzzugangsregime im Kontext einer fehlerhaft entscheidenden Aufsichtsbehörde. Er kommt zu dem Ergebnis, daß die in der Richtlinie postulierte Ergebnisäquivalenz der Systeme in der Regel nicht erreicht wird. Darüberhinaus werden Kriterien für die Entscheidung zwischen den Alternativen unter Effizenzgesichtspunkten hergeleitet.